1. Petitioner is a retired employee of the Respondent No.1/BPCL
Petition on 31.05.2020. This Writ Petition was filed while the
demotion and Ext.P33 Enquiry Report of the Enquiry Officer.
2. As per Ext.P13 Charge Sheet, the Charges levelled against the
"1. While working as 'Planning Assistant' in the Development Cell during the
period from 03.11.2008 to 10.11.2011, you were unnecessarily putting
hardship for Sri. C P Saidhu and Sri. K K Anilkumar, contractors who took
the contract jobs of "Cement Lining of Fire Water Piping" during 2010-11
and "Fire water line Maintenance" during March 2011 to August 2011
respectively, by delaying the verification of the measurements of jobs
carried out by them inspite of repeated requests from the contractors.
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2. On completion of the jobs, you were intentionally finding fault with the
contractors and unnecessarily insisted on redoing the works performed
by them without any valid reasons, which resulted in delay in completion
of jobs and increasing the costs of the contractor. The above actions on
your part were with the ulterior motive of getting undue favour from the
contractor.
3. You had accepted Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) as bribe
from Sri. C P Saidhu, contractor in two instalments of Rs. 10,000/- each
during the period 2010-11 and thereafter you did not make any delay in
verification of the measurements of these jobs. After some time, you
again started harassing the above contractor.
4. You were also harassing Sri. K K Anilkumar with the malafide intention of
extracting undue benefits from him."
3. As per Ext.P13, the said Charges amount to misconduct under
Clause 29.3 of the Certified Standing Orders of BPCL- Kochi
Refinery that 'acceptance or solicitation by employee of any
money, favour or any other reward for retention in the company's
service, or for any other special consideration'.
4. In the Ext.P33 Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Officer found that the
Management has established all the allegations against the
Petitioner in Ext.P13 Charge Sheet and found the Petitioner
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guilty of misconduct under Clause 29.3 of the Standing Orders
of BPCL- Kochi Refinery.
5. In Ext.P37 Order, the Petitioner was imposed with a punishment
of demotion from the post of Senior Fitter Craftsman (Gr-VII) to
the post of General Craftsman (Fitter) at the lowest stage in
Grade VI in the scale of pay of Rs.15,000 - Rs.43,000.
6. The Respondent Nos.1 to 4 have filed Counter Affidavit
opposing the prayers in the Writ Petition.
7. I heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Sri. C.S. Ajith
Prakash, and the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents,
Sri. Benny P. Thomas, instructed by Advocate Sri. D.Prem
Kamath.
8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Petitioner by
way of victimisation on account of the sole reason for
challenging the transfer of the Petitioner from the post of
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Planning Assistant to Senior Fitter Craftsman in this Court by
filing W.P.(C) No.30508/2011, which culminated in Ext.P18
judgment of this Court dated 14.03.2014 setting aside the
transfer order and directing to repost the Petitioner as Planning
Assistant. Ext.P6 Interim Order was passed by this Court on
16.11.2011 in W.P.(C) No.30508/2011 directing to maintain
status quo. The Respondents did not permit the Petitioner to
continue as a Planning Assistant, claiming that by the time
Ext.P6 Interim Order was passed, the transfer order was already
effected. The Respondent No.3 issued Ext.P11 Show Cause
Notice dated 19.02.2013 alleging acceptance of bribe from a
contractor during the period 2010 - 2011 and also alleging
harassment of contractors during the period 2010 - 2011 and
during the period March 2011 to August 2011. There is no
explanation for the Respondents for the delay in initiating the
disciplinary proceedings. Even in Ext.P11 Show Cause Notice
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and Ext.P13 Charge Sheet, the specific dates of the alleged
acceptance of bribe are not stated. The Respondents submitted
only one witness before the Enquiry Officer in the first instance
as per Ext.P14. Thereafter, other witnesses were also included
as per Exts.P15, P16 & P17. The Respondents are
predetermined to impose punishment on the Petitioner and had
been fabricating evidence one by one after initiating the
domestic enquiry. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the
depositions of the witnesses examined before the Enquiry
Officer, which are produced as Exts.P25 to P32 extensively in
order to substantiate the point that it is the case of imposition of
penalty with no evidence. Learned Counsel invited my attention
to Ext.P22 in which the Vigilance Department of the
Respondents reported that the conclusion on the allegations
can be arrived at only through a detailed investigation/enquiry.
