Kerala High Court
Dr.Vinodkumar Jacob vs The Vice Chancellor on 25 August, 2025
Author: T.R.Ravi
Bench: T.R.Ravi
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
2025:KER:64455
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.R.RAVI
MONDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 3RD BHADRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 3197 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
DR.VINODKUMAR JACOB
AGED 55 YEARS
S/O.P.K.JACOB, PAZHOOKUDY HOUSE, RAMALLOOR,
KOTHAMANGALAM.P.O., MEMBER SYNDICATE, APJ ABDUL
KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS,
SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 686691
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.RAVINDRAN (SR.)
SMT.APARNA RAJAN
SHRI.M.R.SABU
SMT.LAKSHMI RAMADAS
SRI.SREEDHAR RAVINDRAN
RESPONDENT:
1 THE VICE CHANCELLOR
APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET
CAMPUS, SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695016
2 THE REGISTRAR
APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET
CAMPUS, SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695016
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
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2
3 APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
CET CAMPUS, SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, PIN - 695016
BY ADVS.
SRI A.J. VARGHESE, SR.GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH
SHRI.KARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABU
SMT.P.LAKSHMI
SMT.AYSHA E.M.
SHRI.HASHIM K.M.
SHRI.ABUASIL A.K.
SMT.HANIYA NAFIZA V.S.
SHRI.M.I.INSAF MOOPPAN
SHRI.RISHI VINCENT
SRI.P.K.ABDUL RAHIMAN
SHRI.MANU KRISHNA S.K.
SRI K.R.GANESH
SRI ELVIN PETER P.J. (SR.)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.4.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).5548/2025, THE COURT ON
25.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
2025:KER:64455
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.R.RAVI
MONDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 3RD BHADRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 5548 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
SAJU I
AGED 46 YEARS
S/O. ISMAIL KANNU, RESIDING AT P.AZEEZ HOUSE,
KILLI, KOLLODE P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN -
695571
BY ADV SHRI.T.RAJASEKHARAN NAIR
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT, HIGHER EDUCATION (J) DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN -
695001
2 APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, CET CAMPUS,
SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695016
3 THE VICE CHANCELLOR
IN CHARGE OF APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL
UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPU, SREEKARIYAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695016
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
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4 THE REGISTRAR
APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET
CAMPUS, SREEKARIYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN -
695016
BY ADVS.
SRI A.J. VARGHESE, SR.GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH
SHRI.KARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABU
SMT.P.LAKSHMI
SMT.AYSHA E.M.
SHRI.HASHIM K.M.
SHRI.ABUASIL A.K.
SMT.HANIYA NAFIZA V.S.
SHRI.M.I.INSAF MOOPPAN
SHRI.RISHI VINCENT
SHRI.MANU KRISHNA S.K.
SRI.P.K.ABDUL RAHIMAN
SHRI.V.MANU, SPL.G.P. TO A.G.
SRI K.R.GANESH
SRI ELVIN PETER P.J. (SR.)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
11.04.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).3197/2025, THE COURT ON ON
25.08.2025, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
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"CR"
T.R. RAVI, J.
--------------------------------------------
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
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Dated this the 25th day of August, 2025
JUDGMENT
The prayers in this writ petition are; to call for the records
leading to Ext.P4 and quash the same by the issue of a writ of
certiorari; to issue any other such writ, order or direction as this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and necessary to meet the ends of
justice in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and to
award the costs of this case to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner is a member of the Syndicate of the 3 rd
respondent University. The Vice Chancellor (1 st respondent)
convened a meeting of the Syndicate to consider various issues
included in the 63rd agenda of the meeting of the Syndicate. This
Court, as per its judgment in W.P.(C) No.39062/2023, had ordered
finalisation of disciplinary proceedings by the Syndicate against
one of the employees of the University. The time granted by this
Court had expired on 07.10.2024. Even though the Enquiry Officer
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submitted his report and the Sub Committee had submitted its
recommendation regarding the penalty, the matter has not been
finalised due to the delay in convening the meeting of the
Syndicate. In the agenda for the 63rd meeting, this matter was
not included. One of the members of the Syndicate mentioned this
matter at the meeting and requested inclusion of this item in the
agenda. Most of the members present in the meeting supported
this suggestion. However, the 1st respondent refused to entertain
the request and declared that the meeting was closed, even
without considering any of the items on the agenda.
3. A majority of the members present objected to the
action of the 1st respondent. After electing one of the members of
the Syndicate to preside, the members continued with the
meeting in the absence of the 1 st respondent, and transacted the
business included in the agenda. The 1st respondent, however,
passed an order annulling the decision of the Syndicate. The writ
petition is filed in the above circumstances. It is contended that
there is no provision either under the University Act or the Statute
framed thereunder enabling the 1st respondent to annul any
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decision of the Syndicate. Reliance is placed on Statute 10 of the
APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University First Statutes, 2020,
('First Statutes' for short) which provides that the Syndicate, in its
discretion, can consider and discuss any issue brought to its notice.
It is contended that the powers conferred on the 1 st respondent
under Section 14 of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University
Act, 2015 ('the Act' for short) do not contain any power to annul
any of the decisions of the Syndicate and that such power is
reserved to be exercised by the Chancellor alone. It is contended
that Chapter III sub-statute 1.3, enables the Syndicate to proceed
with any transaction included in the agenda by electing one of the
members as a Chairperson in the absence of the 1 st respondent. It
is submitted that it is in exercise of this power that the Syndicate
decided to proceed with the 63rd meeting of the Syndicate.
4. The 1st respondent has filed an affidavit contending
that the writ petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts.
The locus standi of a Syndicate member to file the above writ
petition is challenged. It is submitted that the writ petition has not
been filed on behalf of the Syndicate or as authorised by the
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Syndicate, and that there is no averment in the writ petition as to
how the petitioner is aggrieved by the decision of the 1 st
respondent. It is contended that the writ petition proceeds on a
wrong premise that a meeting which was called of by the Vice
Chancellor can be continued by the other members of the
Syndicate, by electing another Chairperson. It is contended that
the said provision deals with only a situation where a meeting of
the Syndicate is to be convened in the absence of the 1 st
respondent and does not deal with a situation where a meeting is
called off by the 1st respondent due to persistent arguments of
some members to include an additional item which was not listed
in the circulated agenda, in exercise of the powers conferred on
him under Section 14(5) of the Act. It is stated that, as regards
the directions of this Court, the 1 st respondent took charge only
on 28.11.2024, and the report regarding the domestic enquiry
was never placed before him for a proper evaluation despite
repeated reminders. It is stated that the file was put up only in
the second week of January, 2025, and by that time, the 1 st
respondent got a report that in the Comptroller and Auditor
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General's report, the alleged withdrawal of PF amounts is entered
as a systemic lapse in the PF Section of the University. It is stated
that, given the above facts, the 1st respondent informed the
Syndicate at the meeting convened on 16.01.2025, that the
matter can be included soon after proper study. It is alleged that
some members of the Syndicate who raised the issue wanted to
punish the employee concerned and ensure that there is no
further enquiry in the matter. It is stated that when it became
known that another meeting was convened in his absence without
following the due procedure, the 1st respondent exercised the
powers vested in him and issued Ext.P4 order and intimated the
same to the Chancellor on 16.01.2025 itself. It is stated that the
then Registrar reported the above-mentioned illegal and irregular
meeting as duly convened, without intimating the 1 st respondent,
so as to get approval from the Government for his extension
without any breaks, since his term was due to expire on
04.02.2025.
