S. Baby Girija vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited
2024 Latest Caselaw 32633 Ker

Kerala High Court

S. Baby Girija vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited on 12 November, 2024

                                    1
WP(C) No.36046 of 2024                                2024:KER:83781


                IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                 PRESENT

            THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISANKAR V. MENON

    TUESDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2024 / 21ST KARTHIKA, 1946

                         WP(C) NO. 36046 OF 2024


PETITIONER:

              S. BABY GIRIJA, AGED 63 YEARS
              W/O. LATE BABU C, SOUMYA NIVAS, A.K. NAGAR,
              PUTHENKANAM, KATTACHAKUZHI P.O., BALARAMAPURAM,
              THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695501.


              BY ADVS.
              ADARSH KUMAR
              K.M.ANEESH
              SHASHANK DEVAN


RESPONDENTS:

     1        INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED,
              REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER & STATE HEAD,
              KERALA STATE OFFICE, PANAMPILLY AVENUE,
              PANAMPILLY NAGAR P.O., KOCHI, PIN - 682036.

     2        THE DIVISIONAL RETAIL HEAD
              INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED, TRIVANDRUM DIVISIONAL
              OFFICE, GROUND FLOOR, PREMIER PARK, INCHAKAL BYE PASS
              ROAD, VALLAKKADAVU P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
              PIN - 695008.

     3        THE SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER,
              INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED, COMBARA,
              PALAYAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695033.


              BY ADVS.
              GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR M
              K.JOHN MATHAI(K/413/1984)
              JOSON MANAVALAN(J-526)
              KURYAN THOMAS(K/131/2003)
                                   2
WP(C) No.36046 of 2024                             2024:KER:83781


            PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM(MAH/58/2006)
            RAJA KANNAN(K/356/2008)
            NAYANPALLY RAMOLA(K/687-F/2014)



THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 06.11.2024,
THE COURT ON 12.11.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
                                 3
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                                                    "C.R."

                          JUDGMENT

The petitioner, who has been engaged in trading in

petroleum products pursuant to a dealership from the 1st

respondent herein under the "social objective scheme," has filed

the captioned writ petition challenging Ext.P2 proceedings by

which the dealership should be terminated.

2. The petitioner points out in this writ petition that she

was engaged as a dealer pursuant to Ext.P1 agreement dated

21.06.2002 and that she has been running the outlet thereafter.

A show cause notice dated 29.09.2022 was issued to the

petitioner, proposing the termination of the dealership. The

essential allegations, as per the said notice, are with reference

to a complaint received from a third party to the effect that the

petitioner had issued a power of attorney in favour of another

person, and, therefore, the petitioner was not the person

running the retail outlet. To the afore notice, the petitioner

submitted detailed objections dated 12.10.2022 as evidenced

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by Ext.P4. Later, a personal hearing was provided to the

petitioner on 21.03.2023 at the State office of the 1st

respondent herein. The petitioner was heard by one Sri.Sanjib

Kumar Behera, Chief General Manager of the 1st respondent

herein. Ext.P5 is the minutes of personal hearing. A perusal of

Ext.P5 shows that the petitioner sought for ten days time to

produce Income Tax Returns and related documents like balance

sheets and Profit and Loss accounts in support of the stand of

the petitioner that the allegations raised against her were

baseless. Ext.P5 also shows that the petitioner was granted

time till 01.04.2023 to submit the additional documents as

prayed for by her.

3. The petitioner submits that thereafter, nothing was

heard from the side of the 1st respondent herein till

October 2024, when on the 10th of October, there was an

attempt to barge into the outlet of the petitioner with reference

to the termination of the dealership. On the next day,

11.10.2024, such an attempt was again made, points out the

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petitioner. On the same date, the proceedings were pasted on

the premises of the petitioner, from which she noticed that the

dealership was terminated. A copy of the above proceedings

dated 11.10.2024 is produced as Ext.P2 in the writ petition.

4. It is challenging the proceedings at Ext.P2 that the

captioned writ petition is filed by the petitioner.

5. A counter affidavit dated 23.10.2024 is filed by the

respondents, essentially relying on various documents seeking

to support the action taken. The counter affidavit also points

out in detail the procedure followed in the case at hand.

