Madhya Pradesh High Court
Prahalad vs State Of M.P. on 3 February, 2022
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
GWALIOR BENCH
DIVISION BENCH
G.S. AHLUWALIA
&
DEEPAK KUMAR AGARWAL J.J.
Cr.A. No. 72 of 2011
Prahalad
Vs.
State of M.P.
_______________________________________
Shri Sunil Jain, Counsel for the Appellant.
Shri C.P. Singh, Counsel for the State.
Date of Hearing : 25-January-2022
Date of Judgment : 3rd - Feb. - 2022
Approved for Reporting :
Judgment
3rd - February -2022
Per G.S. Ahluwalia J.
1.
This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. has been
filed against the judgment and sentence dated 22-12-2010 passed by
Sessions Judge, Shivpuri in Sessions Trial No.127/2010, by which the
appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of I.P.C. and has been
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
sentenced to undergo Life Imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000/- with
default imprisonment of 3 months R.I.
2. The prosecution story in short is that on 5-6-2010 at 21.10, the
complainant Smt. Kamlesh Adivasi, lodged a FIR on the allegations
that she was married to Banna Adivasi, who died about 3 years back
and from thereafter, She is residing with appellant. Today, She had a
quarrel with the appellant on the question of consumption of liquor
and accordingly, She was going to Harinagar to see her daughter
along with Prabhu, brother of her father-in-law. The appellant met her
in Chharch. He too started walking with her. At about 3:30 P.M.,
while they were near Sumer Pond, the appellant threw Prabhu on the
ground and pelted stone on his head. When she tried to intervene,
then the appellant also tried to attack her. Prabhu has expired. As she
was frightened, therefore, she went to Jigani along with her children.
Now she has come to police station along with her elder brother-in-
law for lodging the report.
3. On this information, the police registered FIR in Crime No.
28/2010 for offence under Section 302 of IPC.
4. The dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem. The
statements of the witnesses were recorded. The appellant was
arrested. Spot map was prepared. Blood stained stones were seized.
The police after completing the investigation filed charge sheet under
Section 302 of IPC.
5. The Trial Court by order dated 3-8-2010, framed charge under
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
Section 302 of IPC.
6. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded not guilty.
7. The prosecution examined Kamlesh Adivasi (P.W.1), Risdam
(P.W.2), Dr. Chandrashekhar Gupta (P.W.3), Amar Singh (P.W.4),
Radhe (P.W.5), Devendra Jain (P.W.6), Laxman (P.W.7), Shrichand
(P.W.8), Pillu Adivasi (P.W.9), K.S. Thakur (P.W.10) and A.K. Bajpai
(P.W.11).
8. The appellant examined Rajendra Awasthi (D.W.1) in his
defence.
9. The Trial Court by the impugned judgment, convicted and
sentenced the appellant for the offence mentioned above.
10. Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the Trial
Court, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the FIR
was lodged belatedly by 5 hours. The Trial Court has failed to
appreciate that the appellant had proved his plea of alibi by leading
cogent and reliable evidence. Or in the alternative, the incident took
place all of a sudden without any premeditation. The appellant was
unarmed, and he had an apprehension, that the deceased will not
allow his wife to come back. The stones were already lying on the
ground. Therefore, the act of the appellant may fall within the
purview of Section 304 of IPC and the appellant is in jail from 8-6-
2010 i.e., from the date of his arrest and he has completed more than
11 ½ years of incarceration, therefore, he may be sentenced to the
period already undergone by him.
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
11. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the State that it is
true that the incident took place all of a sudden, but stones were
pelted repeatedly on the head of Prabhu, which is indicative of his
intention and knowledge.
12. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
13. Before adverting to the merits of the case, this Court would
like to find out as to whether the death of Prabhu was homicidal in
nature or not?
14. Dr. Chandrashekhar Gupta (P.W.3) had conducted post-mortem
of dead body of deceased Prabhu and found the following
antemortem injuries :
(i) Swelling hematoma size 7x2 cm present on right
parietal region of head.
(ii) Swelling hematoma size 5x2 cm present on left
parietal region of head.
(iii) Lacerated wound size 4x1x1 cm present on left
mastoid region of head behind the ear.
Compound fractures were found on the right and left
parietal bone and also on temporal bone.
The cause of death was due to coma, caused by Extradural
Hemorrhage and laceration of brain due to head injury. The
death is homicidal in nature and time since death is within
24 hours. The post-mortem report is Ex. P.4
15. This witness was cross-examined. In cross-examination, this
witness clarified that the deceased had not sustained any other injury.
