Kerala High Court
Biju K.J vs Syamala on 16 March, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF MARCH 2022 / 25TH PHALGUNA, 1943
O.P.(RC)NO.59 OF 2022
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 21.02.2022 IN E.P.No.1641 OF 2021
IN R.C.P.NO.53 OF 2020 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF
COURT, THRISSUR
PETITIONER:
BIJU K.J.,
AGED 52 YEARS, S/O. KOOTTAYKKAL JAGADHEESAN,
39/2844, HOUSE NO.3 SANTHI GRAMAM, KOORKKANCHERY
VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK, PIN - 680
007
BY ADVS.
T.K.VIPINDAS
MANUMON A.
K.M.MUHAMMED HUSSAIN
RESPONDENT:
SYAMALA, W/O. EASWARAMANGALATH KALYANAKRISHNAN,
METHALA VILLAGE, DESOM, KODUNGALLUR TALUK,
THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680 664
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI A.K.ALEX- RESPONDENT
THIS OP (RENT CONTROL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
16.03.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
2
JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.53 of
2020 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Thrissur, a petition
filed by the respondent herein-landlady, seeking eviction of
the tenant from the petition schedule building, under Section
11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
1965, on the ground of arrears of rent. The monthly rent
payable by the tenant is Rs.18,000/-. In the Rent Control
Petition, it was alleged that, the tenant had defaulted
payment of monthly rent. During the pendency of that Rent
Control Petition, the landlady filed I.A.No.2 of 2021, a petition
under Section 12 of the Act, seeking an order directing the
tenant to deposit arrears of rent amounting to Rs.3,35,000/-.
By an order dated 13.08.2021 in I.A.No.2 of 2021, the tenant
was directed to pay the arrears of rent within the time limit
stipulated in that order. In the said interlocutory application
the Rent Control Court passed an order under Section 12(3)
of the Act and consequently, the said court passed Ext.P1
order dated 30.10.2021 in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020, whereby the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
entire proceedings in that Rent Control Petition was stopped
and the tenant was directed to put the landlady in possession
of the petition schedule building. On 20.12.2021, the landlady
filed E.P.No.1641 of 2021 before the Principal Munsiff Court,
Thrissur, seeking execution of Ext.P1 order dated 30.10.2021
in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020. In that execution petition, the
execution court passed Ext.P6 order dated 21.02.2022. The
said order reads thus;
"Decree holder represented. Judgment debtor prays
for a month's time for objection. Decree holder is not
willing and counsel has submitted that rent is still in
arrears. Deliver on 16.03.2022. For report -
17.03.2022. Call in court - 16.03.2022."
Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P6 order dated 21.02.2022 in
E.P.No.1641 of 2021 in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020, the petitioner-
tenant is before this Court in this original petition, which is
one filed invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
2. On 15.03.2022, when this original petition came up
for admission, this Court issued notice to the respondent. The
petitioner was permitted to take out notice to the respondent
through her counsel before the Principal Munsiff Court,
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
Thrissur, where E.P.No.1641 of 2021 in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020
is pending consideration and the original petition was ordered
to be listed today at 10.15 am.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-
judgment debtor-tenant and also the learned counsel for the
respondent-decree holder-landlady.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that the total arrears of rent, as on date, in respect of the
petition schedule building comes to Rs.5,69,000/-. The tenant
requires three months time to clear the entire dues. Therefore
he may be granted at least three months time to clear the
arrears of rent.
5. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit
of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As
per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for
eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall
be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control
Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section
18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the
application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by
the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date
of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any
rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the
building, until the termination of the proceedings before the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section
(1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in
such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied
by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in
sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time
fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall
not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and
the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently
accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on
which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act,
if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid,
the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order
directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made
under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the
deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed
manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the
landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court
or the Appellate Authority in that behalf.
6. Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, against
whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord
under Section 11, to pay to the landlord, or deposit with the
Rent Control Court, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant
to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment
or deposit, and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may
subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the
termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court,
in order to contest that application for eviction before the
Rent Control Court. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the
Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an
application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the
landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears
of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the
building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues
to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become
due in respect of the building, until the termination of the
proceedings before the Appellate Authority.
7. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the
Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made
by a landlord under Section 11, or who prefer an appeal under
Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the Rent
Control Court on an application made by a landlord under
Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by the
tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of
payment or deposit, and he shall continue to pay or deposit
any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of
the building, until the termination of the proceedings before
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be.
8. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the
Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the
application for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to
prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any
order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made
by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the
landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the
Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent
admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the
date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to
deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in
respect of the building, until the termination of the
proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be.
9. In J. Ramkumar v. Ashok Jacob [2022 (1) KHC
495 : ILR 2021 (4) Kerala 876] this Court held that,
Section 12(2) of the Act enjoins a tenant to deposit the
admitted rent under sub-section (1), within such time as the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed. The
time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent
and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently
accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso
to Section 12(2). As per the statutory mandate of Section
12(1), on an application filed by the landlord under Section
12, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, has to order payment or deposit of arrears of
rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the
petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or
deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to
pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due
in respect of the building, until the termination of the
proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, regardless of the relief sought for in that
application. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails
to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control
Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall,
unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant
to put the landlord in possession of the building.
10. In Pochappan Narayanan v. Gopalan [1990 (2)
KLT 1] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, Section
12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
deals with consequences flowing as a result of the failure on
the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. When
the tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent, as
provided in Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or
the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, will be required
to ask the tenant to show cause why all further proceedings
should not be stopped and an order be made directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession. When such an
opportunity is afforded to the tenant, the tenant is entitled to
show, if there is sufficient cause, for his failure to pay the
amount or deposit the rent as provided in Section 12(1) and
(2). If the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is
satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not making the
payment or deposit of the rent within time, it will not make
any order stopping further proceedings and directing the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
tenant to put the landlord in possession. If, however, the Rent
Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not satisfied about
the cause shown, an order has to be made stopping all further
proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession.
11. In Pochappan Narayanan the Division Bench held
that, before the consequences contemplated by Section 12(3)
of the Act can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1)
and (2) have to be satisfied. It is therefore clear that, before
any steps can be taken under Section 12(3) for making an
order against the tenant who has committed default in paying
or making the deposit as contemplated by Section 12(1), the
procedure prescribed by Section 12(2) has to be satisfied. A
tenant who does not fulfill the obligations imposed on him by
Section 12(1) cannot be visited with the penal consequences
contemplated by Section 12(3), unless all the conditions
specified by Section 12(2) are satisfactorily fulfilled. Even
after the court acts in accordance with Section 12(2) and the
tenant still commits default, the tenant has to be given one
more opportunity of showing cause as to why penal
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) should not be
imposed on him. It is only when the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown that it can pass an order stopping all further
proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building.
12. In Narayanan v. Vinod [2004 (3) KLT 955] the
order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under
Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act was assailed before the Division Bench, on the ground
that the petitioner-tenant was not granted time as stipulated
in Section 12(2) to deposit the arrears of rent and that, he
had not been issued with any notice under Section 12(3) to
show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent and,
therefore, the order directing eviction of the tenant is contrary
to the provisions of Section 12. The Division Bench noticed
that, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act are mandatory
and no tenant against whom an application for eviction has
been made by a landlord is entitled to contest the same or to
prefer an appeal under Section 18, against any order passed
by the Rent Control Court, unless he had paid or pays to the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or with the
Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be
due in respect of the demised premises up to the date of
payment and continues to pay or deposit the rent which may
subsequently become due in respect of the building until the
termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court
or the Appellate Authority. Section 12(3) of the Act then
mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as
aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority
shall 'unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary'
stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised
premises. In other words, if the admitted rent due is not
deposited during the pendency of the proceedings before the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, all further
proceedings have to stop and the authority concerned is
required to make an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in vacant possession of the premises, unless the
tenant shows sufficient cause for not depositing that rent.
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
13. In Narayanan, on the question as to whether the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, where admitted rent has not been paid, is required to
issue a separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show
sufficient cause for the default in payment of admitted rent or
is it for the tenant himself to file an application and bring to
the notice of the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority
the reasons which prevented him from depositing the rent,
the Division Bench held that, if the admitted arrears of rent
are not deposited within the time fixed by the Rent Control
Court or the Appellate Authority the tenant makes a default
resulting in the penal consequences of his immediate eviction
by stopping all further proceedings. This, however, will not
happen if the tenant is able to show sufficient cause for
making the default in not depositing the admitted rent. From
the language of Section 12(3) of the Act and the legislative
intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable
him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted
arrears of rent. When the time fixed for the deposit of arrears
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same,
the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, is not expected to pass an order of ejectment of the
tenant forthwith.
