Kerala High Court
Varghese .P.Kuriakose vs Emilda Varghese @ Rajini on 6 October, 2025
Author: Sathish Ninan
Bench: Sathish Ninan
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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2025:KER:72628
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 14TH ASWINA, 1947
MAT.APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2019
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 25.05.2019 IN OP NO.1024 OF
2014 OF FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT IN O.P.:
EMILDA VARGHESE @ RAJANI
AGED 46 YEARS
D/O. LUBIS SEBASTIAN,
PULIYATHARAYIL HOUSE,
CHELLANAM P.O., CHELLANAM VILLAGE,
KOCHI 682 008.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.D.G.VIPIN
SRI.KAROL MATHEWS SEBASTIAN ALENCHERRY
RESPONDENT/PETITIONER IN O.P.:
VARGHESE.P.KURIAKOSE, AGED 56 YEARS
S/O. VARKEY KURIAKOSE, CHAMAPARAMBIL HOUSE,
MALAKUNNAM P.O., KURICHY VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM TALUK 683 535.
BY ADVS.
SRI.ABRAHAM GEORGE JACOB
SHRI.JIBU P THOMAS
SHRI.C.MURALIKRISHNAN (PAYYANUR)
THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON
24.09.2025, ALONG WITH RPFC.149/2023, 384/2019, THE COURT ON
06.10.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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2025:KER:72628
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 14TH ASWINA, 1947
RPFC NO. 149 OF 2023
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 25/05/2019 IN MC NO.68 OF 2017 OF
FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM
REVISION PETITIONER/RESPONDENT IN M.C.:
VARGHESE P KURIAKOSE
S/O. VARKEY KURIAKOSE, CHAMAPARAMBIL HOUSE,
MALAKUNNAM P.O, KURICHY VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM TALUK, - 683535.
BY ADV SRI.ABRAHAM GEORGE JACOB
RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
EMILDA VARGHESE @ RAJINI
D/O LUBIS SEBASTIAN, PULIYATHARAYIL HOUSE,
CHELLANAM P.O, CHELLANAM VILLAGE, KOCHI - 682008.
BY ADVS.
SRI.ENOCH DAVID SIMON JOEL
SRI.S.SREEDEV
SRI.RONY JOSE
SHRI.LEO LUKOSE
SRI.KAROL MATHEWS SEBASTIAN ALENCHERRY
SHRI.DERICK MATHAI SAJI
SHRI.KARAN SCARIA ABRAHAM
THIS REV.PETITION(FAMILY COURT) HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING
ON 24.09.2025, ALONG WITH MAT.APPEAL.596/2019 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.10.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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2025:KER:72628
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 14TH ASWINA, 1947
RPFC NO. 384 OF 2019
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 25.05.2019 IN MC NO.68 OF 2017 OF
FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM
REVISION PETITIONER/PETITIONER IN M.C.:
EMILDA VARGHESE @ RAJANI,
AGED 41 YEARS
D/O LUBIS SEBASTIAN, PULIYATHARAYIL HOUSE,
CHELLANAM P.O.,CHELLANAM VILLAGE, KOCHI-682 008.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.D.G.VIPIN
SRI.KAROL MATHEWS SEBASTIAN ALENCHERRY
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT IN M.C.:
VARGHESE.P.KURIAKOSE
AGED 51 YEARS
S/O VARKEY KURIAKOSE, CHAMAPARAMBIL HOUSE,
MALAKUNNAM P.O., KURICHY VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM TALUK-683 535.
THIS REV.PETITION(FAMILY COURT) HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING
ON 24.09.2025 ALONG WITH MAT.APPEAL NO.596/2019 AND CONNECTED
CASES, THE COURT ON 06.10.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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2025:KER:72628
CR
SATHISH NINAN & P. KRISHNA KUMAR, JJ.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Mat.Appeal No.596/2019 &
R.P.(FC)Nos.384/2019, 149/2023
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Dated this the 6th day of October, 2025
JUDGMENT
P.Krishna Kumar, J.
The above appeal and the revision petitions are
preferred against the common judgment passed by the Family
Court, Kottayam, by which the petition filed by the husband
for dissolution of marriage and the case filed by the wife
for maintenance were allowed.
2. The wife challenges the judgment, being aggrieved
both by the decree of dissolution and by the insufficiency
of the maintenance awarded. The husband also challenges that
part of the judgment by which he was directed to pay
maintenance at the rate of ₹6,000/- per month. For the sake
of convenience, the parties will hereinafter be referred to
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as they were arrayed in the petition for divorce.