He also denied the suggestion that if the head of a person collides
with a running vehicle, then he can sustain such injuries. He also
denied the suggestion that the deceased could have sustained injuries
due to fall from a height. However, he explained that if a person falls
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
twice from different angles, only then he can sustain such type of
injuries. He specifically denied the suggestion that the injuries could
have been caused in an accident. He denied that his opinion about
nature of death was not specific. He denied that the deceased had
injuries on other part of his body.
16. Thus, it is clear that the death of the deceased Prabhu was
homicidal in nature.
17. Now the next question for consideration is that whether the
appellant has caused death of Prabhu or not?
18. Kamlesh (P.W.1) has stated that the appellant is her husband
and her first husband was Banna who is no more. The deceased
Prabhu was her father-in-law. From village Jigani, She was going to
Harinagar along with the deceased and her son. When She reached
near Agra Dhade, the appellant met her in Chharch. He started
following her. The appellant pelted stone on the deceased, as a result,
Prabhu died. Thereafter, the appellant tried to attack this witness and
her son, but they ran away and came to village Jigani. She requested
Pillu to inform Shrichand and thereafter, her elder brother-in-law
Shrichand came. Then she went to police station Chharch and lodged
F.I.R. The FIR, Ex. P.1 was read over to this witness, who admitted to
be true. The incident took place at about 4 P.M. The police came on
the spot. Spot map, Ex. P.3 was prepared. For the last 6 months, the
appellant was beating her and her son under the influence of alcohol
and her uncle father-in-law (Kakiya Sasur) could not tolerate the
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
same and, therefore, he was taking her to Harinagar, so that She can
be saved. However, the appellant thought that Prabhu is taking her
away and may not allow her to come back, therefore, he killed him.
This witness was cross-examined.
In cross-examination, this witness clarified that Prabhu was her
uncle father-in-law (Kakiya Sasur). She had informed the police that
for the last 6 months, the appellant was beating her under the
influence of alcohol and the deceased could not tolerate the same, and
therefore, he was taking her away. She also stated that She had
informed the police, that the appellant had thought that Prabhu may
not allow her to come back, therefore, he killed Prabhu, but could not
explain as to why the said facts are not mentioned in FIR, Ex. P.1.
She further stated that the appellant had not quarreled on the date of
incident, but thereafter, She said that fight had taken place, but after
thinking for a while, She again corrected herself by saying that no
fight had taken place on the date of incident, however, could not
explain as to why it was mentioned in FIR, Ex. P.1 that they had a
fight on the date of incident. The appellant had started following
them from Chharch. She denied the suggestion that Prabhu took
Rs.100/- from this witness and after touching her feet, had suggested
her to leave the appellant. She denied the suggestion that Prabhu had
slapped the appellant and had also abused him. However, could not
explain as to why this fact was mentioned in her police statement, Ex.
D.2. She further stated that She had not informed the police that the
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
appellant might have thought that Prabhu is taking her to remarry her,
but could not explain as to why that fact was mentioned in police
statement, Ex. D.2. She further stated that She had witnessed the
incident and the stones were big. She further stated that She had
informed that the appellant had pelted stones thrice, but could not
explain as to why it was mentioned in her police statement, Ex. D.2
that the appellant had assaulted ten times by big and small stones.
However, the Court noticed that the witness had merely stated that
the appellant had assaulted the deceased by stones and number of
assaults were not mentioned. She further claimed that there was
nobody in surrounding fields and nursery. Her son had got frightened,
and suggested her go to village first and therefore, She did not lodge
the report in Police Station Chharch immediately. About 150 families
are residing in village Jigani. Tillu is her uncle whereas Laxman is
her father. She informed the incident to Tillu. Shrichand had come to
village Jigani after two hours and thereafter She went to lodge FIR.
The dead body had remained on the spot for the entire night. Her first
husband Banna had died about 3 years back and thereafter, She
married the appellant. The appellant is the resident of village Lohar
and has old mother. Most of the time, She was residing in village
Jigani. She denied that the appellant was insisting that this witness
should look after her mother. She denied that She is deliberately
residing in village Jigani. She accepted that She was insisting that the
appellant should also stay with her in village Jigani and on this issue
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
there was some dispute between them. She further admitted that a
bridge is under construction on the Puno River and the appellant is
doing labour work on the site. The appellant had gone to the site for
doing labour work. At present she is residing in Harinagar
(Rajasthan) along with her children and daughter. She denied that
She is residing with her younger-brother-in-law.
19. Risdam (P.W.2) is the son of Kamlesh (P.W.1) and is aged
about 8 years. He has also narrated the same incident. In cross-
examination, he stated that his younger brother Kanha was also with
them. The counsel for the appellant could not point out any material
discrepancy in the evidence of Risdam (P.W.2) which may make the
prosecution story doubtful.
