Kerala High Court
Mukesh.K.C vs Canara Bank on 6 February, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI
TUESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 17TH MAGHA, 1945
W.P.(C) NO.27963 OF 2023
PETITIONER:
MUKESH.K.C., AGED 59 YEARS, S/O.BHASKARAN.K.C.,
UNDER THE ORDER OF TERMINATION FROM THE POST OF MANAGER,
CANARA BANK, CHERUVATHUR BRANCH, KASARAGOD, RESIDING AT SHANTI,
KEEZHTHALLI, THAZHE CHOVVA.P.O. KANNUR, PIN - 670 018
BY ADVS.
M.SASINDRAN
SREEHARI INDUKALADHARAN
RESPONDENTS:
1 CANARA BANK, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,
HEAD OFFICE, BANGALORE, KARNATAKA, PIN - 560 001
2 THE GENERAL MANAGER, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, HEAD OFFICE,
BANGALORE, KARNATAKA, PIN - 560 001
3 THE DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, CANARA BANK, H.R.M.SECTION,
HEAD OFFICE, BANGALORE, KARNATAKA, PIN - 560 001
4 THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER, CANARA BANK, H.R.M.SECTION,
CIRCLE OFFICE, MANGALORE, KARNATAKA, PIN - 575 001
5 THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER, CANARA BANK, H.R.M.SECTION,
CIRCLE OFFICE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001, KERALA.
BY ADVS.
GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR. M
K.JOHN MATHAI(K/413/1984)
JOSON MANAVALAN(J-526)
KURYAN THOMAS(K/131/2003)
PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM(MAH/58/2006)
RAJA KANNAN(K/356/2008)
ADV. JAY MOHAN
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 06.02.2024,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2
WPC. 27963/2023
JUDGMENT
(Dated: 6th February, 2024)
The writ petition is filed by a former employee of Canara Bank, who has
been dismissed from service after conducting a disciplinary enquiry on the
basis of the charge sheet issued against the petitioner. Brief facts of the
case are as follows:
2. The petitioner, after completing three years at Mangalore Branch of
Canara Bank as Manager, was transferred to Kerala and posted at
Puthiyatheru Branch at Kannur. While working at the Cheruvathoor Branch
in the year 2016, he was suspended from service as per Ext.P1 dated
22.11.2016, and proceedings were issued by the 4th respondent.
Thereafter, a charge memo was issued to the petitioner as Ext.P2 by the 4th
respondent, who is stationed at Mangalore in Karnataka. The petitioner
filed a reply to the memo of charges and dissatisfied with the reply; enquiry
was initiated by appointing a Divisional Manager as enquiry officer. The
enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and submitted Ext.P3 enquiry report
dated 27.11.2017. The petitioner filed Ext.P4 objection dated 28.12.2017
against the findings of the enquiry officer. The 4th respondent, without
considering the objections submitted to the enquiry report and without
issuing a show cause notice, imposed a punishment of dismissal from
service as per Ext.P5. Aggrieved by Ext.P5, the petitioner filed (Ext.P6)
appeal before the 3rd respondent, but the appellate authority, by Ext.P7
order, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the appellate order, a review
petition was also filed before the 2nd respondent, which was also rejected
along with a letter dated 03.11.2020. Challenging the dismissal of the
appeal, the petitioner approached this Court with the following prayers.
i.Declare that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the
petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable;
ii.issue an order setting aside Exhibit P3, Exhibit P5, Exhibit P7 & Exhibit P8;
iii.issue an order directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service
with continuously in service with all consequential benefits.
iv.exempt the petitioner from producing the English Translation of Malayalam
Exhibits produced along with this writ petition and the petitioners further
undertake that they are ready and willing to produce English Translation of
Malayalam documents as and when required;
v.award cost to the petitioner;
vi.issue any other writ order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in
the facts and circumstances of the case;
3. A counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the respondents in which a
preliminary objection is raised regarding the maintainability of the writ
petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ
petition, as the entire cause of action arose outside the State. The action
for dismissal of the petitioner was after issuing a charge memo, conducting
disciplinary proceedings, and rejecting the appeal as well as the review
petition by the competent authorities, who are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court, a perusal of Exts.P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 would
make it amply clear.