6. I have heard Sri.Adarsh Kumar, the learned counsel for

the petitioner and Sri. E.K.Nandakumar, senior counsel

instructed by Smt.Ramola Nayanpally for the respondents

herein.

7. Sri. Adarsh Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner

would contend that:

i. The impugned order at Ext.P2 is one issued violating

the principles of natural justice. He points out that the

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personal hearing was provided by Sri.Sanjib Kumar

Behera, as seen from Ext.P5, whereas the impugned

order at Ext.P2 is passed by Smt.Geetika Verma.

Therefore, he points out that since the order has been

issued by a different officer than the one who granted

the opportunity of hearing, there is violation of

the principles of natural justice. In this regard, he

relies on the judgments of this Court in Markose v.

Tahsildar [1995 (2) KLT 112] and Marico

Industries Limited v. State of Kerala [2003 (1)

KLT 956].

ii. There is an inordinate delay in issuing the impugned

order at Ext.P2 with reference to the personal hearing

as per Ext.P5. The personal hearing was conducted

on 21.03.2023, and Ext.P2 order was issued on

11.10.2024, after the lapse of nearly 18 months.

Therefore, the petitioner ought to have been granted

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an opportunity of being heard, especially when a

different officer has issued Ext.P2 order.

iii. He would point out that Ext.P2 is not served on the

petitioner in a manner known to law.

iv. He relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in

Municipal Committee Hoshiarpur v. Punjab

State Electricity Board and Ors. [(2010) 13 SCC

216] and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of

Maharahstra and Another [(2009) 7 SCC 104] in

support of the contention that the violation of the

principles of natural justice has caused prejudice to

the petitioner.

v. He relies on ABL International Limited and Anr.

v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India

Limited and Ors.[(2004) 3 SCC 553] to contend that

the writ jurisdiction can be availed in the case at

hand.

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8. Per contra, Sri.E.K.Nandakumar, the learned senior

counsel for the respondents, contends that:

i. The petitioner was offered a dealership as a member

of the backward community, and on account of the

allegations proved against her, the 1st respondent is

entitled to cancel the dealership and engage other

genuine persons.

ii. He refers to the arbitration clause under the dealership

agreement and contends that the writ court is not to

interfere. He relies on the judgment of the Apex

Court in N.G.Projects Limited v. Vinod Kumar

Jain and others [(2022) 6 SCC 127] as also the

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in

W.A.No.2923 of 2009 dated 26.08.2011 in support

of the afore submission.

iii. He points out that the hearing provided in the case at

hand is not a case of "personal hearing" and is an

"institutional hearing". He refers to the detailed

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procedure adopted by the 1st respondent in the

matter, as highlighted in paragraph 35 of the counter

affidavit in support of the above.

iv. He relies on the judgments of the Apex Court in

Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India

and Others [(2013) 5 SCC 252], Ossein and

Gelatine Manufacturers' Association of India v.

Modi Alkalies and Chemicals Limited and

Another [(1989) 4 SCC 264] and the Full Bench

judgment of this Court in Sudheer v. Susheela

[2009 (4) KLT 29(FB)] and would point out that in

the case at hand, no prejudice is established,

assuming that there is violation of the principles of

natural justice. He also relies on Haryana Financial

Corporation and Another v. Kailash Chandra

Ahuja [(2008) 9 SCC 31] and Board of

Directors, Himachal Pradesh Transport

Corporation and Another v. K.C. Rahi [(2008)

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11 SCC 502] to contend that the petitioner is not

entitled to any reliefs.

9. I have considered the rival submissions as well as the

connected records.

10. In view of the rival submissions, the following

questions arise for consideration in this writ petition:

i. Is the petitioner entitled to maintain a writ petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the

case at hand?

ii. Is there any violation of the principles of natural justice

in the case at hand?

iii. Is any prejudice caused to the petitioner on account

of the violation of principles of natural justice, if there

is any?

