income was Rs.1,81,41,376/-. The expenditure during the
is Rs.38,12,257/-. Based on these findings, the Special
crime doesn't arise.
19. The petitioner alleges that respondent No.3
(2) Apartment in Kohinoor City, Mumbai.
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(3) Shopping Complex at Kadappakada in Kollam
District.
20. The VACB, in the preliminary enquiry, found
that respondent No.3 has the following investments:
1.Millennium Apartment in Thiruvananthapuram -
valued at Rs.13,56,611/-.
2.Kohinoor Apartment in Mumbai - valued at
Rs.99,75,000/-.
3. A Hyundai brand Car - valued atRs.7,69,860/-.
21. The VACB concluded that respondent No.3 did
not spend any money to construct the shopping complex
in Kollam, the cost of which was found to be Rs.2.05
Crores in the enquiry.
22. Even though I am conscious of the legal
position that this Court is not expected to look into the
merits of the allegations levelled against respondent No.3
at this stage, having regard to the conclusions arrived at
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in the preliminary enquiry and findings recorded by the
trial Court based on it, I deem it appropriate to consider
some of the findings in the preliminary enquiry (QV
Report). This is necessitated because the petitioner has
built up his case on the following allegations:-
(a) The Vigilance Officer who conducted the
enquiry has arbitrarily fixed a check period
intending to exclude the accumulation of
assets by respondent No.3 during the period
from 2014-2015.
(b) The Vigilance Officer was influenced by
respondent No.3, the then Additional Chief
Secretary.
(c) If the Vigilance Officer had not excluded the
cost of acquiring the shopping complex in
Kollam, he would have concluded that there
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are prima facie materials revealing a
cognizable offence under the PC Act.
23. The conclusions of the Vigilance Officer
regarding the acquisition of immovable properties by
respondent No.3 are as follows:-
Millennium Apartment in Thiruvananthapuram:-
The Enquiry Officer found that respondent No.3 paid
Rs.13,56,611/- to acquire this apartment at the housing
complex constructed by the Officers' Housing
Cooperative Society Ltd., during the period from
22.04.1996 to 04.02.2002.
Apartment in Mumbai
The total sale consideration of the residential flat at
Kohinoor City with a plinth area of 105.91 square meters
was Rs.99,75,000/- in addition to Rs.4,81,350/- and
Rs.30,000/- paid as stamp duty and registration charges,
respectively. Respondent No.3 availed a housing loan for
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Rs.89,00,000/- from the State Bank of India, Pant Nagar
Branch, Mumbai.
Shopping Complex in Kollam
The Vigilance assessed the cost of construction of
the shopping complex by applying plinth area method at
Rs.2.05 Crores. The shopping complex was constructed
during 2014-15.
24. The shopping complex was constructed on a
landed property inherited by respondent No.3, his
brothers Sri. K.M.Thomas and Sri. K.M.Mathew. In the
enquiry, the Vigilance found that a sum of Rs.24,50,000/-
has been credited to the account of Smt.Shirley Abraham,
wife of respondent No.3, from the NRI account
maintained by Sri.K.M.Thomas, brother of respondent
No.3. They also found that a sum of Rs.22,05,688/-
remained in the accounts of Sri. K.M.Thomas and
Smt. Annie Varghese for the period from 02.04.2010 to
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03.12.2016 at the SBI NRI Branch, LMS Compoud. The
VACB also found transfer of money to the account
No.13170100045166 maintained by Smt.Shirley
Abraham, wife of respondent No.3, with the Federal Bank
Nanthancodu Branch for the period from 16.03.2002 to
05.11.2016 by his brothers.
25. The Vigilance, however, could not find the
transfer of funds by his brothers, as stated by respondent
No.3, to the account of his wife to meet the entire
expenses required for the construction of the shopping
complex in Kollam.
26. It is the case of the petitioner that the
investment towards the cost of construction of the
shopping complex was excluded from the check period as
respondent No.3 failed to account for the source of
income for that purpose. The learned counsel for
respondent No.3 submitted that by way of a
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Memorandum of Understanding (Ext.C3 in the QV
Report), respondent No.3 and his brothers agreed that
the entire cost of construction would be met by his
brothers and only on payment of the amount due from
him, he would acquire right over the property. The
learned counsel for respondent No.3 also relied on the
powers-of-attorney executed by the brothers of
respondent No.3 in favour of him. Paragraph No.2 of the
powers-of-attorney (Exts.C1 & C2 in the QV Report) is
relevant in this regard, which reads thus:-
"....2. And whereas we the joint owners propose to
demolish the existing old structures on the property and
to construct a multi-storied Residential cum shopping
complex with equal investment and equal right including
on all common accesses and utilities proposed to be
established there on."
27. The building permit dated 23.07.2014 for the
construction of the shopping complex (Ext.C in the QV
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Report; See page No.236) was issued in the name of
respondent No.3 and his brothers. The Occupancy
Certificate dated 01.07.2015 (Ext.C6 in the QV Report;
See page No.301) would show that the owners of the
building are respondent No.3 and his brothers.