4. The petitioner was transferred to Puthiyatheru Chirackkal Branch on
27.07.2015, and from there, he was transferred to Cheruvathur Branch on
16.08.2016. While he was working in the said branch, the petitioner was
issued with Ext.P1 suspension order by the Assistant General Manager
(Circle Office), Mangaluru, and the charge sheet was served on the
petitioner on 17.04.2017 by the HRM Section Mangaluru, and the enquiry
was conducted by the disciplinary authority who was also stationed at
Mangaluru. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was considered by the
appellate authority, Human Resources Wing, Head Office in
Bangaluru. The Review Petition was also rejected by the reviewing
authority. The punishment of dismissal was served on the petitioner
through the office where he was working in Kerala. Merely because notices
are served on the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court will not
give him a cause of action to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the
respondents prayed for dismissal of the writ petition on the grounds that
this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
5. Heard Sri.M.Sasindran, counsel for the petitioner as well as the
counsel for the respondents.
6. The counsel for the petitioner argues that Clause(2) of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India confers the power by Clause(1); to issue
directions, orders, or writs to any Government, authority or persons may
also exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the
territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government
or authority or the residence of such person is not within those
territories. Therefore, since all the notices including the suspension order,
charge sheet, order of dismissal, and order of the appellate authority as
well as the review order were received by the petitioner while working the
Cheruvathur Branch in Kerala and therefore part of the cause of action
arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and therefore the
petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
7. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the
rights from Ext.P1, P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 are considered and issued in the
State of Karnataka. Merely because the petitioner was stationed at
Cheruvathur Branch, Kasaragod in Kerala, will not give rise to part of the
cause of action for invoking territorial jurisdiction. He relied on the decision
reported in the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Nakul Deo Singh v .
Deputy Commandant (1999 KHC 647) and argued that the receipt of
communication of the appellate authority's order was in Kerala would not
confer jurisdiction in the High Court of Kerala as the action complained
took place out of the territorial jurisdiction of Kerala High Court and also
the fact that the appeal was dismissed by an authority located outside the
jurisdiction of the High Court. He mainly referred to paragraphs 21 and 22,
which read as follows.
21. It is now settled after the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S.
Rathore v State of M.P. (AIR 1990 SC 10) that when there is an appeal
against the original order even in a service dispute, there is a merger of
the original order in the appellate order and the decision rendered by
the appellate authority whether it be of dismissal, reduction, allowance
or modification of the order of the original authority, a cause of action
accrues to the aggrieved person to challenge the appellate order since
the order of the original authority merges in the order of the appellate
authority. What furnishes the cause of action is the rejection of the
appeal by the appellate authority. Communication of that order though
the order become effective only on such communication to the
aggrieved person only furnishes the aggrieved person with a right of
action. Receipt of the communication is not a fact in the bundle of facts
constituting the cause of action. Even though only on receipt of the
order the aggrieved person may be able to challenge that order, receipt
of the order cannot be said to be a fact forming the cause of action.
For, the cause of action arises on the appeal being dismissed by the
authority outside the jurisdiction of the court. The fact that until an
order is published or made known, the order does not became effective
since it will be open to the authority to change his mind before releasing
the order, is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order
also forms part of the cause of action to the aggrieved person. The fact
that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service
outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that
dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not
a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of
action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him
earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he
lost his employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by him to an
appellate authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and
that appeal is dismissed by the appellate authority, the merger in the
decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is
dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ
petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his
appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order
was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the
right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives
him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables
him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the
consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a
person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court
within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also
competent to entertain a Writ Petition under Art 226 of the
Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers
the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not
in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal.
22. In the cases before us, consequences of the order of the original
authority were suffered by the respective petitioners outside the State.
One was dismissed and the other was reduced in rank. Thereafter they
filed appeals before the appellate authority whose offices are in Delhi.
One of the petitioners had come back to his native place in Trivandrum
on his losing the job and from there, he received the copy of the order
dismissing his appeal. In the other, after suffering reduction in rank
from outside the State, the petitioner had obtained a transfer to the
State within the jurisdiction of this court He had also suffered the
punishment while he was outside the territory of this High Court
Mearly because he was working in Kerala at the time when he received
the copy of the appellate order dismissing his appeal cannot be said to
be part of the cause of action to challenge the appellate order. In both
these cases therefore we have no hesitation in holding that no part of
the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this High Court. The
objection raised in that behalf by the respondents is well founded.
He also relied on the Full Bench decision of this court in Indian Maritime
University v. Viswanathan [2014 (4) KLT 798 (F.B.)] in which Nakul Deo
Singh's case cited (supra) also considered and held in paragraphs 28 and
30, which reads as follows:
28. Thus, law is settled that in view of the provisions contained in Art.
226(2) of the Constitution of India, a Writ Petition can be maintained in a
High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an integral part of
the cause of action has arisen. Though the expression "cause of action"
is not defined either in the Constitution or in the Code of Civil Procedure,
it has to be understood in the light of S.20(c) of the CPC and it means a
bundle of facts which are required to be proved for a petitioner or
a plaintiff to seek relief in a court of law. It is also the settled principle of
law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise
to cause of action and service of that communication, though is
necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the
cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other
words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the
service of the order gives rise to a right of action.
