Kerala High Court
R. Asokan vs State Of Kerala on 19 April, 2024
'CR'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIJU ABRAHAM
FRIDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF APRIL 2024 / 30TH CHAITHRA, 1946
WP(C) NO. 26234 OF 2023
PETITIONERS:
1 R. ASOKAN,
AGED 70 YEARS,
S/O. RAGHAVAN P.O., DIVYA BHAVAN, HIGH SCHOOL
JUNCTION, ADOOR, PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN - 691523
2 MANOJ KUMAR,
AGED 57 YEARS,
S/O. GOPALAN NAIR K., KANNOLA HOUSE KODIMATHA,
NATTAKOM P.O., KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686013
3 LEKHA REGHUNATHAN,
AGED 50 YEARS,
W/O. REGHUNATHAN, MAMBLATHU, 2B, REGENCY SQUARE,
COLLECTORATE P.O., KOTTAYAM -686002., PIN -
686002
4 MAYA THAMPAN,
AGED 59 YEARS,
D/O. PADMAVATHY , THAYPARAMBIL HOUSE, KODIMATHA,
NATTAKOM P.O., KOTTAYAM - 686013, PIN - 686013
BY ADVS.
P.A.MOHAMMED SHAH
RENOY VINCENT
SHAHIR SHOWKATH ALI
CHELSON CHEMBARATHY
ABEE SHEJIRIK FASLA N.K
MUHAMED JUNAID V.
ADITH KRISHNAN.U.
FATHIMA AFEEDA P.
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 001., PIN -
695001
2 DISTRICT COLLECTOR
COLLECTORATE, KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686001
3 THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER
KOTTAYAM, COLLECTORATE, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN -
686013
4 TAHSILDAR
KOTTAYAM TALUK OFFICE, KOTTAYAM-, PIN - 686001
W.P.(C).No.26234 of 2023 2
5 VILLAGE OFFICER
NATTAKOM VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686013
6 VILLAGE OFFICER
PANACHIKKADU VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM- 686533., PIN -
686533
OTHER PRESENT:
SPL.GP - N.SUDHADEVI
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 19.04.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.P.(C).No.26234 of 2023 3
'CR'
VIJU ABRAHAM,J
-------------------
W.P.(C).No.26234 of 2023
--------------------------------
Dated this the 19th day of April, 2024
JUDGMENT
The above writ petition is filed seeking to
declare that the action on the part of the
respondents in acquiring the properties of the
petitioner for the 'Kottayam Corridor Project'
without following due process of law and without
payment of compensation amount is arbitrary,
illegal and violative of the fundamental rights
and constitutional rights guaranteed to the
petitioner under Articles 14,19,21 and 300A of the
constitution of India and for other consequential
reliefs.
2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of
the writ petition are as follows: Petitioners are
absolute owners in possession and enjoyment of
different extents of land in Nattakam and
Panachikkadu Village in Kottayam District, as is
evident from Exts.P1 to P4. The 1st respondent
formulated a project by the name 'Kottayam
Development Corridor' as part of a larger proposal
for the development and expansion of the town.
The 1st respondent after realizing that such
project would require full co-operation and
voluntary surrender by the land owners, called for
a meeting on 08.10.2011 and on the basis of the
promises and assurances given by the respondents
that their demand for conversion of the remaining
extent of land after the surrender, would be
accepted, the petitioners granted permission for
effecting construction in their property and
surrendered the following extent of property:
Petitioners Total extent Surrendered Survey No.
of land extent of
(ares) land (ares)
Petitioner No.1 33.53 10.27 232/3-3
Petitioner No.1 44.94 6.12 233/1-5
Petitioner No.2 63.55 31.21 231/3-6,3-
5,3-7
Petitioner No.2 29.12 17.46 231/3-3
By Ext.P5 minutes of the meeting which was
attended by the Minister and the other officials
wherein it was reiterated that the land owners
surrendering the lands will be permitted to
convert an equal extent of their remaining lands
and that exemption will be granted for effecting
changes in the BTR records to enable change in the
zoning for carrying out the project. While so,
Ext.P6 order was issued by the 1st respondent
stating that those land owners who have
surrendered their whole extent of land will be
allotted with Government land to an extent of 50%
of the total surrendered land and such of the land
owners who have surrendered a portion of their
holdings will be allowed to convert paddy land
(excluding wetland)to an extent of 50% of the land
which they have surrendered to State Government.