28. The case of the petitioner is that MOU (Ext.C3
in the QV Report) was created as the product of an
afterthought during preliminary enquiry when respondent
No.3 failed to account for the source of income for
investing in the construction of the shopping complex. It
is pertinent to note that in the preliminary enquiry,
Vigilance could not find any material supporting the
defence set up by respondent No.3 that the shopping
complex was constructed by utilising the funds
transferred by his brothers alone.
29. The petitioner submitted that respondent No.3
being a Senior Officer of the Indian Administrative
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Service influenced the Enquiry Officer who conducted the
preliminary enquiry. The Enquiry Officer deliberately
fixed the check period in such a way as to exclude the
period during which the shopping complex was
constructed. According to the petitioner, even on a
casual assessment, the investment made by respondent
No.3 for the shopping complex would come to around
Rupees Sixty Eight Lakhs (1/3rd of the total cost estimated
by the VACB).
30. The petitioner contends that this is enough to
prima facie conclude that a cognizable offence has been
revealed, but the Enquiry Officer, under the influence of
respondent No.3, intentionally excluded the said period.
The petitioner submits that this is a case where an FIR is
to be registered under Section 13(1)(e) r/w Section 13(2)
of the PC Act. He contends that since respondent No.3 is
employed in the cabinet rank as the Chief Principal
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Secretary to the Chief Minister of Kerala, who holds the
Home Portfolio also, under which the Directorate of
Vigilance functions, there is every chance that respondent
No.3 will influence the investigation that any agency of
the Kerala Police may conduct. According to the
petitioner, the VACB cannot conduct a fair investigation.
Therefore, he seeks registration of FIR and investigation
by the CBI.
31. The learned Special Government Pleader
(Vigilance) appearing for the VACB submitted that the
Enquiry Officer conducted a fair enquiry and concluded
that no cognizable offence was revealed. The learned
Special Government Pleader also submitted that the
Vigilance had no malafides in the fixation of the check
period.
32. The petitioner's case is that in the preliminary
enquiry, to protect respondent No.3, the Enquiry Officer
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intentionally excluded the period in which respondent
No.3 and his two siblings constructed the shopping
complex at Kadappakkada in Kollam. The construction
was commenced and completed during the period from
23.7.2014 to 1.7.2015. The learned counsel for
respondent No.3 and the learned Special Government
Pleader (Vigilance) submitted that it is the prerogative of
the enquiry officer/prosecution to select the check period.
33. There is no general rule or criterion, valid for
all cases, regarding the choice of the period for which
accounts are taken. It shall be determined based on the
allegations. A period must be taken so as to obtain a true
and comprehensive picture of the known sources of
income, pecuniary resources, and property in possession
of the public servant, which is alleged to be
disproportionate. The period selected has a direct
bearing on the acquisitive activities of the public servant
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in amassing wealth. The prosecution cannot exclude the
period during which the public servant allegedly acquired
a substantial asset. Such a situation would amount to
ignoring or avoiding a true picture of the property in
possession of the public servant.
34. In State of Maharashtra v. Pollonji
Darabshaw Daruwalla [AIR 1988 SC 88 = 1987 KHC
771], the Supreme Court considered this aspect and
observed thus:-
"15. .......... In order to establish that a public
servant is in possession of pecuniary resources and
property, disproportionate to his known sources of income,
it is not imperative that the period of reckoning be spread
out for the entire stretch of anterior service of the public
servant. There can be no general rule or criterion, valid
for all cases, in regard to the choice of the period for
which accounts are taken to establish criminal misconduct
under Section 5(1)(e) of the 'Act'.
16. The choice of the period must necessarily be
determined by the allegations of fact on which the
prosecution is founded and rests. However, the period
must be such as to enable a true and comprehensive
picture of the known sources of income and the pecuniary
resources and property in possession of the public servant
either by himself or through any other person on his
behalf, which are alleged to be so disproportionate. In the
facts and circumstances of a case, a ten year period
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cannot be said to be incapable of yielding such a true and
comprehensive picture. The assets spilling over from the
anterior period, if their existence is probabilised, would, of
course, have to be given credit to on the income side and
would go to reduce the extent and the quantum of the
disproportion. .........
17.........It is for the prosecution to choose what,
according to it, is the period which having regard to the
acquisitive activities of the public servant in amassing
wealth, characterise and isolate that period for special
scrutiny."
35. In Shibu.K.S. v. State of Kerala and Another
[2021 KHC OnLine 5078] this Court observed thus:-
"30. No doubt, it is the prerogative of the prosecution to
select the check period. But, such discretion cannot be
exercised arbitrarily. It is not imperative that the period of
reckoning should be spread out for the entire stretch of the
anterior service of the public servant. But, the check
period selected by the prosecution should be capable of
giving a true and comprehensive picture of the known
sources of income and the pecuniary resources and
property in the possession of the public servant. The check
period selected by the prosecution shall cover a reasonable
period of time. The period shall not be very small and
arbitrarily chosen by the investigating officer to project
acquisition of wealth by a public servant."
