Kerala High Court
Vinod Mathew Wilson vs The Union Of India on 20 May, 2024
Author: P Gopinath
Bench: P Gopinath
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
MONDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF MAY 2024 / 30TH VAISAKHA, 1946
WP(C) NO. 17179 OF 2024
CRIME NO.146/2021 OF Kodakara Police Station, Thrissur
PETITIONER:
VINOD MATHEW WILSON
AGED 40 YEARS
S/O V.G WILSON, HAVING PERMANENT ADDRESS AT
VAZHAYIL VEEDU, NEDIYARA P.O, EROOR VILLAGE,
ANCHAL, KOLLAM DISTRICT AND NOW HAVING OFFICE AT
OFFICE OF STATE PRESIDENT, AAM AADMI PARTY,
KERALA STATE COMMITTEE OFFICE, MATHER SQUARE,
NEAR NORTH RAILWAY STATION, ERNAKULAM NORTH P.O,
ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682018
BY ADVS.
MANU RAMACHANDRAN
M.KIRANLAL
T.S.SARATH
R.RAJESH (VARKALA)
SAMEER M NAIR
SAILAKSHMI MENON
JOTHISHA K.A.
SHIFANA M.
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECERTARY,
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS,
NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN - 110001
2 THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
HEAD OFFICE, PRAVARTAN BHAWAN,
APJ ABDUL KALAM ROAD, NEW DELHI,
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, PIN - 110011
3 THE JOINT DIRECTOR
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT ZONAL OFFICE,
KOCHI, KANOOS CASTLE, MULLASSERY CANAL ROAD WEST
(A K SESHADRI ROAD), KOCHI, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682011
WP(C) No.17179/2024 2
4 THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
OFFICE OF PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME
TAX, KERALA, KOCHI, PIN - 682018
5 NATIONAL INVESIGATION AGENCY
BRANCH OFFICE, HOUSE NO.28/443, NEAR KSEB OFFICE
OF GIRI NAGAR, GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA,
KOCHI, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682020
6 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECERTARY, MINISTRY OF HOME
AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
7 THE STATE POLICE CHIEF
KERALA STATE POLICE, POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
VAZHUTHACAUD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695010
8 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
THRISSUR, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680001
9 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
KODAKARA POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680684
BY ADV. KRISHNA T C, SCGC
JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, SC, ED
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
10.05.2024, THE COURT ON 20.05.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C) No.17179/2024 3
(CR)
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 20th day of May, 2024
Syam Kumar V.M. J.
The prayers sought in this Writ Petition, which is filed as a
public interest litigation, are as under:-
"(i) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ or order or
direction directing respondents Nos.2 to 4 to consider and take
action in Ext.P3 representation as per law within a time limit
fixed by the Hon'ble Court, in the interest of justice ;
(ii) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ or order or
direction directing respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7 to consider and
take action in Ext.P5 representation as per law within a time
limit fixed by this Hon'ble Court, in the interest of justice ; and
(iii) Such other writ, orders or directions deem fit on facts and in
the interest of justice."
2. Petitioner submits that a money heist had occurred within
the limits of Kodakara Police Station and that Crime No.146 of 2021
dated 07.04.2021 concerning the same had been registered in the said
Police Station. According to the petitioner, since the said heist has
hawala and money laundering overtones involving political leaders,
he has preferred Ext.P3 representation dated 24.04.2024 and Ext.P5
representation dated 28.04.2024 before the concerned respondents
inter alia seeking registration of a case under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 2002 Act').
Petitioner laments that no action has been taken by the concerned
respondents on his said representations and since according to him
the nature of crime involved has ramifications for the economic
security of the nation, he has moved this Writ Petition seeking the
above prayers.
3. When this Writ Petition came up for consideration on
07.05.2024, the learned standing counsel for respondents 2 and 3
vehemently challenged the maintainability of the Writ Petition and
sought time to file a statement specifically on the said respect.
4. Subsequently, statements have been filed by respondents 1
and 5 as well as respondents 2 and 3.
