Swamy Ayyappa Enterprises Gayathri ... vs Travancore Devaswom Board
2025 Latest Caselaw 7902 Ker

Kerala High Court

Swamy Ayyappa Enterprises Gayathri ... vs Travancore Devaswom Board on 10 April, 2025

Author: Anil K. Narendran

Bench: Anil K. Narendran

                                             2025:KER:31463
         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                           PRESENT

        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN

                             &

        THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.

THURSDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 20TH CHAITHRA, 1947

                  WP(C) NO. 14748 OF 2025

PETITIONER:

         SWAMY AYYAPPA ENTERPRISES GAYATHRI BUILDING
         NEAR VENNALA CO-OP. SOCIETY,
         ALINCHUVADU, VENNALA P.O., KOCHI,
         REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER SURESH M.S
         ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 682028


         BY ADVS.
         V.KRISHNA MENON
         P.VIJAYAMMA
         J.SURYA
         A.B.BEENU




RESPONDENTS:

    1    TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
         REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
         DEVASWOM HEAD QUARTERS, NANDANCODE,
         THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003

    2    THE DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER
         TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD NANTHANCODE,
         THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003

    3    THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
         TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD,
         SABARIMALA DEVASWOM,
         PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN - 689645
 W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025          2                2025:KER:31463
      4       SURENDRAN THARAYIL
              NO. 8, ASTA VILLA, THOPPIL ROAD,
              MAROTTICHUVADU, VAZHAKALA, KOCHI,
              ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 682021



OTHER PRESENT:

              SRI. G. BIJU, SC, TDB
              SMT.SAYUJYA RADHAKRISHNAN, ADVOCATE COMMISSIONER
              SRI.S. RAJMOHAN, SR.GP


       THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 10.04.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
 W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025             3                 2025:KER:31463
                              JUDGMENT

Anil K. Narendran, J.

The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash

Ext.P17 communication dated 15.03.2025 issued by the 3rd

respondent Executive Officer, Sabarimala Devaswom; a

declaration that respondents 1 to 3 are not entitled to forfeit the

amounts payable to the petitioner towards the alleged dues of

S.S.A. Enterprises; and a writ of mandamus commanding

respondents 1 to 3 to pay the petitioner the amounts legally

payable by them, as discernible from Ext.P21 statement of

accounts.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also

the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board for

respondents 1 to 3.

3. On the question of maintainability of this writ petition,

the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board

would point out the law laid down in the decision of this Court in

SITCO Associates v. State of Kerala [2023 (6) KHC SN 5].

4. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals

Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] the Apex Court reiterated that a writ W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 4 2025:KER:31463 petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the

proper procedure for adjudicating disputes relating to the

enforcement of contractual obligations. Under the law, it was open

to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction

for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that

when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the

litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not

invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence

of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the

court to issue a writ, but ordinarily, that would be a good ground

for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. It is true

that many matters could be decided after referring to the

contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that

would hardly be a ground for the exercise of extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of an

alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road

permits by the appellants would justify a breach of contract by the

respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not

required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such

seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with

regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 5 2025:KER:31463 on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a

properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising the

prerogative of issuing writs.

5. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga

Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] the Apex Court was dealing

with a case in which the respondent had filed a writ petition before

the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed two

questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of the security

deposit is without the authority of law and without any binding

contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the

Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in

a claim arising out of breach of contract. While dealing with the

said issue the Apex Court opined that it is settled law that disputes

relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. It has been so held in Kerala State

Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293],

State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd.

[(1996) 6 SCC 22] and Bareilly Development Authority v.

Ajai Pal Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116]. This is settled law. The

dispute in the case before the Apex Court was regarding the terms

of an offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 6 2025:KER:31463 a writ court was not the proper forum. The Senior Counsel for the

respondent relied upon the decisions in Verigamto Naveen v.

State of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] and Harminder Singh

Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247]. The Apex Court

noticed that those are cases where the writ court was enforcing a

statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ

court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus, on the

ground of maintainability, the writ petition should have been

dismissed.

6. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,

Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Apex Court opined that the

High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because in

considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall

to be determined. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court

has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. It is true that

exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, but the discretion must

be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises

questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their

determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that

account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 7 2025:KER:31463 appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline

to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be

justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is

frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute

sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against

whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute

raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the

writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

7. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit

Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the

Apex Court, after referring to various judgments as well as the

pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,

Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and

Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal

Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582], held that, merely because one of

the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts

of the case, the Court entertaining such a petition under Article

226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties

to a suit. In Gunwant Kaur [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Court even

went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts

require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 8 2025:KER:31463 in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to

entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and

there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the

same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some

disputed questions of fact.

8. In ABL International Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the

Apex Court laid down the following legal principles;

(a) in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable.

(b) merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule.

(c) a writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable.

While laying down the principle, the Apex Court sounded a word of

caution as under in paragraph 28;

"28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has the discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. See: Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 9 2025:KER:31463 Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]. And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction."

9. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose [(2015) 9 SCC 433]

the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the respondent

had earlier challenged the order of termination of the contract

before the High Court by filing in W.P.(C)No.22541 of 2013. That

writ petition ended in dismissal. He filed W.A.No.1912 of 2013. The

Division Bench, by the judgment dated 24.02.2014, allowed that

writ appeal. The Division Bench, on the basis of the report of the

Advocate Commission, came to the conclusion that the order of

termination was founded on erroneous facts, inasmuch as the

competent authority had opined that more than 50% of the work

remained to be done. The Division Bench opined that, as there was

a factual defect, which was evident from the report of the Advocate

Commission, the order of termination of the contract is liable to be

quashed. After quashing the said order, the Division Bench directed

the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department (Roads and

Bridges) to consider and dispose of the matter afresh after W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 10 2025:KER:31463 affording the contractor an opportunity of being heard. It also

directed that the Commission's report and the Engineer's report

and the accounts shall be produced by the Contractor before the

competent authority, who shall take the same into account before

taking a final decision in the matter. The State and the official

respondents took up the matter before the Apex Court. The Apex

Court, after referring to the law laid down in Jain Plastics and

Chemicals Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] and Ganga Enterprises

[(2003) 7 SCC 410], reiterated that a writ court should ordinarily

not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India if there is a breach of contract involving disputed questions

of fact. The High Court appointed a Commission to collect the

evidence, accepted the same without calling for objections from

the respondent, and quashed the order of termination of the

contract. The Apex Court observed that the procedure adopted by

the High Court is quite unknown to the exercise of powers under

Article 226 in a contractual matter.

10. In M.K. Jose [(2015) 9 SCC 433] the Apex Court

noticed that in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit

Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] a

Two-Judge Bench after referring to various judgments as well as W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 11 2025:KER:31463 the pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,

Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and

Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal

Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] granted the relief as the facts were

absolutely clear from the documentary evidence brought which

pertain to interpretation of certain clauses of contract of insurance.

The issue that had arisen in ABL International was that an

instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on

the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was

interpreting the contract differently. The Court thought it apt,

merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not

enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there

was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of

the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly, if the materials

that come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ court

may exercise the power of judicial review.

11. It is well settled that, where the rights which are sought

to be agitated are purely of a private character no mandamus can

be claimed. Even if the relief is sought against the State or its

instrumentality, the precondition for the issuance of a writ of

mandamus is a public duty. In a dispute based on a purely W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 12 2025:KER:31463 contractual relationship, there being no public duty element, a writ

of mandamus would not lie.

12. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal

Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116] the Apex Court noticed that, even

conceding that Bareilly Development Authority has the trappings

of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the

purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while determining

price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly

instalments to be paid, the 'authority' or its agent after entering

into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive

capacity. Thereafter, the relations are no longer governed by the

constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which

determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In this

sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the

contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of

Bareilly Development Authority in the said contractual field.

13. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Radhakrishna

Agarwal v. State of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC 457], Premji Bhai

Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority [(1980) 2 SCC 129]

and Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Company

Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC 238] is that, where the contract entered into W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 13 2025:KER:31463 between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and

purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms

of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy

a breach of contract pure and simple.

14. In Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC

238] the Apex Court considered the question of maintainability of

a writ petition in respect of a claim arising out of the contractual

rights and obligations flowing from the terms of a lease. The Apex

Court held that, it is undoubtedly true that High Court can

entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of

the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be

issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even

in respect of a corporation there is a denial of equality before law

or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ

petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. On the facts of

the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that Bishwanath Tea

Company Ltd., the respondent company, was merely trying to

enforce a contractual obligation. The obligation to pay royalty for

timber cut and felled and removed is prescribed by the relevant

regulations. The validity of regulations is not challenged.

W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 14 2025:KER:31463 Therefore, the demand for royalty is unsupported by law. What the

respondent claimed was an exception that in view of a certain term

in the indenture of lease, i.e., clause 2, the appellant is not entitled

to demand and collect royalty from the respondent. This is nothing

but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease. Hence, the

question was whether such contractual obligation can be enforced

by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where a breach

of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach

may sue for specific performance of the contract, if the contract is

capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for

damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognisable by the civil

court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not

entertain a petition either for specific performance of a contract or

for recovering damages. A right to relief flowing from a contract

has to be claimed in a civil court where a suit for specific

performance of a contract or for damages could be filed.

15. The legal principles that can be culled out from the

decisions referred to supra are that, in a case where the contract

entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is of a

non-statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in

terms of a contract between the parties, the contractual W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 15 2025:KER:31463 obligations are matters of private law and a writ would not lie to

enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper

remedy in such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming

damages, injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate

reliefs in a competent civil court. Pure contractual obligation in the

absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable

through a writ.

16. In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union

of India [(2015) 7 SCC 728] the Apex Court held that there is

no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in

contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact

or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,

discretion lies with the High Court which under certain

circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. In paragraph 69 of the

decision, the Apex Court summarised the circumstances in which

the Court would not normally exercise such discretion. In

paragraph 70 the Apex Court summarised different situations/

aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public

authority with private parties. Paragraphs 69 and 70 of the said

decision read thus;

W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 16 2025:KER:31463 "69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of the discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.

70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under:

70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 17 2025:KER:31463 purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness.

70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations.

70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.

70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business.

70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 18 2025:KER:31463 of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages.

70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction.

70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 19 2025:KER:31463 case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes."

17. In SITCO Associates [2023 (6) KHC SN 5] this

Court held that the contractual obligations are matters of private

law and a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would

not lie to enforce a civil liability arising purely out of that contract,

since a pure contractual obligation in the absence of any statutory

complexion would not be enforceable through a writ. Seriously

disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to

breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 20 2025:KER:31463 basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly

instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising the

prerogative of issuing writs. In such cases, the proper remedy of

the person aggrieved would be to approach the competent civil

court seeking appropriate reliefs.

18. After arguing for some time, the learned counsel for the

petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this writ petition without

prejudice to the right of the petitioner to approach the competent

forum for the redressal of its grievances.

Based on the aforesaid submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, this writ petition is dismissed as

withdrawn; however, without prejudice to the aforesaid right of the

petitioner.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

Sd/-

                                     MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE


MSA
 W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025                21                2025:KER:31463
                          APPENDIX OF WP(C) 14748/2025

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit - P1                 A COPY OF THE PARTNERSHIP DEED DATED
                             24.10.2014

Exhibit - P2                 A COPY OF THE PARTNERSHIP DEED DATED
                             11.8.2015

Exhibit - P3                 A COPY OF THE PARTNERSHIP DEED OF S.S.A.
                             ENTERPRISES DATED 5.11.2013

Exhibit - P4                 A COPY OF THE PARTNERSHIP DEED DATED
                             23.1.2016

Exhibit - P5                 A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PETITION DATED
                             27.08.2021 STATED TO HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY
                             THE FOURTH RESPONDENT BEFORE THE
                             COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, KOCHI AND OBTAINED
                             FROM THE WHATSAPP GROUP OF THE SABARIMALA
                             VYAPARYI VYAVASAYIS

Exhibit - P6                 A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN W.P.(C)
                             NO.23993/2021 DATED 3.11.2021

Exhibit - P7                 A COPY OF THE BANK CHALLAN DATED 7.10.2023

Exhibit - P8                 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 13.10.2023

ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT/COMMISSIONER OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT

Exhibit - P9 A COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT(LESS ANNEXURES) DATED 19.2.2024 FILED BY THE NINTH RESPONDENT IN W.P.(C) NO. 41759 OF

Exhibit - P10 A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 28.2.2024 IN W.P.(C) NO.41759 OF 2023

Exhibit - P11 A COPY OF THE WRIT PETITION, W.P.(C) NO.41217 OF 2024(LESS ANNEXURES)

Exhibit - P12 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 24.11.2024 ADDRESSED TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SABARIMALA ALONG WITH THE RECEIPT OF THE DHANALAKSHMI BANK

Exhibit - P13 A COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT(LESS W.P.(C)No.14748 of 2025 22 2025:KER:31463 ANNEXURES) DATED 28.12.2024 FILED BY THE NINTH RESPONDENT IN W.P.(C) NO. 41217 OF

Exhibit - P14 A COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT FILED ON BEHALF OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT HEREIN (SECOND RESPONDENT) IN W.P.(C)

Exhibit - P15 A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 14.11.2024 EXECUTED BETWEEN THE THIRD RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONER IN RESPECT OF THE CONTRACT FOR SUPPLY OF GROCERIES FOR ANNADHANAM

Exhibit - P16 A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 14.11.2024 EXECUTED BETWEEN THE THIRD RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONER IN RESPECT OF THE CONTRACT FOR PREPARING AND SERVING FOOD IN THE DEVASWOM MESS AT SABARIMALA

Exhibit - P17 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 15.3.2025 OF THE THIRD RESPONDENT

Exhibit - P18 A COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 31.8.2017 REFERRED TO BY THE THIRD RESPONDENT AND WHICH HAD BEEN PRODUCED BY THE WRIT PETITIONER IN W.P.(C) NO. 41217 OF 2024

Exhibit - P19 A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUB COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA IN O.S.NO. 11 OF 2018 DATED 8.4.2019 AS OBTAINED FROM THE WEBSITE OF THE SAID COURT

Exhibit - P20 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 24.3.2025 SENT TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SABARIMALA

Exhibit P21 A STATEMENT OF THE AMOUNTS PAYABLE BY THE FIRST FOR RESPONDENT AND PROVIDED TO THE THIRD RESPONDENT DATED 3.4.2025