[Cites 31, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
Suresh K vs Municipal Corporation Of Kollam on 15 January, 2026
Author: P.V.Kunhikrishnan
Bench: P.V.Kunhikrishnan
2026:KER:335
"C.R"
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 25TH POUSHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 35658 OF 2024
PETITIONER/S:
SURESH K ,
AGED 68 YEARS
S/O KRISHNAN , RESIDING AT SIBIN NIVAS 15/297,
MATHRUKA NAGAR-23 ULLIYAKOVIL KOLLAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 691019
BY ADVS.
SMT.BHANU THILAK
SHRI.VISHNU.R
SHRI.S.R.PRASANTH
RESPONDENT/S:
1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF KOLLAM ,
REP BY ITS SECRETARY, OFFICE OF KOLLAM CORPORATION,
PIN - 691001
2 SOMAN PILLAI ,
AGED 62 YEARS
S/O UNKNOWN , RESIDING AT LALITHALAYAM HOUSE
ULIYAKOVIL KOLLAM DISTRICT, PIN - 691019
BY ADVS.
SRI.C.R.JAYAKUMAR
SRI.NOBEL RAJU
SRI S SREEKUMAR(KOLLAM)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
15.01.2026, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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2
"C.R"
P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN, J
--------------------------------
W.P (C) No.35658 of 2024
-------------------------------
Dated this the 15th day of January, 2026
JUDGMENT
This Writ Petition (C) is filed with the following prayers:
"i. issue a writ in the nature of certiorari
calling for the records culminated in the
issuance of Ext.P5 notice and quash the
same.
ii. Issue an order staying all further
proceedings pursuant to Ext.P5
iii. issue such other order or direction, as
this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper to
grant."
[SIC]
2. The petitioner herein is the absolute owner in
possession of a property comprised in re survey No. 722 of Kollam
East Village, having an extent of 1 Are 65 Sq Meters. The 2 nd
respondent is the petitioner's neighbour. The 2 nd respondent's
residential property and the petitioner's property are separated
and demarcated by a compound wall, is the submission. It is the
case of the petitioner that there is a small toilet situated within the
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property of the petitioner, which is used by him and his family
members. The petitioner states that the toilet was constructed in
1990, and he and his family have been using it for the last 34
years without any hindrance or obstruction. While so, the 2 nd
respondent, who is inimical to the petitioner, had lodged a
complaint before the 1st respondent, Panchayat, claiming that the
toilet inside the petitioner's property is an illegal construction, is
the submission. The 1st respondent had passed a conditional order
dated 24.03.2022 under Section 406(1) and (2) of the Kerala
Municipality Act, 1994 (for short, the Act 1994), directing the
petitioner to demolish the toilet constructed. Petitioner submitted
a reply to the same. Subsequently, the Ext.P2 order was passed on
08.08.2022, confirming the conditional order. Thereafter, the
petitioner submitted a reply to Ext.P2. Based on this reply, another
hearing and property inspection were held. But the same was
rejected and again issued Ext.P3 order on 18.08.2023 to demolish
the illegal construction. Thereafter, the 1 st respondent once again
issued Ext.P4 notice dated 09.10.2023 for hearing the matter
based on a direction from the honourable Mayor, and the
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petitioner appeared and gave his statement along with all
supporting documents, is the submission. But the 1st respondent
issued Ext. P5 demolition notice. Hence, this Writ Petition is filed.
3. Heard counsel for the petitioner, Standing Counsel
appearing for the Municipality and also the Counsel appearing for
the 2nd respondent.
4. Admittedly, Ext.P2 is a final order passed under Section
406 (3) of the Act 1994, confirming the provisional order passed
under Section 406 (2) of the Act 1994. Section 406 of the Act 1994
is extracted hereunder:
"406. Demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully
commenced, carried on or completed.--
(1) Where the Secretary is satisfied-
(i) that the construction, reconstruction or alteration of any
building or digging of any well-
(a) has been commenced without obtaining the
permission of the Secretary or in contravention of the
decision of the Council; or
(b) is being carried on, or has been completed
otherwise than in accordance with the plans or
specifications on which such permission or decision
was based; or
(c) is being carried on, or has been completed in
breach of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule
or bye-law or order made or issued thereunder or any
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direction or requisition lawfully given or made under
this Act, such rule, bye-law or order; or
(ii) that any alteration required by any notice issued under
section 395 has not been duly made; or
(iii) that any alteration of or addition to any building or any
other work made or done for any purpose in or upon any
building has been commenced or is being carried on or has
been completed in contravention of the provisions of section
405, he may make a provisional order requiring the owner or
the person for whom the work is done to demolish the work
done, or so much of it as, in the opinion of the Secretary, has
been unlawfully executed or to make such alterations as
may, in the opinion of the Secretary, be necessary to bring
the work in conformity with the provisions of this Act, bye-
laws, rules, direction, order or requisition as aforesaid, or
with the plans and specifications on which such permission
or decision was based, and may also direct that until the said
order is complied with, the owner or such person shall refrain
from proceeding with the work.
Provided that the Secretary may, on realisation of a
compounding fees as may be fixed by the Government,
regularise any constructions, reconstruction or alteration of
any building or digging of any well, commenced, carried on
or completed without getting a plan approved by the
Secretary or in deviation of the approved plan, if such
construction, reconstruction or alteration of the building or
digging of the well does not contravene any of the provisions
and specifications mentioned in this Act or the Building Rules
made thereunder.
(2) The Secretary shall serve a copy of the provisional order made
under sub-section (1) on the owner or the person for whom such
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work is done together with a notice requiring him to show cause
within a reasonable time, to be specified in such notice why the
order should not be confirmed.
(3) Where the owner or the person for whom the work is done fails
to show cause to the satisfaction of the Secretary, the Secretary
may confirm the order or modify the same to such extent as he
may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on
the owner or the person for whom the work is done and on the
failure to comply with the order, the Secretary may himself
cause the building or part thereof, demolished or the well
dismantled, as the case may be and the expenses therefor shall
be recoverable from the owner or such person."
5. Ext.P2 is an appealable order before the Tribunal for
Local Self Government Institutions as per Section 509 (6) of the
Act 1994. Section 509 (6) is extracted hereunder:
"509. Appeal and Revision --
(1) xxxx xxxx
(2) xxxx xxxx
(3) xxxx xxxx
(4) xxxx xxxx
(5) xxxx xxxx
(6) Any person may file an appeal against any notice issued or
any order passed by the Secretary under Sections 390, 391,
395, 406 and 408 to the Tribunal Constituted for the Local
Self Government Institutions under Section 271 S of the
Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1996 (13 of 1994), within thirty
days from the date of passing of such order."
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6. As per Section 509(6) of the Act 1994, the time to file
an appeal against an order issued under Section 406(3) is thirty
days. Proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Tribunal for the Kerala Local Self
Government Institutions Rules, 1999 (Rules 1999) provides that, if
an application for condonation of delay is filed, the delay may be
condoned for a period of one month after the prescribed period
has elapsed. It will be better to extract Rule 8 of the Rules 1999.
"Rule - 8. Petitions to the Tribunal.
(1) A petition submitted to the Tribunal shall be an appeal or
revision against a notice, order or proceedings of the Village
Panchayat, Municipality or its Standing Committee for Finance
or the Secretary in respect of any matter specified in the
schedule appended to these rules or inserted to the said
schedule by the Government from time to time by notification.
(2) If the concerned Village Panchayat or the Municipality or the
Standing Committee for Finance or the Secretary has not
taken decision within the prescribed time limit in cases where
time limit has been prescribed in the Panchayat Act or the
Municipality Act or in the Rules, the affected party may, in this
respect, file appeal before the Tribunal.
(3) Petitions under sub-rule (1) and (2) shall be in Form 'C' and the
same shall be submitted before the Tribunal within thirty days
from the date of the notice or order or proceedings against
which the petition is filed or within ninety days in cases where
decision has not been taken within sixty days of filing appeal
before the Local Self Government Institutions:
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Provided that the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within
one month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that
there is sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the
time limit."
7. This Court, in Thomas Thomas & another v.
Kottayam Municipality and Another [2008 (4) KHC 26],
observed that, upon the expiry of the statutory period of 30 days
and the further condonable period of one month, the Tribunal has
no jurisdiction to condone any further delay. The relevant portion
of the judgment is extracted hereunder:
"11. From the aforesaid judgments it is clear that
once the statutory period of limitation has expired,
the party looses its right of appeal. Thereafter it is
not open to him to invoke the power of this Court
under Art.226 of the Constitution and bypass the
statutory restrictions and get the delay condoned or
to have the matter examined by this Court.
Admittedly proviso to R.8(3) authorises the Tribunal
to condone delay of only one month if it is satisfied
that there is sufficient reason for the delay. The
power conferred on the Tribunal being restricted, in
my view, the above two judgments of this Court
gives a complete answer to the contentions of the
petitioner." (Underline supplied)
8. In Rermal Padmanabhan v. Tribunal for Local
Self Govt. Institutions, Tvm and Another [2015 (3) KHC
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406], the division bench of this court observed like this:
" 20. In yet another decision in 'Popat Bahiru
Govardhane and Others v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer and Another', 2013 KHC 4651 : 2013 (10) SCC
765 : 2013 (130) AIC 97 : 2013 (6) Mah LJ 950 : 2013
(100) ALR 657, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized
the need for strict compliance with the statutory
scheme and held that it is not permissible to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds if Statute does
not permit the same. Taking into account the facts,
circumstances and law involved in the case before us,
we are of the considered opinion that the order passed
by the learned Tribunal, refusing to condone the delay
in excess of the period prescribed under the proviso to
R.8(3) and the affirmation of the same by the learned
Single Judge is correct and no interference is called for."
(Underline supplied).
9. In Thankappan K. N. and Others v. Tribunal
For Local Self Government Institutions, Tvm. and
Others [2015 KHC 495], this court observed like this:
"23. From the above Rule, it is manifest that petitions
shall be submitted before the Tribunal within thirty
days from the date of the notice or order or
proceedings, though it is ninety days under certain
circumstances, which are not relevant for our purpose.
The proviso to the Rules makes it clear that the
Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one
month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is
satisfied that there is sufficient reason for not
submitting the petition within the time limit. Without
an iota of doubt, it can be said that the total
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permissible time for filing an appeal is sixty days."
(Underline supplied)
10. It is a settled position that once the period prescribed
for limitation for filing an appeal is over and the additional one
month for which the Tribunal can condone the delay is also over,
the Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal. Admittedly the petitioner
has not filed any statutory appeal within the period prescribed or
within the period which can be condoned by the tribunal.In such a
situation, the question to be decided is whether this Court can
entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India if there is manifest error in the order.
11. The Apex Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT),
LTU, Kakinada and Others v. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline
Consumer Health Care Limited [2020 KHC 6377], observed
like this:
"15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra),
which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat
High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India
& Ors., AIR 2015 Guj. 97 and also of the Karnataka High Court in
Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise
(Appeal - I), Bangalore, 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.). The logic applied
in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these
decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as S.31 of
the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Art.226 and Art.227 of the Constitution. This approach is
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faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High
Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court
before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the
assessment order by way of writ petition on the ground that the
same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction - by
overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in
flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of
principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The
High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non - suit
the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is
available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the
writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the
maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under S.31 of the
2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for
redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a
party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the
principle underlying the dictum of a three - Judge Bench of this
Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other
words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not
mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the
legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed
under S.31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative
scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose."
(underline supplied)
12. Relying on this judgment, the Allahabad High Court
in Atlantics Intelligence Ltd v. Union of India and
Others [2025 SCC OnLine Allahabad 5291], observed like
this:
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"14. Upon a perusal of the umpteen judgments cited
above and sifting through the ratios laid down by the
Supreme Court and High Courts in the various
judgments, one may extract the principles with
regard to maintainability of the writ petitions after
expiry of the time frame for filing appeal stipulated
in the special statute. The said principles are
summarised below:
A. An order that this Court could make in order to
do complete justice between the parties, must
not only be consistent with the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India,
but also be consistent with the substantive
provisions of the relevant statutory laws.
B. In exercising powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and in assessing the needs
of 'complete justice' of a cause or matter, the
High Court should take note of the express
prohibitions in any substantive statutory
provision based on some fundamental principles
of public policy and regulate the exercise of its
power and discretion accordingly.
C. The prescription of limitation when the statute
commands that delay may be condoned to a
maximum of one month further would come
within the ambit and sweep of the policy of
legislation. In such cases, Section 29(2) read with
Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply, and
accordingly, the Courts shall have no power to
condone the delay of any further period even in
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
D. The principle of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act which is a principle based on advancing the
cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude
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time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are
bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which
ultimately end without a decision on the merits of
the case.
15. In the present case, the petitioner has come to this writ
Court after the limitation has expired for filing an appeal
under Section 107 of the Act. In light of the same, we are of
the view that entertaining this writ petition would amount
to allowing the petitioner to circumvent the statutory
appellate procedure. In our view, no proper explanation has
been provided by the petitioner for non-filing of the appeal
within time and/or non-filing of the writ petition within the
limitation period.
16. The dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in Singh
Enterprises (supra), Hongo India (P) Ltd. (supra) and Glaxo
Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. (supra) has been
consistently followed by Supreme Court and various High
Courts. In light of the same, this Court is of the view that
this Court should not indulge the writ petitioner in
condoning the delay as the present case is neither a case
of gross violation of principles of natural justice nor patent
illegality. Furthermore, writ jurisdiction can certainly not be
exercised when invoked to undermine or defeat the
application of a statutory regime so as to render the
provision of limitation provided in the statute otiose. Ergo,
this Court ought not to entertain the present writ petition
and the same deserves to be rejected in limine."
13. In Sathish Murthi v. Member Secretary, Art and
Heritage Commission, Tvm and Others [2016 KHC 684], the
division bench of this court, relying on Thomas's case (supra), has
observed like this:
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"5. Insofar as WA No. 1017 of 2016 is concerned,
challenging Ext. P8 building permit issued on
23/08/2013 and Ext. P10, the recommendation of the
Art and Heritage Commission dated 17/07/2013, the
appellant therein filed WP (C) No. 14455 of 2014 on
06/06/2014. According to us, that writ petition ought to
have been dismissed at the threshold itself for the
reason that if the appellant was aggrieved by the
building permit, he had a remedy of appeal before the
Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. As per
S.510 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, the time
limit prescribed for filing an appeal is 30 days from the
date of the order. The petitioner in this writ petition did
not file any appeal. Instead, long after the expiry of the
period prescribed in S.510 of the Act, he filed the writ
petition before this Court on 06/06/2014, challenging
the building permit. Once a cause of action has
become time barred, a litigant cannot seek to revive
the same by taking recourse to the extra ordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the
Constitution of India. In this context, it is relevant to
refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise v. Krishna
Poduval (2005 KHC 1914 : 2005 (4) KLT 947 : ILR 2005
(4) Ker. 499), where it was held thus:
"7. At the outset we may state that insofar as the
respondents have not taken up the original orders
imposing penalty in appeals before the Appellate
Authority within the maximum period prescribed under
S.85(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, they cannot get the
appeals revived and heard on merits by resorting to
the discretionary remedy before this Court under
Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Once the period of
limitation has run itself out and the Appellate Authority
does not have power to condone the delay in filing the
appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed under
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the Act, the remedies of the appellants come to an end
just like in the case of a time barred suit and the
respondents cannot, by invoking the discretionary
remedy under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India,
resurrect their unenforceable cause of action and
require this Court to consider their contentions against
the original orders on merit. That would amount to
defeating the very law of limitation which we are not
expected to do under Art.226. If we are to entertain
the contentions of the respondents on merits, that
would amount to negating the law of limitation which
we have no jurisdiction to do under Art.226 and which
may even lead no anomalous results. We are not
satisfied that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Art.226 of the Constitution of India is so wide as to
resurrect a cause of action which has become
unenforceable on account of the law of limitation.
Further, we are of the firm opinion that the jurisdiction
under Art.226 of the Constitution of India cannot be
invoked against express statutory provisions, however
harsh the effect of the provisions may be on an
assessee or litigant."
Subsequently, referring to the judgment in Krishna
Poduval's case (supra), this Court in Thomas Thomas v.
Kottayam Municipality (2008 (4) KHC 26 : 2008 (3) KLT
964 : ILR 2008 (4) Ker. 70 : 2008 (3) KLJ 482) held
thus:
"11. From the aforesaid judgments it is clear that once
the statutory period of limitation has expired, the party
looses its right of appeal. Thereafter it is not open to
him to invoke the power of this Court under Art.226 of
the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions
and get the delay condoned or to have the matter
examined by this Court. Admittedly proviso to R.8(3)
authorises the Tribunal to condone delay of only one
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month if it is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for
the delay. The power conferred on the Tribunal being
restricted, in my view, the above two judgments of this
Court gives a complete answer to the contentions of
the petitioner."
Therefore, for that reason itself, WP (C) No. 14455 of
2014 should have been dismissed as not
maintainable."
14. From the above authoritative judgments of this court
and the apex court, it is clear that, once the period prescribed in
the statute for filing the appeal and the period which can be
condoned as per the statute is over, a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India cannot be entertained by the High
Court. It amounts to invoking the power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India against statutory rules. That is not
permissible. If the Rule's vires is challenged, that will be a different
situation. But if, within the period of Limitation prescribed for
challenging an order, a writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution, instead of invoking the alternative remedy, this court
can exercise the jurisdiction if the order is inherently
unsustainable, or if it is passed without jurisdiction or if it is passed
violating the principles of natural justice. Even in such a situation,
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the invocation of power under Article 226 of the Constitution is the
exception and availing the alternative remedy is the rule. But, if a
writ petition in such a situation is entertained by the High Court,
which was filed within the limitation period prescribed in the
statute concerned and ultimately at the final hearing stage, this
court found that there is nothing to interfere and at that stage, the
limitation period for availing the remedy is also over, whether this
court can relegate the party to avail the alternative remedy is the
next question. In such situations, to do complete justice to the
party, the dictum laid down by the Allahabad High Court in
Atlantics Intelligence Ltd (Supra) is to be followed. The
Allahabad High Court observed that the principle of Section 14 of
the Limitation Act is a principle based on advancing the cause of
justice, which would certainly apply to exclude time taken in
prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due
diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the
merits of the case. I am in perfect agreement with the above
dictum laid down by the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, the High
Court can invoke the principle in Section 14 of the Limitation Act
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and relegate to avail the alternative remedy with a rider that the
party approached the High Court within the period prescribed by
the statute for availing the statutory remedy.
15. In this case, the order passed under Section 406(3) was
on 08.08.2022. The petitioner filed this writ petition on
09.10.2024. This means the writ petition is filed about two years
after the date of Ext. P2. The appeal against such an order can be
filed only within thirty days as per Section 509(6) of the Act, 1994
and according to the proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Tribunal for the
Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, the Tribunal
may admit a petition submitted within one month after the said
time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason
for not submitting the petition within the time limit. Thereafter, the
Tribunal is functus officio to consider an appeal against an order
under Section 406 (3) of the Act 1994. Therefore, I am of the
considered opinion that this Court cannot entertain a writ petition
when the period of limitation specifically mentioned in statute for
filing an appeal is over, and the period for which a delay
condonation petition can be entertained is also over. Therefore,
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the challenge against Ext.P2 is to be rejected. Hence, this writ
petition is to be dismissed. It is true that the petitioner challenges
Ext.P5 in this writ petition. Ext.P5 is only an execution order of
Ext.P2, and therefore, as long as Ext.P2 is in force, a challenge
against Ext.P5 independently is not possible.
16. At this stage, the counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the petitioner and his 86-year-old mother are residing in the
house, and if this toilet is demolished, there will be great difficulty
for the petitioner and his mother. There is no other toilet in the
house, and the 86-year-old mother will be in trouble if the toilet is
demolished immediately. This is the plight of these harsh
provisions in the Rules 1999. The tribunal, or even this court,
cannot look into the merits of the impugned order due to the bar
under the proviso to Rule 8(3) of the Rules 1999. I cannot close my
eyes thinking of the plight of this old lady, who is not only the
mother of the petitioner, but also of all of us. Let the petitioner
construct a new toilet within a short period, and the execution of
the impugned orders can be deferred for three months. Therefore,
in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
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three months' time can be given to demolish the toilet as ordered
in Exts. P2, P3, and P5.
17. Before parting, I cannot ignore the plights of ordinary
litigants because of the mandate in proviso to Rule 8(3) of Rule
1999. The Kerala Panchayat Raj Act 1994 and the Kerala
Municipality Act 1994 are legislation made for the citizens with a
great objective. These are statutes to help people, not to harass
them with such restrictions. Imagine a situation like this; If a poor,
illiterate citizen constructed a small residential house in a small
plot with his hard earned money from his coolie work and an order
under section 406 the Municipality Act or under the provisions of
the Panchayath Raj Act is issued to demolish such residential
house, which is prima facie an illegal order, and due to his
ignorance of the mandate of law or because of some sufficient
reason, he was not able to file appeal within the prescribed time,
he has to demolish his dream house which he constructed using
his hard earned money. It will be an injustice. It is a settled
position that the first appeal is a right of a litigant. If restrictions
are imposed on filing the first appeal, which leads to injustice to a
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party, the legislature should seriously consider amending the
proviso to Rule 8(3) of Rule 1999. But this court has no jurisdiction
to issue such a direction to the legislature. But I am hopeful that a
welfare government will consider this injustice in the rules. The
Registry shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Chief
Secretary to the Government of Kerala, the Secretary to the Local
Self-Government Institutions, Government of Kerala, the Law
Secretary, and the Secretary to the Kerala Legislative Assembly.
But, in light of the discussion in this judgment, it is clear that
this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders
on merit. The court of law cannot ignore the statutory rule and
issue orders. Therefore, this writ petition is dismissed, granting the
petitioner three months' time to demolish the toilet as ordered in
Exts. P2, P3, and P5.
Sd/-
P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
JUDGE
SSG
Judgment reserved NA
Date of judgment 1501.2026
Judgment dictated 15.01.2026
Draft Judgment Placed 15.01.2026
Final Judgment Uploaded 20.01.2026
2026:KER:3355
WP(C) NO.35658 OF 2024
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 35658 OF 2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT DATED 05-
08-2024
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.08.2022
PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 18-08-2023
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE HEARING NOTICE ISSUED
BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 09-10-2023
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29-08-2024
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
