[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
Santhosh Kumar R vs Dr. Sanjay Behari on 5 February, 2026
CON.CASE(C) NO. 2639 OF 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
THURSDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 16TH MAGHA, 1947
CON.CASE(C) NO. 2639 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 13.08.2024 IN OP (CAT) NO.104 OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA
PETITIONER/S:
1 SANTHOSH KUMAR R. AGED 47 YEARS
S/O RAVEENDRAN R., TECHNICAL ASSISTANT A, DEPARTMENT OF BIO-CHEMISTRY,
SREE CHITHIRA THIRUNAL INSTIITUTE FOR MEDICAL SCINCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
MEDICAL COLLEGE P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695011
2 PRADEEP M.J. AGED 42 YEARS
S/O MAHADEVAN, TECHNICAL ASSISTANT A, DEPARTMENT OF BIO-CHEMISTRY, SREE
CHITHIRA THIRUNAL INSTIITUTE FOR MEDICAL SCINCE AND TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL
COLLEGE P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695011
3 FORUM OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS (FORMETECH)
SREE CHITHIRA THIRUNAL INSTIITUTE FOR MEDICAL SCINCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
MEDICAL COLLEGE P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - , REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, RANJITH S., PIN - 695011
BY ADVS.
SHRI.K.H.ASIF
SHRI.C.A.MAJEED
SMT.MOLTY MAJEED
SHRI.P.B.UNNIKRISHNAN NAIR
SMT.SHERIN BIJU
CON.CASE(C) NO. 2639 OF 2025
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RESPONDENT/S:
DR. SANJAY BEHARI
AGE AND FATHERS NAME NOT KNOWN, DIRECTOR, SREE CHITHIRA THIRUNAL
INSTIITUTE FOR MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL COLLEGE P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695011
BY ADV SHRI.V. SAJITH KUMAR, SC, SREE CHITRA TIRUNAL INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL
SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY (SCTIMST)
SRI ARL SUNDARESHAN, ASGI
THIS CONTEMPT OF COURT CASE (CIVIL) HAVING RESERVED ON 20.01.2026, THE COURT ON
05.02.2026 THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.
The present Contempt Case is filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Article 215 of the Constitution
of India, alleging willful disobedience of and non-compliance with the
common judgment dated 13.08.2024 passed in O.P.(CAT) Nos. 104 of 2019
and 215 of 2017, arising out of O.A. No. 300/2015 on the file of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench, as well as the order dated
03.12.2024 passed in R.P. Nos. 991 of 2024 and 988 of 2024 in O.P.(CAT)
Nos. 215 of 2017 and 104 of 2019 respectively.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners had filed an
Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Ernakulam Bench, seeking restoration of the Hospital Patient Care
Allowance (HPCA) / Patient Care Allowance (PCA) from the date of its
discontinuance and grant of all consequential arrears. The Tribunal,
after hearing both sides, allowed the Original Application, directing the
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respondent herein to restore the HPCA/PCA from the date of its
discontinuance and to grant all consequential arrears within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
2.1 Being aggrieved by the said order, O.P.(CAT) Nos. 104 of 2019
and 215 of 2017 were filed by the petitioners as well as the respondent
respectively. Both the Original Petitions were heard analogously and
were disposed of by a common judgment. This Court disposed of the
Original Petitions by modifying the order to the extent indicated below:
"13. Thus, we modify the order of the Tribunal and direct the
respondents to reconsider the issue of the applicants and similarly
situated persons who had been falling under Group 'C' and 'D' category
for the purpose of eligibility of HPCA and pay HPCA in case they have not
been brought under the insurance coverage, and if otherwise, there will
be no directions. If the insurance coverage has been provided, then
respondents are not required to determine HPCA in respect of Group 'C'
and 'B' employees.
It is clear that persons falling in the category of Grade Pay of Rs.5400,
Rs.4800, Rs.4600 and Rs.4200 in the pay scale of 9300-34800 are falling
under Group 'B' category and therefore, would not be entitled to the
benefit of HPCA.
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With the aforementioned modification, these OP(CAT)s stand disposed
off."
2.2 Being aggrieved, the petitioners herein had also filed Review
Petition Nos. 991 and 988 of 2024, which came to be dismissed vide order
dated 03.12.2024, wherein this Court passed the following order:
"In this view of the matter, we thus modify the judgment and expunge
the following observations from the judgment.