20. Amar Singh (P.W.4) is the younger-brother-in-law of Kamlesh
(P.W.1). He stated that he was in his village Harinagar. He received a
telephonic message from Pillu that his father is not well and
accordingly he came to Jigani and met with Kamlesh (P.W.1) who
informed that the appellant has killed Prabhu. This witness is son of
Prabhu. Thereafter, he went to police station Chharch along with
Kamlesh (P.W.1) to lodge FIR. He further stated that he had seen the
dead body of his father which was covered with stones and had
injuries all over the body. The safina form is Ex. P.5 and Lash
Panchnama is Ex. P.6. The blood stained earth and plain earth along
with blood stained stones were seized from the spot, vide seizure
memo Ex. P.7. This witness was cross-examined.
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
In cross-examination, this witness has stated that his elder
brother Banna has died about 3 years back. Kamlesh (P.W.1) was the
wife of his brother. After the death of Banna, Kamlesh (P.W.1) had
married appellant, therefore, this witness broke his relationship with
Kamlesh (P.W.1). Thus, it is clear that this witness is a hearsay
witness of incident, who was informed by Kamlesh (P.W.1).
21. Radhe (P.W. 5) is also a hearsay witness, who was informed
by Kamlesh (P.W.1).
22. Laxman (P.W.7) is the father of Kamlesh (P.W.1) and is also a
hearsay witness. He was informed by Kamlesh (P.W.1). The
memorandum of appellant was recorded, which is Ex. P.10 and blood
stained cloths of the appellant were seized from the house of the
appellant vide seizure memo Ex. P.11. This witness was cross-
examined.
In cross-examination, this witness clearly stated that appellant
was in habit of assaulting Kamlesh (P.W.1) under the influence of
alcohol. He further stated that under construction bridge on Puno
River is about 1 furlong away from his village (Jigani). He admitted
that the appellant was doing labour work on the site. He further
admitted that Ex-in-laws of Kamlesh (P.W.1) were calling her and
were interested that Kamlesh (P.W.1) should go back to Harinagar
and Kamlesh (P.W.1) was also interested to go back to Harinagar,
however, he denied that Kamlesh (P.W.1) was interested to remarry
again.
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
23. Shrichand (P.W. 8) is also a hearsay witness who was informed
by Kamlesh (P.W.1). He stated that after Kamlesh (P.W.1) informed
her that the appellant has killed Prabhu, then he went to the spot
along with Kamlesh (P.W.1) to see the dead body. The blood was
oozing out from the head. Thereafter, they went to police station.
24. Pillu Adivasi (P.W.9) is also a hearsay witness, who was
informed by Kamlesh (P.W.1). He has also supported the prosecution
story. He has stated that appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex
P.12, but was declared hostile for the limited purpose of
memorandum of the appellant. In cross-examination by the
prosecutor, he admitted that appellant had given his memorandum,
and accordingly, his blood stained cloths were seized by seizure
memo Ex. P.11.
25. K.S. Thakur (P.W.10) is the Investigating Officer. He has stated
that on 8-6-2010, he arrested the appellant vide arrest memo, Ex. P.12
and his memorandum, Ex. P.10 was recorded. Blood stained cloths of
the appellant were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P.11.
In cross-examination, this witness clarified that photographs of
the dead body were not taken. Since, he had received the case diary
for further investigation, therefore, all the previous proceedings were
done by another Investigating Officer.
26. A.K. Bajpai (P.W.11) had registered the FIR, Ex. P.1 on the
complaint made by Kamlesh (P.W.1). He issued safina form, Ex. P.5
and prepared Lash Panchnama, Ex. P.6. The dead body was covered
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
with stones and had injuries on various parts of the body. The blood
stained earth, plain earth and 10 big and small blood stained stones
were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P.7. The spot map, Ex. P.3 was
prepared. The dead body was sent for post-mortem and the requisition
for post-mortem is Ex. P.4-A. This witness was cross-examined.
In cross-examination., this witness admitted that Kamlesh
(P.W.1) had come to the police station at 9:10 P.M. The omissions or
improvements in the evidence of the witnesses were also pointed out
to this witness, who clarified that the statements given by the
witnesses were recorded without any substraction or addition. He
further stated that he cannot say about the weight of the stones.
27. The appellant has examined Rajendra Awasthy (D.W.1) in
defence, who has stated that he was working as Supervisor of under
construction bridge and the appellant had come for doing labour
work. He has also brought the attendance register Ex. D.6.
