[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
The Secretary vs V.G.Shine on 7 January, 2026
Author: Anil K. Narendran
Bench: Anil K. Narendran
C.R.P.No.362 of 2005 1
2026:KER:198
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
WEDNESDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 17TH POUSHA, 1947
CRP NO. 362 OF 2005
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 08.11.2004 IN APPEAL NO.2 OF 2004
OF UNIVERSITY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
REVISION PETITIONER/1ST RESPONDENT:
THE SECRETARY
N.S.S. COLLEGES' COMMITTEE, N.S.S. HEAD OFFICE,
PERUNNAI, CHANGANACHERRY.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.G.PARAMESWARA PANICKER (SR.)
SHRI.P.GOPAL
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3:
1 V.G.SHINE
RESIDING AT VIJAYAVILASOM
P.O.NAVAIKULAM, PIN- 695 603.
2 THE REGISTRAR UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
3 THE DIRECTOR OF COLLEGIATE EDUCATION
VIKAS BHAVAN, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADVS.
SRI.ENOCH DAVID SIMON JOEL
SHRI.T.K.VIPINDAS, SENIOR G.P.
C.R.P.No.362 of 2005 2
2026:KER:198
OTHER PRESENT:
SMT. MARY BEENA JOSEPH; SR. GP
THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
10.12.2025, THE COURT ON 07.01.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
C.R.P.No.362 of 2005 3
2026:KER:198
ORDER
Muralee Krishna S., J.
This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the 1st respondent in
Appeal No.2 of 2004 on the file of the Kerala University Appellate
Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the 'Tribunal' in short), under
Section 60(9) r/w Section 63 of the Kerala University Act, 1974
(the 'Act' in short), against the judgment dated 08.11.2004
passed by the Tribunal in that appeal.
2. The 1st respondent herein, who is the appellant in
Appeal No.2 of 2004 before the Tribunal, was a Last Grade Staff
in N.S.S. College, Nilamel. The College had its PTA account in the
State Bank of Travancore, Nilamel. A cheque leaf was stolen from
the college, and affixing the forged signature and seal of the
Principal, the cheque was encashed for Rs.1,30,000/- on
28.12.2002. On getting a complaint from the Principal, the Police
registered a crime and arrested the 1st respondent and his friend
Rajesh Kannan in connection with the theft of the cheque and
withdrawal of the amount from the Bank. Meanwhile, on
28.12.2002, the 1st respondent deposited a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
in his bank account. Following the registration of the crime and
the arrest of the 1st respondent by the Police, the 1st respondent
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was placed under suspension, and a departmental enquiry was
conducted against him. The enquiry officer submitted his report,
wherein the charges levelled against the 1st respondent were
reported as proved. Therefore, ultimately, the 1st respondent was
dismissed from service by the order dated 10.11.2003 of the
petitioner herein. Challenging the dismissal from service, the 1 st
respondent filed Appeal No.2 of 2004 before the Tribunal under
Section 60 of the Act. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner herein
filed a detailed counter affidavit. From the side of the 1 st
respondent, the impugned order of his dismissal from service was
marked as Exhibit A1 and from the side of the petitioner herein,
the entire files relating to the disciplinary enquiry were marked as
Exhibit B1 series. The Tribunal raised necessary points for
consideration and, after hearing both sides and on appreciation of
the materials on record, by the impugned judgment dated
08.11.2004, allowed the appeal, by setting aside the order of the
petitioner dated 10.11.2003, dismissing the 1st respondent from
service with effect from 25.01.2003 and directed the Management
to await the disposal of the original case registered against the 1 st
respondent in connection with the same incident. It was also
ordered that in the meanwhile, the 1st respondent shall continue
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in suspension from the service of the petitioner. Liberty is granted
to the petitioner to pass a fresh order in the disciplinary
proceedings against the 1st respondent in tune with the findings of
the criminal court.
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the
Tribunal, the petitioner is now before this Court with the present
revision petition.
4. On 28.03.2005, when this revision petition came up for
consideration, this Court admitted the same and issued notice to
the respondents. However, despite service of notice, none
appeared for the 1st respondent. The learned Senior Government
Pleader entered appearance for the 3rd respondent.
5. When the appeal records are called for by the order
dated 05.11.2025, it was informed by the Tribunal that the records
were destroyed, following the Rules as per the Office order dated
10.06.2020.
6. Since the records in Appeal No.2 of 2004 have already
been destroyed by the Kerala University Appellate Tribunal, on
04.12.2025, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned
Government Pleader have made available for the perusal of this
Court a copy of the records in Appeal No.2 of 2004.