5. Respondents 2 and 3 have in their statement, challenged
the locus standi of the petitioner to prefer the Writ Petition in a matter
which essentially has criminal law implications. The statement also
reveals that based on FIR No.146 of 2021 dated 07.04.2021 of
Kodakara Police Station and the Final Report filed therein by the
Police, an ECIR/KCZO/11/2023 dated 30.01.2023 has been registered
by the Enforcement Directorate under the Act, 2002 and that the
matter is under active investigation. It has been stated therein that
several persons have been questioned and their statements recorded.
That effective steps are being presently undertaken by the
Enforcement Directorate to ascertain the proceeds of crime including
the money trail and that meticulous investigation is required in cases
of such nature to find out the money trail, the proceeds of the crime
and the persons involved in the money laundering case, are also
pointed out by respondents 2 and 3 in their statement. The
Enforcement Directorate has through the said statement sought
dismissal of the Writ Petition at the very threshold on the ground of
maintainability and lack of locus standi in the petitioner .
6. Respondents 1 and 5 have in their statement contended
that the Writ Petition is not maintainable and that no public interest is
involved in the matter. It is alleged by them therein that the Writ
Petition has been filed with political interest and ulterior motives by
the petitioner who is admittedly the State President of a political party.
It is also averred therein that Ext.P2 Final Report clearly reveals that
the State Police has completed the investigation and has filed the Final
Report before the jurisdictional Magistrate who has taken cognizance
of the matter. Respondents 1 and 5 thus seek dismissal of the Writ
Petition on the ground that a public interest litigation is not
maintainable in a criminal matter and that the petitioner is only a
stranger who is in no way connected with the alleged crime.
7. We have heard Sri.Manu Ramachandran learned Advocate
appearing for the petitioner, Sri.Jaishankar V.Nair learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, Sri.T.C.Krishna learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 5 and the learned
Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the 4 th respondent. We have
also heard the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of
respondents 6 to 9.
8. Since the question of locus standi of the petitioner to prefer
the Writ Petition has been challenged by the all the respondents, and
the same being a question that goes to the very root of the matter, we
deem it fit to consider the same at the outset.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited our
attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr.P.Nalla
Thampy Thera v. Union of India and others (W.P.(Crl.) No.114
of 1991) and he contends that in defining the rule of locus standi in
public interest litigations, no 'rigid litmus test' can be applied and that
the dominant object of public interest litigation is to ensure
observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can
be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged
groups and individuals. Basing on the said dictum, learned counsel for
the petitioner further submits that public interest litigation
necessitates appreciation of doctrine of locus standi on a case to case
basis. Since the respondents are with oblique motives and under
undue political pressure delaying further necessary action in the
criminal proceedings arising out of the FIR in Crime No.146 of 2021 of
Kodakara Police Station, which according to the petitioner have
serious economic consequences for the nation, the objection of locus
standi raised by the respondents is devoid of merits and
unsustainable. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
this Court had an occasion to consider the very same subject matter
earlier in Writ Petition (C) No.11797 of 2021 wherein vide judgment
dated 24.11.2021, this Court had recorded the statements of the
Deputy Solicitor General of India that based on the complaints
received from various persons, a file has been opened by the
Enforcement Directorate and they are in receipt of the charge sheet in
Crime No.146 of 2021 of Kodakara Police Station and the Enforcement
Directorate is examining the details and appropriate action under the
2002 Act will be taken as envisaged in law. This Court had also in the
said judgment recorded the statement that the State Police is also
conducting further investigation in Crime No.146 of 2021. Based on
the above said judgment in W.P.(C) No.11797 of 2021, counsel for the
petitioner submits that nothing much has further transpired in the
matter after the said judgment and that there is a stalemate in
proceeding further, which it alleged is deliberate, purposeful and a
result of undue political interference.
10. This argument of the petitioner is countered by the learned
counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 relying on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Shiv
Shankar Sharma and others (2022 SCC Online SC 1541), wherein
it has been held that for entertaining a public interest litigation, the
court needs to be satisfied credentials of the person approaching the
court. Reliance is also placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Suprme
Court in Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and another
[(1992) 4 SCC 653 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 22] and Subramanian Swamy
and others v. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board
and another [(2013) 10 SCC 465 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 785 : 2013 SCC
OnLine SC 754], wherein the Supreme Court has held that a third
party, who is a total stranger to the prosecution, has no locus standi in
criminal matters and has no right to whatsoever to file a petition in
public interest. In Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand and others
[(2001) 5 SCC 407 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1322 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 634],
it has been held that doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to
criminal jurisprudence and similarly in State of Uttaranchal v.