The Enquiry Officer completed the Enquiry without waiting for
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further investigation by the Vigilance Department. The learned
Counsel invited my attention to Ext.P33 Enquiry Report and
contended that the Enquiry Officer relied on the evidence of the
management witnesses, finding that there is nothing to discard
their testimonies in cross-examination. The evidence of the
witnesses was not analysed by the Enquiry Officer before
entering into a finding that the allegations against the Petitioner
are proved. Hence, there is perversity also in appreciating the
evidence in Ext.P33 Enquiry Report. The Petitioner produced
DWs 1 to 3, who are the superior officers of the Petitioner. All of
them deposed that they do not have any complaint against the
Petitioner and that the Petitioner had been very punctual and
sincere in his job. DWs 1 to 3 are the immediate superior officers
of the Petitioner. The allegation is that MW2 & MW3 contractors
submitted Exts.M5 & M7 complaints to the Respondent No.3.
The reason for submitting such complaints directly to the
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Respondent No.3 is not revealed. It is clear that the
Respondents obtained the said false complaints from MW2 &
MW3 in order to initiate disciplinary action against the Petitioner.
Even though there is specific allegation that MW2 had given
Rs.20,000/- as bribe to the Petitioner, no action was taken
against him for blacklisting, and he has still been continuing as
a contractor of the Respondents involving Crores of Rupees.
The Petitioner was compelled to approach this Court by filing
this Writ Petition challenging Ext.P37 Order & Ext.P33 Enquiry
Report since the Trade Unions refused to raise a dispute before
the Labour Court with regard to the legality of the same. Since
it is not a case of dismissal, the Petitioner cannot raise an
individual dispute before the Labour Court. The learned Counsel
pointed out the serious civil consequences suffered by the
Petitioner on account of the disciplinary proceedings, as the
basic pay of Rs.48,098/- and total monthly pay of
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Rs.1,26,880.30 enjoyed by the Petitioner as Senior Fitter
Craftsman was reduced to a pay scale of Rs.15,000 -
Rs.43,000 in the post of General Craftsman (Fitter). Learned
Counsel cited the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee [(2022) 13 SCC 329],
State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491], Anil
Kumar v. Presiding Officer and Others [(1985) 3 SCC 378], M.V. Bijlani v.
Union of India and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 88], Kuldeep Singh v.
Commissioner of Police and Others [(1999) 2 SCC 10] and Utkal
Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager and
Others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1400], the decision of this Court in
Sekharan N.R. v. State of Kerala [2015 KHC 3673], the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Association of Engineering Workers, Mumbai
v. Hindustan Motor Manufacturing Company, Mumbai [2004-II-LLJ 790]
and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sant Lal v. State
of U.P. and Others [MANU/UP/1302/2005] in support of his
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contentions. Learned Counsel concluded his arguments by
praying to allow the Writ Petition setting aside Ext.P37 Order
and Ext.P33 Enquiry Report and to grant appropriate reliefs to
the Petitioner as he retired from service during the pendency of
the Writ Petition.
9. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents
contended that when the Petitioner is having an effective
alternate remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before
the Labour Court against the Ext.P33 Enquiry Report and
Ext.P37 Order of the Disciplinary Authority, the Writ Petition
challenging the same is not maintainable. The Writ Petition was
filed at a time when the Petitioner was in the service of the
Respondents and the Petitioner was a member of the Trade
Union. The reasons stated in the Writ Petition for not invoking
the alternate remedy are that the alternate remedy is not
efficacious and the Petitioner is visited with severe financial
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implications which have a long-standing effect. The Petitioner
has no case that the Petitioner approached the Trade Union for
raising an industrial dispute and the same was refused by the
Trade Union. If the Petitioner had challenged Exts.P33 & P37
by raising an industrial dispute, the Labour Court would have
considered the legality and propriety of the enquiry at the first
stage. If the Labour Court had set aside the Enquiry Report, the
Labour Court would have given opportunity to the
Respondents/Management to adduce evidence before the
Labour Court to substantiate the charges against the Petitioner.
The said exercise could not be done by this Court. Hence, the
Writ Petition is not maintainable. The Petitioner has no
allegation that the principles of natural justice were not complied
with in the enquiry. The Petitioner was given effective
opportunity to defend the charges in the Enquiry Report. The
Respondents adduced both oral and documentary evidence
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before the Enquiry Officer by examining MWs 1 to 5 and marking
Exts.M1 to M9. The Petitioner adduced evidence by examining
DWs 1 to 4 and marking Exts.D1 to D22. When evidence is
available before the Enquiry Officer, it is a matter of appreciation
of evidence by the Enquiry Officer and it is not a case of no
evidence in support of the charges. Even assuming that the Writ
Petition is maintainable, this Court cannot undertake
reappreciation of evidence and arrive at a conclusion different
from that arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. There could not be
any perversity attributed to the findings in Ext.P33 Enquiry
Report, as the Enquiry Officer has entered findings based on the
evidence before him. The contention of the Petitioner that the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated by way of victimisation is
totally unfounded. There are several employees who had
challenged transfer orders issued by the Respondents before
the Court. In several cases, they obtained favourable orders
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also. The Petitioner could not point out that in all cases where
the employees approached the Court challenging the transfer
order or obtained favourable orders, the Respondents have
initiated disciplinary proceedings. When the acceptance of bribe
is proved in the enquiry, the Respondents could have imposed
the punishment of dismissal from service on the Petitioner. But
the Respondents have taken a lenient view and ordered
punishment of demotion on the Petitioner. If the intention of the
Respondents was to victimise the Petitioner, there was no need
for the Respondents to show any leniency in favour of the
Petitioner. Learned Counsel cited the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and
Others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [(2021) 2 SCC 612], Union of India and
Others v. P. Gunasekaran [(2015) 2 SCC 610], Airports Authority of India
v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee [(2025) 4 SCC 111] and Premier Automobiles
Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others [(1976) 1 SCC
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496] in support of his contentions. The learned Senior Counsel
concluded his arguments, praying to dismiss the Writ Petition.I
have considered the rival contentions.
10. Since the learned Senior Counsel has raised a question of
maintainability of the Writ Petition, let me consider the said
question first.
11. There is an effective adjudication mechanism under the
Industrial Disputes Act to challenge the Enquiry Report and the
Order of the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on the
basis of the findings in the Enquiry Report. If the Enquiry
Report is set aside by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, the
Management gets an opportunity to adduce evidence before
the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to prove the charges. If this
Court sets aside the Enquiry Report, the Management will not
get an opportunity to adduce evidence before this Court to
prove the charges. The Petitioner has not stated any
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sustainable reason to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though the Counsel for
the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner filed this Writ
Petition on the refusal of the Trade Union to raise an Industrial
Dispute, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondents, there is no averment in the Writ Petition
that the Petitioner approached the Trade Union to raise an
Industrial Dispute and the Trade Union refused the same. In
Premier Automobiles Ltd. (supra) cited by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
considered the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to
industrial disputes. It is held that if the industrial dispute relates
to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the
Industrial Disputes Act, then the only remedy available is to get
an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. In Utkal
Highways Engineers and Contractors (supra) cited by the learned
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Counsel for the Petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
dismissal of a Writ Petition on grounds of alternative remedy
after 10 years, particularly when parties have exchanged
affidavits, is not the correct course unless there are disputed
questions of fact which by their very nature cannot be
adjudicated upon without recording formal evidence. The
decision in Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors (supra) is
clearly distinguishable as the remedy before this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not an effective
remedy to challenge the Enquiry Report and the Order of the
Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on the basis of the
findings in the Enquiry Report. Hence, I find that this Writ
Petition challenging Ext.P33 Enquiry Report and Ext.P37
Order of the Disciplinary Authority is unsustainable.