14. In Narayanan the Division Bench held that, the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, while fixing the
time within which the arrears of rent shall be deposited by the
tenant should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a
date beyond the date fixed for depositing the rent, thereby
allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient
cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default
in payment. It will then be for the tenant to move an
application before the concerned authority to show sufficient
cause for the non-payment of rent. In other words, the
interval between the date up to which the rent is to be
deposited and the date on which the order under Section
12(3) is passed should be reasonable to enable the tenant to
show sufficient cause for committing the default, if he so
chooses. If the tenant moves such an application and points
out the reasons which prevented him from depositing the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
arrears of admitted rent, the concerned authority will examine
the issue on merits to find out whether sufficient cause has
been shown or not. If sufficient cause has been shown, the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority will not order
immediate ejectment of the tenant. If no application is filed by
the tenant or if the reasons shown by the tenant are
insufficient, the penal consequences as contemplated in
Section 12(3) of the Act shall follow. Section 12(3) of the Act
is a mandate to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority to order immediate ejectment of the tenant, if the
tenant does not deposit the admitted arrears of rent, the only
exception being, if he is able to show sufficient cause for not
doing so. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench
concluded that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not
been deposited by the tenant, is not required to issue any
separate notice to the tenant, to enable him to show sufficient
cause for committing the default.
15. In Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakhayogam No. 610,
Alappuzha [2020 (2) KHC 574] a Full Bench of this Court
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
held that, in view of the principle evolved in Narayanan
[2004 (3) KLT 955], from the language of Section 12(3) of
the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and
from the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court
or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the
tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not
depositing the admitted arrears of rent. Instead, when the
time fixed for deposit of the arrears of rent runs out and the
tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or
the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected
to pass an order ordering ejectment of the tenant forthwith.
The Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a
date beyond the date fixed for deposit, thereby allowing
reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not
depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment of
the arrears of rent. The interpretation made and the directions
issued in Narayanan is more apt and appropriate to be held,
as a view which can be legally sustained. The opportunity to
be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause with respect
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
to the failure to pay or deposit rent, as directed in Section
12(1) and (2), within the date stipulated, is not an empty
formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that
the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
may be, should afford the tenant with such an opportunity.
16. In Shaji M., on the question as to whether the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is required to
issue any specific notice to the tenant to show cause, the Full
Bench noticed that, the consequences provided under Section
12(3) of the Act follows when there occurred a default in
complying with the direction for deposit or payment of the
admitted arrears. Therefore, on the date stipulated for
effecting such payment, by virtue of the order passed under
Section 12(1) and (2), the tenant becomes fully aware that,
unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default
committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings
and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building,
would follow automatically. Therefore, there is no necessity to
alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard,
calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand,
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated
for effecting the payment or the deposit, is mandatory. If no
sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which
the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the
authority and competence; and is the natural consequence
that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the
tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Such
a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for
providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory
requirement contained in Section 12(3). Hence the Full Bench
concluded that the decision in Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT
955], even though passed without noticing the decision in
Pochappan Narayanan [1990 (2) KLT 1] had laid the
correct law. The Full Bench noticed that its view in this regard
has got support from the decision of the Apex Court in
Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami [(1999) 6 SCC
396], the decisions of this Court in C.V. Xavier v. Francis
Leonard Pappali [1975 KLT 542] and Narayanan v.
Muraleedhara Maran [1964 KLT 509].
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
17. In Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami
[(1999) 6 SCC 396] the Apex Court held that, it is for the
tenant to show sufficient cause and not for the Rent Control
Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue
any show cause notice calling upon the tenant to show cause
why an order of eviction shall not be passed.
18. In C.V. Xavier v. Francis Leonard Pappali
[1975 KLT 542] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the
reasonable opportunity contemplated under Section 12(3) of
the Act must be a reasonable and real opportunity and is not
an empty formality and that, if the tenant is not given such
opportunity to show sufficient cause, an order passed under
Section 12(3) would be unsustainable.
19. In Narayanan v. Muraleedhara Maran [1964
KLT 509] a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the
court had passed an order directing a party before it to do a
particular thing, in default of which certain consequence is to
follow, if the party is to be relieved of the consequences of
any non-compliance of that order, he has to make a specific
motion thereof showing sufficient cause for his non-
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
compliance of the order and making appropriate prayer
therein. Otherwise the order would work itself out and the
default to comply with it will bring the appointed
consequences on the tenant.