Balwant Singh Chaufal and others [(2010) 3 SCC 402 : (2010) 2
SCC (Cri) 81 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 807 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 196], the
Supreme Court has held that public interest litigation is available only
where larger public interests are involved and when the matter is so
grave and urgent that it must take precedence over other matters. The
dictum in Swaraj Abhiyan and another v. Union of India and
others [(2017) 11 SCC 237 : 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1417], wherein the
Supreme Court has held that when an issue takes the colour of political
nature or a political protagonist approaches the court in the guise of a
public interest litigation to settle political scores, it loses the character
of public interest litigation, is also relied on by respondents 2 and 3.
11. The legal position regarding locus standi in matters
involving criminal jurisprudence being as stated above, the counsel for
respondents 2 and 3 submits that it is beyond dispute that the
petitoner is in no way connected to Crime No.146 of 2021 of Kodakara
Police Station. The learned counsel points to para 3 of the Writ
Petition wherein it has been stated as follows: "The petitioner is having
no personal or private interet in the matter and the present writ petition is
filed to espouse the social cause againt the hawala money transaction
plaguing the economic secutiry of India." Further, it is relevant to note
that although in Ext.P2 charge sheet the names of the accused are
specifically mentioned, none of them have been impleaded and
arrayed as parties to the Writ Petition. Prayers sought for in the Writ
Petition cannot thus be granted without the necessary parties in the
respondent array. It is also relevant to note that Exts.P3 and P5
representations are dated 24.04.2024 and 28.04.2024 respectively.
The Writ Petition filed based on the said exhibits is dated 29.04.2024.
Thus the Writ Petition has been filed within less than a week of the
date in Exts.P3 and P5 representations. The said facts read in
conjunction, fortifies the contention of respondents 1 and 5 that the
Writ Petition has been filed with political objectives in mind and for
instrumentalising the Court as a platform for furthering partisan
political interest.
12. With respect to the contention put forth by the petitioner
based on Dr.P.Nalla Thampy Thera v. Union of India and
others (supra), the mandate laid down therein that public interest
litigation necessitates appreciation of doctrine of locus standi on a
case to case basis is not satisfactorily met with or satisfied by the
petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. We note
that the petitioner has not sought to enforce any fundamental right of
the general public nor does he complain that any of his fundamental
rights for being violated. As revealed by the discussion of the cases
above, it is no longer res integra that entertaining public interest
litigation in matters having criminal overtones should be done with
great circumspection and care. We are guided in this respect by the
dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Janata Dal v.
H.S.Chowdhary and Others [1991 KHC 1163 : AIR 1993 SC 892]
which reads as follows: "Even if there are million questions of law to be
deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature registered
against specified accused persons, it is for them and them alone to raise all
such questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at the
appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under
the garb of public interest litigants". The above proposition has been
affirmed by the Apex Court in Sanjai Tiwari v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another [(2021) 15 SCC 660 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC
1027].
13. In view of the above, we find that the petitioner has failed
to reveal any locus standi to prefer or maintain the above Writ Petition
as a public interest litigation. The objections raised by the respondents
in their statements regarding lack of locus standi in the petitioner has
legal merit and are accordingly accepted and upheld.
14. We are convinced that even if we were to hold that the
Writ Petition is maintainable at the instance of the petitioner, the
reliefs sought for cannot be granted.
15. Ext.P3 representation is addressed to officials of the
Enforcement Directorate seeking registration of a case under the Act,
2002, against a named individual. There is also a prayer in Ext.P3 that
the named individual and his associates should be arrested. The
prayer for consideration of Ext.P3 by the competent authority under
the 2002 Act is based on a misconception of the scope of the 2002 Act.