36. In Ashok Kumar Kapoor v. Central Bureau
of Investigation [2019 SCC OnLine Del 7182], Delhi
High Court, while dealing with a case where the
prosecution arbitrarily curtailed the check period,
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observed that the check period must be fixed in such a
way as to reveal the true and comprehensive picture in
disproportionate asset cases.
37. In the present case, the petitioner specifically
alleged that respondent No.3 constructed a shopping
complex at Kadappakkada, the value of which would
come to Rs.8 Crores. In the preliminary enquiry, the
VACB found that the cost of construction, applying the
plinth area method, would come to Rs.2.05 Crores.
Admittedly, the multi-storey building has an area of
9883.961 sq.ft. (918.25 m2). The building is in the joint
names of respondent No.3 and his brothers, as revealed
from the building permit and the Occupancy Certificate
(Exts.C & C6 in QV Report). The powers-of-attorney
executed by the brothers of respondent No.3 would show
that they jointly invested.
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38. In the preliminary enquiry, the reasoning
applied for fixing the check period as 01.01.2000 to
31.12.2009 is the following:-
"......Here in this case the petition of the Crl. MP alleges
that the counter petitioner acquired disproportionate
assets such as a residential flat in Mumbai City
amounting in Rs. 3 Crores, another residential flat in
Thiruvananthapuram amounting to Rs. 1 Crore and a
shopping Complex in Kollam District amount to Rs. 8
Crores. Out of these three assets the First Asset acquired
was the Millennium Apartment in Jagathy in 2001 and
the flat at Kohinoor city in Mumbai in 2009. Hence, a
period of 10 years ie, the period between 01-01-2000 to
31-12-2009 is selected as the check period for this
enquiry....."
39. The defence set up by respondent No.3 in the
preliminary enquiry was that he had not spent any money
on the construction of the shopping complex at
Kadappakkada and that the entire money was spent by
his brothers, who forwarded the funds through the
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account of his wife. The powers-of-attorney referred to
above and the documents issued by the local authority
would reveal that the building is in the joint names of
respondent No.3 and his brothers and they jointly
invested in the construction of the building.
40. After collecting the source of income for the
construction of the building based on the statement given
by respondent No.3 and also relying on the Memorandum
of Understating (Ext.C3 in the QV Report) stated to have
been executed among respondent No.3 and his siblings,
wherein it was recited that his brothers agreed to make
the entire investment, the Enquiry Officer concluded that
respondent No.3 did not spend any funds for the
construction. The specific case of the petitioner is that
the MOU stated to have been executed on 25.2.2012,
which would go against the recitals in the powers-of-
attorney executed by the brothers of respondent No.3 and
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the documents issued by the local authority regarding the
ownership of the building, is the product of an
afterthought.
41. The Enquiry Officer collected the details
regarding the transfer of funds by the brothers of
respondent No.3 to the account of his wife. The funds
stated to have been transferred by his brothers would not
account for the entire expenditure of Rs.2.05 Crores.
Therefore, the Enquiry Officer excluded the period during
which the construction was done from the check period.
The intention of the enquiry officer is very evident. Prima
facie, it is established that respondent No.3 spent one-
third (1/3rd) of the investment required to construct the
shopping complex. The exclusion of the period during
which the shopping complex was constructed relying on
the recitals in the MOU, which go against the powers-of-
attorney executed by the brothers of respondent No.3,
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and the documents issued by the local authority persuade
this Court to infer that the conclusion of the Enquiry
Officer is doubtful. This does not instil confidence to
conclude that the Enquiry Officer made an independent
and impartial enquiry.
42. The petitioner submitted that the VACB ought to
have come to a prima facie conclusion that respondent
No.3 invested at least Rs.68.34 Lakhs, one-third (1/3rd) of
the investment assessed in the preliminary enquiry.
43. The materials collected by the enquiry officer
would prima facie elicit that respondent No.3 made an
investment in the shopping complex at Kadappakada, to a
minimum extent of one-third (1/3rd) of the total cost
assessed as Rs. 2.05 Crores. If the investment in the
shopping complex had also been taken into account, by
including it in the check period, the conclusion in the
preliminary enquiry would have been different.
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44. The consistent stand of respondent No.3 is that
he spent no money for the construction of the shopping
complex in Kollam. This is prima facie not believable for
the following reasons:-
(a) The powers-of-attorney he relies on reflect that he and
his brothers agreed to invest equally in the construction.
(b) The building permit and the Occupancy Certificate
issued by the local authority indicate that he has rights in
the building.
(c) The contention of the petitioner that the MOU relied
on by respondent No.3 is the product of an afterthought
has force, though this is a matter to be investigated.
(d) Respondent No.3 could not produce materials to the
satisfaction of the enquiry officer that his brothers spent
the entire money to construct the shopping complex.