20. As per sub-section (4) of Section 12, when any
deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court
or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause
notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the
prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to
such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the
landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court
or the Appellate Authority in that behalf.
21. In J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495], this Court
held that, Section 12 of the Act imposes certain obligations on
the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent, during the
pendency of the proceedings for eviction under Section 11,
before the Rent Control Court, and also the proceedings in an
appeal filed under Section 18, before the Appellate Authority,
against such an order of eviction. Section 12(3) of the Act
also provides for the consequences, which were to follow, for
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
committing default in fulfilling those obligations. Section 12(3)
of the Act deals with the consequences flowing as a result of
the failure of the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted
rent. Before the consequences under Section 12(3) can
ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have
to be satisfied. Section 12(3) mandates that if any tenant fails
to pay or deposit the admitted rent as provided under Section
12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows
sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings
and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building. Therefore, if the Rent Control
Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is
satisfied about the cause shown by the tenant, it will not
make any order under Section 12(3) of the Act, stopping
further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building.
22. It is clear from the plain language and also the
legislative intent of Section 12 of the Act that, it is not for the
Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
may be, to pass an order under Section 12(3), stopping
further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building, once the time limit
fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent runs out, and
the tenant defaulted payment or deposit of rent in terms of
the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Though it is
not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as
the case may be, to issue any separate notice to the tenant to
enable him to show sufficient cause for not paying or
depositing the admitted arrears of rent, as held by the
Division Bench in Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT 955] and
approved by the Full Bench in Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC
574], the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not
expected to pass an order forthwith, stopping further
proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building, under Section 12(3).
23. Before passing an order under Section 12(3) of the
Act, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case
to a date beyond the date fixed for payment or deposit of
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
admitted rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant
to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the
admitted rent, if he has committed default in payment of the
same, within the time limit stipulated in the order passed
under Section 12(1) and (2). Such an opportunity to be
afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause is not an
empty formality. The principles of natural justice would
mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority should afford such an opportunity to the tenant
before passing an order under Section 12(3).
24. In J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495], this Court
held that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of
the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in
complying with the direction in an order passed under Section
12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears
of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by
virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that,
unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default
committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings
and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building,
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
under Section 12(3) would follow automatically. There is no
necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in
this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the
other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last
date stipulated for effecting payment or deposit of admitted
rent, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such
extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is
absolutely within the authority and competence, and is the
natural consequence that, the Rent Control Court or the
Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the
proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building. As held by the Full Bench in Shaji
M. [2020 (2) KHC 574], such a procedure, if followed,
would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable
opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in
Section 12(3) of the Act.
25. In Venugopalan v. Raphael [1974 KLT 640] the
Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which
the landlord filed Rent Control Petition under Section 11(2)(b)
of the Act claiming eviction of the petition schedule building
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
on the ground of arrears of rent. The Rent Control Court
passed an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears
of rent on or before the 20.09.1971. In the said order it was
made clear that, on default of deposit within the specified
period, an order for possession under Section 12(3) of the
Act, will be passed. The order under Section 12(1) and (2)
was not complied with, despite the fact that time for payment
was extended. Therefore, the Rent Control Court passed an
order for possession under Section 12(3) of the Act, which
was dated 25.10.1971. Within thirty days of the said order,
the tenant filed I.A. No. 4143 of 1971 to receive what was
claimed to be the admitted arrears; and I.A. No. 4142 of 1971
to set aside the order for possession passed under Section
12(3) of the Act on 25.10.1971. The Rent Control Court
dismissed I.A. No. 4142 of 1971 holding that an order under
Section 12(3) cannot be set aside or vacated on the mere
ground that the admitted arrears of rent had been deposited
subsequent to the order. It declined to receive the arrears of
rent tendered along with the I.A. No. 4143 of 1971, and
accordingly dismissed the same. The appeals preferred by the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
tenant under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act against those orders
were dismissed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. On
further revision, the revisional court, namely the District
Court, Trichur, allowed the revision and set aside the orders
of the Rent Control Court and of the Appellate Authority and
remanded I.A. Nos. 4142 of 1971 and 4143 of 1971 back to
the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal directing that the
time for making deposit of the arrears of rent, will be
extended by the Rent Control Court. Feeling aggrieved
landlord preferred revision petition before this Court.
26. In Venugopalan the Division Bench noticed that,
under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act a tenant, against whom a
decree for eviction has been passed by the Rent Control Court
on the ground that rent had been kept in arrears, is allowed
relief against the forfeiture of tenancy incurred by non-
payment of rent, by depositing the arrears of rent decreed,
within a certain period. In Kurien v. Saramma Chacko
[1964 KLT 1] it was held that the power under Section 11(2)
(c) can be exercised by the Appellate Authority and also by
the Revisional Authority. Section 12 of the Act provides for a
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
totally different contingency. The deposit of the admitted
arrears enjoined by Section 12, is a condition precedent to the
tenant entering on his defence and contesting the application
for eviction, or an appeal filed therefrom. The scope and
purpose of the deposit of arrears of rent enjoined by Section
12 is fundamentally different from the scope and the purpose
of the deposit envisaged by Section 11(2)(c) of the Act. In
K.P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma [1963 KLT 688] the
Division Bench held that, Section 11 and Section 12 of the Act
are not dependent on each other. They provide for different
contingencies though the consequence of the non compliance
of the mandates of either Section is eviction. An order of
eviction passed under Section 12(3) of the Act is not
amenable to correction under Section 11(2)(c), which relates
to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b) only. In
T.B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai [1970 KLT 1024] a
learned Judge of this Court held that an order passed under
Section 12 of the Act, cannot be reopened or vacated by
tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said
order. In Venugopalan, the Division Bench held that, even
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
assuming that for purpose of execution an order under
Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as
the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the
consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for
failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can not be
vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages
or periods.
27. In Venugopalan it was argued before the Division
Bench that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Division
Bench observed that, the scope and the purpose of Section
11(2)(c) and Section 12 are fundamentally different. The one
is meant to relieve against forfeiture, and the other, as a
condition precedent to be performed by the tenant before
entering on his defence. The law itself does not encourage or
put a premium on dishonesty, although those inclined to be
dishonest may make use of its provisions to suit their
purpose. Therefore, the Division Bench repelled the contention
of the tenant that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory.
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
28. In Davy v. Indu [1999 (3) KLT 434] a Division
Bench of this Court reiterated that Section 11 and Section 12
of the Act operate in different fields and circumstances. The
compliance of these mandatory provisions will lead to eviction
of the tenant. But an order of eviction once passed under
Section 12(3) cannot be undone by resorting to Section 11(2)
(c) of the Act. Section 11(2)(c) of the Act relates to orders of
eviction passed under Section 11(2) only. Therefore, Section
11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other.
29. In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2
SCC 577] the question as to the applicability of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, in the matter of default in deposit of
rent as also interpretation of the word 'shall' occurring in
Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1950, came up for consideration before a Three-
Judge Bench of the Apex. Section 13(1)(a) of the Act enables
a landlord to sue for a decree of eviction in the event a tenant
has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from
him for six months. In terms of Section 13(3), which was
substituted by Section 8(i) of Rajasthan Act 14 of 1976, it is
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
obligatory on the court to provisionally determine the amount
of rent wherefor no application is required to be filed. As per
Section 13(4) of the Act, the tenant shall deposit in court or
pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under
Section 13(3) within fifteen days from the date of such
determination, or within such further time, not exceeding
three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant
shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord,
month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period
up to which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of
each succeeding month or within such further time not
exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at
the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the
court under Section 13(3). Under Section 13(5), if a tenant
fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Section 13
(4), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court
shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and
shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.
30. In Nasiruddin the Apex Court held that, a bare
perusal of the aforementioned provisions would show that in
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
terms of Section 13(4), a tenant is required to deposit the
amount of rent determined by the court under Section 13(3)
within fifteen days of the date of determination or within such
further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended
by the court. By reason of the 1976 Amendment, the
following was specifically inserted:
"within such further time, not exceeding three months
as may be extended by the court" or the words "or
within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as
may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at
which the rent was determined by the court under sub-
section (3)"
The word "shall", which is ordinarily imperative in nature, has
been used in Section 13(4). The power of the court has also
been limited to the extent that it can extend time for such
deposit not exceeding three months and so far as the deposit
of monthly rent is concerned, by fifteen days. The court's
power, therefore, is restricted. In case the tenant deposits the
provisional rent as determined by the court within the
stipulated period the tenant is relieved by the eviction decree.
