Anil K. Narendran, J.
2. By the judgment dated 24.09.2025, the learned Single
Judge dismissed the writ petition. Paragraphs 2 to 4 and also the
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the sale
of a portion of a property can wipe out the entire liability.
These are all the contentions the petitioner can urge before
the Tribunal while challenging the measures of the secured
creditor for the sale of the property. Parallel attempts by filing
this writ petition after the stay granted by the tribunal is
vacated, cannot be entertained.
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The stay petition having been dismissed, the remedy of the
petitioner is to approach the Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
Without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to avail of the
same and without prejudice to any of the contentions, the writ
petition is dismissed."
3. Challenging the judgment dated 24.09.2025 of the
learned Single in W.P.(C)No.35003 of 2025, the appellant is before
this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section
5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner
and the learned Standing Counsel for State Bank of India, for the
respondents.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner would
contend that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is one
rendered without taking note of the legal and factual contentions
raised by the petitioner. The learned counsel would submit that
there is no suppression of facts by the petitioner, on account of non-
production of a copy of the judgment of this Court dated 11.04.2025
in W.P.(C)No.15757 of 2025, along with the memorandum of
W.P.(C)No.35003 of 2025, since while marking Ext.P3 order dated
28.04.2025 issued by the respondent Bank, the petitioner has
stated that the proposal made by the petitioner pursuant to the
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direction contained in the said judgment dated 11.04.2025, for
permitting him to clear the balance outstanding liability, by selling
a portion of the property, was rejected by Ext.P3 order.
6. The learned Standing Counsel for the State Bank of
India, for the respondents would submit that in S.A.No.725 of 2024
filed by the appellant-petitioner challenging the proceedings
initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal-II, Ernakulam, granted an interim order. Since the
appellant failed to comply with the condition stipulated in that order
regarding payment of the second installment, the Tribunal vacated
that interim order, vide Ext.P4 order dated 11.08.2025. The
appellant has not chosen to challenge Ext.P4 order by approaching
the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, invoking the provisions
under the SARFAESI Act.
7. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip
[(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge made
against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act,
the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the
interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and
efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a
statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of
the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such
matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court.
The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued
over a decision when the court finds that the process does not
conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not
expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making
authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons
assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all
violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into
the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question
as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory
prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the
domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence
and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal.
The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as
observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4
SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of
recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair
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mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally
trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers
to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential
reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and
costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive
meaning to the expression 'any person', who could approach the
Tribunal.
8. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311] the
Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act,
approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the
borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of
mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said
power in the absence of any legal right. More circumspection is
required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the
parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode,
an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a
writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of
approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees,
and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph
17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law
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regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining
to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal
Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank
of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank
of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix
ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC
345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023)
2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while
requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In
paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the
powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are
rather wide, but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and
adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters
involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has
provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.
9. Rule 146 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971,
deals with contents of the applications. As per the proviso to Rule
146, no petition shall be entertained by the Registry unless it
contains a statement as to whether the petitioner had filed any
petition seeking similar reliefs in respect of the same subject matter
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earlier and if so, the result thereof. The statement made in
paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in support of W.P.(C)No.35003 of
2025 is that the petitioner has not filed any other petition before
this Court seeking same or identical reliefs. However, in paragraph
3 of the statement of facts the petitioner has stated about the
disposal of W.P.(C)No.15757 of 2025, by the judgment dated
11.04.2025.
10. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decision
referred to supra, the remedy open to the appellant-petitioner, if he
is aggrieved by the proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank
under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, is to approach the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, by way of a Securitisation Application under
Section 17 of the said Act. In S.A.No.725 of 2024 filed by the
appellant-petitioner before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II,
Ernakulam, the Tribunal granted an interim order. Since the
appellant failed to comply with the condition stipulated in that
interim order, the same was vacated vide Ext.P4 order dated
11.08.2025. If the appellant is feeling aggrieved by that order, he
has to invoke the statutory remedy provided under Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act by approaching the Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal.
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11. In such circumstances, we find no reason to interfere
with the judgment dated 24.09.2025 of the learned Single Judge in
W.P.(C)No.35003 of 2025, whereby that writ petition was dismissed,
without prejudice to the right of the appellant-petitioner to invoke
the statutory remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act.
In the result, this writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly
dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
MSA