In cross-examination, he claimed that since, the attendance
register is in his handwriting, therefore, it does not contain his
signatures. However, he admitted that there is a column for signature
of Supervisor. He further admitted that no serial no. is mentioned on
the register.
Delay in lodging FIR
28. The first argument of Shri Sunil Jain, is that there is a delay of
approximately 5 hours in lodging the FIR, therefore, the complainant
had sufficient time to cook up a false story. In fact, She wanted to get
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
rid of appellant, therefore, he has been falsely implicated.
29. The Supreme Court in the case of Sher Singh Vs. State of
Haryana reported in (2015) 3 SCC 724 has held as under :
20. Now, to the case in hand. It has been contended before
us, as was also unsuccessfully argued before both the courts
below that there was a "delay" in lodging the FIR. There is
no perversity in the concurrent views that its lodgement
after ten hours on the day next after the tragedy i.e. 8-2-
1998 did not constitute inordinate delay such as would
justifiably categorising the FIR as an afterthought or as
contrived. The complainant along with family and friends
had to travel to another village; he would have had to first
come to terms with the tragedy, make enquiries and consider
the circumstances, before recording the FIR.......
30. Thus, mere delay in lodging the FIR cannot be ground to
dislodge the prosecution case, provided the said delay is satisfactorily
explained.
31. In the present case, Kamlesh (P.W.1) was going along with her
two minor sons, one aged about 8 years and another a younger one.
Prabhu was already killed by the appellant and according to Kamlesh
(P.W.1), Prabhu had also tried to attack her. Therefore, the primary
concern of Kamlesh (P.W.1) was the safety of herself and of her two
minor children. Therefore, if she decided to go back to village Jigani
and to inform her relatives, then such conduct of Kamlesh (P.W.1)
cannot be said to be unnatural. Further, Shrichand has also stated that
he was informed by Pillu on mobile about the ill health of Prabhu,
accordingly, he came to village Jigani. Thereafter, the entire incident
was narrated to the witnesses, who went to the spot to see the dead
body of Prabhu. Only thereafter, they went to Police Station Chharch
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
to lodge FIR. Thus, it is held that the prosecution has satisfactorily
explained the delay of 5 hours in lodging the FIR.
Plea of alibi
32. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that the
Trial Court has wrongly rejected the plea of alibi. The appellant was
working at the site of an under-construction bridge, which has been
duly proved by Rajendra Awasthy (D.W.1).
33. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
appellant.
34. When the presence of an accused on the spot, has been
established by the prosecution by leading positive evidence, then the
burden is on the accused to prove that he was present elsewhere,
thereby demolishing the positive evidence of prosecution. Thus, the
plea of alibi is to be proved by leading cogent evidence. The accused
must prove that it was not possible for him to be on the spot at the
time of incident. The Supreme Court in the case of Mukesh Vs. State
(NCT of Delhi), reported in (2017) 6 SCC 1 has held as under :
Acceptability of the plea of alibi
247. Presently, we shall deal with the plea of alibi as the
same has been advanced with immense conviction. It is well
settled in law that when a plea of alibi is taken by an
accused, the burden is upon him to establish the same by
positive evidence after the onus as regards the presence on
the spot is established by the prosecution. In this context,
we may usefully reproduce a few paragraphs from Binay
Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar: (SCC p. 293, paras 22-23)
"22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an
exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal
Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only a rule of
evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence Act
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue
are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision
is worth reproducing in this context:
'(a) The question is whether A committed a crime at
Calcutta on a certain date. The fact that, on that date, A
was at Lahore is relevant.'
23. The Latin word alibi means "elsewhere" and that
word is used for convenience when an accused takes
recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence
took place he was so far away from the place of
occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he
would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law
that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged
to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the
burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused
was present at the scene and has participated in the
crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere
fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi.
The plea of the accused in such cases need be
considered only when the burden has been discharged
by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the
prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is
incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of
alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to
exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of
occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the
scene of occurrence has been established
satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable
evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe
any counter-evidence to the effect that he was
elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the
evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality
and of such a standard that the court may entertain
some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the
scene when the occurrence took place, the accused
would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that
reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a
sound proposition to be laid down that, in such
circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather
heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required
for establishing the plea of alibi. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v.
State of Haryana, Sk. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra,
Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana and Vijay Pal.
35. In the present case, although the appellant has examined
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
Rajendra Awasthy (D.W.1) to the effect that on the date of incident,
the appellant was working on the site, but the attendance register
doesnot contain the signatures of the Supervisor, although there is a
column for the same. Further, Rajendra Awasthy (D.W.1) has not
produced any document to prove that he was working as Supervisor
on the construction site. However, there is another important aspect.