5. The prayers in this writ petition are; to issue a writ of
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mandamus or other orders by directing the Vice Chancellor to
convene the meeting of the Syndicate urgently, to place the
orders of the Government approving the reappointments of the
Registrar of the University and the Controller of Examinations as
requested by the petitioner in Ext.P15; to quash Ext.P9 order
issued by the 3rd respondent; and to direct the 3rd respondent to
implement Ext.P14 orders issued by Government with immediate
effect. The petitioner is a member of the Syndicate and the Board
of Governors of the 2nd respondent University. The contentions
raised against the actions of the 3 rd respondent are similar to
those in W.P.(C)No.3197 of 2025. It is stated that the decisions of
the 63rd meeting of the Syndicate have been forwarded to the
Government for approval and the same has also been granted, in
particular, the reappointment of the Controller of Examinations. It
is contended that though the petitioner and other members of the
Syndicate have made requests to the 3rd respondent to convene
the meeting of the Syndicate for taking urgent steps to implement
the orders of the Government based on the decision of the
Syndicate, the 3rd respondent is not convening a meeting.
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6. It is contended that the Syndicate of the University is
the administrative authority as per the Statutes and the 3 rd
respondent is only an officer of the University and has to
implement the decision of the Governing Body and Syndicate. It is
contended that since the Government of Kerala has granted
approval of the decision taken by the Syndicate at its 63rd
meeting held on 16.1.2025, all that remains is to implement the
same. It is alleged that the actions of the 3 rd respondent are
politically motivated.
7. The 3rd respondent has filed a statement adopting the
stand taken in the connected writ petition. It is stated that after
the calling off of the meeting of the Syndicate on 16.01.2025, the
Controller of Examinations had submitted a handwritten
representation dated 10.01.2025 on 16.01.2025 requesting to
extend her term and the same was forwarded to the Registrar
then and there, to be duly forwarded to the Government. It is
pointed out that it can be seen from Ext.P11 that the request had
been forwarded to the Government for approval. It is stated that
the 3rd respondent is informed that some of the Syndicate
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members took offence to the above actions and even threatened
the officers. It is stated that the Government declined the request
as per Ext.P12 dated 23.01.2025 and the incumbent demitted her
office on 24.01.2025. It is stated that thereafter, the then
Registrar, without informing the 3 rd respondent, submitted Ext.P13
on 01.02.2025 and on the said date itself, the Government
instructed the Registrar to re-submit the proposal with the
decision of the Syndicate, if any, in this regard. Ext.P17 dated
01.02.2025 was submitted by the Registrar before the
Government requesting for extension of his term, with the alleged
approved Minutes of the 63rd meeting of the Syndicate, by
including the request for extension of the term of Controller of
Examinations, which was declined as per Ext.12. It is submitted
that the alleged approved minutes was also not placed before the
3rd respondent.
8. It is stated further that the Government has approved
the extension of the term of both the Registrar and the Controller
of Examinations, as per Exts.P14 and P18 dated 03/02/2025 and
that when Exhibits P14 and P18 were put up before the 3 rd
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respondent, no further action was taken thereon since the matter
regarding convening of Syndicate was subjudice by then.
9. Heard Sri P. Ravindran, Senior Advocate, instructed by
Advocate Smt. Aparna Rajan, on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.
(C)No.3197 of 2025, Sri T. Rajasekharan Nair, on behalf of the
petitioner in W.P.(C)No.5548 of 2025, Sri A.J. Varghese, Senior
Government Pleader and Smt. M.A.Vaheeda Babu on behalf of the
1st respondent in W.P.(C)No.3197 of 2025 (3rd respondent in W.P.
(C)No.5548 of 2025).
10. The facts are not much in dispute. A meeting of the
Syndicate had been convened by the Vice Chancellor. It was called
off even without transacting any business. Later, the members
other than the Vice Chancellor held a meeting by electing a
Chairman, in the absence of the Vice Chancellor and passed
certain resolutions. The said decisions taken were annulled by the
Vice Chancellor, on the reason that it was not a properly convened
meeting. The correctness or otherwise of what happened later
would depend on the legality of the conduct of the Vice Chancellor
in calling off the meeting and that of the other members in
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holding a meeting subsequently.
11. The following issues arise for consideration.
1. Whether the First Statute of the
University, which is in Vernacular, can be
relied on for the purpose of ascertaining
the powers of the Syndicate and the Vice
Chancellor and their functioning?
2. Whether a writ petition can be maintained
by a member of the Syndicate against a
decision of the Vice Chancellor, as a
person aggrieved?
3. Whether the Vice Chancellor could have
called off a meeting which was properly
convened, after the meeting has started,
without carrying out any of the business
which were in the agenda?
4. Whether the Vice Chancellor can annul
the decisions taken by the remaining
members of the Syndicate after the Vice
Chancellor left the meeting, treating the
same as not a meeting held in accordance
with law ?
12. The first question is of significant importance. Article
348 of the Constitution of India deals with the language to be
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used in the Supreme Court and High Court and the authoritative
text of Bills, etc. passed by the Legislature of the State and
Ordinances promulgated by the Government and orders, rules,
regulations and bylaws issued under the Constitution or under any
law made by the Legislature of the State. Article 348 reads thus:
"348. Language to be used in the Supreme Court
and in the High Courts and for Acts, Bills, etc.--
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provi-
sions of this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise
provides--
(a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in
every High Court,
(b) the authoritative texts--
(i) of all Bills to be introduced or amend-
ments thereto to be moved in either
House of Parliament or in the House or
either House of the Legislature of a
State,
(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the
Legislature of a State and of all Ordi-
nances promulgated by the President or
the Governor of a State, and
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(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and
bye-laws issued under this Constitution
or under any law made by Parliament or
the Legislature of a State,
shall be in the English language.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of
clause (1), the Governor of a State may, with
the previous consent of the President, authorise
the use of the Hindi language, or any other
language used for any official purposes of the
State, in proceedings in the High Court having
its principal seat in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply
to any judgment, decree or order passed or
made by such High Court.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of
clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has
prescribed any language other than the English
language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts
passed by, the Legislature of the State or in
Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of the
State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law
referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause,
a translation of the same in the English
language published under the authority of the
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Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of
that State shall be deemed to be the
authoritative text thereof in the English
language under this article."
13. In cases where the Legislature of the State has
prescribed any language other than English Language for use in
Bills etc., a translation of the same in the English Language
published under the authority of the Governor, in the Official
Gazette of that State is deemed to be the authoritative text
thereof in the English Language. As per Section 2 of the Kerala
Official Languages Act, 1969, the language to be used in Bills to
be introduced or amendment thereto to be moved in the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Kerala, Acts passed by the
Legislature of the State of Kerala Ordinances promulgated by the
Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution; and orders, rules,
regulations and bye-laws issued by the Government under the
Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the
Legislature of the State of Kerala shall be Malayalam or English.
Thus, Kerala has adopted both Malayalam and English. However,
as far as the High Court is concerned, going by the requirement of
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Article 348(3), the authoritative text is the one in English
Language, either as the original text of the legal document or as a
translation published with the authority of the Governor and
published in the Official Gazette.
14. In Prabhat Kumar Sharma v. Union Public Service
Commission [(2006) 10 SCC 587], the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered a situation where there was difference in the
English version and the Hindi version regarding the name of a
Scheduled Tribe. The Apex Court held as follows:
"19. The Court after taking notice of Article 348(1)(b) of
the Constitution of India which provides that the
authoritative text of all Bills to be introduced or
amendments thereof to be moved in either House of
Parliament shall be in English language came to the
conclusion that the Hindi version was a translated version
and the original version was the authoritative text and in
the Hindi version there was some defect in translation
because of which Lohar community had been claiming the
advantage of being a Scheduled Tribe when actually they
were only a Backward Class and thus could not be given
the benefit of reservation as a Scheduled Tribe. It was
observed in Nityanand case [(1996) 3 SCC 576] : (SCC
p. 584, para 19)
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"19. Article 348(1)(b) of the Constitution
provides that notwithstanding anything in
Part II (in Chapter II Articles 346 and 347
relate to regional languages) the
authoritative text of all Bills to be
introduced and amendments thereto to be
moved in either House of Parliament ... of
all ordinances promulgated by the President
... and all orders, rules, regulations and
bye-laws issued under the Constitution or
under any law made by Parliament, shall be
in the English language. By operation of
sub-article (3) thereof with a non obstante
clause, where the legislature of a State has
prescribed any language other than the
English language for use in Bills introduced
in, or Acts passed by, the legislature of the
State or in ordinances promulgated by the
Governor of the State or in any order, rule,
regulation or bye-law referred to in para
(iii) of that sub-clause, a translation of the
same in the English language published
under the authority of the Governor of the
State in the Official Gazette of that State
shall be deemed to be the authoritative text
thereof in the English language under this
article. Therefore, the Act and the Schedule
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thereto are part of the Act, as enacted by
Parliament in English language. It is the
authoritative text. When the Schedules
were translated into Hindi, the translator
wrongly translated Lohara as Lohar
omitting the letter 'a' while Lohra is written
as mentioned in English version. It is also
clear when we compare Part XVI of the
Second Schedule relating to the State of
West Bengal, the word Lohar both in
English as well as in the Hindi version was
not mentioned. Court would take judicial
notice of Acts of Parliament and would
interpret the Schedule in the light of the
English version being an authoritative text
of the Act and the Second Schedule."
15. In Thanga Dorai v. Chancellor, Kerala University,
[1995 KHC 369], a learned Judge of this Court considered the
necessity of publication of English translation. In paragraph 22 of
the judgment, the court held as follows.
"22. As per Clause (3) of Art.348 of the Constitution, the
State Legislature can prescribe any language other than
the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts
passed by the legislature or in Ordinances promulgated
by the Governor. That provision further enjoins the State
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Legislature to have a translation of the Bill, Act or
Ordinance of any order, rule, regulation or bye-law in
English language in the official gazette. Clause (3) further
proceeds to state that the translation in English language
shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of the Bill,
Act or Ordinance etc. So whenever a Bill is introduced in
the Legislature or an Act is passed by the Legislature or
an Ordinance is promulgated by the Governor or any
order, rule, regulation or bye-law is issued in the exercise
of the powers to make Subordinate Legislation English
translation of the same should be published
simultaneously. The said translation is to be deemed to
be the authoritative text thereof. Such English
translations are not forthcoming immediately after the
passing of the Act, promulgation of the Ordinance of the
issue of order, rule, regulation, bye-law etc. This is
against the constitutional provision contained in
Art.348(3) of the Constitution. The Government and the
Legislature cannot ignore the said constitutional
mandate. So, I take this opportunity to impress upon the
Legislature and the Government to issue English
translations of the Bills, Acts, Ordinances, Order, Bye-law
etc. simultaneously with their introduction, passing,
promulgation or issue as the case may be."
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16. Thereafter in Murali Purushothaman v. State of
Kerala [2001 SCC OnLine Ker 545], a Division Bench of this
Court considered the issue and held as follows:
"3. Art. 348(1)(b) of the Constitution requires that the
authoritative texts of all Bills to be introduced or
amendments thereto to be moved in either House of
Parliament or in the House or either House of Legislature
of a State, and of all Acts passed by the Legislature of a
State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the Governor
of a State, and of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-
laws issued under this Constitution or under any law
made by the Legislature of a State should be in the
English language. C1.(3) of Art. 348 of the Constitution
permits usage of any local language other than the
English language for use in the Legislature of the State,
but requires that a translation of the same in the English
language published under the authority of the Governor
of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be
deemed to be authoritative text thereof in the English
language, as required, by the said Article.
4. In view of this clear mandate of the Constitution, we
see no reason or justification for the State of Kerala for
not implementing these directives, even after such a long
period of time, notwithstanding a specific direction by an
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order of this Court in Thanga Dorai v. Chancellor, Kerala
University, 1995 (2) KLT 663."
17. However, things did not change even after 28 years
after the first judgment and 22 years after the judgment of the
Division Bench. A learned Single Judge of this Court again
considered the issue in P.H. Babu Ansari v. The Municipal
Council, Kottayam Municipality [2023 (6) KLT 523], and
after referring to the earlier two decisions reiterated the legal
position thus;
"10. In this context, it is apposite to point out that the
Legislature and the Rule making authority are bound to
issue an English translation, simultaneous with the
introduction and passing of the law and the Rules. The
requirement of an English text is a Constitutional
obligation and cannot be avoided. In the decision
in Thanga Dorai v. Chancellor, Kerala University ((1995)
2 KLT 663), it was held that as per Article 348(3) of
the Constitution of India, the translation in English
language shall be deemed to be the authoritative text of
the Bill, Act or Ordinance etc. So whenever a Bill is
introduced in the Legislature, or an Act is passed by the
Legislature or an Ordinance is promulgated by the
Governor or any order, rule, regulation or bye-law is
issued in exercise of the powers to make Subordinate
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Legislation English translation of the legislation should be
published simultaneously. The Court noted that, of late,
such English translations are not forthcoming
immediately after the passing of the Act, the
promulgation of the Ordinance, or the issue of order,
rule, regulation, bye law etc., which is against the
Constitutional provision contained in Art. 348(3) of
the Constitution. The Government and the Legislature
cannot ignore the said constitutional mandate.
11. Again, in Murali Purushothaman v. State of
Kerala ((2002) 1 KLT 698), a Division Bench of this Court
also noticed that Art. 348(1)(b) of
the Constitution requires that the authoritative texts of all
Bills and all Acts passed by the Legislature and of all
Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of a State,
including all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws
issued under this Constitution or under any law made by
the Legislature of a State to be in the English language.
Art. 348(3) of the Constitution permits usage of any local
language other than English for use in the Legislature of
the State but requires that a translation of the same in
the English language be published under the authority of
the Governor of the State in the Official Gazette of that
State which shall be deemed to be the authoritative text
thereof in the English language, as required by the said
Article.
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12. The need for publishing statutes and rules in English
language need not be reiterated. When a State like
Kerala opens its invitation for people from all over the
world to invest, it would be incongruous if the laws are
incomprehensible to them. The importance of English as
an international language of communication and
comprehension within and outside the Country cannot be
ignored. Parochial considerations have to be kept aside
while contemplating growth and development of the
State. Enacting laws in English as mandated by the
Constitution in a diverse country like India, will not have
any bearing on the growth of the regional language. On
the other hand, it can enhance the growth potential of
the State as an investment destination with better
awareness about its laws. Therefore, this Court reminds
the State Government to abide by the Constitutional
obligation to prepare the texts of all Statutes, Rules and
other enactments in English, lest this Court be compelled
to issue appropriate directions in that regard. In the
instant case, this Court restrains from issuing such
directions since a relief of such a nature has not been
sought."
18. It is disheartening to note that all the reminders issued
by this Court are falling into deaf ears. The First Statutes of the
University (3rd respondent in W.P.(C)No.3197 of 2025) was
introduced in the vernacular and even today there is no English
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Translation of the Statutes as required under Article 348(3) of the
Constitution of India available before the Court as an authoritative
text, to be looked into. Admittedly, the Statute was brought into
force in the vernacular in 2020, much after the judgments of this
Court in Thanga Dorai (supra) and Murali Purushothaman
(supra). The requirement of an authoritative text, for use in the
High Court was however not taken note of either at the time of
introducing the Statutes or for the five years thereafter, till today.
This Court can only feel helpless when it reiterates what has been
stated earlier on three occasions by this Court and hopes that the
Legislature would not ignore the Constitutional requirements while
legislating or while issuing any subordinate legislations. This court
is stopping short of stating that the Court will ignore the First
Statutes in vernacular, since it is very much aware of the view of a
Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Mathura Prasad Singh
v. State of Bihar [1975 SCC OnLine Pat 88], wherein an
argument that there is no authoritative text available in the
absence of an English translation was considered and it was held
that since the Bihar Legislature has provided for issuance of
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Ordinances in Hindi, the Ordinance cannot be said to be non est
simply because a translation of the same in English language has
not been published under the authority of the Governor and that
Clause (3) also does not lay down that, if such a translation is not
published, the Ordinance will not be effective. To the extent it
says that the law will not become non est, I am in respective
agreement. However, when it comes to the version that the High
Court should treat as the authoritative text, it is necessary going
by the Constitutional mandate that the English translation is
available. Another Division Bench of the Patna High Court in
Shree Alok Kumar Agrawal & Ors. v. State [1976 KHC
2451] had considered a similar issue and held that in the absence
of the authoritative text, it cannot be held that the Ordinance
itself will be ineffective and that the only consequence will be that
there will be no authoritative text. Reference was made to the
decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Samad v.