12. Then, let me examine the established propositions of law with
respect to the scope of judicial review in disciplinary
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proceedings, which are laid down in the decisions cited by both
sides.
13. Biswanath Bhattacharjee (supra) cited by the Counsel for the
Petitioner arose from a departmental proceedings, in which the
Hon'ble Supreme Court followed its decision in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749] in which it is held that where the
findings of the disciplinary authority are not based on evidence,
or based on a consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring
relevant material, are mala fide, or where the findings are
perverse or such that they could not have been rendered by any
reasonable person placed in like circumstances, the remedies
under Article 226 of the Constitution are available, and
intervention is warranted. In the very same decision, it is held
that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made; that it is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
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ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the Court; that the
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an
appellate authority; it does not re-appreciate the evidence; that
the Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the
proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is
based on no evidence; that if the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case; that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts; that in a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant and that
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adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court referred Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964)
4 SCR 718], in which it is held that if the conclusion, upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
the record or is based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued.
14. Rattan Singh (supra) cited by the Counsel for the Petitioner arose
from a service case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in a
domestic enquiry, the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence
under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, may not apply; that all
materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible; that departmental authorities and administrative
tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should
not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under
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the Evidence Act; and that sufficiency of evidence in proof of the
finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. It is further held
that the essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion
of extraneous materials or considerations, and observance of
rules of natural justice, and that fair play is the basis and if
perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiates the conclusions reached, such a finding, even
though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.
15. Anil Kumar (supra) is cited by the Counsel for the Petitioner to
substantiate the point that the Enquiry Report is bad if the
Enquiry Officer does not discuss the evidence. It is held that an
Enquiry Report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the
reasons for the conclusion; that it cannot be an ipse dixit of the
Enquiry Officer; that it has to be a speaking order in the sense
that the conclusion is supported by reasons; and that where a
disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a
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stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of
natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must
be a reasoned one.
16. In M.V. Bijlani (supra) cited by the Counsel for the Petitioner, it is
held that disciplinary proceedings being quasi-criminal in
nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge; that
the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon
analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there
had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges
on the basis of materials on record; and that while doing so, he
cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact.
17. In Kuldeep Singh (supra), it is held that if a decision is arrived at
on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
perverse; that if there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever
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compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated
as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with; and
that normally the High Court and the Supreme Court would not
interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic
enquiry but if the findings of guilt is based on no evidence, it
would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial
scrutiny.
18. The decision of this Court in Sekharan N.R. (supra) is cited by the
Counsel for the Petitioner to substantiate the point that, without
any proof of demand of illegal gratification, a person cannot be
found guilty. This decision arose from a criminal case under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in which this Court was
considering the ingredients of the offence under Section 7
therein, and hence this decision is not applicable to the present
case.
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19. In Association of Engineering Workers(supra), the Bombay High
Court held that it is the duty of the Enquiry Officer to analyse
evidence to disclose how the allegation against the workman is
established.
20. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sant Lal (supra) is
cited by the Counsel for the Petitioner to substantiate the point
that uncorroborated evidence should not be relied on. In the said
case, the Court was dealing with the reliability of the evidence
of an approver in a criminal case, and hence, this decision is not
applicable to the case on hand.
21. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents cited Ajai Kumar
Srivastava (supra) to highlight the scope of judicial review in
departmental enquiry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an
evaluation of the decision - making process and not the merits
of the decision itself; that it is to ensure fairness in treatment and
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not to ensure fairness of conclusion; that the Court/Tribunal may
interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in
any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence; that if the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever
reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the
evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued; and that the
scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination
of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a
matter of fact. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the
matters to be examined by the Court as: (i) whether the enquiry
was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural
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justice are complied with; and (iii) whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has
power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
22. In P. Gunasekaran (supra) cited by the Senior Counsel for the
Respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while
exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court shall not - (i) reappreciate
the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii)
go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of
the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however
grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
23. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents cited the recent
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradip Kumar Banerjee
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(supra) arising from a charge of illegal gratification in which it is
held that even non-examination of the complainant is not fatal
in a departmental enquiry if there is sufficient evidence from
other witnesses in a departmental enquiry. The further finding is
that it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with
each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the
representation against the proposed penalty and detailed
reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing
punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer. But this finding is made with reference to the Order of
the Disciplinary Authority and not with reference to the Enquiry
Report.
24. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal propositions, let me examine
whether there is any scope for interference with Ext.P37 Order
of the Disciplinary Authority and Ext.P33 Enquiry Report. In the
light of the aforesaid legal propositions and the arguments
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addressed before me, the question to be considered is whether
Ext.P37 Order and Ext.P33 Enquiry Report are unsustainable
on the grounds of a case of no evidence to prove the charges,
perversity of findings, and victimisation.
25. The Petitioner has no case that there is a violation of the
principles of natural justice in the Enquiry. The Petitioner was
given full opportunity to cross-examine the Management
Witnesses and to examine Witnesses from his side. Since both
sides adduced evidence before the Enquiry Officer, it could not
be said that it is a case of no evidence. In view of the settled
propositions of law, the adequacy or reliability of evidence in the
domestic enquiry is not a matter for the Court to consider. In light
of the aforesaid decisions, what is needed is some evidence to
prove the charges. Under judicial review, this Court cannot
reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different
from that of the Enquiry Officer. Of course, if necessary, this
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Court can go through the evidence to confirm that it is not a case
of no evidence. While undertaking such an exercise, even if this
Court is of the view that a different conclusion could have been
possible, this Court cannot substitute its view with that of the
Enquiry Officer. That too, when the Enquiry Report and the
Order of the Disciplinary Authority in a labour matter are
challenged directly in this Court. Even the fairness of the
conclusion is not a matter for this Court to consider. I hold that
this is not a case of no evidence to support the charges against
the Petitioner.
26. The next question is whether there is any perversity in the
findings of the Enquiry Officer. It is well settled that the strict rules
of evidence is not applicable to an enquiry in disciplinary
proceedings. Only if the Enquiry Officer has entered findings
contrary to the evidence before him, it could be said that he acted
in a perverse manner. Even though the Petitioner attempted to
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persuade this Court by taking this Court extensively through the
evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer, this Court is of the
view that even if the Petitioner succeeds in such an attempt, it is
not legally permissible for this Court to substitute its opinion with
that of the opinion of the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer has
discussed the evidence in the Enquiry Report. Even if this Court
feels that there should have been a better consideration or
discussion of evidence at the hands of the Enquiry Officer, it is
not a ground to interfere with the Enquiry Report. I hold that there
is no perversity or arbitrariness in the findings of the Enquiry
Officer.
27. Learned Counsel contended that the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated by way of victimisation for challenging the transfer
order issued by the Respondents. There is nothing on record to
prove that the Respondents used to victimize employees who
challenged the actions of the Respondents. When the charge of
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taking bribe is proved in the enquiry, the Respondents could have
imposed a punishment of dismissal on the Petitioner. But the
Respondents took a lenient view and imposed a punishment of
demotion to a lower grade with lower pay. Of course, it has
resulted in serious civil consequences for the Petitioner. But
considering the proven charge of taking bribe, it is only a lesser
punishment. In such a case, the case of victimisation alleged by
the Petitioner is unsustainable.