16. In the 2002 Act,
"Money laundering" is defined in Section 2(1)(p), "Proceeds of
Crime" is defined in Section 2(1)(u) and "Property" is defined in
Section 2(1)(v), and the offence of Money laundering is set out in
Section 3 of the 2002 Act. Section 2 (1) (p) of the 2002 Act states
that "money-laundering" has the meaning assigned to it in Section
3 of the said Act. Section 2 (1)(u) defines "proceeds of crime" as "any
property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person
as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the
value of any such property or where such property is taken or held
outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held
within the country or abroad". The Explanation to Section 2 (1)(u)
of the 2002 Act states thus "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived
or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which
may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any
criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence". Section 2 (1)(v)
of the 2002 Act defines property as "any property or assets of every
description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or
assets, wherever located". The Explanation to Section 2 (1)(v) of the
2002 Act reads thus : "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
clarified that the term property includes property of any kind used
in the commission of an offence under this Act or any of the
scheduled offences". Section 3 of the 2002 Act sets out the
ingredients of the offence of money laundering and the provision
reads thus:-
"Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly
assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process
or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or
claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering.
Explanation. -- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified
that, --
(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such
person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or
knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in
one or more of the following processes or activities connected with
proceeds of crime, namely:--
(a) concealment; or
(b) possession; or
(c) acquisition; or
(d) use; or
(e) projecting as untainted property; or
(f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever;
(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a
continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or
indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or
possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property
or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever."
17. To understand the scope of the proceedings under the 2002
Act we may usefully refer to two judgments of the Supreme Court
namely (i) Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. UOI, [2022 SCC
OnLine SC 929] & (ii) Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of
Enforcement, [2023 SCC OnLine 1586]. In Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary (supra) it was held:-
"89. This argument clearly overlooks the overall scheme of the
2002 Act. As noticed earlier, it is a comprehensive legislation,
not limited to provide for prosecution of person involved in the
offence of money-laundering, but mainly intended to prevent
money-laundering activity and confiscate the proceeds of
crime involved in money-laundering. It also provides for
prosecuting the person involved in such activity constituting
offence of money-laundering. In other words, this legislation is
an amalgam of different facets including setting up of agencies
and mechanisms for co- ordinating measures for combating
money-laundering. Chapter III is a provision to effectuate
these purposes and objectives by attachment, adjudication and
confiscation. The adjudication is done by the Adjudicating
Authority to confirm the order of provisional attachment in
respect of proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering.
For accomplishing that objective, the authorities appointed
under Chapter VIII have been authorised to make inquiry into
all matters by way of survey, searches and seizures of records
and property. These provisions in no way invest power in the
Authorities referred to in Chapter VIII of the 2002 Act to
maintain law and order or for that matter, purely
investigating into a criminal offence. The inquiry preceding
filing of the complaint by the authorities under the 2002 Act,
may have the semblance of an investigation conducted by
them. However, it is essentially an inquiry to collect evidence
to facilitate the Adjudicating Authority to decide on the
confirmation of provisional attachment order, including to
pass order of confiscation, as a result of which, the proceeds of
crime would vest in the Central Government in terms of section
9 of the 2002 Act. In other words, the role of the Authorities
appointed under Chapter VIII of the 2002 Act is such that they
are tasked with dual role of conducting inquiry and collect
evidence to facilitate adjudication proceedings before the
Adjudicating Authority in exercise of powers conferred upon
them under Chapters III and V of the 2002 Act and also to use
the same materials to bolster the allegation against the person
concerned by way of a formal complaint to be filed for offence
of money-laundering under the 2002 Act before the Special
Court, if the fact situation so warrant......"
"181. .......It is also correct to say that there is no such
requirement under the 2002 Act or for that matter, that there
is nothing like investigation of a crime of money-laundering as
per the scheme of 2002 Act. The investigation, however, is to
track the property being proceeds of crime and to attach the
same for being dealt with under the 2002 Act. Stricto sensu, it
is in the nature of an inquiry in respect of civil action of
attachment. Nevertheless, since the inquiry in due course ends
in identifying the offender who is involved in the process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime and then to
prosecute him......"
18. In Pavana Dibbur (supra) after referring extensively to
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) it was held:-
"15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of
crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is
necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary. In paragraph 253 of the said
decision, this Court held thus:
"253. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived
or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded
as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act
cannot resort to action against any person for money-
laundering on an assumption that the property recovered
by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled
offence has been committed, unless the same is registered
with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way
of complaint before the competent forum. For, the
expression "derived or obtained" is indicative of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence already
accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in
the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is
finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction
owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of
quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against
him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering
against such a person or person claiming through him in
relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled
offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on
the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular
Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other
view would be rewriting of these provisions and
disregarding the express language of definition clause
"proceeds of crime", as it obtains as of now."