3. The marriage was solemnized on 20.04.2006 under the
Christian law. The petitioner-husband contended that on the
death of his first wife he was left with two minor children,
and since he was employed far away at the US base in
Afghanistan, he was compelled to marry the respondent to
ensure their care. However, soon after the marriage, it was
understood that the respondent was not at all endearing and
was neither attending to nor caring for the children or his
ailing father. When his father died, the petitioner had to
shift his daughter to a hostel because of the continuous
harassment by the respondent. As the younger son was with
the respondent, she continued to assault and torture him.
She portrayed the child as a problematic ward, compelling
the teachers to give counselling to him, resulting in grave
mental agony to the child and to the petitioner. The
respondent even attempted to resort to sorcery on the child
to remove him from the house and permitted him to enter the
house only through the back door. The respondent further
attempted to commit suicide by consuming an excessive number
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of tablets, but it was averted by timely medical care. At
last, the petitioner was constrained to send the child to
his brother in Kuwait. Later, when the petitioner returned
home on leave, the respondent picked a quarrel with him and
left his company, leaving him in extreme mental agony,
harassment and humiliation. These are the circumstances upon
which the petitioner seeks a remedy for the dissolution of
marriage.
4. The respondent denied all the above allegations and
contended that she had attended to the petitioner's father
with due diligence and had always taken care of the children
with love, care and compassion. She was a loving and devoted
wife and the allegations of harassment and ill-treatment are
false. It was the petitioner and his son who kept torturing
her physically and mentally to such an extent that she had
to swallow some tablets at home in a spur of emotion. The
respondent had only informed the petitioner about the
unhealthy relationship of the daughter and some acts of
misdemeanor of the younger son with the intention of
correcting him, it is contented.
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5. The respondent-wife filed the maintenance case
contending that ever since the marriage, the husband did not
pay any amount as maintenance to her, whereas she was unable
to maintain herself and she required ₹50,000/- per month for
managing her affairs. It is alleged that the petitioner,
being a Technician in the US military base in Afghanistan,
had been receiving a monthly salary of more than
₹2,00,000/-. Thus, she claimed ₹50,000/- as monthly
maintenance.
6. The petitioner-husband denied the said allegation and
contended that he had been sending ₹10,000/- to ₹15,000/-
every month for the household expenses and the maintenance
of the wife. The respondent had been engaged in tailoring
work and earning more than ₹5,000/- per month. He also
alleged that the respondent deserted him without any
justification and hence she is not entitled to get any
maintenance.
7. Both cases were tried together by the Family Court.
The evidence of the petitioner consists of the testimony of
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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PW1 to PW6 and Ext. A1. The respondent examined herself as
RW1 and produced Ext. B1. After analysing the oral and
documentary evidence, the trial court concluded that the
respondent ill-treated the children, which agonized their
father - the petitioner, and hence he is entitled to get
divorce. The court also found that the petitioner is bound
to pay maintenance at the rate of ₹6,000/- per month, as
there were no materials to prove that the wife left the
company of the petitioner on her own.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on
either side.
9. The main contention raised by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-wife is that dissolution of
marriage under Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act can be
granted only if the husband succeeded in proving the element
of cruelty in the exact terms of the statute, i.e., when the
husband was treated by the wife with such cruelty as to
cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the
petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for him to
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live with the wife. To substantiate his contention, the
learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Libin
Varghese v. Rajani Anna Mathew (2022 (5) KLT 448). The
learned counsel further submitted that none of the
contentions raised by the petitioner would amount to cruelty
within the meaning of Section 10(1)(x) of the Act and hence
the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with. He
further submitted that the amount of maintenance awarded by
the trial Court is too low considering the status and income
of the petitioner.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner contended that the evidence of PW1 to PW6
would clearly prove that the respondent was extremely cruel
to the petitioner's children and that she even tried to
commit suicide without any cause and that all these acts
amount to severe cruelty, as continuing such a relationship
would be extremely dangerous to the life of the petitioner.
Relying on the decision in Mohanan v. Thankamani (1994 (2)
KLT 677), the learned counsel further contended that ill-
treatment of children would amount to inflicting mental
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cruelty on the father and hence that itself is sufficient to
attract the statutory provision. Reliance was also placed on
Narendra v. K. Meena (2016 (5) KHC 180) to contend that the
attempt of the wife to separate the husband from his family
members also amounts to cruelty.
11. As it was contended by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent that the alleged ill-treatment of the
children by the wife would not attract Section 10(1)(x) of
the Act, it is necessary to consider the said aspect first.
Section 10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act reads as follows:
"10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage.--(1) Any
marriage solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001
(51 of 2001), may, on a petition presented to the
District Court either by the husband or the wife, be
dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of
the marriage, the respondent--
xx xx xx xx
(x) has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to
cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the
petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the
petitioner to live with the respondent."
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This Court in A: husband v. B: wife (2010 (4) KLT 434), had
the occasion to consider the question whether the term
"cruelty" is used with different magnitude in various
statutes relating to marriage and divorce. After analysing
the analogous provisions in the Hindu Marriage Act and the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, the Division Bench of
this Court held that the nature of cruelty which would
entitle a spouse to divorce must certainly be identical in
all religious faiths, as the law cannot recognize varieties
of cruelty based on religion. Merely because different words
are used in the respective personal laws, it was held that
identical standards of matrimonial cruelty have to be
applied by the courts for all citizens irrespective of the
words used in the statute. The court held as follows:
"33. All courts called upon to consider the plea for a
decree for divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelty
under any of the enactments referred above must reckon the
above observations as beacon lights to ascertain the
contours of matrimonial cruelty. To live without the
threat or risk of matrimonial cruelty must be reckoned as
a Constitutional fundamental right guaranteed under Art.
21 of the Constitution. That inalienable human right must
ideally be available to all human beings existing on the
planet today. More so in a secular socialist
Constitutional republic like ours which guarantees the
right to life. The right to live without matrimonial
cruelty in the domestic environment in a secular republic
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
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cannot obviously depend on the religious moorings of a
citizen. After all, religion, more often than not, is not
a matter of choice of the citizen. It is a fait accompli
with no real option or choice for the individual. It is an
accident of birth. If nature or the Intelligent Designer
had ordained that you must be born not in this house but
in the neighbour's, you would have belonged to another
religion. How many citizens in this country have known,
studied and understood their own religion? How many have
cared to know, study and understand the neighbour's
religion? How many have exercised an informed choice about
religion? The point is only that liability to suffer
matrimonial cruelty in a secular republic cannot at all
depend on the religious denomination of the citizen.
Notwithstanding the absence of a uniform legislation
relating to marriage and matrimonial cruelty despite the
mandate/hope of Art. 44, Judges are bound to interpret the
concept of matrimonial cruelty in different personal laws
in such a manner as to usher in identical standards of
matrimonial cruelty for all citizens. It must shock the
judicial conscience that a citizen belonging to any
religious denomination can/ought to be compelled to endure
greater or graver matrimonial cruelty merely on the basis
of his religious faith. That would be negation of the
right to equality and right to life guaranteed by the
Constitution. We discard the theory that the concept of
matrimonial cruelty to entitle a spouse to divorce can be
dissimilar and different for persons belonging to
different religious faiths merely because different words
are used in the relevant personal law statutes. The
concept of matrimonial cruelty recognised and accepted in
Naveen Kohli must inform the Courts while ascertaining
contumaciousness in matrimony whatever the religious faith
of the parties. Wherever the law offers elbow room to the
Courts, they must resort to the exercise of interpretation
to navigate the Indian polity to the promised shores under
Art. 44 of the Constitution."
One of the seminal principles of interpretation is that
statutory provisions should be construed in conformity with
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the constitutional scheme and the mandate of equality.
Therefore, we do not find any justification in the attempt
made by the respondent to attack the impugned judgment on
the above ground. Even otherwise, if the wife is guilty of
ill-treating the children, certainly it would cause
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the husband that it
would be harmful or injurious for him to live with her. The
expression "harmful or injurious" is not confined to
physical acts alone, but equally extends to mental torture.
12. Coming to the facts and evidence, we find no ground
to uphold the contentions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent. The petitioner has proved his
allegations not only through his own testimony, but also by
examining PW2, his daughter, PW6, the son, and PW3 to PW5,
persons who had personal acquaintance with the alleged ill-
treatment by the wife. It is relevant to consider the
evidence of PW6 carefully. In his chief affidavit he inter
alia stated as follows:
"ഏകദദേശശം ഒരു വർഷശം കഴഴിഞ്ഞദപപ്പോൾ വലല്യപൻ മരണപപട. വലല്യപൻ ജജീവഴിചഴിരുന്ന കപ്പോലതത
അമ്മ എദന്നപ്പോടശം എപന്റെ സദഹപ്പോദേരഴിദയപ്പോടശം ദസ്നേഹമപ്പോയഴിടപ്പോണത പപെരുമപ്പോറഴിയഴിരുന്നതത, എന്നപ്പോൽ
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വലല്യപപന്റെ മരണദശഷശം അമ്മയത ഞങ്ങദളപ്പോടള്ള സമജീപെനശം മപ്പോറഴി. ഞങ്ങദളപ്പോടത അമ്മ
ദസ്നേഹശൂനല്യമപ്പോയശം ക്രൂരമപ്പോയശം പപെരുമപ്പോറപ്പോൻ തുടങ്ങഴി. എപന്റെ സപ്പോദഹപ്പോദേരഴി ദഹപ്പോസ്റ്റലഴിൽ നഴിന്നപ്പോണത
കൂടതൽ കപ്പോലവശം പെഠഴിചതത. വജീടഴിൽ മഴിക്കവപ്പോറശം ഞപ്പോനശം അമ്മയശം ദജപ്പോലഴിക്കപ്പോരഴിയശം
മപ്പോത്രമപ്പോയഴിരുന്നു തപ്പോമസശം. എനഴിക്കത നല്ല ഭക്ഷണശം ഉണപ്പോക്കഴി തരപ്പോപതയപ്പോയഴി, മഴിക്കവപ്പോറശം ബ്രഡശം
കഞ്ഞഴിയമപ്പോണത തന്നഴിരുന്നതത. കൂടപ്പോപത എപന്ന അകപ്പോരണമപ്പോയഴി വഴക്കുപെറയകയശം ക്രൂരമപ്പോയഴി
ദദേദഹപ്പോപെദ്രവശം ഏൽപഴിക്കപ്പോനശം തുടങ്ങഴി. ചൂരൽ വടഴിയശം പെടഴിക കഷ്ണവശം കർടൻ ദറപ്പോഡശം മറശം
ഉപെദയപ്പോഗഴിചപ്പോണത മഴിക്കവപ്പോറശം എപന്ന അടഴിചഴിരുന്നതത. അപൻ അവധഴിക്കത വജീടഴിൽ വരുദമപ്പോൾ
അമ്മ നല്ല ഭക്ഷണശം ഉണപ്പോക്കുകയശം എദന്നപ്പോടത ദസ്നേഹശം നടഴിക്കുകയശം പചെയ്തു .
ഞപ്പോൻ ആറപ്പോശം കപ്പോസഴിൽ പെഠഴിചഴിരുന്ന സമയശം ഒരഴിക്കൽ എപന്റെ സദഹപ്പോദേരഴി, അവധഴിക്കത വജീടഴിൽ
വന്നദപപ്പോൾ എപന്റെ പുറതത അമ്മ അടഴിച പെപ്പോടകൾ കണ, ദചെചഴി. അതഴിപനപറഴി അമ്മദയപ്പോടത
ദചെപ്പോദേഴിചതത ഇഷ്ടപപടപ്പോപത അമ്മ ദചെചഴിദയപ്പോടത വഴക്കുണപ്പോക്കഴി. ഒരഴിക്കൽ അമ്മദയപ്പോപടപ്പോപശം
പചെല്ലപ്പോനതത ദപെപ്പോയദപപ്പോൾ ഞപ്പോൻ അവഴിടപത ആൾക്കപ്പോദരപ്പോപടപ്പോപശം കടൽ കപ്പോണപ്പോൻ ദപെപ്പോയതത
ഇഷ്ടപപടപ്പോപത അവരുപട എല്ലപ്പോശം മുൻപെഴിൽ ഇടത എപന്ന കുപറ തല്ലഴി. എപന്റെ കപ്പോൽ മുറഴിഞ,
ഞപ്പോൻ ഒൻപെതപ്പോശം കപ്പോസഴിൽ കയറഴിയദപപ്പോൾ മുതൽ സ്കൂളഴിൽ പകപ്പോണദപെപ്പോകപ്പോൻ ഉചഭക്ഷണശം
തന്നുവഴിടപ്പോപതയപ്പോയഴി. ഒൻപെതുശം പെതശം കപ്പോസുകളഴിൽ പെഠഴിക്കുദമപ്പോൾ ഉചയത സ്കൂളഴിൽ നഴിന്നുശം
ദബേക്കറഴി പെലഹപ്പോരമപ്പോണത ഞപ്പോൻ കഴഴിചഴിരുന്നതത. പചെറപശം മുതദല അമ്മ എപന്നപറഴി എപന്റെ
ടജീദചഴഴിദനപ്പോടത ഇല്ലപ്പോത കുറശം പെറഞപകപ്പോടതഴിരുന്നു. ഞപ്പോൻ ഏഴപ്പോശം കപ്പോസഴിൽ പെഠഴിക്കുന്ന
കപ്പോലശം തുടങ്ങഴി ഇങ്ങപന അമ്മ കുറശം പെറയന്നതത ദകടത എനഴിക്കത. സസ്വഭപ്പോവ ദൂഷല്യമുപണന്നത