45. It is also pertinent to note that respondent No.3
reported to the Chief Secretary that his wife had not
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acquired any immovable property during his service
period. In the letter dated 10.06.2015 addressed to the
Chief Secretary, respondent No.3 submitted as follows:-
"With reference to the above, this is to inform that my
wife Smt. Shirley Abraham and my dependents have
never owned any immovable property. They have also
not acquired any movable item other than clothes and
items needed for routine daily use during my period of
service in the IAS." (See Page No.110 of paper book)
46. The petitioner has brought to my notice a series
of transactions made by his wife through the Federal
Bank Ltd., Nandancodu branch. This gives rise to a
prima facie, conclusion that respondent No.3 acquired
assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.
47. On a careful analysis of the preliminary enquiry
report, the other materials placed before the Court and
the defence set up by respondent No.3 during enquiry,
prima facie, it is established that respondent No.3 had
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movable and immovable properties disproportionate to
his known sources of income.
48. This discussion takes me to the prima facie
conclusion that there are sufficient facts constituting the
offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of
the PC Act. The materials prima facie reveal a cognizable
offence warranting registration of a crime and
investigation. Point No.1 is answered accordingly.
The observations made by this Court while answering this
point are limited to the question whether the material
made available ex facie discloses a cognizable offence.
Point No.2
49. Having concluded that the materials prima
facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, as
held in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. [AIR 2014 SC
187], registration of the FIR is mandatory. The VACB is
the Investigating agency empowered to register FIR
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under the PC Act. I have already held that in the
preliminary enquiry, the report of which was verified by
the Legal Officer/Public Prosecutor and the Director of
Vigilance, the enquiry officer deliberately excluded the
acquisition of an immovable property having substantial
value by respondent No.3 from consideration by way of
curtailing the check period. At the time of the
preliminary enquiry, respondent No.3 was the Additional
Chief Secretary to the Government of Kerala. Presently,
he is the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister of
Kerala in the cabinet rank. The investigation by the VACB
will not instil confidence in the public. At the cost of
repetition, I must say that the credibility of the enquiry
done by State Vigilance is doubtful.
50. The petitioner has prayed for directing the CBI
to register an FIR and conduct investigation. The learned
counsel for respondent No.3 and the learned Special
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Government Pleader (Vigilance) submitted that merely
because a party made allegations against a person, the
High Court cannot direct CBI to investigate whether that
person committed an offence as alleged or not.
51. The learned counsel for respondent No.3,
relying on Minor Irrigation & Rural Engg. Services,
U.P. v. Sahngoo Ram Arya [2002 (5) SCC 521],
submitted that the power to order investigation by the
CBI is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.
The learned Special Government Pleader (Vigilance)
relied on Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
[(2023) 12 SCC 592] and submitted that an order
directing the CBI to conduct investigation cannot be
passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party
has levelled some allegations against the local Police. It
is submitted that this power is to be exercised sparingly,
cautiously and in exceptional situations.
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52. It is trite that if a citizen who is a complainant
in a criminal case alleging the commission of cognizable
offence against Government officials or influential
persons prays before a court for a direction of
investigation of the alleged offence by CBI, such prayer
should not be granted on mere asking. In State of W.B
v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights
[2010 (3) SCC 571], while considering the prayer for
investigation by the CBI, a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court held that Constitutional Courts are fully
empowered to direct for CBI investigation and
restrictions under the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act, 1946 do not apply to Constitutional Courts. The
Supreme Court further observed that although no
inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether
or not such powers should be exercised, such an order is
not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because
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a party has levelled some allegations against the State
Police. This extraordinary power must be exercised
sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where
it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil
confidence in investigations, or where the incident may
have national and international ramifications, or where
such an order may be necessary for doing complete
justice and enforcing the fundamental rights.
53. In Minor Irrigation & Rural Engg. Services,
U.P., the Supreme Court held that an order directing an
investigation by the CBI should be passed only when the
High Court, after considering the material on record,
comes to the conclusion that such material does disclose
a prima facie case calling for an investigation by the CBI
or any other agency.
54. In Himanshu Kumar, the Supreme Court held
that in an appropriate case when the Court feels that the
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investigation by the State Police authorities is not in a
proper direction, and to do complete justice in the case
and if high police officials are involved in the alleged
crime, the Court may be justified in such circumstances
to handover the investigation to an independent agency
like CBI. By now, it is well - settled that even after the
filing of the charge sheet, the court is empowered, in an
appropriate case, to hand over the investigation to an
independent agency like the CBI. The Supreme Court
further held that the prime concern and the endeavour of
the court of law should be to secure justice on the basis of
true facts, which ought to be unearthed through a
committed, resolved and competent investigating agency.
55. In K. V. Rajendran v. CBCID [2013 (12) SCC
480], the Apex Court held that the power of transferring
such investigation must be in rare and exceptional cases
where the court finds it necessary in order to do justice
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between the parties and to instil confidence in the public
mind, or where investigation by the State police lacks
credibility and it is necessary for having "a fair, honest
and complete investigation", and particularly when it is
imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial
working of the State agencies.
56. In K. V. Rajendran, in paragraph 17 of
judgment, the Apex Court observed thus:
"17. ... the Court could exercise its constitutional
powers for transferring an investigation from the
State investigating agency to any other independent
investigating agency like CBI only in rare and
exceptional cases. Such as where high officials of
State authorities are involved, or the accusation
itself is against the top officials of the investigating
agency thereby allowing them to influence the
investigation, and further that it is so necessary to
do justice and to instil confidence in the
investigation or where the investigation is prima
facie found to be tainted / biased."
57. In Himanshu Kumar, the Supreme Court
further observed that one factor that Courts may consider
is that such transfer of investigation to the CBI is
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"imperative" to retain "public confidence in the impartial
working of the State agencies."
58. In Amar Nath Chaubey v. Union of India,
[(2021) 11 SCC 804], in paragraph 11 of the judgment the
Supreme Court, observed thus:
"11. The police has a statutory duty to investigate into
any crime in accordance with law as provided in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Investigation is the
exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which
cannot be interfered with. But if the police does not
perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is
remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot
abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that
investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police.
Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the
materials on record, that the police has not investigated
properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the
court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure
that the investigation is conducted in accordance with
law. If the court gives any directions for that purpose
within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to
interference with investigation. A fair investigation is,
but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden
obligation to ensure adherence by the police."
59. Bearing in mind the position of law discussed
above, from the materials on record, I now proceed to
consider whether it has been prima facie established that
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this is a fit case for allowing the prayer of the petitioner
for investigation by the CBI. In the afore-said
discussions, I have concluded that the Vigilance, while
conducting preliminary enquiry, deliberately excluded the
acquisition of property having substantial value by
respondent No.3 with the intent to protect him.
60. Strangely enough, the enquiry report was
scrutinized and verified by the Director of the VACB.
There was a deliberate attempt to save respondent No.3
on the part of the State Vigilance. Respondent No.3
retired from the Indian Administrative Service as Chief
Secretary, Government of Kerala and is now employed in
the cabinet rank as the Chief Principal Secretary to the
Chief Minister of Kerala, who holds the Home Portfolio
under which the Directorate of Vigilance functions.
61. This Court has a duty to retain public
confidence in the investigation. Justice should not only be
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done, but it must appear to have been conducted in a fair
manner. For a fair, honest and complete investigation to
retain public confidence in the impartial working of the
State agencies, the investigation in the present case is to
be done by the CBI. The learned Public Prosecutor, CBI
submitted that the CBI has no objection in conducting
investigation. Therefore, this Court comes to the
conclusion that the CBI is to be directed to register an
FIR and conduct investigation.
Point No.3
62. A question may arise as to whether a
preliminary enquiry is mandatory before registering the
FIR. In P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [AIR 1971 SC
520], the Supreme Court observed that before a public
servant is charged with acts of dishonesty amounting to a
serious misdemeanour, some suitable preliminary enquiry
must be conducted in order to obviate incalculable harm
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to the reputation of that person. This decision was
followed by another Two Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab,
[(2009) 1 SCC 441], where it was observed that in
accordance with the CBI Manual, CBI may only be held to
have established a prima facie case upon the completion
of a preliminary enquiry.
63. Later, in Lalita Kumari, a Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court observed that preliminary enquiry
may be made before registration of the FIR in some
categories of cases, including corruption cases. In
Lalita Kumari, in paragraph 119 of the judgment, the
Supreme Court observed thus:
"119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims
regarding registration or non-registration, what is
necessary is only that the information given to the
police must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is
mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made
out in the information given, then the FIR need not be
registered immediately and perhaps the police can
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conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry
for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a
cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the
information given clearly mentions the commission of
a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to
register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are
not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such
as, whether the information is falsely given, whether
the information is genuine, whether the information is
credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be
verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the
stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is
merely whether the information given ex facie
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If,
after investigation, the information given is found to
be false, there is always an option to prosecute the
complainant for filing a false FIR. "
64. It was concluded in Lalita Kumari that
registration of the FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure if the information
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and no
preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation and
if the information received does not disclose a cognizable
offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a
preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain
whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not . The
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Court further held that the scope of preliminary inquiry is
not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information
received but only to ascertain whether the information
reveals any cognizable offence.
65. The principle declared in Lalita Kumari was
considered by a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
in Yashwant Sinha v. CBI [(2020) 2 SCC 338], wherein
it was observed that a preliminary enquiry may be
desirable in corruption cases. In State of Telangana v.
Managipet, [(2019) 19 SCC 87], a Two Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court, after analysing Lalita Kumari, noted
that whether a preliminary enquiry is required or not will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and
it cannot be said to be a mandatory requirement without
which a case cannot be registered against the accused in
corruption cases. The Supreme Court observed that the
objective of preliminary enquiry is only to ensure that a
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criminal investigation process is not initiated on a
frivolous and untenable complaint.
66. In CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi [(2021) 18 SCC 135], a Three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court held that a preliminary
enquiry is not mandatory in all cases which involve
allegations of corruption. In paragraphs 39 and 43 of the
judgment, the Apex Court observed thus:
"39...
The precedents of this Court and the provisions
of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that
a Preliminary Enquiry is not mandatory in all
cases which involve allegations of corruption.
The decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita
Kumari (supra) holds that if the information
received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence at the outset, no Preliminary
Enquiry would be required. It also clarified that
the scope of a Preliminary Enquiry is not to
check the veracity of the information received,
but only to scrutinize whether it discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly,
para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a
Preliminary Enquiry is required only if the
information (whether verified or unverified) does
not disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. Even when a Preliminary Enquiry is
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initiated, it has to stop as soon as the officer
ascertains that enough material has been
collected which discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. A similar conclusion has
been reached by a two Judge Bench
in Managipet (supra) as well. Hence, the
proposition that a Preliminary Enquiry is
mandatory is plainly contrary to law, for it is not
only contrary to the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra) but would also
tear apart the framework created by the CBI
Manual.
xxx xxx xxx
43. The above formulation does not take away
from the value of conducting a Preliminary
Enquiry in an appropriate case. This has been
acknowledged by the decisions of this Court in P.
Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and
Charansingh (supra). Even in Vinod Dua (supra),
this Court noted that "[a]s a matter of fact, the
accepted norm - be it in the form of CBI Manual
or like instruments is to insist on a preliminary
inquiry". The registration of a Regular Case can
have disastrous consequences for the career of
an officer, if the allegations ultimately turn out to
be false. In a Preliminary Enquiry, the CBI is
allowed access to documentary records and
speak to persons just as they would in an
investigation, which entails that information
gathered can be used at the investigation stage
as well. Hence, conducting a Preliminary
Enquiry would not take away from the ultimate
goal of prosecuting accused persons in a timely
manner. However, we once again clarify that if
the CBI chooses not to hold a Preliminary
Enquiry, the accused cannot demand it as a
matter of right. As clarified by this Court in
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Managipet (supra), the purpose of Lalita Kumari
(supra) noting that a Preliminary Enquiry is
valuable in corruption cases was not to vest a
right in the accused but to ensure that there is
no abuse of the process of law in order to target
public servants."
67. In Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi,
the Supreme Court held that an accused public servant
does not have any right to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets before filing an FIR. In State of
Karnataka v. Channakeshava [2025 KHC Online 6326],
the Supreme Court reiterated that a public servant has
no inherent right to be heard at the stage of registration
of FIR. The Supreme Court further held that preliminary
enquiry is not mandated in a case where detailed
information in the form of source report is available.
68. In the present case, the VACB already
conducted a preliminary enquiry and collected relevant
materials. Those materials revealed the commission of a
cognizable offence, which they failed to note or
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deliberately omitted to note, and this Court has examined
and satisfied itself that a cognizable offence has been
revealed.
69. Therefore, no preliminary enquiry is required
before registration of the FIR.
70. Yet another question that arises for
consideration is whether the prior approval under Section
17A of the PC Act is required.
71. I have no doubt that this is not a case where
prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act is
required. The bar under Section 17A operates where the
alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made
or decision taken by such public servant concerned in the
discharge of his official functions or duties. This bar does
not apply to investigation or enquiry conducted into all or
every offence under the PC Act allegedly committed by a
public servant. The purpose of Section 17A is to protect
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an honest and responsible public servant if the
recommendation made or decision taken by him is in
discharge of his official functions or duties. When it is
alleged that a public servant committed the offence of
criminal misconduct by fraudulently misappropriating
public money, it cannot be held that it relates to any
decision taken or recommendation made by him in the
discharge of his official functions or duties. This view is
reinforced by the decision of this Court in Jayaprakash
v. State of Kerala [2022 (1) KHC 206]. Therefore, I am
of the view that the bar under Section 17A of the PC Act
does not apply to the facts in the present case. Moreover,
this Court is of the view that there is a necessity for
investigation into the offence alleged. In Venugopal V.
State of Kerala [2021 KHC 565] this Court held that
once a Constitutional Court examines and satisfies itself
about the necessity or desirability of an enquiry or
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investigation into an offence under the PC Act, the
requirement of previous approval by the competent
authority is substituted by a more judicious
determination.
The impugned order of rejection of the complaint
72. The petitioner raised the following objections
to the preliminary enquiry report (QV Report):-
(a) The enquiry officer has arbitrarily fixed the check
period from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2009.
(b) Possession of 100 sovereigns of gold ornaments by
the wife of respondent No.3 was not reflected in the
property statement submitted to the Chief Secretary.