11. The first issue arising for consideration is as regards

the maintainability of this writ petition. Sri.Nandakumar, the

learned senior counsel for the respondents relied upon

N.G.Projects Ltd. (supra) rendered by the Apex Court and the

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judgment in Writ Appeal No.2923 of 2009 of a Division Bench

of this Court. In N.G.Projects Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court was

considering the rejection of a bid pursuant to a tender invited

by the Road Construction Department, Jharkhand. Considering

the afore situation, the Apex Court held that the writ court

should refrain itself from endorsing the decision over the

decision taken as to whether or not to accept the bid of a

tenderer, especially when the courts do not have the expertise

to examine the terms and conditions of the present day

economic activities of the State. The Apex Court also cautioned

that the courts should not find fault with a magnifying glass in

its hand; rather, the courts are only to examine whether the

decision-making process is correct. In my opinion, the afore

judgment cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of

the case at hand, insofar as, here, the petitioner is complaining

of the absence of procedural fairness since, according to her,

there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The Apex

Court, in the afore judgment, has also held that the High Court

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can examine whether the decision-making process is one in

tune with the known principles of administrative law. Similarly,

the judgment of the Division Bench in W.P.(C) No.2923 of 2009,

considered a situation where the dealership was terminated

pursuant to certain discrepancies noticed in the quality of the

products, which were supplied by the petroleum company to the

dealer. This Court found that even if there may be a failure on

part of the company to scrupulously follow the procedure

prescribed, assuming so, that does not entitle the dealer to

approach this Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, I notice that

the afore judgment has been rendered with respect to the

dispute raised by the dealer as regards certain procedures

adopted in drawing samples of petroleum products from the

custody of the dealers/agents. But in the case at hand, the

dispute raised is essentially as regards the alleged violation of

the principles of natural justice. I also notice that in the afore

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, the Division Bench

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has also noticed an earlier round of litigation against the order

of termination, wherein the impugned proceedings were set

aside directing to provide a personal hearing to the dealer in

question. In other words, an opportunity for hearing is to be

granted in cases of the present nature, and if there is any

violation, the dealer is entitled to approach this Court. I also

notice the judgment of the Apex Court relied on by the learned

counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Adarsh Kumar - ABL

International Limited (supra), wherein it is held as under:

"23. It is clear from the above observations of this Court, once State or an instrumentality of State is a party to the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if by the impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellants the first respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in the contravention of the above said requirement of Article 14 then we have no hesitation that a Writ Court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of the first respondent."

Again the Apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v.

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Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others [(2003) 2 SCC

107], with respect to the termination of dealerships by the

Indian Oil Corporation themselves, has found as under:-

"7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies:

(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

(See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." In the light of the afore principles, I am of the opinion that

insofar as the allegation raised by the petitioner is with

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reference to the violation of the principles of natural justice at

the hands of the 1st respondent herein, which is admittedly an

instrumentality of the State, the petitioner is justified in

approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

12. The second question arising for consideration is with

reference to the alleged violation of the principles of natural

justice. The petitioner contends that Ext.P2 proceedings has

been issued by a different officer than the one who granted the

opportunity of hearing as seen from Ext.P5, and therefore, there

is violation of principles of natural justice. Sri. Adarsh Kumar,

the learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on the judgment of

a learned Single Judge of this Court in Markose (supra). That

was a case where the officer who heard the matter was

transferred, and the successor officer issued the impugned

order without granting a fresh opportunity for hearing.

However, that was a case where an opportunity for a personal

hearing was extended to the assessee/petitioner. But in the case

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at hand the respondents have raised the contention that the

hearing provided was not a case of "personal hearing" but one

of "institutional hearing". In that regard, Sri.Adarsh Kumar

relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in

Marico Industries (supra). In the said judgment, this Court

held as under:

"8. It is one of the accepted fundamental rules of natural justice that "the one who decides must hear". The salutary rule of natural justice of audi alterum partem will be violated insubstance and content if the person who hears does not render the decision. It is possible to conclude that this is not an invariable and rigid rule of universal application. It is possible to find circumstances where this rule cannot be applied rigidly and with rigour. In an institutional hearing it is not essential that the person who hears must also decide. Our attention has been drawn to various decisions having a bearing on this question. Our attention has been specifically drawn to the decisions reported in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. (AIR 1959 SC 308), Thomas Mathew v. Secretary to Government (1999 (3) KLT 275), Katherine v. Secretary to Government (2002 (1) KLT 882) and Union of India v. Andrew (1996 (1) KLT 133). A valid institutional decision after institutional hearing may not be impossible under the Indian Law also. In that view of the matter it may

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be possible in an appropriate case for a body like the Government, board, department or a specified head of a department to render an institutional decision after institutional hearing (and not personal hearing) without offending the rule of audi alterum partem. But the nature and quality of the hearing contemplated and the nature and texture of the decision to be rendered must be carefully and alertly considered to answer the question whether in the given case the hearing/decision contemplated is an institutional one where the golden rule that the one who hears must also render the decision, can be deviated from.