വഴിചെപ്പോരഴിചത ടജീദചഴത എനഴിക്കത നഴിരന്തരമപ്പോയഴി കകൗൺസലഴിങ്ങത തരപ്പോൻ തുടങ്ങഴി. അതത
ടജീദചഴഴിപന്റെയശം കുടഴികളുപടയശം ഇടയഴിൽ എനഴിക്കത വലഴിയ അപെമപ്പോനതഴിനഴിടയപ്പോക്കഴി. അമ്മയപട
ശപ്പോരജീരഴികമപ്പോയശം മപ്പോനസഴികമപ്പോയശം പെജീഡനങ്ങൾ എപന്റെ പെഠനപതയശം ബേപ്പോധഴിച്ചു .
എപന്റെ മുടഴി പവടപ്പോൻ വജീടഴിൽ വന്നഴിരുന്ന ബേപ്പോർബേർ വത്സലപന പകപ്പോണത എപന്റെ ഇഷ്ടതഴിന
വഴിരുദ്ധമപ്പോയഴി എദപപ്പോഴശം എപന്റെ മുടഴി പെപറ പവടഴിക്കുന്നതത അമ്മ പെതഴിവപ്പോക്കഴി. അതത എനഴിക്കത
വലഴിയ മനനഃപ്രയപ്പോസശം ഉണപ്പോക്കഴിയഴിരുന്നു. 2013 ജൂൺ മപ്പോസതഴിൽ ദചെചഴിയപട കലല്യപ്പോണതഴിനത
മുൻപെത വത്സലൻ മുടഴി പവടപ്പോൻ വന്നദപപ്പോൾ ദചെചഴിയപട കലല്യപ്പോണമപ്പോയതഴിനപ്പോൽ മുടഴി പെദറ പവദടണ
എന്നത ഞപ്പോൻ പെറഞ, എന്നപ്പോൽ കലല്യപ്പോണശം കപ്പോരല്യമപ്പോദക്കണ മുടഴി പെപറ പവടണശം എന്നത അമ്മ
വത്സലദനപ്പോടത നഴിർബേന്ധപൂർവശം പെറഞ, എന്നപ്പോൽ മുടഴി പവടപ്പോൻ വഴിസമ്മതഴിച എപന്റെ
കപ്പോരണതത അമ്മ അടഴിക്കുകയശം നഴിർബേന്ധഴിച്ചു, മുടഴി പെപറ പവടഴിക്കുകയശം പചെയ്തു, മുടഴി പവടത
കഴഴിഞ്ഞത വജീടഴിൽ കയറഴിയ ദശഷവശം, അമ്മ എപന്ന വഴക്കുപെറയന്നതത തുടരുകയശം ദചെചഴിപയപറഴി
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
2025:KER:72628
ദമപ്പോശമപ്പോയഴി സശംസപ്പോരഴിക്കുകയശം പചെയ്തു, എനഴിക്കത സങ്കടവശം ദദേഷല്യവശം സഹഴിക്കപ്പോൻ പെറപ്പോപത ഞപ്പോൻ
അമ്മദയപ്പോടത ദദേഷല്യപപട, അദപപ്പോൾ അമ്മ ദദേഷല്യപപടത എപന്ന വജീണശം അടഴിക്കപ്പോനപ്പോയഴി കക
ഓങ്ങഴി. അടഴി തടയന്നതഴിനപ്പോയഴി ഞപ്പോൻ അമ്മയപട കയഴിൽ കയറഴി പെഴിടഴിചദപപ്പോൾ അമ്മ എപന്റെ
വലുതു കകതണയഴിൽ കടഴിചത മുറഴിദവൽപഴിച്ചു, അടത ദേഴിവസശം സ്കൂളഴിൽ ദപെപ്പോകുന്ന വഴഴി ഞപ്പോൻ
ഞങ്ങളുപട ബേന്ധുവപ്പോയ സപ്പോബു അങ്കഴിളഴിപന്റെ വജീടഴിൽ പചെല്ലുകയശം എപന്റെ കകതണയഴിപല മുറഴിവത
കണത അങ്കഴിൾ ദചെപ്പോദേഴിചദപപ്പോൾ ഉണപ്പോയ വഴിവരശം ഞപ്പോൻ അങ്കഴിളഴിദനപ്പോടത പെറഞ്ഞഴിടള്ളതുമപ്പോണത. ടഴി
സമയശം എപന്ന സ്കൂളഴിൽ എദപപ്പോഴശം കകൗൺസഴിലഴിശംഗഴിനത വഴിദധയനക്കപ്പോറദണപ്പോ എന്നത അങ്കഴിൾ
എദന്നപ്പോടത ദചെപ്പോദേഴിക്കുകയശം, അമ്മ നഴിരന്തരശം എപന്ന പെറഴി അനപ്പോവശല്യമപ്പോയഴി ടജീദചഴഴിദനപ്പോടത കുറശം
പെറഞ പകപ്പോടക്കുന്നതഴിനപ്പോൽ എപന്ന സ്കൂളഴിൽ നഴിരന്തരശം കകൗൺസഴിലഴിശംഗഴിനത വഴിദധയനപ്പോക്കുന്ന
വഴിവരശം ഞപ്പോൻ പെറയകയശം പചെയ്തു, സപ്പോബു അങ്കഴിൾ പെറഞ്ഞതനസരഴിചത ഞപ്പോൻ ടജീദചഴഴിദനപ്പോടത
എപന്റെ അമ്മ രണപ്പോനമ്മയപ്പോപണന്നത പെറയകയശം പെഴിന്നജീടത അവർ അമ്മപയ വഴിളഴിപഴിക്കുകയശം
ഇല്ലപ്പോത കപ്പോരല്യങ്ങൾ ആണത അമ്മ പെറഞ പകപ്പോടതഴിരുന്നതത എന്നത മനസഴിലപ്പോക്കഴിയ ദശഷശം
കകൗൺസലഴിങ്ങത നഴിർതകയശം പചെയ്തു."
It is interesting to note that none of the above aspects
were challenged in his cross-examination. Apart from that,
his version was clearly corroborated by PW3 and PW4. When