(c) Respondent No.3 had been paying Rs.1,00,000/- per
month towards repayment of the loan availed by him for
the purchase of the apartment in Mumbai, whereas his
monthly salary at the relevant period was less than
Rs.1,00,000/-.
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(d) The income tax returns submitted by respondent No.3
were not collected and verified.
(e) The MOU referred to by the enquiry officer is a sham
document.
(f) As per the registered powers-of attorney executed by
the brothers of respondent No.3 he had to bear one-third
(1/3rd ) of the cost for the construction of the shopping
complex.
73. The learned Special Judge concluded that the
officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry had
examined the relevant witnesses and, verified the
documents, and arrived at a conclusion that there was no
amassment of wealth disproportionate to his known
sources of income. The learned Special Judge did not
consider the specific objections raised by the petitioner
regarding the exclusion of the period during which the
shopping complex was constructed from consideration.
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74. The legal advisor of the VACB, submitted a
statement in tune with the conclusions arrived at by the
enquiry officer. It appears that he had verified the quick
verification report. The specific objections raised by the
petitioner were before the legal advisor. The legal
advisor submitted that the enquiry officer conducted the
enquiry systematically and concluded that respondent
No.3 has not amassed any wealth disproportionate to his
known sources of income during the check period. He
also submitted that respondent No.3 did not spend any
money for the construction of the shopping complex at
Kollam. The Legal Advisor/Public Prosecutor has been
appointed not to blindly support what the Police or
Vigilance submits before the Court. The statutory
responsibility of a Legal Advisor is to uphold the law. He
is independent of the Executive. He is not subject to the
orders of the higher officials of the Executive. He is not
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the servant of anyone. His statutory responsibility is to
bring the truth before the Court. There is a public
element attached to the office of the Legal Advisor. In the
present case, I must say that the legal advisor has
miserably failed in his responsibility.
75. The learned Special Judge, in a casual and
perfunctory manner, blindly accepted the quick
verification report and came to the conclusion that no
cognizable offence under the PC Act had been revealed
and rejected the complaint at the threshold. The learned
Special Judge accepted the submissions made by the legal
advisor of the VACB in this regard. The learned Special
Judge ought to have appreciated the contention of the
petitioner that the acquisition of the property, having a
substantial value, by respondent No.3 has been excluded
from consideration by the Enquiry Officer. The approach
adopted by the learned Special Judge is not acceptable.
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The impugned order is perverse and wholly unreasonable.
Non-consideration of the relevant materials and palpable
misreading of records is on the face of the impugned
order. The finding of the learned Special Judge is
untenable in law, grossly erroneous and based on no
material. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be
set aside.
The challenge to the motive of the petitioner
76. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 and the
learned Special Government Pleader (Vigilance) challenged
the motive of the petitioner in prosecuting the matter. The
learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that the
petitioner is acting as a tool in the hands of some highly
influential persons who maintain enmity towards
respondent No.3. The learned counsel submitted that
the petitioner has the habit of misusing the process of law
by filing public interest litigations to attract media
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attention. It is submitted that his concern is not public
interest but media attention. The learned counsel relied
on Jomon Puthenpurackal v. Lok Ayukta [2006 (1) KLT
705], a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this
Court holding that the petitioner had an improper motive
in the prosecution of a matter before the Lok Ayakta. The
facts considered in Jomon Puthenpurackal v. Lok
Ayukta cannot in any way be related to the initiative of
the petitioner in filing a petition against respondent No.3
before the Special Court and this Court.
77. Any member of a society has the locus standi to
initiate a criminal proceeding in the interest of the
society. One of the essential facets of justice
administration is the initiation of criminal proceedings by
the citizen to punish an offender in the interest of the
society. Every citizen has to be a partner in this mission if
he sincerely aspires for a stable, just and ideal social
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order as envisioned by our forefathers. The petitioner
has approached this Court with credible materials
alleging corruption against respondent No.3.
78. Should the Judiciary not entertain such
initiatives and protect whistle-blowers like the petitioner?
79. India has been a signatory to the UN
Convention Against Corruption since 2005, which
provides adequate safeguards and protection to persons
making complaints and faciliates reporting against
corrupt public officials. In 2011, our Parliament passed
the Whistle-blowers Protection Act, 2011 ('WBPA' for
short) to protect whistle-blowers from victimisation. The
Act was initiated after the brutal murder of Satyendra
Dubey, an NHAI Engineer who exposed the corruption in
the Golden Quadrilateral Highway Construction Project in
Jharkhand. It is submitted at the Bar that the WBPA has
not been so far enforced.
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80. The act of whistle-blowing requires a lot of
courage. The Courts in India have always shown a
progressive approach for the protection of whistle-
blowers. [See:-Manjeet Singh Khera v. State of
Maharashtra [2013 (9) SCC 276] & Common Course
v. Union of India [2015 (6) SCC 332].
81. I am of the opinion that the initiative of the
petitioner is intended to be in the public interest.