30. In this context, we should also make reference to paragraph 27 of the
judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., where, the
Apes Court has held that challenge can be maintained against an order
passed by the original authority and the appellate authority where the
seats of the original authority and appellate authority are situated and
the Apex Court did not mention that such challenge is possible at the
place where orders are served. Therefore, irrespective of whether it is the
disciplinary authority's order or appellate authority's order, service of
order does not give rise to any part of the cause of action to an aggrieved
person.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision
reported in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and Others (2014 KHC
4507), the judgment of the Apex Court, and argues that the Apex Court had
occasion considered the issue regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts. In the said case, the appellant was working in the Shipping
Corporation of India, and his registration as an employee was cancelled,
and he was found permanently unfit for sea service due to medical
reasons. At that time, the employee was residing in Bihar, and he sent
letters seeking financial claims. The Shipping Corporation of India rejected
his application and held that he was not entitled for disability
compensation. The writ petition was filed in Patna High Court which was
dismissed on the ground that no cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Patna High Court. The Apex Court, in that case, held that
all the causes of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court,
where the employee received a letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation. The Apex Court, in that case, held that the High
Court of Patna has jurisdiction because the letter of refusal from claiming
disability compensation was received by him within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court, and so the cause of action arose on receipt of the letter
of refusal. The representation sent was from his home in Bihar claiming
disability compensation, and the representation was replied to his home
address in Gaya, rejecting his claim for disability compensation. After he
was declared unfit, he returned back to his home in Bihar and all the claims
and filed representation from his home address at Gaya, which were
entertained by the respondents, and the decisions on those
representations were communicated to him at his address in Bihar. The
appellant was also suffering from serious heart muscle disease and
breathing problems, which forced him to stay in his native place. Taking all
these facts together, the Apex Court held that the Patna High Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He also relied on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Shanti Devi @ Shanti Mishra v. Union of India and
Others (2020 KHC 6632). That was a case in which the deceased petitioner
was continuously receiving his pension for many years in his savings bank
account in the State Bank of India, Darbhanga, and the stoppage of the
pension of the petitioner affected him at his native place, he is
being deprived of the benefit of pension which he was receiving from his
employer. So, when there is a stoppage of pension, it gives cause of action for
the petitioner to approach the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction
it is situated. In the said facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court
held that part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of
the High Court of Patna and held that it is maintainable.
9. Coming to the facts of this case, it can be seen that all the proceedings
were initiated and conducted within the State of Karnataka, and
merely because he was working in the Branch of Kerala, notices were issued
to the petitioner to inform him about the proceedings initiated; otherwise, it
would be a violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. Merely letters
received, including the rejection of the appeal, will not give rise to the cause
of action for the petitioner to approach this court. Cause of action though not
defined anywhere in the constitution nor in the C.P.C., would mean the
bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for relief in a court
of law. The cause of action means every fact which gives, if traversed, would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the court. It gives the plaintiff the right to claim against the
defendant. In the case laws relied on by the counsel for the petitioner the
disability compensation as well as the pension was stopped which gave raise
for a cause of action in the place where he was residing as integral part of the
cause of action arose there. Therefore, the dictum cannot be applied to the
facts of this case.
As mentioned earlier, Exts.P1, P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 are all issued by
authorities who are placed in the State of Karnataka and have been held by
the Apex Court as well as the Full Bench of this court in Nakul Deo Singh's case
cited (supra), mere receipt of a letter will not give rise to a cause of action for
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Therefore, taking into consideration the above-mentioned decisions of
the Apex Court, as well as this Court, I am of the considered opinion that this
Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition, and therefore,
without going into the merits, this writ petition is dismissed as not
maintainable.
Sd/-
BASANT BALAJI,
JUDGE
ss
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 27963/2023
PETITIONER EXHIBITS:
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS NO. HRM CO MLR
3347 2016 DATED 22.11.2016 ISSUED BY THE 4TH
RESPONDENT SUSPENDING THE APPLICANT FROM
SERVICE
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE ARTICLES OF CHARGE REF.NO.
MGC/HRM/CS0/3/2017 ISSUED BY THE 4TH
RESPONDENT ON 17.04.2017
Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED
27.11.2017
Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION DATED 28.12.2017
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE ENQUIRY
REPORT.
Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.02.2018
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL DATED 12.04.2018
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD
RESPONDENT
Exhibit P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 24.06.2019
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER REJECTING THE REVIEW
PETITION ALONG WITH THE LETTER DATED
03.11.2020 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER
