Ram Bharose Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2021 Latest Caselaw 2130 MP

1                                                       W.P.No. 10989/2020

               HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                         BENCH AT GWALIOR


                            DIVISION BENCH
                        JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU &
                        JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK


                        W.P.No. 10989/2020 (PIL)
                          Ram Bharose Sharma
                                      Vs.
                           State of M.P. & Ors.
===============================================
      Shri J.P.Mishra and Shri Aditya Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioner.
      Shri Ankur Modi, learned Additional Advocate General for
respondents No. 1 and 2/State.
      Shri Deepak Khot, learned counsel for respondent No. 3-
Municipal Corporation, Gwalior.
================================================

                Whether approved for reporting:- Yes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Law laid down:-


        (i)     Issuance of public notice               by way of

        publication in newspaper for mutation purpose is as

        per principles of Public Policy and Public Welfare.

        It brings transparency, fair play and clarity in the

        mutation proceedings;

       Concept of Public Policy- discussed & explained.

        (ii)    Commissioner, Municipal Corporation has

        power      to    declare     certain     expenses      to   be

        improvement expenses as per Section 378 of the

        Municipal Corporation Act, 1956;
 2                                                W.P.No. 10989/2020

      (iii)   Commissioner, Municipal Corporation can

      seek publication of notice from the person

      concerned on his own expenses else expenses shall

      have to be borne by Municipal Corporation and

      shall have to be paid through public money; and

      (iv)    Earlier judgments of Division Bench in Awas

      Smasya      Niwaran    Sansthan     Vs.     Municipal

      Corporation, Indore, 1986 (1) MPWN 290 &

      Ward Sudhar Samiti, Gwalior Vs. Municipal

      Corporation, Gwalior, 1991 MPJR 137 discussed

      and overruled as they pass sub silentio and stand

      per incuriam- reasons explained.

===============================================
                      ORDER

( Passed on 7th June, 2021)

Per Justice Anand Pathak, J

The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India has been preferred by the petitioner as Pro Bono Publico in

which quashment of resolution dated 8/4/2020 (Annexure P/1) and

resolution dated 29/6/2020 (Annexure P/4) passed by Divisional

Commissioner as Administrator of Municipal Corporation,

Gwalior; whereby, the order dated 26/5/2020 (Annexure P/2)

passed by Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior and

order dated 8/6/2020 (Annexure P/3) passed by Additional

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior has been

considered by the Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior

(respondent No. 3 herein) and it is resolved to accept Rs. 5,000/- as

publication charges from the owners/applicants for mutation of

immovable properties and in lieu thereof, they have been given

facility to get the notice for mutation published in the format

prescribed by the Corporation.

2. It is the grievance of the petitioner that Section 167 of the

Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short "Act of 1956")

nowhere contemplates such mechanism whereby Corporation may

seek mutation fees from applicants for publication of notice.

Section 167 of the Act of 1956 does not enable charging of

mutation fees, therefore, resolution passed by Corporation is

illegal. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the

petitioner placed reliance over the judgment passed by Division

Bench of this Court (Indore Bench) in the matter of Awas Smasya

Niwaran Sansthan Vs. Municipal Corporation, Indore, 1986 (1)

MPWN 290 and later on another judgment passed by another

Division Bench at Gwalior in the case of Ward Sudhar Samiti,

Gwalior Vs. Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, 1991 MPJR 137

while placing reliance over the said judgments. It has been

submitted that action of the respondents is arbitrary and illegal. No

other ground has been raised by the petitioner.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents/State

opposed the prayer and submits that State Government has power

as per Part IX, Chapter XXXVI-Control under Act of 1956. It is

further submitted that if petitioner has any grievance; then he can

approach State Government under Section 421 of Act of 1956 for

redressal of his grievances.

4. Learned counsel for the Corporation also vehemently

opposed the prayer. According to him, Section 133 of Act of 1956

gives sufficient powers to the Corporation to impose fees by a

resolution. He relied upon Madan Gopal Agarwal Vs. District

Magistrate, Allahabad, AIR 1972 SC 2656 and Gorkha

Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Others,

(2014) 9 SCC 105.

5. It is further submitted that as per Madhya Pradesh Municipal

(Achal Sampatti Antaran) Rule, 2016, especially Rule 4,

Corporation has the right to invite objections by publishing a

notice in two daily newspapers, and therefore, Corporation has not

tried to enrich it by taking money as publication charges, but the

purpose is to intimate all concerned about the mutation

proceedings of the property so that litigation may be avoided in

future. He also stressed over the point that if any person who

intends to mutate the property caused the publication of notice on

his own expenses as per the format provided by the Corporation,

then Corporation has no objection to such proposition and it would

be accepted as service by publication and no further amount would

be asked for mutation.