Therefore, the attack on the credibility of the petitioner
by the counsel for respondent No.3 cannot be accepted.
In the result,
(i) The Crl.M.C. is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the
Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge,
Thiruvananthapuram in CMP No.298/2016
stands set aside.
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(iii) The Superintendent of Police, Central
Bureau of Investigation, Kochi Unit is
directed to register an FIR against
respondent No.3 based on the complaint,
statement of the petitioner, information
made available in the preliminary enquiry
report and other relevant materials.
(iv) Respondent No.4 is directed to issue orders
entrusting investigation in the matter with
the CBI , Kochi Unit.
(v) The Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau
shall hand over the entire case file in
QV.25/2016/SCT to the Superintendent of
Police, CBI, Kochi Unit, forthwith.
(vi) In view of the direction of this Court that an
FIR is to be registered by the CBI, the
proeedings in CMP No.298/2016 before the
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Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge,
Thiruvananthapuram, stand closed.
(v) The Registry shall hand over the case file in
QV.25/2016/SCT to the Special Government
Pleader (Vigilance).
Before parting with this case, it is made clear that
the observations made by this Court in this order are only
limited to the issue of directing CBI investigation, and
these observations must not affect the investigation in
any way, which has to be done in a fair and just manner.
Sd/-
K.BABU, JUDGE
Tks/kkj/kas
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PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure I TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT ALONG WITH
THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT OF THE
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
Annexure II TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 5/2/2016
OF THE ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND
SPECIAL JUDGE, THRISSUR IN ANNEXURE I
COMPLAINT.
Annexure III TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 7/10/2016
IN CRL.M.P.NO.298/2016 OF THE ENQUIRY
COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
Annexure IV TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT FILED BY THE
2ND RESPONDENT IN CRL.M.P.NO.298/2016.
Annexure V TRUE COPY OF THE ARGUMENT NOTE FILED
BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE ENQUIRY
COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
Annexure VI TRUE COPY OF THE ARGUMENT NOTE
SUBMITTED BY THE LEGAL ADVISOR.
Annexure VII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.A.
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Annexure VIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.A1.
Annexure IX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.A2.
Annexure X TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.B.
Annexure XI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.B1.
Annexure XII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.B2.
Annexure XIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.B3.
Annexure XIV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
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ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C.
Annexure XV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C1.
Annexure XVI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C2.
Annexure XVII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C3.
Annexure XVIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C3(1).
Annexure XIX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C3(2).
Annexure XX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
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MARKED AS EXT.C4.
Annexure XXI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C5.
Annexure XXII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS MARKED
AS EXT.C6.
Annexure XXIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS MARKED
AS EXT.C7.
Annexure XXIV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS MARKED
AS EXT.C8.
Annexure XXV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS MARKED
AS EXT.C9.
Annexure XXVI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS MARKED
AS EXT.C10.
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Annexure XXVII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.C11.
Annexure XXVIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.D.
Annexure XXIX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E.
Annexure XXX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E1.
Annexure XXXI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E2.
Annexure XXXII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E3.
Annexure XXXIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
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ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E4.
Annexure XXXIV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E5.
Annexure XXXV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E6.
Annexure XXXVI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E7.
Annexure XXXVII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E8.
Annexure XXXVIII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.E9.
Annexure XXXIX TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
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MARKED AS EXT.E10.
Annexure XL TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.F.
Annexure XLI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.G.
Annexure XLII TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.G1.
Annexure XL111 TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.H.
Annexure XLIV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.J.
Annexure XLV TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.K.
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Annexure XLVI TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WHICH WAS
MARKED AS EXT.L.
Annexure XLVII TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
28.11.2017 IN CRL.M.P.NO.298/2016 OF
THE ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL
JUDGE.
Annexure XLVIII TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
20/1/2018 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE HON'BLE CHIEF MINISTER OF
KERALA.
Annexure XLIX TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER
NO.2178488/SPECIAL.A1/18/GAD DATED
8.2.2018 OF THE CHIEF SECRETARY OF
KERALA.
Annexure-L TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT DATED
03.11.2016 AND 09/11/2016 GIVEN BY THE
3RD RESPONDENT TO THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICER
Annexure-LI TRUE COPY OF THE REVISED BUILDING
PERMIT NO.PW4/BA/223/10-11 ISSUED BY
THE CORPORATION OF KOLLAM TO THE 3RD
RESPONDENT WITH VALIDITY PERIOD UP TO
26/02/2015
Annexure-LII TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO.1-
14011/18/2020-IPS.I(II) DATED
30/09/2020 OF MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Annexure-LIII TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED
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05.11.2016 SUBMITTED BY S. RAJENDRAN,
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, VIGILANCE
AND ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU, SPECIAL
CELL, THIRUVANANTHAURAM BEFORE THE
HONOURABLE COURT OF ENQUIRY
COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE,
OF 2016
Annexure-LIV TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER,
G.O.(RT.) NO.1972/2021/GAD DATED
25/05/2020