28. The Writ Petition fails both on the ground of maintainability and
unsustainability of the challenge against Ext.P33 Enquiry Report
and Ext.P37 Order of the Disciplinary Authority. Accordingly, the
Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM
JUDGE
Jma/shg
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 29334 OF 2016
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE DEGREE CERTIFICATE OF SOCIOLOGY
ISSUED BY THE M.G.UNIVERISTY.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE NATIONAL CERTIFICATE IN
SUPERVISION.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 13.10.2000 PROMOTING
THE PETITINER AS SENIOR FITTER CRAFTSMAN.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE SELECTION MEMO DAT ED
31.10.2008.
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE TRANSFER ORDER DATED 10.11.2011.
EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF STATUS QUO IN WP(C)
NO.30508/2011.
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT DATED 2.3.2012 FILED
BY THE PETITIONER ALONG WITHOUT ANNEXURES.
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT IN WP(C)
NO.30508/11 DATED 22.11.2011.
EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 17.9.2012.
EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 1.10.2012.
EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 1.10.2012.
EXHIBIT P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 5.3.2013.
EXHIBIT P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 12.3.2013.
EXHIBIT P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE LIST OF WITNESS AND DOCUMENTS
SUBMITTED BY THE PRESENTING OFFICER DATED
19.4.2013.
EXHIBIT P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY
THE MANAGEMENT ON 6.5.2013.
EXHIBIT P16 A TRUE COPY OFTHE ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST
SUBMITTED BY THE MANAGEMENT DATED 17.9.2014.
EXHIBIT P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL WITNESS LIST
SUBMITTED BY THE MANAGEMENT DATED 24.10.2013.
EXHIBIT P18 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 14.3.2014 IN
WP(C) NO.30508/2011.
EXHIBIT P19 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY SUBMITTED BY THE
MANAGEMENT DATED 21.11.2014.
EXHIBIT P20 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 17.11.2007 WHICH
IS MARKED AS M-5 IN THE ENQUIRY PROCEEDINGS.
EXHIBIT P21 A TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT RECORDED FROM C.P.
SAYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALLEGATION AGAINST
THE PETITIONER MARKED AS M6 IN THE ENQUIRY.
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EXHIBIT P22 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT CHECKING THE VERACITY OF
THE COMPLAINT PREPARED BY MW4.,
EXHIBIT P23 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT SUBMITTED BY THE
K.K.ANILKUMAR TO THE DGM MAINTENANCE MARKED AS M7
IN THE ENQUIRY.
EXHIBIT P24 A TRUE COPY OF THESTATEMETN RECORDED FROM
K.K.ANILKUMAR ON 23.1.2012 BY THE MW4 AND MARKED
AS M8.
EXHIBIT P25 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE DEPOSITION
OF MW1.
EXHIBIT P26 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE DEPOSITION
OF MW2.,
EXHIBIT P27 A RELEVANT PORTION OF THE DEPOSTIION OF MW 3.
EXHIBIT P28 RELEVANT PORTION OF THE DEPOSTION OF THE MW4 IN
THE ENQUIRY.
EXHIBIT P29 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE MW5
DEPOSITION.
EXHIBIT P30 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE DEPOSITON
OF THE DW1.
EXHIBIT P31 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE DEPOSITION.
EXHIBIT P32 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF THE DEPOSTION
OF DW4.,
EXHIBIT P33 A TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT.
EXHIBIT P34 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY.
EXHIBIT P35 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROPOSED PUNISHMENT.
EXHIBIT P36 A TRUE COPY OF THEREPLY ORDER 20.10 .
EXHIBIT P37 A TRUE COPY OF THE PURCHASE.
EXHIBIT P38 A TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY STATEMENT CONTAINING THE
STANDARD MONTHLY SALARY FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
2015.
EXHIBIT P39 A TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY OF THE PETITIONER DURING
THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 2015 AFTER HIS DEMOTION.
