Kerala High Court
State Of Kerala vs Sathyanandan on 28 May, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 7TH JYAISHTA, 1947
CRL.APPEAL NO. 867 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 16.08.2014 IN CC NO.209 OF
2008 OF ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE, KOTTAYAM
APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA,
REP. BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT
OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
SRI A RAJESH, SPL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (VIG)
SMT REKHA S, SR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED 1 TO 3:
1 SATHYANANDAN, (DIED)
S/O.AYYAPPAN, KRISHNAN, FORMERLY FORESTER,
CHELLARCOVIL SECTION, KUMILY FOREST RANGE,
(NEDIYAKALAYIL HOUSE, KUMILY) - 685 509.
2 SULAIMAN, (DIED)
S/O.IBRAHIM, KUTTIKKATTUTHAZHE HOUSE,
66TH MILE, KUMILY - 685 509.
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2
Crl.Appeal No.867 of 2025
3 M.MUHAMMED ALI,
S/O.MOIDEEN BAVA, FORMERLY FOREST RANGE
OFFICER, KUMILY (CHIRAPPATTU PUTHENVEEDU,
PADOM P.O., KALANJOOR VILLAGE,
PATHANAMTHITTA - 689 694.
BY ADV SRI.K.SURESHBABU (KOCHIN)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 28.05.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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3
Crl.Appeal No.867 of 2025
P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J.
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Crl.Appeal No.867 of 2025
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Dated this the 28th day of May, 2025
JUDGMENT
This is an appeal filed by the state against acquittal.
Having obtained leave, the appeal was preferred under
section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Code).
2. There were three accused in C.C.No.209 of 2008 on
the files of the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special
Judge, Kottayam. They were charged for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). After a
full-fledged trial, the Special Court acquitted the accused as
per the judgment dated 16.08.2014. The said judgment is
under challenge in this appeal.
3. Heard the learned Special Public Prosecutor and the
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. After the
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impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 expired and
therefore the appeal as against them stands abated.
4. Heard the learned Special Public Prosecutor
(Vigilance) on admission.
5. The charge was based on the allegation that in
order to release the vehicle bearing Reg.No.KL-3A-5346
belonging to PW1, which was seized for transporting barks of
trees in ten gunny bags, demanded and received Rs.18,000/-
as bribe. It was alleged that accused No.1, who was working
as Forester and accused No.3, who was working as Forest
Ranger Officer, Kumily, demanded and obtained bribe through
accused No.2.
6. On the side of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 12 were
examined and Exts.P1 to P28 were marked. It is seen that
when questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code all the
accused denied the incriminating circumstances appeared
against them in evidence. Accused Nos.1 and 3 had filed
written statements as well. On the side of the accused, DWs.1
and 2 were examined and Exts.D1 to D6 were marked. The
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trial court, after considering the said evidence, concluded that
there was total lack of evidence in order to prove that any of
the accused demanded or received bribe.
7. PW1 was the owner of the jeep from whom bribe
was allegedly collected. PW3 is a politician, who intervened in
the incident and facilitated payment of bribe. The trial court
found that the evidence of PWs.1 and 3 were totally
inconsistent inasmuch as the receipt of bribe by the accused
is concerned. As far as the demand of bribe, it was held that
there was practically no evidence against accused Nos.1 and
3. Even regarding the amount of bribe said to have been paid
also, there was no consistency in their evidence. Accordingly,
it was held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge.
8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor took me
through the judgment. It is pointed out that insofar as the
payment of money is concerned, there is evidence and the
discrepancy pointed out in the impugned judgment are
insufficient to discard the evidence altogether. Accordingly, it
is submitted that a re-appreciation of evidence is warranted in
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this case and the appeal deserves admission.
9. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Neeraj
Dutta v. State (Govt.of NCT of Delhi) [AIR 2023 SC 330]
settled the law concerning the elements required to be proved
to establish offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act as well as the nature and quantum of evidence that
enable to enter a finding against the accused. Paragraph
No.68 in the decision is extracted below:
"68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a
sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused
public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of
fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence
which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary
evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and
documentary evidence.
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(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant,
the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver
without there being any demand from the public servant and
the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the
Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the
public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders
the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the
public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of
obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by
the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in
issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii)
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act,
in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer
which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the
public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a
prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the
bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is
received by the public servant, would be an offence of
obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
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(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and
acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be
made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and
documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the
basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion
to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the
fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of
course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the
accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died
or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of
illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of
any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally
or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the
case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor
does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public
servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the
proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to
raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the
purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court
as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course,
the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20
does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20
of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to
above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption
while the latter is discretionary in nature."
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Thus, it is trite that a charge under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act can be sustained only if the prosecution is able to prove
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. When accused
Nos.1 and 2 are no more, the overt act of accused No.3, who
is respondent No.3, may require anxious consideration. Of
course, conspiracy is also alleged and if the prosecution is
able to establish demand and acceptance of bribe by other
accused and the same was in consequence of an
understanding between all the accused, a charge may sustain.
10. As stated, evidence of PWs.1 and 3 alone is
available to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe. PW1
did not say anything about the demand by accused No.1 or 3.
But PW3 stated that accused No.1 demanded payment of
bribe and accordingly the payment was effected. Even PW3
did not say any overt act on the part of accused No.3. Other
than the evidence of these two witnesses no evidence; either
documentary or oral, was brought on record to show that
accused No.3 acted illegally in the matter of releasing the
vehicle. As pointed out by the trial court, delay was occurred
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in releasing the vehicle only on account of non-production of
documents showing ownership of PW1 to the vehicle.
11. Unless there is tangible evidence to show that
accused No.3 acted illegally in that matter or that there was a
demand from his part for illegal gratification, there cannot be
a finding that he involved in a conspiracy, based on which
illegal gratification was demanded and accepted. There is total
lack of evidence to prove that respondent No.3/accused No.3
had made a demand for bribe or accepted. Also, there is no
evidence to show that he involved in a conspiracy for
obtaining bribe. Therefore, the finding entered into by the
Special Court, which resulted in acquittal of accused No.3
cannot be said to be against evidence. Hence, I am of the
view that there is no prima facie ground to hold that
appreciation of evidence is wrong and the appeal, which is
one against acquittal, requires consideration in detail.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed summarily.
Sd/-
P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE
dkr