6. Therefore, according to respondent/Corporation, it is not a

case of unjust enrichment by imposing mutation fees per se, but it

is procedural / incidental charges at best.

7. It is further submission that judgments passed by the earlier

Division Bench are to be seen in that perspective only. He prayed

for dismissal of the writ petition.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents appended thereto.

9. Sheet anchor of the case of petitioner is two orders passed by

Division Bench of this Court earlier in almost identical facts

situation; wherein, then petitioners also resisted the imposition of

mutation fees. Therefore, case is to be seen on its own merits as

well as the discussion so surfaced in earlier orders of Division

Bench.

10. Concept of mutation is being provided in part IV, Chapter

XI-Taxation under Act of 1956. Relevant provision, i.e. Section

167 of the Act of 1956 is hereby reproduced for ready reference; as

under:-

"167. Notice of transfer of title, when to be given.- (1) Whenever the title in any land or building or in any part or share of any land or building is transferred , the transfer and the transferee shall, within three months of the registration of the deed of transfer or if it be not registered, within three months of the execution of the instrument of transfer, or, if no such instrument be executed, after the transfer is effected, give notice in writing of such transfer to the Commissioner.

(2) Every person liable for the payment of a tax on any property whose transfers his title to or over such property without giving notice of such transfers to

the Corporation as aforesaid, shall in addition to any other liability which he incurs through such neglect , continue to be liable for the payment of all such taxes payable in respect of the said property until he gives such notice or until the transfer is recorded in the books of the Corporation.

(3) In the event of the death of the person in whom title to any land or building or in any part or share of any land or building vests,, the person who as an heir or otherwise takes the title of the deceased by descent or devise, shall, within three months from the death of the deceased, give notice of his title to the Commissioner in writing.

(4) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to affect the liability of the heir or devise for the said taxes or to affect the prior claim of the Corporation for the recovery of the taxes due thereupon.

(5) (i) When any new building is erected, or when any building is rebuilt or enlarged, or when any building which has been vacant is re-occupied, the person primarily liable for the property taxes assessed on the building shall within fifteen days give notice thereof in writing to the Commissioner.

(ii) The said period of fifteen days shall be counted from the date of the completion or the occupation, whichever first occurs, of the building which has been newly erected or rebuilt, or of the enlargement, as the case may be, and in the case of a building which has been vacant, from the date of the re- occupation thereof."

11. It is to be noted that Chapter XI is segmented into three

sub-divisions in which Section 167 falls under Supplemental

Provision and other two sub-divisions are Taxation and the

Property Tax ( Imposition of of Property Tax). At the first glance,

it appears that Section 167 of the Act of 1956 contemplates

issuance of notice in writing by the Transferer as well as

Transferee, who claim any right, title or interest in the property

and Corporation does not have to invite objections through

publication but Clause 2 puts liability over a person (as transferer

also) that the transferer shall continue to pay property tax, if he

does not inform about the sale of the property to transferee within

three months of the execution of the instrument. Therefore, to

avoid such anomalous situation, transferer has to intimate the

Corporation alongwith transferee. Same situation exists if the

property is devolved upon a legal heir because Section 167 (3)

contemplates death of title holder and therefore, legal heir of

deceased (within three months of the death of title holder) has to

give notice of factum of his devolved title to the Commissioner.

12. In both the situations, as contemplated under Section 167 (2)

as well as under Section 167 (3), it is experienced by the

authorities that at times mutations are being done with oblique

motive by unscrupulous persons, who may not have any right, title

or interest over the property or may be one of the claimants of the

property, who intends to get the whole property in his name

bypassing the claims of other legitimate claimants (or other

existing legal heirs of a deceased owner). Therefore, to reconcile

the same, as a regulatory measure, concept of publication of

intention of an applicant to mutate the property in his name has

been formulated to avoid future complications. This thought is in

line with concept of Fair Play, Public Welfare and Transparency.

13. When any expenses or charges are levied without the

element of quid pro quo then such imposition can be treated as a

part of regulatory measure and this aspect has been elaborately

discussed in the case of Calcutta Municipal Corporation and

Ors. Vs. M/s Shrey Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC

245. Relevant discussion is worth reproduction for clarity

purpose:-

"14.According to "Words & Phrases", Permanent Edition, Vol. 41 Page 230, a charge or fee, if levied for the purpose of raising revenue under the taxing power is a "tax". Similarly, imposition of fees for the primary purpose of "regulation and control" may be classified as fees as it is in the exercise of "police power", but if revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, then the imposition is a "tax". A tax is an enforced contribution expected pursuant to a legislative authority for purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes and not as payment for a special privilege or service rendered by a public officer, in which case it is a "fee". Generally speaking "taxes" are burdens of a pecuniary nature imposed for defraying the cost of governmental functions, whereas charges are "fees" where they are imposed upon a person to defray the cost of particular services rendered to his account.

