Madhya Pradesh High Court

Deepak Dhakad vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 December, 2021

Author: Nandita Dubey

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            THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                         Cr.R-3383-2021
              (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

Gwalior, Dated: 27.12.2021

      Shri Bhupendra Singh Dhakad, learned counsel for the applicant.

      Shri G.K. Agarwal, Counsel for the State.

      Shri Surendra Singh Dhakad, Counsel for the complainant.

      This Criminal revision emanates from the judgment and order dated

25.11.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 233/2017 by First Additional

Session Judge, Shivpuri affirming the judgment and order dated 23.05.2017

passed in RCT No. 2390/2015 by JMFC, Shivpuri whereby petitioner has

been acquitted from the charges under Sections 323, 294, 506- part II of

IPC and convicted for offence under Section 354 of IPC and sentenced to

one year RI with fine of Rs. 500/-.

      According to the prosecution case, complainant went to take water

from the bore well situated in the premises of the accused who offered to

help her with lifting of a pot and while doing so, he inappropriately touched

her breast with the intention of outraging her modesty resulting in

altercation where both complainant and accused used abusive words and

slapped each other. The petitioner/accused was committed for trial under

Sections 354, 323, 294 and 506-part-II of the IPC. During pendency of the

trial, the petitioner/accused and complainant/respondent no. 2 entered into a

mutual settlement to dispel their misunderstanding and jointly moved an

application for compromise. The learned trial Court took note of the

compromise between the parties and compounded the offence under

Sections 323, 294 and 506 part-II of the IPC and acquitted the

petitioner/accused of the same. The trial Court, nonetheless, convicted the

THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH Cr.R-3383-2021 (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

petitioner under Section 354 of IPC since the said offence is non-

compoundable and sentenced him as afore-stated. The petitioner assailed

his conviction before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri, who

dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order of the trial Court.

The petitioner is now before this Court seeking compounding of his

conviction under Section 354 of IPC in view of the settlement between the

parties.

In view of the settlement/compromise application, the parties were

directed to appear before the Principal Registrar for its verification. The

Principal Registrar has submitted his report verifying the fact that the parties

have arrived at compromise voluntarily, without any threat, inducement and

coercion. However, it has been pointed out that "according to Section 320 of

Cr.P.C, the offence under Section 354 of IPC is non- compoundable."

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

Learned Counsel for the parties jointly seek this Court to invoke the

inherent jurisdiction to compound the offence and do complete justice to

them.

The question, whether a High Court can quash the proceedings arising

from non-compoundable offences on the basis of compromise arrived at

between the accused and victim, is no longer res-integra.

In State of M.P v. Laxmi Narayan and Ors. reported in (2019) 5

SCC 688, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principles:-

15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH Cr.R-3383-2021 (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

15.1 that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2 such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4 offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-

THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH Cr.R-3383-2021 (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

In Ramgopal and Anr. v. State of M.P. reported in 2021 Legal

Eagle (SC) 569 referring to the case of Gyan Singh v. State of Punjab

reported in 2012 10 SCC 303 and State of M.P. (supra), the Supreme Court

set aside the order of the High Court in a Criminal Revision whereby the

prayer for compounding of offence under Section 306 IPC in the light of

compromise arrived at between the parties was rejected, retreating that the

offence is non-compoundable. It was observed as under:-

12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non- heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section

THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH Cr.R-3383-2021 (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 466, and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).

15. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power to compound a noncompoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and is, thus, unsustainable.

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.

21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read with the settlement dated 13th September 2006, we find it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, all offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the trial court, appellate court and the High Court are set aside. Resultantly, the Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the charged offences for all intents and purposes.

In the instant case, the incident occurred in the year 2015. The

petitioner and complainant are residents of the same neighborhood. They

THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH Cr.R-3383-2021 (Deepak Dhakad V. State of M.P. and Anr.)

have settled their misunderstanding and dispute on their own volition

without any coercion or compulsion and buried their differences. Both the

parties wish to live in peace and harmony.

Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case and nature of offence in question and the fact that the complainant and

the accused/petitioner have settled their dispute amicably, I deem it proper

to grant permission of compounding the offence invoking inherent powers

of this Court. Consequently, the proceedings emanated out of FIR in Crime

No.841/2015, the judgment and orders passed by the trial Court and