Petitioners submit that a conjoint reading of
Exts.P5 and P6 would clearly denote that
respondent No.1 reneged on its initial promise to
the landowners and instead of allowing them to
convert an equal extent of the surrendered
property for construction, the new order
stipulated that the landowners including the
petitioners herein would only be allowed to
convert 50% of the surrendered land for
construction purposes. Despite the unilateral
modification, petitioners decided not to raise any
objection against Ext.P6. Even thereafter, no
action was taken from the side of the 1st
respondent. Consequently, one of the affected
landowners approached this Court by filing WP(C)
No.33882/2015, which was disposed of as per Ext.P7
judgment directing the Government to implement
Ext.P6 order. Even after a direction was issued as
per Ext.P7, no steps were taken to implement the
same and the petitioners therein were constrained
to approach this Court by filing CCC No.2135/2016.
While contempt of court proceeding was pending,
the 1st respondent issued Ext.P8 order holding that
change of character of remaining lands of persons
who have surrendered portions of their lands for
road widening cannot be permitted as the same will
be in violation of the provisions of the Kerala
Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008.
It was further ordered as per Ext P8 that the
second condition which stipulates that persons who
have surrendered the land will be provided with
alternate land having an extent of 50% of the
surrendered land is not feasible since there are
no sufficient lands available for giving such
alternate land and that it may also lead to
arbitrary exercise of Government Largesse and
thereupon decided that the land owners who have
surrendered land for 'Kottayam Corridor' project
will be compensated for the extent of land that
they have actually surrendered at the rate of
market value prevalent at the time of surrendering
of their land and land value will be fixed as per
the provisions under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as LARR Act 2013). Though
petitioners 2,3 and 4 have filed WPC No.
33117/2019 along with some other aggrieved persons
seeking implementation of Ext.P6, later they
decided not to press for the reliefs sought for in
the said writ petition and as per Ext.P10 order,
they were deleted from the party array.
Petitioners submit that action on the part of the
respondents in taking over possession of their
property without taking recourse to acquisition
proceedings or following due process of law is
arbitrary and violative of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article
300A of the Constitution. In the said
circumstances, the petitioners have approached
this Court.
3. A detailed statement has been filed by the
1st respondent wherein it is admitted that the
petitioners have handed over lands for the
Kottayam Corridor Project based on the G.O.
(Rt)No.5925/2015/RD dated 13/11/2015, on condition
that those who handover land for the Kottayam
Corridor Project will be allowed to reclaim paddy
land (except wetland) equal to 50% of the extent
of land handed over to Government and those who
handover their whole extent of land will be given
land equal to 50% of the land transferred to
Government but as per the G.O.(Rt.)4064/2018/RD
dated 04.10.2018, the benefit earlier granted was
cancelled and those persons who handed over land
for Kottayam Corridor Project will be compensated
for the exact extent of land they have actually
surrendered at the rate of Market Value which was
prevalent at the time of surrendering of their
land by fixing land value as per LARR Act, 2013.
It is also stated that in the case of the
petitioners who have surrendered large extents of
their land for the Kottayam Corridor Project, the
benefit of G.O.(Rt.)4064/2018/RD dated 04/10/2018
will be made applicable and that those persons who
handed over land to Kottayam Corridor Project
would be compensated for the exact extent of land
they have actually surrendered at the rate of
Market Value which was prevalent at the time of
surrendering of their land by fixing land value as
per LARR Act, 2013 and the same will be done on
the basis of negotiation or on payment the value
of land at the time of taking possession of the
land for the project.
4. I have considered the rival contentions on
both sides.
5. Admittedly, petitioners surrendered their
land as early as in 2015 only on an assurance
given, as evident from Ext.P5 that they would be
permitted to convert equal extent of land that
they have surrendered. Thereafter, the Government
retracted from their promise and imposed a further
condition as per Ext.P6. Even Ext.P6 was modified
by the Government by Ext.P8 order wherein they
have given away all the promises given to the
petitioners and ordered that the land will be
acquired as per the provisions of LARR Act, 2013
fixing the land value as on the date of surrender.
Whether the above stand taken by the Government in
Ext P8 is in accordance with law and in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, the 1st
respondent should initiate proceedings as per the
LARR Act 2013 and pay compensation in accordance
with the provisions of the said Act is the issue
involved in this case.
6. Though the right to property was initially a
fundamental right guaranteed as per the
Constitution of India, by the 44th Constitution
Amendment Act, the said right is no longer a
fundamental right but it is still a constitutional
right and a part of human right. The Apex Court in
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius
Chennai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 has held that in view of
Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the
State in exercise of power of 'eminent domain' may
interfere with the right of the property of a
person by acquiring the same but the same must be
for a public purpose and reasonable compensation,
therefore, must be paid. The Apex Court in
N.Padmamma v. S.Ramakrishna Reddy, reported in
(2008) 15 SCC 517 held as follows:
"21. If a right of property is a human right as
also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken
away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of
the Constitution protects such right. The provisions
of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in
view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.