the respondent was examined as RW1, though she denied those
allegations, we find her ipse dixit too insufficient to
discard the aforesaid testimonies.
13. We also notice yet another aspect which supports
the contention raised by the petitioner. The petitioner
contended that the respondent attempted to commit suicide by
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
2025:KER:72628
consuming an excessive number of pills, but she was saved by
immediate medical intervention. In her pleading, she
attempted to justify her act by contending that it was
because of the ill-treatment of the petitioner and his son
that she was forced to do so. However, when she was cross-
examined, she took a contention which is entirely contrary
to her pleading. She stated that it was because she had a
cold she took an excessive number of pills. There is
evidence on record that after the said incident she was
hospitalized and her stomach was washed. The above aspects
probabilise the contention of the petitioner that she
attempted to commit suicide without any reasonable cause. It
is settled law that making such suicide attempts or threats
would amount to cruelty on the spouse.
14. The discussion made above unerringly points to the
conclusion that the impugned judgment is not liable to be
interfered with to the extent of granting the decree of
divorce. However, we find no justification for limiting the
quantum of maintenance to ₹6,000/- per month, considering
the admitted nature and income of the petitioner's job. In
Mat.Appeal Nos.596/2019, 149/2023, 384/2019
2025:KER:72628
our estimation, the respondent requires at least ₹15,000/-
per month for meeting her needs. While fixing the
maintenance, the income and living status of the husband is
of relevance. [See Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge,
Dehradun and others, [(1997) 7 SCC 7], Rakhi Sadhukhan vs.
Raja Sadhukhan (AIR 2025 SC 3268). The evidence on record
shows that the petitioner has the means to pay the said
amount. Hence, to that extent, the judgment is to be
modified.
In the result, Mat.Appeal No.596/2019 and R.P.(FC)No.
149/2023 are dismissed. R.P.(FC)No.384/2019 is partly
allowed by enhancing the amount of maintenance to ₹15,000/-
per month from the date of the petition.
Sd/-
SATHISH NINAN
JUDGE
Sd/-
P. KRISHNA KUMAR
JUDGE
sv