Thus, this Court noticed that there is a difference between an

"institutional hearing" and "personal hearing". Thereafter, it is

found that the fundamental rule that the "one who decide must

hear" may not be strictly applied to "institutional hearing". In

that case, ultimately this Court found that a hearing to be

provided by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes with

reference to Section 59A(2) of the KGST Act was not

institutional but personal. It is in the afore circumstances that

this Court interfered with the impugned order therein and

directed reconsideration of the issue. Therefore, the principles

laid down in the afore judgment may not strictly help the case

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of the petitioner.

13. The question as to whether the hearing contemplated

in the present case is an "institutional one" or "personal one" is

now to be considered.

14. In the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, the

nature of the decision-making process is pointed out as under:

"35. With reference to the averments contained in paragraph 14 of the writ petition, the same are incorrect and denied. As detailed above, the procedure for termination of an SC/ST dealership is governed by the guidelines issued by the 1 st respondent, which are clearly documented vide policy circulars and the corporation acts only in accordance with the same. In the case of an SC/ST dealership termination, the decision to terminate the dealership is taken by the competent authority at the Head Office of the 1 respondent, and in this case the competent authority was the Director (Marketing) at Head office, Mumbai, of Indian Oil Corporation Limited. As per the policy, before the final proposal for termination is placed before the competent authority for approval, the State Head of the corresponding state (in this case, the State Head-Kerala & Lakshadweep, Indian Oil Corporation Limited) is to offer a personal hearing to the "SC"/"ST" category dealer in conformity with the principles of natural justice and the same was done on 21.03.2023 as mentioned by the petitioner herself. Once the proposal moved to the office of the Director

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(Marketing), after various queries, replies from various levels in various departments, the note was approved by the Director (Marketing). Once the same is approved, as per policy, the letter of termination is to be issued under the name and stamp of the corresponding state head, in this case the State Head, Kerala & Lakshadweep, Indian Oil Corporation Limited. The mere fact that the official who gave personal hearing (the State Head during March 2023) and that the official who has signed the termination notice (the State Head during October 2024) are not one and the same cannot be a reason for alleging the decision to be bad in law. As a Government of India undertaking, the officials of the 1st respondent are transferred on PAN India basis and hence a continuity in the posts and persons decorating the posts is not possible by design. Effectively, the decision making process for termination of an SC/ST dealership is an institutional one, and as such, goes through several levels of scrutiny. It is settled law that in an institutional decision making process, the one who hears need not be the one who decides.

Thus, it is seen that the decision-making process is as under:

i. A fact-finding letter is issued by the Divisional

Retail Sales Head.

ii. If the response from the dealer is not satisfactory,

a show-cause notice is issued.

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iii. It is for the State Head to offer the personal

hearing to the dealer.

iv. The final proposal is to be placed before the

competent authority for approval by the State

Head.

v. Decision is to be taken by the Director (Marketing),

Head Office, Mumbai (Competent Authority).

vi. Once it is so approved, the State Head issues the

letters of termination intimating the approval by

the competent authority.

Thus, the 1st respondent contends that the case at hand

concerns only an institutional hearing and not a personal

hearing.

15. Along with the above, a reference to the agreement

entered into between the petitioner and the respondent

Corporation is also to be made. The petitioner has produced

the said agreement as Ext.P1 along with this writ petition. It is

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seen that the agreement is entered into between the "Indian Oil

Corporation" and the petitioner herein. A reading of the said

agreement would also show that the appointment of the

petitioner as the dealer is effected by the "Corporation." It is

only that on behalf of the Corporation, a designated Manager is

signing the agreement. The petitioner, being the dealer, is to

act according to the said terms and conditions, not to the

detriment of the Corporation and also not against the terms and

conditions thereof. Under clause 56 of the agreement, the

respondent Corporation is granted liberty to terminate the

agreement in question. Thus, it is seen that the petitioner is

entering into the agreement with the respondent Corporation

and is also continuing to act on the basis of the covenants of

the said agreement, set out by the Corporation. Ultimately, the

termination also takes place at the hands of the "Corporation",

and it is only that the Corporation is being represented by its

officials.

