Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 4467 Ker
Judgement Date : 25 February, 2025
2025:KER:15489
Crl.R.P.No.703/2018
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.GIRISH
TUESDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2025 / 6TH PHALGUNA, 1946
CRL.REV.PET NO. 703 OF 2018
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 28.03.2018 IN Crl.A NO.314 OF 2014
OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT - II, MANJERI
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 26.08.2014 IN ST NO.541 OF 2011 OF
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -I, PONNANI
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
C.SIDHIQUE
S/O.MUHAMMED KUTTY,
CHENAKKAL HOUSE, KADAVANAD, PONNANI,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.SRI.P.U.SHAILAJAN
SMT.D.N.NISHANI
SRI.M.SURESH KUMAR
SRI.V.SREEJITH K13982000
SMT.VIDYA KURIAKOSE
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT & STATE:
1 V.K.UMMER
S/O.MAYUMU, VEETTILAKATHU HOUSE,
KADAVANAD, PONNANI SOUTH,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN-679586.
2 THE STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682031.
BY ADV SRI.ABDUL RAOOF PALLIPATH FOR R1
SMT. MAYA M.N., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
21.02.2025, THE COURT ON 25.02.2025 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:15489
Crl.R.P.No.703/2018
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ORDER
The petitioner is the accused in S.T.No. 541/2011 on the files of the
Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Ponnani. The aforesaid case arose
out of a complaint preferred by the first respondent herein alleging the
offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881(in
short, 'NI Act'). Upon conclusion of the trial before the learned Magistrate,
with the examination of the first respondent as PW1 and marking of Exts
P1 to P3 on the part of the complainant, and also two witnesses on the
part of the petitioner as DW1 and DW2, the learned Magistrate found the
petitioner guilty of the commission of the aforesaid offence and sentenced
him to simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a compensation
of Rs.1,30,000/- under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973(in short, 'Cr.PC'). The petitioner challenged the above verdict
before the Sessions Court, Manjeri, by filing Crl.A.No.314/2014. The
Additional Sessions Judge-II, Manjeri, as per the judgment dated
28.03.2018, concurred with the finding of the learned Magistrate that the
complainant has successfully established the commission of offence under
Section 138 NI Act by the petitioner. However, the sentence imposed was
modified to imprisonment till the rising of the Court with a direction to 2025:KER:15489
pay compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- to the first respondent herein under
Section 357(3) Cr.PC. Challenging the above judgment of the Appellate
Court, the petitioner is here before this Court with this revision.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned
counsel for the first respondent and the learned Public Prosecutor
representing the State of Kerala.
3. The case of the first respondent was that towards the
discharge of a debt of Rs.1,00,000/- which the petitioner owed him, a
cheque dated 23.02.2005 was issued by the petitioner, which, when
presented for collection, was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in
the account of the petitioner on 05.03.2005, and that the petitioner did
not care to make payment of the cheque amount in spite of demand by
way of registered lawyer's notice. It is stated that the petitioner refused
to accept the lawyer's notice issued by the first respondent.
4. In the evidence adduced before the Trial Court, the first
respondent stated about the above liability incurred by the petitioner in
the above regard and the execution and issuance of Ext P1 cheque
towards the discharge of the aforesaid liability. Ext P2 and P3 series were
brought on record to show the dishonour of the cheque and the failure of 2025:KER:15489
the petitioner to make payment of the cheque amount despite the
demand made by the first respondent by way of statutory notice
contemplated under proviso (b) of Section 138 of the NI Act.
5. Though the petitioner has strongly disputed the financial
transaction with the first respondent, nothing would be brought forth to
substantiate the said challenge. The learned counsel for the petitioner
would argue that the absence of detailed description of the financial
transactions between the petitioner and the first respondent in the legal
notice as well as in the complaint, itself is sufficient to come to a
conclusion that the case put forward by the complainant is wrong. I find
no merit in the above argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
There is no invariable principle of law that in a complaint preferred under
section 138 of the NI Act the complainant has to describe elaborately
about the nature of the transaction with the accused which gave rise to
the financial liability. As far as the present case is concerned, the fact
that the petitioner owed Rs.1,00,000/- from the first respondent is clearly
narrated in the legal notice as well as the complaint. It is not possible to
attribute any credence upon the evidence relied on by the petitioner on
the basis of the statements of the two witnesses examined as DW1 & 2025:KER:15489
DW2 who stated that the complainant had not mobilised the money by
pledging or selling gold as claimed, and that there was no transaction
between the complainant and the accused. So also, the contention of the
petitioner that a signed blank cheque issued by him was manipulated and
misused for the institution of this complaint, cannot be accepted on face
value in the light of the settled position of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [(2019) 4 SCC 197].
There is absolutely nothing which the petitioner could bring forth to rebut
the presumption under section 139 of the NI Act which the complainant
successfully established through his evidence before the Trial Court.
The Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence in the correct perspective. In the absence of any material to
show that there was perverse appreciation of evidence or utter disregard
to the settled principles of law on the part of the courts below, it is not
possible for this Court to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court in this proceedings under revision.
6. The proposition of law upon the scope of interference in
revision, is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
2025:KER:15489
7. In State of Kerala v. Jathadevan Namboodiri : AIR
1999 SC 981, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.
8. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke & Anr : 2015 (3) SCC 123, it has been held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as follows:
Revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.
9. Referring the above dictums, the Apex Court has observed in
Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda : 2018 (8) SCC 165 as follows:
Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others, 2015 (3) SCC 123. This Court held 2025:KER:15489
that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in paragraph 14:
"14.....Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal.
Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
10. As far as the present case is concerned, none of the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid
decisions as reasons justifying the interference in revision, with the
findings of the courts below, are attracted in the facts and circumstances 2025:KER:15489
of this case. Therefore, the present revision petition is found to be
devoid of merit.
In the result, the petition is hereby dismissed.
(Sd/-)
G. GIRISH, JUDGE
DST
//True Copy//
P.A.To Judge
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