(See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627] .) The principle laid down
in the said decision, having regard to the concept of
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India may be held
to have some application in a case of this nature."
7. In a democracy governed by the rule of law,
the State cannot deprive a citizen without the
sanction of law. The facts of the present case
reveal that the land was taken over from the
petitioners without paying any compensation solely
based on the undertaking given to the petitioners
regarding certain benefits to be extended to the
petitioners as is evident from Ext P5 and P6, the
Government has even retracted from the said
promises and the present stand taken as per Ext P8
order and as per the counter affidavit is that
they will be granted compensation as per LARR Act
2013 at the rate of market value which was
prevalent at the time of surrendering of their
land. From 2015 onwards, the land is in possession
of the Government and the same has been utilized
for the 'Kottayam Corridor Project' without even
paying any compensation till this date. In the
said backdrop, the question to be considered is as
to whether the stand taken by the Government that
the petitioner will be paid compensation based on
the value of the land as on the date of the
surrender of the property is legally sustainable
or not.
8. The Apex Court in K. Krishna Reddy & Ors.
v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition
Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, (1988) 4
SCC 163 considered the difficulty caused to the
citizen in case of delayed payment of compensation
and held in paragraph 12 as follows:
"12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and need
of claimants to get compensation here and now. No matter
what it is. The lands were acquired as far back in 1977.
One decade has already passed. Now the remand means
another round of litigation. There would be further
delay in getting the compensation. After all money is
what money buys. What the claimants could have bought
with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988.
Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common
experience that the purchasing power of rupee is
dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment
may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In
some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the
interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists
generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon
land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere.
They are left high and dry. They have no savings to
draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no
other work. They may even face starvation unless
rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost
importance that the award should be made without delay.
The enhanced compensation must be determined without
loss of time. The appellate power of remand, at any rate
ought not to be exercised lightly. It shall not be
resorted to unless the award is wholly unintelligible.
It shall not be exercised unless there is total lack of
evidence. If remand is imperative, and if the claim for
enhanced compensation is tenable, it would be proper for
the appellate court to do modest best to mitigate
hardships. The appellate court may direct some interim
payment to claimants subject to adjustment in the
eventual award."
(underline supplied)
Taking into consideration the fact that the
property was taken over almost a decade back
without giving a single penny towards
compensation, the decision now taken to acquire
the land fixing the land value as on the date of
taking possession will cause serious hardships to
the petitioners. I am of the opinion that the same
will not be adequate compensation in view of the
fact that petitioners will not be able to purchase
now even a small extent of land which the
petitioners could have purchased had the
compensation amount been given at the time of
taking possession itself. Therefore, the decision
to pay compensation based on the land value as on
the date of taking possession, which was almost a
decade back, is absolutely arbitrary and unjust as
observed by the Apex Court in K. Krishna Reddy &
Ors case cited supra.
9. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the
impact of acquiring the land without sanction of
law and without paying due compensation in
D.B.Basnett(D) through L.Rs. v. The Collector,
East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and Others (2020)4
SCC 572 and held that the Government should either
retain the land by issuing a proper notification
as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
or surrender possession of the land to the
petitioners therein. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the
said judgment reads as follows:
"19. The result of the aforesaid would be that the
respondents have failed to establish that they had
acquired the land in accordance with law and paid due
compensation. The appellant would, thus, be entitled
to the possession of the land as also damages for
illegal use and occupation of the same by the
respondents, at least, for a period of three (3) years
prior to the notice having been served upon them. We
are strengthened in our observations on account of the
judgment of this Court in LAO v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy
[LAO v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2011) 11 SCC 648 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 633] , wherein it was held that the
owner can be entitled to damages for wrongful use and
possession of land in respect of which no notification
is issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
from the date of possession till the date such
notification is finally published.
20. We are conscious that the land is being used
by the respondent State through Respondent 2
Department. That, however, does not give such a
licence to the State Government. We had endeavoured
to refer the matter for mediation, to find an
amicable solution, but that did not fructify. We,
however, would like to give some time to the
respondent State to analyse the consequences of this
judgment, and, in case they so desire, to acquire the
land through a proper notification under the said
Act, and to take proper recourse in law so as to
enable them to keep the land. We grant three (3)
months' time from the date of the judgment for the
respondent State to make up their mind as to what
they want to do. Would they still like to retain the
land by issuing a proper notification, or would they
like to surrender possession of the land. In either
eventuality, the question of payment for use and
occupation would still arise, which will have to be
determined in accordance with law. Mesne profits
would be determined by a Court Commissioner, to be
appointed by the trial court, as a relief in that
behalf has been sought in the plaint itself."
(underline supplied)
The Apex Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v.
M.I.D.C and Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353 while
considering a case where the property was taken
over without following the procedure prescribed,
explained the legal position as follows:
8. The appellants were deprived of their immovable
property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution
was still intact and the right to property was a part
of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the
Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after
the right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right, taking possession of or acquiring the property
of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to
deprivation and such deprivation can take place only
in accordance with the "law", as the said word has
specifically been used in Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by
resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The
same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order
or administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai
Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 :
AIR 1995 SC 142] , it has been held as follows : (SCC
p. 627, para 48)
"48. In other words, Article 300-A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law. There [is]
no deprivation without [due] sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or
taking possession under Article 300-A. In other
words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation."
9. The right to property is now considered to be
not only a constitutional or a statutory right but
also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature
of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human
rights are considered to be in realm of individual
rights, such as the right to health, the right to
livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc.
Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater
multifaceted dimension. The right to property is
considered very much to be a part of such new
dimension. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram [(2007)
10 SCC 448] , Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab
[(2010) 10 SCC 43 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 29] , State of
M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639 :
(2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , State of
Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [(2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3
SCC (Civ) 769 : AIR 2012 SC 559] and Delhi Airtech
Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC
354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : AIR 2012 SC 573] )
10. In the case at hand, there has been no
acquisition. The question that emerges for
consideration is whether, in a democratic body
polity, which is supposedly governed by the rule of
law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen
of his property, without adhering to the law. The
matter would have been different had the State
pleaded that it has right, title and interest over
the said land. It however, concedes to the right,
title and interest of the appellants over such land
and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as
grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.
*************
*************
17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable
properties was a clear violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory
authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate
compensation, but there is also a legal obligation
upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-
fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to
forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds
or to indulge in anti-national activities as such
sentiments would be born in them on account of such
ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for
any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him
of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under
the garb of industrial development.
18. The appellants have been deprived of their
legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a
fact situation, we fail to understand for which class
of citizens the Constitution provides guarantees and
rights in this regard and what is the exact
percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom
constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in
accordance with the law.
19. The appellants have been seriously
discriminated against qua other persons, whose land
was also acquired. Some of them were given the
benefits of acquisition, including compensation in
the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not only
breeds corruption, but also disrespect for
governance, as it leads to frustration and to a
certain extent, forces persons to take the law into
their own hands. The findings of the High Court,
that requisite records were not available, or that
the appellants approached the authorities at a
belated stage are contrary to the evidence available
on record and thus, cannot be accepted and excused
as it remains a slur on the system of governance and
justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of
equality, which is the soul of our Constitution.
Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a
legal obligation on the part of the authorities to
complete such acquisition proceedings at the
earliest, and to make payment of requisite
compensation. The appeals, etc. are required to be
decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if
a person is not paid compensation in time, he will
be unable to purchase any land or other immovable
property, for the amount of compensation that is
likely to be paid to him at a belated stage.
(underline supplied)
The Apex Court after discussing the above said
legal principles in Tukaram Kana Joshi's case
cited supra issued the following directions:
22. Be that as it may, ultimately, good sense
prevailed, and the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the State came forward with a welcome suggestion
stating that in order to redress the grievances of
the appellants, the respondent authorities would
notify the land in dispute under Section 4 of the
Act within a period of 4 weeks from today. Section 6
declaration will be issued within a period of one
week thereafter. As the appellants have full notice
and information with respect to the proceedings,
publication in the newspapers either of the
notification or of the declaration under the Act are
dispensed with. Notice under Section 9 of the Act
will be served within a period of 4 weeks after the
publication of Section 6 declaration and award will
be made within a period of three months thereafter.
The deemed acquisition proceedings would thus be
concluded most expeditiously. Needless to say, the
market value of the land in dispute will be assessed
as it prevails on the date on which the Section 4
notification is published in the Official Gazette.
Payment of compensation/award amount will be made to
the claimants/persons interested immediately
thereafter, along with all statutory benefits. The
appellants shall be entitled to pursue the statutory
remedies available to them for further enhancement
of compensation, if so desired.
(underline supplied)
10. In State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Asit
Das & Ors,(MAT 207 of 2018) a Division Bench of
the High Court of Calcutta, in a factually similar
situation where no land acquisition proceedings
were initiated for utilizing the land of the writ
petitioners therein and no compensation amount was
paid, upheld the order passed by the learned
single judge directing the Land Acquisition
Collector to initiate the land acquisition
proceedings as per the provisions of the Act,2013
and to pay compensation to them for the acquired
land.
11. The Apex Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi's case
cited supra while directing the authorities to
take further proceedings for the acquisition of
the land as per the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act categorically held that the market
value of the land in dispute will be assessed as
prevailing on the date on which Section 4
notification is published in the official gazette.
The Apex Court in Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P.,
(2011) 5 SCC 553 has held that the High Court while
examining the land owner's challenge to the
acquisition of land in a petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution should not adopt a
pedantic approach, but decide the matter keeping
in view the constitutional goals of social and
economic justice and the fact that even though the
right to property is no longer a fundamental
right, the same continues to be an important
constitutional right and in terms of Article 300-
A, no person can be deprived of his property
except by authority of law.
12. Yet another aspect to be considered is
that in the matter of taking over the property of
a citizen, the authorities are bound to follow the
procedure established by law. When the authorities
are given power under the LARR Act 2013 to acquire
the land, they are bound to follow the procedures
prescribed therein, if not, the taking over of the
property becomes arbitrary. It is settled law as
per the judgments in Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1
Ch.D. 426, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, 1936 SCC
Online PC 41, Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir
Prasad and Others, (1999) 8 SCC 266, Cherukuri
Mani v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
and Others, (2015)13 SCC 722 and a catena of
judgments of the Apex Court that where a power is
given to do certain things in a certain way, the
thing must be done in that way or not at all.In
the present case none of the procedures have been
followed before the land was taken over.
13. In view of the above, the stand of the
Government that the fixation of the land value
will be on the value as prevailing on the date of
the original surrender of land cannot be accepted.
When the land of the petitioners was surrendered
on a promise given by the Government regarding
certain benefits as evident from Exts.P5 and P6
without giving any compensation towards the
acquisition and later the Government retracted
from the said promise and utilized the land for
the project without paying any amount to the
petitioners for almost a decade, I am of the view
that the Government is bound to proceed for the
acquisition of land as per the provisions of the
LARR Act 2013 for determining adequate
compensation due to the petitioners, if not, the
Government will be playing fraud on the citizens.
Therefore, the above writ petition is disposed
of with a direction to the respondents to grant
compensation for the land taken over from the
petitioners by initiating proceedings as per the
provisions under the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the
value of the land will be assessed as it prevailed
on the date on which Section 4 notification is
published in the Official Gazette. On the basis of
the same, the award will be passed in accordance
with law, at any rate within an outer limit of 3
months from the date of receipt of a copy of the
judgment and thereafter, the compensation
amount/award amount shall be paid to the
claimants/petitioners along with all statutory
benefits within a further period of one month.
Since the property has already been taken over and
a road has been formed long back, it is made clear
that the proceedings now directed to be initiated
by this court as per the provisions of the LARR
Act 2013 including issuance of Section 4
notification for the purpose of ascertaining the
land value as on the date of the said notification
and the passing of the award are intended only for
fixing adequate compensation to be paid to the
petitioners and therefore it is made clear that
the proceedings shall be treated as deemed
acquisition proceedings and only steps provided as
per the LARR Act 2013 that are required for
fixation of adequate compensation alone need be
initiated by the respondents. The petitioners will
be entitled to pursue the statutory remedies
available to them for further enhancement of
compensation, if so desired.
sd/-
VIJU ABRAHAM,
JUDGE
pm
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 26234/2023
PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS
Exhibit-P1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED
TO THE 1ST PETITIONER DATED 16.06.2023
Exhibit-P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED
TO THE 2ND PETITIONER DATED 07.06.2023
Exhibit-P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED
TO THE 3RD PETITIONER DATED 08.06.2023
Exhibit-P4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED
TO THE 4TH PETITIONER DATED 04.04.2023
Exhibit-P5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE
MEETING HELD ON 25.07.2015 DATED
05.08.2015
Exhibit-P6 THE TRUE COPY OF GOVERNMENT ORDER
NO.5925/15 REVENUE ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 DATED 13.11.2015
Exhibit -P7 THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT PASSED IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 33882/2015
DATED 09.08.2016
Exhibit-P 8 THE TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER
(RT) NO.4064/18/RP ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 DATED 04.10.2018
Exhibit -P9 THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WRIT
PETITION NO.35722/2018 DATED 12.11.2018
Exhibit-P 10 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED IN
WRIT PETITION NO.33117/2019 DATED
31.07.2023
Exhibit-P 11 THE TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES FROM
THE MASTER PLAN FOR KOTTAYAM