Paragraph 12: 'and therefore, they were brought under category of Group
'B' who were not eligible for facility of HPCA'
Paragraph 13: "It is clear that persons falling in the category of Grade Pay
of Rs.5400, Rs.4800, Rs.4600 and Rs.4200 in the pay scale of 9300-34800 are
failing under Group 'B' category and therefore, would not be entitled to
the benefit of HPCA."
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that,
despite the specific orders issued by this Court, the respondent has failed
to comply with the same. It was submitted that, notwithstanding the
specific direction issued by this Court to bring the petitioners under
insurance coverage, the respondent has willfully and deliberately
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violated the directions of this Court by not complying with the order,
thereby flouting the orders passed by this Court.
4. Notice was issued to the respondent herein, who, in turn, filed
a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, it is pleaded that a bare
reading of the judgment dated 13.08.2024 passed in the Original
Petitions, as well as the order dated 03.12.2024 passed in the Review
Petitions, makes it clear that the operative directions issued therein are
strictly limited to employees falling under Group C and Group D
categories. As per the Government of India, Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare Office Memorandum dated 25.01.1988, HPCA/PCA was
sanctioned exclusively for Group C and Group D (non-ministerial)
employees who regularly handle infectious patients or contaminated
materials and are exposed to associated occupational risks. The said
Scheme was never intended to apply to Group B employees or higher
categories.
4.1 It is further stated that the Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for
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Medical Sciences and Technology has implemented the policy of the
Government of India by granting HPCA/PCA to all eligible Group C and
Group D employees, including those working in the BMT Wing.
4.2 In the absence of any specific direction to grant the benefit of
HPCA/PCA to Group B employees, the respondent contends that there
has been no willful disobedience of the directions passed by this Court.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the contempt petition deserves to be
closed and that the rule nisi issued against the respondent/alleged
contemnor stands discharged.
5. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the
records.
6. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, defines "civil
contempt" as the willful disobedience of a court's judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ, or other process, or the willful breach of an
undertaking given to a court.
6.1 Initiation of contempt proceedings requires a deliberate,
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intentional flouting of court orders rather than mere
negligence. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act forms the basis
for initiating civil contempt proceedings, allowing Courts to penalize
parties who refuse to comply with judicial orders.
Judicial Pronouncements:
Niaz Mohammad And Others v. State of Haryana and Others1
7. The Supreme Court in the above case has dealt with Section
2(b) elaborately as follows:
"9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act') defines "Civil Contempt" to mean "willful disobedience to
any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a
court...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry
out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil
contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction
has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt
against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing
from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like
an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order
(1994) 6 SCC 332
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has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The Court while
considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be
punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the
Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a
particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil
contempt, have said that it must be willful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a
contemner is punished for non compliance of the direction of a court the
Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment,
decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such
disobedience was willful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing
a decree against the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered
whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was willful. Once
a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree
whatever may be consequences thereof. But while examining the
grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to
initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before
any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record
a finding that such disobedience was willful and intentional. If from the
circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the
Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such
disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances which it was
not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court may
not punish the alleged contemner."
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A.K. Jayaprakash v. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao2
8. The Supreme Court in the above case in paragraphs 16 to 19
held as follows:
"16. The question that arises for consideration is whether the delayed
compliance constitutes willful disobedience so as to attract the
jurisdiction of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
17. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and Others - (2003) 11
SCC 1, this Court has held that contempt jurisdiction is intended to uphold
the majesty of law and not to settle personal grievances. Similarly, in
Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Another (2006) 11 SCC 114, in a case of
civil contempt, the breach must be deliberate and intentional.
18. Tested on the anvil of the above principles, we find that although the
Bank did not effect payment within the time permitted by this Court, the
material placed on record do not demonstrate that the delay in
compliance was borne out of any willful or contumacious intent. The
explanation tendered refers to administrative hurdles post-merger and
retrieval of records dating back over three decades. While such
circumstances cannot justify laxity in complying with orders of this
Court, the element of mens rea, essential for sustaining a charge of civil
contempt, cannot be inferred merely from the factum of delay.
19. Insofar as the claim for pension is concerned, it is evident that no such
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relief was ever sought in the Civil Appeal Nos. 6732-6733 of 2009 or any
other earlier proceedings or submissions moved by the Petitioner, nor
was there any adjudication to the said effect by the courts below.