Laxman (P.W. 7) has specifically stated that the construction site of
under-construction bridge was only 1 furlong from the village Jigani.
Thus, even if the appellant had gone on his work, then it was possible
for him to come to the spot, because the construction of the bridge
was going on in an open area with no obstruction for the workers to
move out of the construction site. Thus, this Court is of the
considered opinion, that the appellant has failed to prove his plea of
alibi.
Nature of Offence
36. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that from
the prosecution story, it is clear that the appellant was apprehensive
of the fact that Prabhu may not allow his wife Kamlesh (P.W.1) to
come back, and therefore, if he assaulted Prabhu by stones, then it
cannot be said that the offence was committed in a pre-meditated
manner. Further, the appellant was not armed with any weapon. He
picked up the stones which were lying on the spot. The prosecution
has not proved the weight of the stones, but since, the scalp bone of
the deceased Prabhu was not crushed, therefore, it appears that the
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
stones were not very heavy. Only compound fracture of Right, Left
parietal bones and temporal bone were found. Therefore, the act of
the appellant would be punishable under Section 304 (Part 1) of IPC
and since, the appellant is in jail from 8-6-2010 i.e., from the date of
his arrest and he has completed more than 11 ½ years of
incarceration, the appellant may be sentenced for the period already
undergone by him.
37. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the
appellant.
38. The Supreme Court in the case of Lavghanbhai Devjibhai
Vasava v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2018) 4 SCC 329 has held
as under :
7. This Court in Dhirendra Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand
has laid down the parameters which are to be taken into
consideration while deciding the question as to whether a
case falls under Section 302 IPC or Section 304 IPC, which
are the following:
(a) The circumstances in which the incident took place;
(b) The nature of weapon used;
(c) Whether the weapon was carried or was taken from the
spot;
(d) Whether the assault was aimed on vital part of body;
(e) The amount of the force used.
(f) Whether the deceased participated in the sudden fight;
(g) Whether there was any previous enmity;
(h) Whether there was any sudden provocation.
(i) Whether the attack was in the heat of passion; and
(j) Whether the person inflicting the injury took any undue
advantage or acted in the cruel or unusual manner.
39. If the facts of this case are considered, then it is clear that
Kamlesh (P.W.1) is the wife of the appellant. His relationship with
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
Kamlesh (P.W.1) were not cordial. Kamlesh (P.W.1) has admitted that
She was insisting that the appellant should shift to village Jigani and
on this issue, the relationship was strained. Further, Kamlesh (P.W.1)
was going along with her father-in-law. It is also the case of Kamlesh
(P.W.1) that the appellant met her in Chharch and was following her.
Thus, it is clear that the appellant might have pleaded that Kamlesh
(P.W.1) should not go. He was under apprehension, that Kamlesh
(P.W.1) may not come back. Further, the appellant was not armed
with any weapon. The allegations are that he assaulted the deceased
by stones which were lying on the spot. The weight of the stones has
not been established by the prosecution, although the nature and
number of injuries suggest that the assault must have been made
thrice. Although compound fractures were found on right and left
Parietal bone and temporal bone, but the bone was not crushed. Thus,
it is clear that the incident took place all of a sudden. The appellant
had an apprehension and only because of that he assaulted Prabhu by
stones which were lying on the spot. Thus, the attack was in a heat of
passion.
40. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the
act of the appellant is punishable under Section 304 (Part 1) of IPC
and accordingly, the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section
302 of IPC and is convicted for offence under Section 304 (Part 1) of
IPC.
41. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, the appellant
Prahalad Vs. State of M.P. (Cr.A. No.72/2011)
was taken into custody on 8-6-2010. He was never released on bail
during trial. He was also not granted bail in this appeal. Thus, it is
clear that he has already completed 11 ½ years of incarceration.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the
appellant has already undergone sufficient period of detention.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him
and a fine of Rs.3,000/- in default 3 months R.I.
42. With aforesaid modification, the judgment and sentence dated
22-12-2010 passed by Sessions Judge, Shivpuri, in S.T. No. 127/2010
is hereby Affirmed.
43. The Appellant is in jail. He be released immediately, if not
required in any other case.
44. Let a copy of this judgment be provided to the appellant
immediately, free of cost.
45. The record of the Trial Court be sent back along with copy of
this judgment for necessary information and compliance.
46. The appeal succeeds in part and is accordingly Partly allowed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) (Deepak Kumar Agarwal)
Judge Judge
ABHISHEK
CHATURVEDI
2022.02.03
15:26:52 +05'30'