16. It is in the background of the afore that the question

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as to whether there is violation of the principles of natural

justice in the case at hand is to be decided.

17. In Ossein and Gelatine Manufacturers'

Association (supra), the Apex Court considered a situation

where, in relation to approval by the Government, a hearing was

offered by one officer, and the ultimate order was signed/passed

by another officer. Considering the afore situation, the Apex

Court found that:

"6. There was some discussion before us on a larger question as to whether the requirements of natural justice can be said to have been complied with where the objections of parties are heard by one officer but the order is passed by another. Shri Salve, referring to certain passages in Local Government Board v. Alridge [1915 AC 120 : 84 LJKB 72], Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 :

(1963) 2 WLR 3], Regina v. Race Relations Board, Ex parte Selvarajan [(1975) 1 WLR 1686] and in de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn., pp. 219-220) submitted that this was not necessarily so and that the contents of natural justice will vary with the nature of the enquiry, the object of the proceeding and whether the decision involved is an "institutional" decision or one taken by an officer specially empowered to do it. Shri Divan, on the other hand, pointed out that the majority judgment

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in Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC [AIR 1959 SC 308 : 1959 Supp 1 SCR 319] has disapproved of Alridge case [1915 AC 120 : 84 LJKB 72] and that natural justice demands that the hearing and order should be by the same officer. This is a very interesting question and Alridge case [1915 AC 120 : 84 LJKB 72] has been dealt with by Wade [Administrative Law, 6th Edn., p. 507 et seq]. We are of opinion that it is unnecessary to enter into a decision (sic discussion) of this issue for the purposes of the present case. Here the issue is one of grant of approval by the Government and not any particular officer statutorily designated. It is also perfectly clear on the records that the officer who passed the order has taken full note of all the objections put forward by the petitioners. We are fully satisfied, therefore, that the requirements of natural justice have been fulfilled in the present case."

Again, the Apex Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation (supra)

considered the applicability of the principles of natural justice

with respect to the institutional hearing. That was a case where

the concerned parties were heard by a Joint Secretary on behalf

of the Central Government, but the order was passed by a

Deputy Secretary. Considering the afore, the Apex Court found

as under:

"70. We also do not find much substance in the submission

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made by Mr Krishnan that the Order dated 27-9-2001 is vitiated as it has been passed by an officer who did not give a hearing to the parties. This is clearly a case of an institutional hearing. The direction has been issued by the High Court for a hearing to be given by the Central Government. There was no direction that any particular officer or an authority was to give a hearing. In such circumstances, the orders are generally passed in the relevant files and may often be communicated by an officer other than the officer who gave the hearing."

Further, a Full Bench of this Court in Sudheer (supra),

considered a situation where the Government issued orders

under Rule 4(4) of Chapter III of Kerala Education Rules. The

dispute arose in a situation where the opportunity of hearing

was granted by the Under Secretary of the Government, and

the final order was issued by the Secretary to the Government.

Therefore, it was contended that there was violation of the

principles of natural justice. The Full Bench of this Court in

Sudheer (supra) noticed the following circumstances on the

basis of which the impugned order was issued:

"The said note was made at para.22 of the Note File. Sri.K.T.George, Additional Law Secretary, on receiving the File, called for further documents to tender the advice sought

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by the Administrative Department. On getting further details, the Additional Law Secretary, at para.35 of the Note File stated that the Law Department agrees to the suggestion at para.22 of the Note file. Based on the advice of the Law Department, a draft of Ext.P8 was put up. It was approved by the Under Secretary, Smt.Sujatha on 26.8.2008, by Sri.P.C.Jose, Additional Secretary, General Education Department on 28.08.2008 and further approved by Sri.James Varghese, Secretary to Government, General Education Department on 30.08.2008. As a consequence, Ext.P8 order dated 30.8.2008, was issued by the Government. We doubt, if the learned Single Judge has seen the files, whether the impugned order would have been quashed on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice."