Contempt jurisdiction is not a forum for asserting new claims or seeking
substantive reliefs which were neither raised nor granted earlier."
Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly3
9. In the above case, the Supreme Court was considering an
appeal from the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
which held that the respondent/contemners had not complied with the
order in an appropriate manner, but there is some doubt and the
respondent/contemners were entitled to benefit of doubt. However, the
Division Bench issued new orders different than the original one which
were disapproved by the Supreme Court observing thus:
"11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and
dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded
by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and
the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is
undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced
(2002) 5 SCC 352
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under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of
the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the
country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power
vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the
statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and
caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied
regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in
mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt
does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of
the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be
confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate
disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who
is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The
court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into
questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment
or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to
consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not
to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the
question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have
committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions
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issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the
court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead
of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the
power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by
the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in
mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts
exercising contempt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers
in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same
without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be
avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the
party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in
the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions
is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round
of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the
majesty and image of courts.
***
13. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are constrained to
hold that the judgment/order passed by the High Court was without
jurisdiction. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment/order
under challenge is set aside. The petition filed by the writ petitioners
for taking action for contempt of court against the respondents is
dismissed."
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V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju4
10. The Supreme Court observed that the position of law is that
in contempt proceedings no further directions could be issued by the
Court. If it is found that there is a violation of the order passed by the
Court, the Court may punish the contemnor; otherwise, notice of
contempt is to be discharged. The order passed in the contempt petition
could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting relief.
Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran5
11. In this case the Supreme Court held as follows:
"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish
for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the
Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic
power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual
charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power
casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest
of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not,
adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination
(2004) 13 SCC 610
(2014) 3 SCC 373
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of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which
disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond
the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or
enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the
judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions
which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly selfevident ought
to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether
there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided
issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered.
The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the
power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review
or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to
what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while
exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an
exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as
noticed above...."
Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Raphael & Company6
12. The Division Bench of this Court, headed by the then Chief
Justice, in the above case dealt with the circumstances amounting to
willful disobedience as follows:
"12. Thus, the legal position is settled that civil contempt jurisdiction is
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meant to ensure compliance with the orders of the Court and maintain
the dignity of the Court. This jurisdiction is not be executed to
supplement or modify earlier judicial decisions. In contempt jurisdiction
Courts have to limit the determination to whether there has been willful
disobedience to a self-evident order. It is not permissible to travel beyond
the original judgment or enter into issues that were not previously
adjudicated. Directions that are not contained in the judgment cannot be
enforced through contempt proceedings. If an order is ambiguous,
seeking clarification through review or appeal is the appropriate remedy.
Thus, if a substantive relief that alters the original order or a new order
is executed in civil contempt, proceedings will be beyond jurisdiction."
13. Willful disobedience under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 arises only when non-compliance is deliberate,
conscious and intentional, with full knowledge of the order and the
ability to comply. Mere delay, administrative difficulty, bona fide
interpretation or inability to comply does not constitute willful
disobedience, as consistently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Niaz
Mohammad (supra) and Ashok Paper Kamgar Union (supra).
14. On a perusal of the judgment and order passed in the Original
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Petitions as well as the Review Petitions, it is clear that persons drawing
a pay scale of ₹9,300-34,800 and falling under the Group B category are
not entitled to the said benefit. Admittedly, the petitioners belong to the
Group B category and are drawing a pay scale of ₹9,300-34,800.
In view of the aforementioned, no case for initiating contempt
proceedings is made out. The contempt case is, therefore, closed, and the
rule nisi issued against the respondent stands discharged.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
JUDGE
Sd/-
P. V. BALAKRISHNAN
JUDGE
jjj
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APPENDIX OF CON.CASE(C) NO. 2639 OF 2025
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure.A-1 CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 13/08/2024 IN OP(CAT)
Annexure.A-2 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 03/12/2024 IN RP NO. 988/2024 IN
OP(CAT) 104 OF 2019
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
Annexure R1(a) A true copy of the Audit Enquiry Reference No. 21 (AENQ-447652) dated
09.01.2024 issued by the Director General of Audit (Environment and
Scientific Departments), New Delhi at Bengaluru
Annexure R1(b) A true copy of the Audit Enquiry Reference No. 20 (AENQ-447436) dated
09.01.2024 issued by the Director General of Audit (Environment and
Scientific Departments), New Delhi at Bengaluru