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7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned Senior Government Pleader. At the time of hearing the
revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner produced
the copies of available records of the appeal before the Tribunal
for our perusal.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that the Tribunal considered the disciplinary proceedings by
equating the same with that of the criminal proceedings. The
Tribunal proceeded as if in the disciplinary proceedings, the rigour
of proof is as that of a criminal case. The learned counsel
vehemently submitted that there is no bar in proceeding with the
disciplinary proceedings before the conclusion of the criminal case,
since both are independent proceedings. The learned counsel
invited our attention to the evidence tendered by the witnesses
examined by the enquiry officer to argue that the enquiry officer
reached to a finding that the 1st respondent has committed gross
dereliction of duty and misconduct, taking advantage of his
presence in the office room wherein the stolen cheque was kept
by the Principal. In support of his arguments regarding the
independent existence of disciplinary action taken against the 1st
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respondent, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the
Apex Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699],
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya
[(2011) 4 SCC 584], and Divisional Controller, KSRTC v.
M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442].
9. The learned Senior Government Pleader also supported
the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and
submitted that if the judgment of the Tribunal is permitted to
stand, the State will be bound by the said decision and will be
burdened, since the State is the pay master.
10. We have carefully perused the available records of the
appeal, including disciplinary proceedings produced by the
petitioner and also perused the materials placed on record in this
Civil Revision Petition. From the impugned judgment of the
Tribunal, we notice that, as rightly argued by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, the Tribunal proceeded as if the rigor of proof
required in the case of disciplinary proceedings is equal to that of
a criminal trial. Similarly, the Tribunal reached to a conclusion that
since a criminal case is pending against the 1st respondent, it
would be appropriate to wait till the finalisation of the said criminal
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case to conclude the departmental enquiry also. At this juncture,
it is relevant to note the judgments cited at the Bar on this point.
11. In Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699], while
considering the appeal by special leave against the stay of
departmental proceedings till the completion of the prosecution
launched by the Police for an offence punishable under Section
304, Part II, IPC, against the driver of a double-decker bus of A.P.
Road Transport Corporation, the Apex Court held thus;
"6. The rival contentions give rise to the question; whether
it would be right to stay the criminal proceedings pending
departmental enquiry? This Court in Meena's case, [1996
AIR SCW 4160], had elaborately considered the entire case
law including Kusheshwar Dubey's case, [AIR 1988 SC
2118], relieving the necessity to consider them once over.
The Bench, to which one of us, K. Venkataswami, J., was a
member, had concluded thus: (Paras 14 and 17 of AIR)
"It would be evident from the above decisions that each of
them, starts with the indisputable proposition that there is
no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously
and then say that in certain situations, it may not be
'desirable' 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the
disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on
identical charges. The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it
is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard
to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no
hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf. The only
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ground suggested in the above decision as constituting a
valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is "that
the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not
be prejudiced." This ground has, however, been hedged in
by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave
nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful
opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave
but that the case must involve complicated questions of law
and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', desirability' or 'propriety,
as the case may be, has to be determined in each case
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, of
the case. The ground indicated in D. C. M., [AIR 1960 SC
806] and Tata Oil Mills [AIR 1965 SC 155], is not also an
invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales
while judging the advisability or desirability of staying
disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending
consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be and
should not be delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are
concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly
where high officials or persons holding high public officers
are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other
ground. They hardly even reach a prompt conclusion. That
is the reality in spite of repeated advise and admonitions
from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is
unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going
ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the
disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage.
The interests of administration and good Government
demand that these proceedings are concluded
expeditiously. It must be remembered that these
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proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be
remembered that undesirable elements are thrown out and
any charge of misdemeanor is enquired into promptly. The
disciplinary proceedings are meant nor really to punish the
guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by
getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent
officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary
proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour
should be indicated at the earliest possible moment and if
he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to
law. it is not also in the interest of administration that
persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be
continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting
the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of
administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and
dishonest. While it is not possible the enumerate to various
factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings,
we found it necessary to emphasise some of the important
considerations in view of the fact that very often the
disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods
pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary
proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of
course. All the relevant factors for and against, should be
weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various
principles laid down in the decisions referred to above."
There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective
in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings
is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary
proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is
guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from
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service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas
in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the
offences registered against him under the Prevention of
Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are
established and, if established, what sentence should be
imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of
enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both
the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of
disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to
repeat, should not be a matter of course not a considered
decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may
require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly
delayed."
We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The
purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two
different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is
launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender
owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided
that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So
crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of
commission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to
maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public
service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the
disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as
expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to
lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the
departmental proceedings may or may no be stayed
pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer.
Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its
own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to
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proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial
of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of
grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and
law. Offence generally implies infringement of public, as
distinguished from mere private rights punishable under
criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it
should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the
evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act.
Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry
in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach
of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his
misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or
law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The
enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the
conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is
not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen
that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be
conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in
public administration and the criminal trial will take its own
course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely
different from the departmental proceedings. In the former,
prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on
the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in
the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the
criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the
standard point of Evidence Act. The evidence required in the
departmental enquiry is not regulated by Evidence Act.
Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is
whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice
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the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case.
It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case
depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case,
we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the
accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with
the culpability of the offence under Section 304 A and 338
IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not
right in staying the proceedings."
[Underline supplied]
12. In Nemi Chand Nalwaya [(2011) 4 SCC 584], while
considering the issue pertaining to the dismissal of the respondent
therein who was working as a clerk in the appellant Bank for
misappropriation of amount, the Apex Court held thus;
"6. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has
been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such
findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters,
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if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have
been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.
(vide B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, [(1995)
6 SCC 749], Union of India v. G. Gunayuthan, [(1997)
7 SCC 463], and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana,
[(1999) 5 SCC 762], High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shahsi Kant S Patil, [(2001) 1 SCC 416].
8. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge.
One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the
preliminary inquiry and to whom the respondent had made
a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted
the subject matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who
was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch
Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence,
the Inquiry Officer found the respondent to be guilty of the
second charge and that has been accepted by the
disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the
said finding without expressly holding that the said finding
of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if
it was sitting in appeal over the departmental inquiry and
interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the
respondent must have acted bonafide in an "increasing
customer friendly atmosphere". There was no justification
for the division bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.
9. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted
the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not
in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings
invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or
consequential punishment. The standard of proof required
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in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of
proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges
and evidence may lead to different results in the two
proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in
the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the
departmental proceedings are more proximate to the
incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no
effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An
employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the
punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by
non - challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court
has acquitted him."
[Underline supplied]
13. In M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442], while
considering the appeal against the judgment and order passed by
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, by which the appeal
preferred by the appellant therein against the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of
the respondent-workman against the award of the Labour Court,
the Apex Court held thus;
"8. DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY AND ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL
CASE
The question of considering reinstatement after decision of
acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal Court arises
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only and only if the dismissal from services was based on
conviction by the criminal Court in view of the provisions of
Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, 1950, or
analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a
case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently
of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal Court is
of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood
acquitted by a criminal Court, domestic enquiry can be held,
the reason being that the standard of proof required in a
domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether
different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is
beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is
the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test
to be applied. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another,
[AIR 1992 SC 1981 : 1992 (4) SCC 711], this Court held :
'The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different
from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an
order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the
departmental proceeding.'
19. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal
proposition that as the standard of proof in both the
proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not
based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case,
the acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the
basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings.
Nor can such an action of the department be termed as
double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul
Anthony (supra) does not lay down the law of universal
application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence etc.
involved in an individual case would determine as to
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whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the
findings recorded in the domestic enquiry."
[Underline supplied]
14. From the principle that can be discernible from the
aforesaid judgments, it is clear that for the conclusion of
departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority need not wait till
the conclusion of the criminal proceedings initiated against the
delinquent. The departmental enquiry as well as the criminal
proceedings are on different footing. The acquittal in a criminal
case registered in respect of the very same incident will have only
a limited bearing in the disciplinary proceedings, which also, in
exceptional circumstances.
15. In the instant case, the evidence of MWs 1, 3, 4, 5 and
M18 statement were relied by the enquiry officer to find the 1 st
respondent responsible for the stealing of the cheque from the
office room of the Principal of the College and presentation of the
same to the Bank after forging the signature and seal of the
Principal. The attending circumstances brought out in evidence by
the examination of the witnesses were also taken into
consideration by the enquiry officer to find the 1st respondent
guilty of the charges levelled against him in the departmental
proceedings. But the impugned judgment of the Tribunal would
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show that the Tribunal brushed aside the findings of the enquiry
officer without proper appreciation of the evidence of these
witnesses. In fact, the Tribunal ought not have reappreciated the
evidence like a criminal trial, especially in the matter of
departmental proceedings.
16. Having considered the pleadings and materials on
record and the submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the
judgments referred to supra, we find that the impugned judgment
of the Tribunal is passed without proper appreciation of the
evidence and materials on record, and hence it is liable to be set
aside.
In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed by setting
aside the impugned judgment dated 08.11.2004, passed by the
Tribunal in Appeal No.2 of 2004 and the appeal stands dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
MSA