State of Kerala [2007 (4) KLT 473], to submit that the non
English version can be looked into as an external aid. The said
decision is rendered in a case where there is a difference between
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the two versions and does not deal with a case where there is
total absence of an authoritative text in English.
19. It is all the more important that an English translation
as provided in Article 348 (3) of the Constitution is available, in
cases where the legislations are regarding Universities which take
care of higher education, and when the State is aiming to become
a global education hub. Should not the students coming from all
over India and all over the World have access to the law relating
the University where they wish to pursue their higher education or
should we still remain as "Koopa mandookam" (translated as frog
in a well)?
20. I shall now address the third question posed in
paragraph 11. Section 2(zp) of the A.P.J.Abdul Kalam
Technological University Act, 2015 defines "University" as the
A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Technological University established and
incorporated under the Act. Section 8(xxi) empowers the
University to define the powers and duties of the officers of the
University other than the Vice-Chancellor. Section 8(xxvi)
empowers the University to make Statutes, Ordinances and
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Regulations and to amend, modify or repeal the same. Section 8
(xxvii) empowers the University to generally to do such other acts
as may be required for the furtherance of the objects and
purposes of this Act. Section 9 of the Act spells out the control of
the Government over the University in certain matters.
21. Section 14 of the Act deals with the powers of the Vice
Chancellor and it reads thus:
"S.14: Powers of the Vice-Chancellor.-(1) The Vice-
Chancellor shall be the principal academic and executive
officer of the University. He shall be responsible for the
development of academic programmes of the University.
He shall oversee and monitor the administration of the
academic programmes and general administration of the
University to ensure efficiency and good order of the
University.
(2) The Vice-Chancellor shall have the power to
convene meetings of any of the authorities, bodies or
committees, as and when he considers that such meeting
is necessary.
(3) The Vice-Chancellor shall ensure that the directions
issued by the Board of Governors are strictly complied
with or implemented.
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(4) It shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to ensure
that the actions of the University are carried out in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, Statutes,
Ordinances and Regulations and that the decisions of the
authorities, bodies and committees are not inconsistent
with this Act, Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations.
(5) If there are reasonable grounds for the Vice-
Chancellor to believe that there is an emergency which
requires immediate action to be taken, he shall, take
such action as he thinks necessary, and shall, as soon as
may be, report in writing, the grounds for the emergency
and the action taken by him, to such authority or body
which, in the ordinary course, would have dealt with the
matter. In the event of a difference arising between the
Vice-Chancellor and the authority, on the issue of
existence of such an emergency, or on the action taken
or on both, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor
whose decision shall be final.
(6) Where any matter is required to be regulated by
Statutes or Regulations but no Statutes or Regulations
have been made in that behalf, the Vice-Chancellor shall,
for the time being, regulate the matter by issuing such
directions as the Vice-Chancellor thinks necessary, and
shall, as soon as may be, submit them before the Board
of Governors or other authority or body concerned for
approval.
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(7) The Vice-Chancellor shall appoint the University
teachers based on the recommendations of the Selection
Committee constituted for the said purpose in such
manner as may be presoribed by Statutes and with the
approval of the Executive Committee.
(8) The Vice-Chancellor shall appoint all officers of the
University of and above the rank of Deputy Registrar
based on the recommendations of the Selection
Committee constituted in such manner as may be
prescribed by Statutes and with the approval of the
Executive Committe.
(9) The Vice-Chancellor shall have the financial power to
make expenditure subject to the limit fixed by the
Statutes.
(10) As the Chairperson of the authorities or bodies or
committees of the University, the Vice-Chancellor shall
have, subject to the approval of the Executive
Committee, the power to suspend a member from the
meeting of the authority, body or committee for
obstructing or stalling the proceedings or for indulging in
behaviour unbecoming of a member and shall report the
matter accordingly to the Board of Governors.
(11) Subject to the provisions of the Statutes and
Ordinances and the approval of the Executive Committee,
the Vice-Chancellor shall have the power to suspend,
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discharge, dismiss or otherwise take any disciplinary
action against the staff of the University after giving them
reasonable opportunity to defend their part.
(12) The Vice-Chancellor shall appoint the members of all
Committees and Boards in accordance with the Statutes,
unless specified in this Act.
(13) The Vice-Chancellor shall place before the Board of
Governors and Executive Committee a report of the work
done by the University periodically as provided under the
Statutes.
(14) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such other powers
and perform such other duties as may be conferred upon
the Vice-Chancellor by or under this Act and Statutes".
22. Section 16 of the Act deals with the appointment,
powers and functions of the Registrar. It says that the Registrar is
to be appointed by the Syndicate, with the approval of the
Government and recommended by a Selection Committee. The
Registrar is the Chief Administrative Officer of the University who
is to work directly under the superintendence, direction and
control of the Vice Chancellor. The Vice Chancellor is to appoint a
suitable person to officiate as the Registrar in case the office of
the Registrar is likely to fall vacant for period less than 6 months,
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which shall be until a new Registrar is appointed and assumes
office or the Registrar resumes duty, as the case may be. The
Registrar shall act as Convenor of the Board of Governors and the
Executive Committee. The Registrar shall exercise such other
powers and perform such other duties as provided by or under
this Act or as may be prescribed by Statutes or assigned to him,
from time to time, by the Vice Chancellor. Under Section 18, the
Controller of Examinations is to be appointed by the Syndicate
and is to be a person who is proposed by the Government from
among three persons recommended by a Selection Committee
determined by the Executive Committee, with the Vice Chancellor
as the Convenor. Section 27 of the Act speaks about the Syndicate
of the University. Sub-section (1) of Section 27 says that the
Syndicate shall be the Chief Executive body of the University
which consists of Ex-officio Members and nominated members.
Sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act says that the Vice
Chancellor shall be the Chairperson of the Syndicate and the
Registrar shall be the Ex-officio Secretary of the Syndicate.
23. Section 28 of the Act deals with meetings of the
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Syndicate which is referred to as Executive Committee, and
Section 30 deals with the powers, functions and duties of the
Executive Committee, and they read thus:
"S.28. Meetings of the Executive Committee.-(1) The
Executive Committee shall meet as often as decided by
the Vice-Chancellor but at least once in two months on
the dates to be fixed by the Vice-Chancellor. The quorum
for a meeting of the Executive Committee shall be five.
(2) The Registrar shall convene the meetings of the
Executive Committee at such place and on such date and
time as may be directed by the Vice-Chancellor.
S.30. Powers, functions and duties of the Executive
Committee.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and
the Statutes, the executive powers of the University,
including the general superintendence and control over
the institutions of the University, shall be vested in the
Executive Committee.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes,
the Committee shall have the following powers, namely:-
(i) to make Ordinances in conformity with this Act
and the Statutes made thereunder and to amend
or repeal the same;
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(ii) to propose Statutes for the consideration of
the Board of Governors;
(iii) to propose norms and standards for affiliating
colleges as regular colleges or autonomous
colleges or constituent colleges of the University;
(iv) to establish, maintain and administer hostels
and to recognise hostels not managed by the
University and to suspend or withdraw such
recognition;
(v) to exercise control over the students of the
University, to secure their health, well being and
discipline and to exercise through the affiliated
colleges control for similar purposes over the
students of affiliated colleges;
(vi) to control-and regulate admission of students
for various courses of study in colleges,
departments, or centres maintained by the
University;
(vii) to conduct University examinations and
approve and publish the results thereof;
(viii) to fix the fees payable to the University and
to demand and receive such fees;
(ix) to accept endowments, bequests, donations
and transfers of any movable or immovable
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properties to the University on its behalf: Provided
that all such endowments, bequests, donations
and transfers shall be reported to the Board of
Governors at its next meeting;
(x) to receive funds for collaboration programmes
from foreign agencies subject to the rules and
regulations of the Central Government and State
Government in that behalf;
(xi) to direct for the management and control of
all immovable and movable properties transferred
to the University by the Government;
(xii) to consider the financial estimates of the
University and submit thein to the Board of
Governors in accordance with the provisions of the
Statutes made in this behalf;
(xiii) to direct the form, custody and use of the
common seal of the University;
(xiv) to arrange for and direct the investigation
into the affairs of affiliated colleges, to issue
instructions for maintaining their efficiency, for
ensuring academic and administrative resources,
infrastructural facility, academic performance,
performance of teachers of these colleges and in
the case of private colleges ensure payment of
adequate salaries and service conditions to the
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members of the staff and in case of disregard of
such instructions, to modify the conditions of
affiliation or take such steps as it deems proper in
that behalf;
(xv) to define the powers and duties of the
officers of the University other than those
provided in this Act;
(xvi) to delegate any of its powers to the Vice-
Chancellor or to committee appointed from among
its members;
(xvii) to exercise such other powers and perform
such other functions as may be prescribed by this
Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances."
24. It can be seen from the above provisions that Section
28 is the only provision dealing with meetings of the Syndicate.
The Section says of four requirements. One is that the Syndicate
is to meet as of as decided by the Vice Chancellor and at least
once in two months and that too on dates to be fixed by the Vice
Chancellor. The second is that the quorum for the meeting is Five
members. The third is that the Registrar is to convene the
meeting. The fourth is that the meeting is to be convened on such
date and time as directed by the Vice Chancellor. It is thus clear
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from a reading that no meeting of the Syndicate can happen at
the instance of the individual members and has to be necessarily
with the junction of the Vice Chancellor and the Registrar.
25. With the above statutory requirements in mind, let us
see the facts that are admitted in this case. To begin with, a
meeting was properly convened by the Vice Chancellor and it also
commenced. Thereafter, the meeting was called off by the Vice
Chancellor due to altercations regarding inclusion of an additional
item in the agenda. I shall deal with the correctness or otherwise
of the above action later. What happened next was that the
members of the Syndicate, proceeded to elect a person from
among themselves to chair a meeting and held a meeting,
treating it as a continuation of the meeting that had already been
convened. There is no provision in the Act, for holding such a
meeting. Such a meeting cannot be a meeting contemplated by
Section 28 of the Act. It was not convened by the Registrar on
directions of the Vice Chancellor. Admittedly, an additional item
was included in the agenda, which was not originally there. The
mere fact that the requirement of the quorum was satisfied, it
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cannot be held to be a properly convened meeting of the
Syndicate. To hold that such a meeting should be treated as a
properly convened meeting can create havoc. At any point of
time, 5 members which alone is the quorum required can call a
meeting, in the absence of the Vice Chancellor, and upset any
earlier decision of the Syndicate, taken in a properly convened
meeting. It is to prevent such situations, that even though the
quorum is only one-third of the total strength of the Syndicate,
controls are laid by requiring that the meeting is to be at the
instance of the Vice Chancellor. Even though the Vice Chancellor
does not hold a post above that of the Syndicate, going by the
scheme of the Act, controls are brought in to ensure that there is
no misuse of the provision. In case the Vice Chancellor falters in
his duty to call the meeting of the Syndicate, there are sufficient
provisions to approach the Chancellor. Such inbuilt controls are
required to ensure a smooth and systematic functioning of the
University.
26. In the above paragraph, I have deliberately considered
only the provisions of the Act, since I have already found that the
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First Statutes which is the vernacular cannot be treated as an
authoritative text. I hasten to add that, the above conclusion does
not in any manner mean that the First Statutes is invalid. All that
is required is to comply with the constitutional mandate of
publishing an English version in the Official Gazette, which has
been authorised by the Governor. I shall now examine the issue,
treating the vernacular version as an authoritative text, in the
absence of an English translation.
27. The only provision in the First Statutes which is relied
on to submit that the second meeting held after the meeting was
called off by the Vice Chancellor was a validly held meeting, is
Statute 10 of Chapter 3 of the First Statutes, which has been
translated from the vernacular as follows:
"Meetings - (1) For the conduct of business of
the University, Syndicate meetings shall be
convened once in two months or as and when
necessary on such date and time decided by the
Vice Chancellor.
(2) In the absence of the Vice-Chancellor, the Pro-
Vice-Chancellor or a Member elected by the
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members for among those present shall preside
over the meeting.
(3) Subject to Statute 13 of these Statutes, the
Syndicate shall frame the procedure for conduct of
its meetings and the meetings of its Standing
Committees"
28. The petitioners rely on Statute 10(2) and lay emphasis
on the words "in the absence of the Vice-Chancellor". According to
them once the Vice-Chancellor left after calling off the meeting, it
was a situation of "absence of the Vice-Chancellor" and the
remaining members were free to continue the meeting as if it was
the meeting earlier convened, ignoring the calling off of the
meeting, after electing a person to Chair the meeting. Firstly, it is
not a case where there was absence of the Vice Chancellor. As
already observed, this can lead to absurdities. Even if the Vice
Chancellor was in his office, a meeting can be held in another
room by 5 members of the Syndicate and call it as a Syndicate
meeting, which is not what is contemplated by law. So also, even
if a meeting is completed and all the business is transacted and
wound up, five persons can still continue with another meeting
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and intermeddle with the decisions already taken earlier. An
interpretation of the above said Statute in the manner suggested
by the petitioners, will only lead to serious mischief. So, even if
the First Statutes in vernacular are to be considered, the situation
will not be different and the second meeting will have to be held
as not in accordance with law.
29. It is necessary in this context to refer to some
decisions which will have a bearing on the subject. This is with
regard to the question whether the Vice Chancellor could have
called off the meeting which was properly convened, without
completing the business stated in the agenda.
30. There is no specific provision regarding the manner in
which the Syndicate meeting is to be conducted or in what
circumstances a meeting can be called off, either in the Act or in
the First Statutes in vernacular. What can be applied are only the
general principles regarding the law of meetings.
31. In Chandrakant Khaire v. Shantaram Kale [(1988) 4
SCC 577], the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
question of adjournment of a meeting. The question arose under the
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Municipal laws. The Apex Court held thus:
"15. Shackleton on the Law and Practice of
Meetings, 7th edn. apart from the passage at p. 44
already quoted, gives the different shades of
meaning of adjournment as understood in legal
parlance, in the following words:
"Adjournment is the act is (sic) postponing a
meeting of any private or public body or any
business until another time, or indefinitely, in
which case it is an adjournment sine die. The
word applies also to the period during which the
meeting or business stands adjourned. An
adjournment may be:
1. For an interval expiring on the day of the
adjournment.
2. For an interval expiring on some later date.
3. For an indefinite time (i.e. sine die).
4. Until a fixed time and date.
5. To another place."
The learned author then sets out the different
causes giving rise to an adjournment which may
be by (1) Resolution of the meeting, (2) Action of
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the chairman, and (3) Failure to achieve or
maintain a quorum.
16. A properly convened meeting cannot be
postponed. The proper course to adopt is to hold
the meeting as originally intended, and then and
there adjourn it to a more suitable date. If this
course be not adopted, members will be entitled to
ignore the notice of postponement, and, if sufficient
to form a quorum, hold the meeting as originally
convened and validly transact the business thereat.
Even if the relevant rules do not give the chairman
power to adjourn the meeting, he may do so in the
event of disorder. Such an adjournment must be
for no longer than the chairman considers
necessary and the chairman must, so far as
possible, communicate his decision to those
present.
17. The law relating to adjournment has been put
succinctly in Horsley's Meetings Procedure, Law
and Practice, 2nd Edn., ed. by W. John Taggart at
p. 84, para 1002:
"The word 'adjournment' tends to be used
loosely in connection with meetings.
Indeed, as a result, the word is possibly
in process of acquiring a further, derived
meaning of 'close, conclude or finish',
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whereas a meeting or a debate is
adjourned when its further proceedings
are postponed to some subsequent time
or to enable it to reassemble at some
other place; to a later hour in the same
day, to some future date, or indefinitely,
i.e. sine die (without a day being named).
The business (of the whole meeting or
the debate respectively) is indeed
suspended, but with an intention of
deferring it until resumption at a later
time."
The learned author goes on to say that the word
"adjourn" has been in use for almost five centuries
in connection with meetings, with an early
meaning of "to put off or defer proceedings to
another day", and adds:
"This in due course gave rise to the added
meaning 'to break off for later
resumption".
32. The judgment in Chandrakant Khaire (supra) was
again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in
Jayantbhai Manubhai Patel v. Arun Subodhbhai Mehta,
[(1989) 2 SCC 484], which again was a case which arose under
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the Municipal laws. In the said case, the correctness of the
observation in the earlier judgment that a properly convened
meeting cannot be postponed was considered. The relevant
paragraphs from the above judgment are extracted below:
"13. As we have pointed out earlier in Chandrakant
Khaire case [(1988) 4 SCC 577 : AIR 1988 SC
1665] the meeting which was convened had
already commenced and the contention of the
appellant was that in view of the riotous behaviour
of the councillors as well as the outsiders who had
got into the meeting, the Commissioner had
adjourned the meeting sine die. It was common
ground that no resolution was passed at the
meeting regarding its adjournment. It was in those
circumstances that the aforesaid observations have
been made by the Division Bench of this Court
which decided the case. The Bench in that case was
not really concerned with a situation where a
meeting had not commenced at all and the notice
convening the meeting had been cancelled by the
person authorised to issue the notice convening the
meeting. In this connection, we may refer to the
meaning of the term "adjournment" given in certain
dictionaries. It has been observed in
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edn., Volume I at
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p. 61 that the word "adjournment" must be
construed with reference to the object of the
context, and with reference to the object of the
enquiry. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary,
International Edition, at p. 18 the term
"adjournment" has, inter alia, been defined as "(1)
To put off to another day or place, as a meeting or
session; postpone (2) To put off to the next
session, as the decision of a council (3) To
postpone or suspend proceedings for a specified
time". In Concise Oxford Dictionary, Sixth Edn., the
word "adjournment" has been defined, inter alia, as
"(i) Put off, postpone; break off for later
resumption". The definitions of the aforesaid term
"adjournment" in Chambers Twentieth Century
Dictionary, Revised Edition (1964) and Collins
English Dictionary are more or less similar to the
aforestated definition of the said term in Webster
Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition. It
appears to us that strictly speaking, unless the
object of the context or inquiry otherwise warrants
the term "adjournment" in connection with a
meeting should be applied only to the case of a
meeting which has already convened and which is
thereafter postponed and not to a case where a
notice convening a meeting is cancelled and
subsequently, a notice for holding the same
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meeting on a later date is issued, as in the case
before us.
14. It seems that the passage in the judgment
in Chandrakant Khaire case [(1988) 4 SCC 577 :
AIR 1988 SC 1665] which has been strongly relied
upon by Respondent 1 has been taken substantially
from the observations at p. 156 in Shackleton on
the Law and Practice of Meetings, Seventh Edition.
Shackleton has based those observations on the
decision of a single case, namely, Smith v. Paringa
Mines Ltd. [(1906) 2 Ch 193] In that case, a
company had two directors and there was
disagreement among them regarding the
appointment of an additional director. The
aggrieved director commenced an action and after
this a notice was issued postponing a general
meeting already called but, in the belief that the
attempted postponement was illegal, the aggrieved
director advertised the meeting in the press for the
same day as previously arranged. On that day, he
with certain other shareholders attended the
meeting and at that meeting resolutions were
approved re-electing himself as a director and
refusing to re-appoint the other director. It was
held that the resolutions were valid, for, in the
absence of express authority in the articles, the
directors of a company have no power to postpone
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a general meeting properly convened. It appears,
therefore, that these observations are based on a
decision which dealt with the powers of the
directors of a company which are derived from the
articles of association of the company which
essentially are in the nature of a compact or an
agreement. The only powers which the directors of
a company have, are such as have been conferred
upon them by articles of association of the
company. The powers of the Mayor of the
Corporation, on the other hand, are statutory in
nature and they are derived from the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act. As set out by us earlier,
sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the said Act
provides for the election of a Mayor of a Municipal
Corporation. The Mayor has various powers
conferred under the said Act. Sub-clause (c) of
clause 1 in Chapter II of the said Schedule in the
Municipal Corporation Act provides that except for
the first meeting for a new Corporation which has
been duly elected, the time, day and place of
meeting shall be fixed by the Mayor. The powers of
the Mayor regarding the holding of meetings of the
Corporation, therefore, are not derived from any
compact as in the case of directors of a company
but are essentially statutory in nature. We do not
think, with respect, that, in these circumstances, it
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would be proper to apply the aforestated
observations of Shackleton to the present case.
Moreover, as we have already pointed out, the case
before this Court in Chandrakant Khaire v. Dr.
Shantaram Kale [(1988) 4 SCC 577 : AIR 1988 SC
1665] was not a case where a notice convening a
meeting was cancelled and later a notice convening
another meeting was issued but it was a case
where a meeting duly convened had commenced
and it was alleged that the Municipal Commissioner
had adjourned it without there being any resolution
to that effect. We are, therefore, of the view that
the aforesaid observations in the decision
of Chandrakant Khaire case [(1988) 4 SCC 577 :
AIR 1988 SC 1665] are not applicable to the case
before us.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
18. In our view, the learned Judges of the Gujarat
High Court who delivered the judgment under
consideration before us need not have considered
themselves bound by the aforesaid observations
in Chandrakant Khaire case [(1988) 4 SCC 577 :
AIR 1988 SC 1665] as they have done. In the first
place, these observations do not constitute the
ratio of the judgment in that case. The question in
that case was whether a meeting which was duly
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convened and had commenced could have been
adjourned by the Municipal Commissioner and not
whether a notice convening a meeting issued by
the Municipal Corporation could be cancelled by him
before the commencement of the meeting with a
view to have the meeting held on a subsequent
date. We are of the view that the Division Bench
was not really called upon to consider the situation
in such a case, as we have pointed out earlier.
Moreover, it appears that the Division Bench has
not taken into account the provisions of Section 21
of the Bombay General Clauses Act or the principles
underlying that section. No argument was
advanced before the Division Bench on the basis of
that section at all. The attention of the Division
Bench was not drawn to the judgment of this Court
in Mohd. Yunus Saleem case [(1974) 4 SCC 854 :
AIR 1974 SC 1218 : (1974) 3 SCR 738] . Had that
been done, we feel that the Division Bench which
decided the Chandrakant Khaire case [(1988) 4
SCC 577 : AIR 1988 SC 1665] might not have
made the aforestated observations at all. In our
view, the principles underlying Section 21 of the
Bombay General Clauses Act would be clearly
applicable in considering the scope of the powers of
the Mayor of a Municipal Corporation set out in
clause 1 of Chapter II of the said Schedule in the
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said Act and in particular, in sub-clause (c) of the
said clause. We may point out that the rules in the
Schedule have been framed under the statutory
provisions of the said Act and Section 453 of the
said Act provides that the rules in the Schedule as
amended from time to time shall be deemed to be
part of that Act. In our view, the power of the
Mayor conferred under clause 1 of Chapter II of the
said Schedule must be regarded as a statutory
power as distinguished from the powers of directors
of a company which are derived strictly from the
Articles of Association of the Company which are
contractual in nature. There appears to be no
reason to take the view that the principles
underlying Section 21 of the Bombay General
Clauses Act would not apply to the said powers of
the Mayor. In our view, Appellant 1, the Mayor of
Respondent 5, Corporation, had the power to
cancel the notice convening the meeting before the
commencement of the meeting with a view to
convene the meeting on a later date. The
questions, however, whether he has exercised the
power within its true ambit is a different question
altogether. In this regard, in our opinion, although
the Mayor had the power to cancel the notice
convening the meeting and to direct the secretary
to issue a notice to that effect, the said power could
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be exercised only bona fide and for a purpose or
purposes within the scope of the said Act. If the
power was exercised mala fide or for a collateral
purpose, the exercise of the power would certainly
be bad. In the present case, there is considerable
factual controversy as to whether, even on the
footing that Appellant 1 had the power to cancel
the notice convening the meeting that power was
exercised bona fide for a purpose within the scope
of the said Act or whether it was exercised for
collateral or impermissible purposes. We remand
the matter to the Gujarat High Court for the
determination of that question. In view of the
urgency of the matter, we would request the
Gujarat High Court to dispose of the writ petition
latest by 30-4-1989 as far as possible. The interim
order granted by this Court on 16-11-1988 shall
continue up to 5-5-1989, subject to any orders
which may be passed hereafter by the Gujarat High
Court. From that date, it will be for the parties to
apply for appropriate interim orders to the Gujarat
High Court till the case is finally disposed of by that
Court."