On the afore factual position, the Full Bench of this Court in

Sudheer (supra) at paragraph 22 of the judgment has laid

down the law as under:

"22. We have mentioned the above point to emphasise that in matters of statutory appeals and revisions before the Government, decisions are taken in accordance with the Rules of Business and communicated in the name of the Governor. The order may be signed by the Secretary/Additional Secretary/Joint Secretary/Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary, as the case may be. But the decision may or may not be one taken by the officer who signed it. In Sanjeevi's case (supra), the Apex Court has

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specifically upheld the power of the Minister concerned to call for any file and take a decision, even though the officers under him may be competent to deal with the said matter and also the power to issue directions to the officers regarding the disposal of a specific case and in that event the officers can take decision in that case, subject to such directions only. In some cases, the files have to be sent to the Chief Minister. In certain other matters, the Council of Ministers alone can take decision. We have quoted the Rules of Business, wherein there is mandatory consultation with Finance Department and Law Department on certain specified matters. So, a decision, as mentioned earlier, can never be taken according to the personal opinion of the Secretary, who heard the matter."

Therefore, the Full Bench of this Court also has found that in

cases where institutional hearings are provided, principles of

natural justice - he who heard must decide - may not be strictly

applicable.

18. Applying the afore to the facts and circumstances of

the case at hand, this Court notices that the impugned order at

Ext.P2 is issued for and on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation

Limited and it is only that the same is communicated/signed by

the State Head. A detailed procedure has already been noticed

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and is provided with respect to the hearing granted and the

manner in which the decision is arrived at. In my opinion, it is

a case of institutional hearing and the rules of natural justice,

to the extent applicable, have been followed in the matter.

Merely because the hearing has been extended by the then

State Head and the impugned order issued by the current State

Head that may not be a reason for upsetting the impugned

order.

19. Therefore, I hold that there is no violation of the

principles of natural justice in the case at hand. On account of

the above, there is no requirement to consider the third

question posed in paragraph 10 above.

Resultantly, this writ petition would stand dismissed,

without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to challenge

Ext.P2 order before the appellate authority on the merits of the

findings contained therein.

Sd/-

                               HARISANKAR V. MENON, JUDGE
ln

WP(C) No.36046 of 2024                                   2024:KER:83781



                         APPENDIX OF WP(C) 36046/2024

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT P1                 A TRUE COPY OF THE PETROL/HSD PUMP DEALER

AGREEMENT DATED 21-06-2002 ENTERED BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.

EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE TERMINATION COMMUNICATION DATED 11-10-2024 SEEN TO BE MADE BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT

EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 29-09-2022 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER

EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY COMMUNICATION DATED 12-10-2022 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT

EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF PERSONAL HEARING HELD ON 21-03-2023 AT IOCL KERALA STATE OFFICE, PANAMPILLY NAGAR, KOCHI- 682036

EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF FIR BEARING NO. 0642 DATED 02- 06-2023 REGISTERED BY THE THIRUVANANTHAPURAM CITY MUSEUM POLICE STATION

EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 12-10-2022 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE LAW SECRETARY, LAW DEPARTMENT, GOVT. SECRETARIAT

EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 04-06- 2002 ISSUED BY THE OMC TO THE PETITIONER

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:

EXHIBIT R1(A) A TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT FOR AD-HOC ARRANGEMENT FOR OPERATION OF MS/HSD RETAIL OUTLET DATED 12.10.2024 EXECUTED BETWEEN THE 1ST RESPONDENT AND M/S A.R. FUELS

EXHIBIT R1(B) A TRUE COPY OF AN INVOICE AND A CASH BILL DATED 14.10.2024

WP(C) No.36046 of 2024 2024:KER:83781

EXHIBIT R1(C) A TRUE COPY OF THE PETITIONER'S REPLY DATED 02.11.2020

EXHIBIT R1(D) A TRUE COPY OF THE PETITIONER'S REPLY DATED 05.02.2022

EXHIBIT R1(E) A TRUE COPY OF THE VISITOR SLIP DATED 11.10.2024