(underline supplied)
16. In paragraphs 269 and 270, this Court held thus:
"269. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002
Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money-
laundering is an independent offence regarding the
process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime
which had been derived or obtained as a result of
criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled
offence. The process or activity can be in any form -- be it
one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of
proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in any
one of such process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money-
laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with
the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence --
except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a
result of that crime.
270. Needless to mention that such process or activity
can be indulged in only after the property is derived or
obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled
offence). It would be an offence of money-laundering to
indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such
process or activity in a given fact situation may be a
continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of
commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the
criminal activity may have been committed before the
same had been notified as scheduled offence for the
purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in
or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing
with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such
criminal activity even after it has been notified as
scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for
offence of money-laundering under the 2002 Act -- for
continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime
(fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it
in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of money-
laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on
which the scheduled offence or if we may say so the
predicate offence has been committed. The relevant date
is the date on which the person indulges in the process or
activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These
ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision
(Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in force till
31.7.2019); and the same has been merely explained and
clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2) Act,
2019. Thus understood, inclusion of Clause (ii) in
Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it
does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all."
17. Coming back to Section 3 of the PMLA, on its plain reading,
an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled
offence is committed. For example, let us take the case of a
person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence,
knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or
knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that case, he
can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of
the PMLA. To give a concrete example, the offences under
Sections 384 to 389 of the IPC relating to "extortion" are
scheduled offences included in Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to
the PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of extortion
covered by Sections 384 to 389 of IPC and extort money.
Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence of
extortion may assist the said accused in the concealment of the
proceeds of extortion. In such a case, the person who assists the
accused in the scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of
the crime of extortion can be guilty of the offence of money
laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against
whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must
have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. What
is held in paragraph 270 of the decision of this Court in the case
of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary1 supports the above conclusion.
The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under
Section 3 of the PMLA are that there must be a scheduled
offence and that there must be proceeds of crime in relation to
the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of sub-section (1)
of Section 3 of the PMLA."
19. From the above, it is clear that the Enforcement
Directorate is not an investigating agency stricto pp.psensu. The
command and mandate of the Enforcement Directorate under the
2002 Act is to ensure that no person benefits from the proceeds of
crime derived out of the commission of a scheduled offence and to see
that such property is confiscated to the State. Therefore, in the facts of
this case there cannot be any direction issued to consider Ext.P3
which has been filed with a prayer to register a case and arrest certain
individuals for that is not the mandate of the Enforcement
Directorate. Moreover, the statement filed on behalf of respondents 2
and 3 filed in this case indicates that the Enforcement Directorate has
registered an ECIR/KCZO/11/23 in the above matter and the same is
being enquired into as well. Thus we see no reason to direct the
consideration of Ext.P3.
20. Ext.P5 representation regarding which the 2nd relief seeks
that action be taken under the provisions of Section 6 of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the NIA Act,
2008). The prayer in Ext.P5 is that suitable action be taken by the
State Government under Section 6 of the NIA Act 2008. This is
misconcieved. A reading of Section 6 of the NIA Act, 2008 shows that
the process starts with the registration of an FIR under Section 154
Cr.P.C in respect of an offence set out in the Schedule to the NIA Act,
2008. A reading of Ext.P2 final report indicates that even in the final
report there is no indication that any of the offences in the Schedule to
the NIA Act, 2008 has been committed.
For all the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition is liable to be
dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
GOPINATH P.
JUDGE
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
csl
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
EXT.P1: TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO.146/2021 OF
KODAKARA POLICE STATION, THRISSUR DISTRICT
EXT.P2: TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CRIME NO.146/2021
OF KODAKARA POLICE STATION, THRISSUR DISTRICT
WHICH IS NOW PENDING AS C.P.NO.47/2021 ON THE
FILES OF JFMC, IRINJALAKUDA.
Ext.P3: TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION VIA EMAIL DATED
24.04.2024 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO
RESPONDENTS 2 TO 4
EXT.P4: TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION VIA EMAIL DATED
25.04.2024 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO
RESPONDENT NO.5-NIA
EXT.P5: TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION VIA EMAIL DATED
28.04.2024 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS :
NIL