33. From the law laid down in the above two judgments, it
is clear that the law envisages a situation where a meeting that
had been properly convened can be adjourned by the Chairperson
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in certain situations. The Apex Court has also stated as to how the
law in the case of meetings which are convened under the
provisions of a Statute are different from the law relating to
companies, where the parties are governed by their contract
contained in the Memorandum of Association. In Jayantbhai
Manubhai Patel (supra), the Court has held that the Mayor had
power even to call off a meeting which was properly convened,
before it commenced, for bona fide reasons. The law is thus clear
that in case of statutory meetings, the person who convenes the
meeting had power to call off the meeting even before it
commenced or to call off a meeting which had already
commenced, in certain situations. Hence, such a power has to be
conceded in favour of the Vice Chancellor in the case on hand.
34. The only question then is whether the action was bona
fide. While considering the above question, it is necessary to
consider the role of the Vice Chancellor in a University. In
Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, [(2022) 5 SCC
179], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
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"53. It is to be noted that the post of Vice-
Chancellor of the university is a very important post
so far as the university is concerned. Being a leader
and head of the institution, the Vice-Chancellor of
the university has to play very important role.
While academic qualifications, administrative
experience, research credentials and track record
could be considered as basic eligibility
requirements, the greater qualities of a Vice-
Chancellor would be one who is a true leader and a
passionate visionary. A Vice-Chancellor needs to be
one who understands and handles the affairs of the
university as ethical business and maintains a
pellucidity in his conduct towards the betterment of
the university as well as the students therein. A
Vice-Chancellor should be one who can inspire
students and guarantee entry of high quality
teachers into the university system. A Vice-
Chancellor functions as a bridge between the
executive and academic wings of a university as he
is the head of both a "teacher" and an
"administrator".
54. We may refer to some of the significant
Commission Reports concerning the personality and
role of a Vice-Chancellor of a university as under:
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54.1. The 1949 Radhakrishnan Commission stated
that originally, the Vice-Chancellorship of an Indian
university was regarded as an honorary post to be
filled by a prominent man in his leisure time. But
now the position has changed, there is enough
work to justify a full-time appointment and the
universities should have full-time paid Vice-
Chancellors. While discussing the duties of a Vice-
Chancellor, the Commission stated that a Vice-
Chancellor must be the chief liaison between the
university and the public and must be a keeper of
the university's conscience, both setting the highest
standard by example and dealing firmly and
promptly with indiscipline and malpractice of any
kind. He/she must have the strength of character
to resist unflinchingly the many forms of pressure.
Being a full-time task, it needs an exceptional man
(or woman) to undertake it. The Commission
rejected the proposal of selecting the Vice-
Chancellor by an external body and recommended
that the Chancellor should appoint the Vice-
Chancellor upon the recommendation of the
executive.
54.2. The 1971 Report of the Committee on
Governance of Universities and Colleges by the
University Grants Commission chaired by Dr P.B.
Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India while
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reiterating the recommendations and observations
made by the aforesaid commissions also stated that
the selection of a Vice-Chancellor is the single most
important decision that the governing body of the
university may be called upon to make. While the
Chancellor of a university may be a high dignitary
of the State of the Union of India or an eminent
scholar or eminent person in public life of the State,
the appointment of Vice-Chancellor, being the
important functionary of the university is most
strategic. The powers of proper maintenance of
discipline and a healthy environment for both
teachers and students in the university is vested
with the Vice-Chancellor along with all the other
powers vested in him/her by various Statutes,
Ordinances or Regulations. The Commission also
stated that appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is
made in most of the universities out of a panel of at
least three names by the Chancellor in case of
State Universities and by the Visitor in case of
Central Universities. The panel of names is
prepared by a Search Committee constituted in
accordance with the provision of the Act/Statute.
Since it was difficult to have a uniform system of
forming a committee in all the States, the
alternatives to constitute the Search Committee
were also provided in the Report.
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54.3. The 1990 Report of the UGC Committee
towards New Educational Management by Professor
A. Gnanam (also called as the Gnanam Committee
Report, 1990) accentuated the role of a Vice-
Chancellor, stating that the Vice-Chancellor should
be a person with vision and qualities of academic
leadership and with a flair for administration
because what the universities need is a sensitive,
efficient, fair and bold administrator. The Vice-
Chancellor should be a distinguished educationist
from the higher education system having highest
level of competence, integrity, morals and self-
respect.
54.4. The Ramlal Parikh Committee 1993 accented
that the universities need distinguished and
dignified persons as Vice-Chancellors and it is
necessary to ensure that they are treated with
dignity and regard, which the office merits.
54.5. The University Grants Commission in its
handbook titled Governance in Higher Education :
Handbook for Vice-Chancellors published in 2019
has penned down the role of Vice-Chancellor of
Indian universities having gained a paramount
importance in the recent times. In the words of
Prof. D.P. Singh, the then Chairman of University
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Grants Commission and former Director of National
Assessment and Accreditation Council ("NAAC"):
"As Chief Executives and Academic Heads of
Universities, the Vice-Chancellors are expected to
be efficient and effective in terms of:
(a) Implementation of National Higher Education
Policy and programmes,
(b) Institutional change in tune with the national
reforms package,
(c) Quality and innovation enhancement and their
sustainability,
(d) Productive engagement with 'communities of
scholars' from within their universities and from
national and international domains,
(e) Nurturing of 'Research and Innovation
Ecosystem' and translation of deliverables to
society and economy,
(f) Adoption of international best practices of 'Good
Governance'."
"The Vice-Chancellor has to evolve as the leader of
a symphony of orchestra with the attributes of:
(a) Developing teams and teamwork, building
partnerships and collaborations delicately
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interwoven by collegiality, friendship and
intellectual engagement;
(b) Devising a strategy and action plan with defined
milestones and deliverables;
(c) Ensuring primary accountabilities of self and the
abovementioned university governing bodies; and
(d) Steering an institutional monitoring and
evaluation mechanism on university performance
built on principles of transparency."
56. Thus, universities are autonomous and the
Vice-Chancellor is the leader of a higher education
institution. As per the norm, he/she should be an
eminent academician, excellent administrator and
also someone who has a high moral stature. The
aforesaid reports of the Radhakrishnan
Commission, Kothari Commission, Gnanam
Committee and Ramlal Parikh Committee have
highlighted the importance of the role of Vice-
Chancellor in maintaining the quality and relevance
of universities, in addition to its growth and
development, keeping in view, the much needed
changes from time to time. Further, these
committees have also made suggestions and
recommendations for identifying the right person
for the said position. At this stage, it is correct to
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say that a Vice-Chancellor is the kingpin of a
university's system and a keeper of the university's
conscience."
35. The action of the Vice Chancellor in calling off the
meeting that had commenced has to be evaluated keeping in
mind the above explained significant role that he plays in the
running of the University. A certain amount of discretion and play
in the joints have to be conceded to the Vice Chancellor. When the
Vice Chancellor calls off a meeting due to disruption, it is not for
this Court to conduct an enquiry into what happened or might
have happened during the meeting, which can be said to justify or
not justify the action of calling off the meeting, as if sitting in
appeal over the said action. The members of the Syndicate had
the option to take up the matter with the Chancellor, if they are
aggrieved by the conduct of the Vice Chancellor. If it is to be held
that the members can convene meeting by themselves, it would
mean that in a case like this, there can be a possibility of the
three groups of five members each, can all convene different
meetings by themselves, satisfying the quorum for the meeting,
and decide as they like, on the so called reason of "absence of the
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Vice Chancellor". This would only create ridiculous situations. The
third question which was posed in paragraph 11 is answered as
above.
36. In the light of my finding regarding questions 1 and 3
posed in paragraph 11, I do not find anything illegal in the order
of the Vice Chancellor annulling the decisions taken at the
meeting held by the members of the Syndicate, after the meeting
was called off, since the said meeting cannot be treated as a
meeting of the Syndicate.
37. The counsel for the Vice Chancellor relied on the
decision in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji
Bashir Ahmed [(1976) 1 SCC 671], to submit that the
members of Syndicates are not aggrieved persons and cannot
challenge the decision of the Vice Chancellor. It is submitted that
it should be the Syndicate which can be said to be aggrieved and
unless the writ petition is filed on behalf of the Syndicate, being
authorised to represent the Syndicate, it will not be maintainable.
I do not think it is necessary to go into the said question in view
of the conclusions stated above. I am also of the opinion that it
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may not be in the interests of justice to hold that members of the
Syndicate are not persons interested in or aggrieved by the
cancellation of a decision, which they contend to be the decision
of the Syndicate. The 2nd question that was posed in paragraph 11
is answered as above.
38. Before parting with the case, I would like to remind the
authorities and the officers of the Universities the following
passage from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prof.
Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2005) 5 SCC 420].
"23. Shortly after Independence on 4.11.1948 the
Government of India constituted a Commission
known as "University Education Commission" of
which Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was the Chairman.
Dr. Tara Chand, former Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad
University, Dr. Zakir Hussain, Vice-Chancellor,
Aligarh Muslim University, Dr. A. Lakshmanaswami
Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor, Madras University, Dr.
Meghnad Saha, Dean, Faculty of Science, Calcutta
University and 5 other eminent personalities in the
field of education were its members. The
Commission gave a very long and exhaustive
report. Chapter II of the report deals with the aims
of university education and para 2 of Part I is
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illustrative and the same is being reproduced
below:
"2. Universities as the organs of
civilisation.--He indeed must be blind who
does not see that, mighty as are the
political changes, far deeper are the
fundamental questions which will be
decided by what happens in the
universities. Everything is being brought to
the test of reason, venerable theologies,
ancient political institutions, time-honoured
social arrangements, a thousand things
which a generation ago looked as fixed as
the hills. If India is to confront the
confusion of our time, she must turn for
guidance, not to those who are lost in the
mere exigencies of the passing hour, but to
her men of letters, and men of science, to
her poets and artists, to her discoverers
and inventors. These intellectual pioneers
of civilisation are to be found and trained in
the universities, which are the sanctuaries
of the inner life of the nation."
39. The Court is hopeful of better tomorrows, where
wisdom dawns on the authorities and officers of the Universities
and they function in unison, to ensure that the purpose for which
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the Universities are formed furthered and not jeopardised by their
narrow mindedness.
40. In the result, W.P.(C) No. 3197 of 2025 is dismissed.
The prayers (ii) and (iii) in W.P.(C)No. 5448 of 2025 are rejected.
There will be a direction to the Vice Chancellor to direct the
Registrar to convene a meeting of the Syndicate at the earliest
and consider the business that had been left untransacted and
such other business that might have arisen subsequently. The
Vice Chancellor is reminded that it is not always necessary to
adjourn meetings when requests are made to add items to the
agenda. It is well within the powers of the Chairman of a meeting
to add additional items in the agenda which may become
necessary and to discuss on the same and if necessary, postpone
the decision to another day.
Sd/-
T.R. RAVI
JUDGE
dsn
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 3197/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Ext.P1 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN W.P.(C)
NO.39062/2023 DATED 07.03.2024
Ext.P2 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE
SYNDICATE ELECTING THE PETITIONER AS THE
CHAIRPERSON FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE
MEETING HELD ON 16.01.2024
Ext.P3 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE
SYNDICATE HELD ON 16.01.2025 ITEM NO.S-
063-OA15
Ext.P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE VICE
CHANCELLOR DATED 20.01.2025
NO.U.O.NO.106/2025/KTU
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
2025:KER:64455
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5548/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Ext.P1 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER NO. G,O.
(RT)NO.386/2021/HEDN DATED 26.2.2021
ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KERALA
Ext.P2 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER
NO.U.0.NO.359/2021/KTU DATED 26.2.2021
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Ext.P3 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES
OF THE APJ ABDULKALAM TECHNICAL
UNIVERSITY ACT, 2015
Ext.P4 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES
OF THE UNIVERSITY ACT, 2015 AND AS
AMENDED BY ACT 17 OF 2018
Ext.P5 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE NOTIFICATION
NO.GS6- 2838/2022 DATED 27.11.2024
ISSUED BY THE GOVERNOR'S SECRETARIAT
KERALA RAJ BHAVAN
Ext.P6 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES
OF SECTION 27 AND 28 IN CHAPTER 4 OF THE
APJAKTU ACT 2015
Ext.P7 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES
OF CHAPTER 3 OF THE FIRST STATUTE 2020
Ext.P8 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER NO.G.O.
(RT) NO.50/2021/HEDN DATED 8.1.2021
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Ext.P9 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER
NO.U.O.NO.106/2025/KTU DATED 20-1-2025
ISSUED BY THE VICE CHANCELLOR OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT
Ext.P10 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER DATED
27.1.2025 PASSED BY THIS COURT IN WP(C).
Ext.P11 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION NO.
KTU/REGOFFICE/101/2025 DATED 21-1-2025
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
2025:KER:64455
FORWARDED BY THE REGISTRAR TO THE
SECRETARY, HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Ext.P12 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO.HEDN-
J3/30/2025- HEDN DATED 23.1.2025 SENT BY
THE GOVERNMENT TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE
UNIVERSITY
Ext.P13 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE LETTER
NO.KTU/ASST3(ADMIN)744/2021 DATED
01.02.2025 SUBMITTED BY THE
3RDRESPONDENT TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Ext.P14 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE LETTER NO. J3/
45/2025/HEDN DATED 3.2.2025 ISSUED BY
THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Ext.P15 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE LETTER DATED
5.2.2025 MOVED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE
VICE-CHANCELLOR
Ext.P16 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED
5.2.2018 PASSED BY THIS COURT IN W.P.(C)
Ext.P17 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE REQUEST DATED
1.2.2025 SUBMITTED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT I
Ext.P18 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER DATED
3.2.2025 ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
ANNEXURE R3(A) A TRUE COPY OF THE HAND WRITTEN
REPRESENTATION DATED 10/01/2025 WHICH
WAS SUBMITTED BY THE CE ON 16/01/2025
BEFORE THE VC
ANNEXURE R3(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED
01/02/2025 OF THE GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTING
THE REGISTRAR TO RE-SUBMIT THE PROPOSAL
WITH THE DECISION OF THE SYNDICATE, IF,
ANY
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Ext.P19 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE RESOLUTION
W.P (C) Nos.3197 & 5548 of 2025
2025:KER:64455
PASSED BY THE SYNDICATE OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY
Ext.P20 A TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER DATED
29.1.2025 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