16.Therefore, the main difference between "a fee"

and "a tax" is on account of the source of power. Although "police power" is not mentioned in the Constitution, we may rely upon it as a concept to bring out the difference between "a fee" and "a tax". The power to tax must be distinguished from an exercise of the police power. The "police power" is different from the "taxing power" in its essential principles. The power to regulate, control and prohibit with the main object of giving some special benefit to a specific class or group of persons is in the exercise of police power and the charge levied on that class to defray the costs of providing benefit to such a class is "a fee". Therefore, in the aforestated judgment in Kesoram's case, it has been held that where regulation is the primary purpose, its power is referable to the "police power". If the primary purpose in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the government. But where the government intends to raise revenue as the primary object, the imposition is a tax. In the case of Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., reported in [(1990) 1 SCC 109], it has been held that regulation is a necessary concomitant of the police power of the State and that though the doctrine of police power is an American doctrine, the power to regulate is a part of the sovereign power of the State, exercisable by the competent legislature. However, as held in Kesoram's case (supra), in the garb of regulation, any fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or expense of administering the regulation cannot be imposed and only such levy can be justified which can be

treated as a part of regulatory measure. To that extent, the State's power to regulate as an expression of the sovereign power has its limitations. It is not plenary as in the case of the power of taxation."

14. Therefore, asking for publication cost by Municipal

Corporation, Gwalior from an individual is to be seen in that

perspective only and not as an element of quid pro quo or a device

to fill-up the treasury of Corporation. It is only meant for such

regulatory purpose only because publication of notice brings

transparency, fair play and clarity in the mutation proceedings and

any intended or prospective mischief can be avoided. Therefore,

Corporation is just and right in its approach to avoid future

litigation and complication, rightly decided to go for publication. It

is not a device to enrich the treasury.

15. Not only this, another facet of the controversy is drain of

public money over personal use of property of an individual. If

Corporation is saddled with the liability to publish notice for

mutation purpose in newspaper for an individual's immovable

property, then Corporation shall have to pay through the public

money (deposited by the citizenry of that Corporation under

different heads like property tax, service charges, etc.), and that

would again create anomalous situation wherein the expenses of

mutation proceedings of an individual are being paid by public

money.

16. Therefore, the controversy from this perspective also does

not stand to Principles of Public Policy and Public Welfare rather it

is opposed to it. Public Policy in its broad spectrum, as a system of

Laws, Regulatory Measures, Source of Action and Funding

Priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a government

entity or its representatives has basically three types of Policies (I)

Restrictive, (ii) Regulatory and (iii) Facilitating. The evolutionary

trend of Public Policy has been discussed in detail by Apex Court

in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation

Limited and Anr. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Ors., (1986) 3

SCC 156. Para 92 is worth reproduction:-

"92. The Indian Contract Act does not define the expression "public policy" or "opposed to public policy". From the very nature of things, the expressions "public policy", "opposed to public policy" or "contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the courts and similarly where there has been a well-recognized head of public policy, the courts have not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There are two schools of thought -

"the narrow view" school and "the broad view" school. According to the former, courts can not create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenances judicial law-making in this area. The adherents of "the narrow view" school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy unless that particular ground had been well- established by authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Uriefontein Consolidated Mines Limited [1902] A.C. 484, 500 "Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision." That was in the year 1902. Seventy-eight years earlier, & Burros, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, [1824] 2 Bing. 229, 252; s.c. 130 E.R. 294, 303 and [1824-34] All E.R. Reprint 258, 266, described public policy as "a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you." The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a-man to shy away from unmanageable horses and in words which conjure up before our eyes the picture of the young Alexander the Great taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderyby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd., [1971] Ch. 591, 606. "With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles." Had the timorous always held the field, not only the doctrine of public policy but even the Common Law or the principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his "History of English Law", Volume III, page 55, has said :

In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to suppress practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them.

It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. If there is no head of public policy which D covers a case, then the court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution.

Therefore, with the changed circumstances, decision of

Corporation regarding Publication is to be seen in the light of such

broad principle of Public Policy and guidance given by Apex Court

in this regard. It is a regulatory or at best a Facilitating Measure,

nothing else.

17. Even otherwise, it cannot be said that Corporation /

Commissioner is completely bereft of any legal authority because

Commissioner has power to declare certain expenses to be

improvement expenses as per Section 378 of the Act of 1956 and

said expenses are recoverable and payable by the owner / occupier

of the premises as per the provisions of Section 379 of Act of

1956..

18. Section 377 and 378 of the Act of 1956 are reproduced

hereinbelow for ready reference:-

"377. Power of Commissioner to accept agreement for payment of expenses in installments.- (1) When ever under this Act or under any rule or byelaw made there under, the cost of any work executed or of any measure taken or thing done, by or under the order of a municipal authority, any magistrate or any municipal officer empowered in this behalf, is payable by any person, the Commissioner may with the approval of the Mayor-in- Council instead of recovering any such cost in any other manner provided in this Act or in any rule or byelaw made there under, take an agreement from the said person to pay the same in installments of such amount and at such intervals as will secure the payment of the whole amount due, with interest there on at the rate not exceeding six per centum per annum, within a period of not more than five years. (2) If any installment is not paid on or before the date on which it falls due, the Commissioner may thence forward recover interest on the sum then due at such rate not exceeding nine per centum per annum as he

may deem fit.

378. Power to declare certain expenses to be improvement expenses.- If any cost or expenses removable under this Act have been incurred by the Commissioner under any provision of this Act or any rule or byelaw made there under in respect of, or for the benefit of, any land or building the Commissioner may with the approval of the Corporation declare such costs or expenses to be improvement expenses."

19. Perusal of these provisions reinforces authority in the Office

of Commissioner to declare any cost or expenses to be

improvement expenses and therefore, source of power is not

altogether held up or missing as tried to be projected by the

petitioner. Both the judgments relied upon by the petitioner have

not taken into account these provisions of Act of 1956, which are

apparently the source of power of Commissioner.

20. Even otherwise, when issuance of public notice by way of

publication in newspapers and its utility is being established then

Section 371 of the Act of 1956 ought to be read in tendum with

other provisions of Act of 1956 to bring home the point that

Commissioner has the authority to ask for public notice through

publication in local newspaper. Section 371 is to be read in

conjunction with all other relevant provisions of Act of 1956.

Section 371 is reproduced as under:-

"371. Public notice how to be made known.- Whenever it is provided by or under this Act that public notice shall or may be given of anything, such

public notice shall, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, be in writing under the signature of the Commissioner or of a municipal officer empowered under sub section (4) of section 69 to give the same, and shall be widely made known in the locality to be effected thereby, affixing copy thereof in conspicuous public places within the said locality, or by publishing the same by beat of drum, or by advertisement in the local newspapers, or by two or more of these means and by any other means that the Commissioner shall think fit."

21. Perusal of the section reveals that Public Notice of

"anything", "may" ("shall") be given as provided under the

Section. When necessity of Public Notice is established in this time

period as discussed above, then Public Notice can very well be

published and expenses can be sought by commissioner as

"Improvement Expenses". It is in line with Public Policy and

Public Welfare also.

22. So far as, judgment of Divisions bench in case of Awas

Smasya Niwaran (Supra) is concerned, it revolves around Section

167 and Section 366 of the Act of 1956. If the discussion as

surfaced into it is accepted then it would render scope and object of

Section 167 very limited and virtually redundant in some

circumstances because in that condition only notice of intimation

by the transferer / transferee would complete the proceedings. It

would not address the problem of indeterminate class of persons

who are not on record but have Right, Title or Interest in the

property. It is true that mutation is not the document of title and

only presumptive in nature but it cannot be ignored that if mutation

is being done in favour of a wrong man or without knowledge of

all claimants / stakeholders then it may lead to further

complications; wherein, said person after mutation; done

surreptitiously, may go for construction of the building thus

leading to more complications. Therefore, said reasoning as

advanced in the judgment cannot be accepted on the basis of

discussion made above.

23. Later judgment of Division Bench Ward Sudhar Samiti

(supra) is proceeded mainly on the assumption that Section 148

and 153 of the Act of 1956 nowhere contemplate issuance of

public notice in newspaper and therefore, no public notice is

required by law to be given in proceedings under Section 148 (1)

and Section 153(1) of the Act of 1956. Section 371 has also been

discussed accordingly.

24. In fact, proceedings under Section 148 and 153 fall under

sub-section Imposition of Property Tax in Chapter XI

(Taxation); whereas, Mutation falls under Supplemental

Provision. Beside that Sections 148 and 153 are in respect of

imposition of property tax and the rate at which it is to be charged,

therefore, fundamentally, it is for assessment of the different

variables used for ascertaining property tax / annual letting value

of land and building. There, the owners or occupiers or

stakeholders are known. Its a concept altogether different than

'Mutation', where multiple claimants/legal heirs as indeterminate

class of persons may have right, title or interest in the property.

25. In computation of annual letting value / property tax, etc.,

the person concerned or owners are usually before the Corporation,

therefore, recipients are determinant class of individuals; whereas,

in mutation proceedings, most of the time nobody knows who has

Right, Title or Interest in the property which is likely to be mutated

because acquisition of property through sale deed or

devolution/succession, may have multiple claims. Therefore,

Corporation has to inform the 'indeterminate class of public' for

inviting objections. Therefore, purpose and scope of Section 148 /

153 is totally different vis-a-vis Section 167 which mainly falls

under Supplemental Provision and not under other two sub-

divisions which are Taxation and the Property Tax (Imposition of

of Property Tax). Therefore, that analogy of judgment cannot be

borrowed here and interpretation of scope of Section 371 vis-a-vis

Sections 148/153 is misplaced in facts and circumstances of the

case.

26. Division Bench in the case of Ward Sudhar Samiti (Supra)

further proceeded on the point of service of notice as per Section

369 and 370 of Act of 1956 also and opined that those provisions

also nowhere refer the service of notice through publication in

newspapers and therefore, mutation proceedings cannot be

proceeded with publication of notice in newspaper, but said service

of notices as per Section 369/370 is for limited purpose and

nowhere deals for addressing question of intimation to

'indeterminate class of persons'.

27. Even otherwise, Code of Civil Procedure also postulates

service of notice through publication. (see: Order V Rule 20,

substituted service) and provisions of CPC are not barred in the

proceedings in hand. Rather provisions are accepted for realizing

the objects of the Act.

28. Therefore, cumulatively, the decision of Division Bench in

the case of Awas Smasya Niwaran Sansthan (supra) as well as

in Ward Sudhar Samiti (supra), did not consider the interplay of

different provisions of the Act of 1956 and their resultant effect in

the light of principle of Public Policy, especially when provisions

of issuance of public notice and authority to impose improvement

charges lie with the Commissioner as per Section 371 and 378

respectively of the Act of 1956 and both judgments did not

consider these provisions and point of law involved in given

factual set up, then both these judgments pass sub silentio and

cannot be relied upon being per incuriam on discussion made and

reasons stated above.

29. Still, certain creases need to be ironed out.

30. In future, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation shall have

to give liberty (as per the resolution itself) to the applicants /

persons interested in mutation, to get the intimation notice

published in a given format in any enlisted newspaper, which is

widely circulated in the area (not any newspaper with poor

circulation), so that public at large may know the particulars of the

property and person for mutation and that can only be the best

possible solution in the controversy. Format of notice, dimensions

of notice and list of newspapers should be transparent, clear and be

in public domain, so that publication of mutation notice may

become facilitator of disputes rather than its launching pad.

31. It is given to understand that several applications are

pending consideration for mutation and because of interim order,

such mutation proceedings are on hold and amount has been

deposited in different head, therefore, Commissioner, Municipal

Corporation, Gwalior is directed to proceed expeditiously with the

applications as per law and amount which were already deposited

by the applicants may be utilized for publication of notices and

residuary amount if any remains, after publication charges, then

same be returned back to the applicants in transparent and fair

manner.

32. Still, even after this judgment if any anomaly or discrepancy

exists then it would be the duty of Municipal Corporation as well

as State to contemplate such difficulty in accordance with law

especially as per the provisions of Act of 1956 inter alia as

contained in Section 421 of Act of 1956 and come out with a legal

framework or solution for facilitating process of mutation more

transparent and smooth.

33. Resultantly, in the considered opinion of this Court,

Municipal Corporation, Gwalior can direct the applicants to cause

notice to be published in newspapers and no illegality exists in

getting the notice published in widely circulated newspapers at the

expense of applicants.

34. Petition accordingly fails in substance, however, disposed of

as referred above.

35. Ordered accordingly.

                                                     (Sheel Nagu)                                 ( Anand Pathak)
                                                         Judge                                         Judge

                        jps/-
JAI       Digitally signed by JAI PRAKASH SOLANKI
          DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
          PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH


PRAKASH
          COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
          GWALIOR, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya
          Pradesh,

2.5.4.20=287738d30aabaeda9b10cecdf179c

SOLANKI ec865c7633f4cfb9e38ce14fcbb05b9522a, cn=JAI PRAKASH SOLANKI Date: 2021.06.07 16:08:04 +05'30'