31. In Nasiruddin the Apex Court noticed that,
Section 13(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
dealt with in the decision in Shyamcharan Sharma v.
Dharamdas [(1980) 2 SCC 151] the court has been
conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent to any
such further time, as it may, on an application made to it,
allow in this behalf. The power of the court under the M.P. Act
Act is not restricted. However, discretion available to the court
under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act is limited. Furthermore, in Section 13(6) of the M.P. Act,
the word "may" has been used which is directory; in
contradistinction with the word "shall" employed in the
Rajasthan Act. The M.P. Act provides for the power of the
court to extend the time in the event sufficient cause therefor
is shown which is absent in the Rajasthan Act. Furthermore,
in terms thereof once the rent has been determined, the same
has to be deposited within the prescribed period wherefor
there exists no provision for filing an application. Wherever
the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation
of default, the court possesses the power therefor, but where
the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to
condone the default in depositing the rent within the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so.
In that view of the matter it must be held that in absence of
such provisions in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent
and Eviction) Act, the court did not have the power to either
extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the
default in depositing the rent.
32. In Nasiruddin the Apex Court observed that, it is
true that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act does not expressly exclude the application of the
Limitation Act, 1963. But Section 5 of the Limitation Act in its
terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in
depositing the rent by the tenant. The provisions of Section 5
of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to
Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of
the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other
special statute, a cause of action must arise. Compliance with
an order passed by a court of law in terms of a statutory
provision does not give rise to a cause of action. On failure to
comply with an order passed by a court of law, instant
consequences are provided for under the statute. The court
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
can condone the default only when the statute confers such a
power on the court and not otherwise. In that view of the
matter the Apex Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act has no application in the case on hand.
33. In J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495], this Court
concluded that, the consequences provided under Section
12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the
tenant in complying with the direction in an order passed
under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the
admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting
such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes
fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown
for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the
proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of
the building, under Section 12(3) would follow automatically.
As held by a Division Bench in Venugopalan [1974 KLT
640] and reiterated in Davy [1999 (3) KLT 434] even
assuming that for purpose of execution an order under
Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as
the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act. The law laid
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in
Nasiruddin [(2003) 2 SCC 577] is to the effect that, where
the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to
condone the default in depositing the rent within the
stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so.
34. The judgment of this Court in J. Ramkumar
[2022 (1) KHC 495] was under challenge before the Apex
Court in SLP(C)No.18301 of 2021. After having heard the
learned counsel for the parties, the Apex Court was not
inclined to interfere with the order of this Court and
accordingly, the special leave petition along with connected
matters were dismissed by the order dated 18.11.2021. The
said order reads thus;
"After having heard the learned counsel for the
parties, we are not inclined to interfere with the
Special Leave Petitions.
Mr.Roy Abraham, learned counsel for the petitioner
points out that he deposited a sum of Rs.26,00,000/-
in compliance of order dated 16.04.2019 passed by
this Court. According to him that represented the rent
due as on that day.
According to the petitioner, the amount of
Rs.26,00,000/- represented the amount of admitted
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
arrears. He, therefore, prays that when this Court is
not accepting the request to set aside the order under
Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1965 and grant relief otherwise the
Court may direct to return the amount that was
deposited by him. This is objected to Mr.Liju V.
Stephen, learned counsel for the respondent. We
notice that the order was dated 16.04.2019. We
would take the view that the interest of justice would
require that after deducting a sum of Rs.11,10,000/-
which would be the rent due for a period of 30
months from 16.04.2019 the amount remaining,
namely, Rs.14,90,000/- must be returned to the
petitioner. It is accordingly so ordered.
Out of the amount of Rs.26,00,000/-, petitioner is
free to withdraw a sum of Rs.14,90,000/- from the
Rent Control Court. It will be open to the respondent-
landlord to appropriate towards the rent for the period
as already noted the balance amount of
Rs.11,10,000/-. It can be withdrawn by the
respondent-landlord. We leave it open to the landlord-
respondent to seek remedies as regards any amount
due towards arrears of rent.
Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions stands
dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of."
(underline supplied)
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
35. In the instant case, the proceedings in R.C.P.No.53
of 2020 was stopped by the Rent Control Court by Ext.P1
order dated 30.10.2021, under Section 12(3) of the Act. As
held by this Court in J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495],
Section 12 of the Act imposes certain obligations on the
tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent, during the pendency
of the proceedings for eviction under Section 11, before the
Rent Control Court, and also the proceedings in an appeal
filed under Section 18, before the Appellate Authority, against
such an order of eviction. Section 12(3) of the Act also
provides for the consequences, which were to follow, for
committing default in fulfilling those obligations. Section 12(3)
of the Act deals with the consequences flowing as a result of
the failure of the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted
rent. Before the consequences under Section 12(3) can
ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have
to be satisfied. Section 12(3) mandates that if any tenant fails
to pay or deposit the admitted rent as provided under Section
12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate
Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings
and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building. The consequences provided under
Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default
by the tenant in complying with the direction in an order
passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment
of the admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for
effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant
becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been
shown for the default committed, the consequence of
stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord
in possession of the building, under Section 12(3) would
follow automatically. There is no necessity to alert the tenant
by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him
to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a
further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting
payment or deposit of admitted rent, is mandatory. If no
sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which
the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the
authority and competence, and is the natural consequence
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the
case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the
tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As
held by the Full Bench in Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574],
such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance
for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory
requirement contained in Section 12(3) of the Act. An order of
eviction passed under Section 12(3) of the Act is not
amenable to correction under Section 11(2)(c), which relates
to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b) only. As
held by a learned Judge of this Court in T.B. Mohanan v.
Kanakaraja Pillai [1970 KLT 1024], an order passed under
Section 12 of the Act, cannot be reopened or vacated by
tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said
order. As held by the Division Bench in Venugopalan, even
assuming that for purpose of execution an order under
Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as
the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the
consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for
failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can not be
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages
or periods.
36. In Meenakshi Saxena v. ECGC Ltd. [(2018) 7
SCC 479] the Apex Court held that the whole purpose of
execution proceedings is to enforce the verdict of the court.
Executing court while executing the decree is only concerned
with the execution part of it but nothing else. The court has to
take the judgment in its face value. It is settled law that
executing court cannot go beyond the decree. But the
difficulty arises when there is ambiguity in the decree with
regard to the material aspects. Then it becomes the bounden
duty of the court to interpret the decree in the process of
giving a true effect to the decree. At that juncture the
executing court has to be very cautious in supplementing its
interpretation and conscious of the fact that it cannot draw a
new decree. The executing court shall strike a fine balance
between the two while exercising this jurisdiction in the
process of giving effect to the decree.
37. In the instant case, Ext.P1 order passed by the
Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020 has attained
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
finality in the absence of an appeal filed by the tenant, before
the Rent Control Appellate Authority, invoking the provisions
under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. In such circumstances, the
execution court cannot be found fault in passing the impugned
order, since an execution court has no power to go beyond
the decree or refuse to give effect to the terms of the decree,
especially when the judgment debtor-tenant has no case that
there is any ambiguity in the decree with regard to the
material aspects.
38. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with
power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.
Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High
Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction. Clause (2) of Article 227 provides that, without
prejudice to the generality of the provisions under clause (1),
the High Court may call for returns from such courts; make
and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the
practice and proceedings of such courts; and prescribe forms
in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
officers of any such courts. Going by clause (4), nothing in
Article 227 shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers
of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by
or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
39. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar
Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing
the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of
superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to
maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring
it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article
227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of
justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public
confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
40. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
[(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope
of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under
Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure
that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-
judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within
the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power
and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with
the well established principles of law. The exercise of
jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It
cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all
errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the
limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be
exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave
dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law or justice.
41. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan
Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex
Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when
there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been
gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of
natural justice have been flouted.
42. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016
(1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law
is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that
in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by
the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is
only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court.
Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the
Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower
court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the
reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or
the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict
with settled principles of law.
43. In view of the law laid down in the decisions
referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be
exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a
lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its
jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can
be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a
lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of
duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or
justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called
for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or
tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is
palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of
the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled
principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest
failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have
been flouted.
44. In the above circumstances, no interference is
warranted in the impugned order of the Principal Munsiff
Court, Thrissur dated 21.02.2022 in E.P.No.1641 of 2021 in
R.C.P.No.53 of 2020, when the said court, which is the
execution court, has no power to go beyond the decree, i.e.,
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
Ext.P1 order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.53 of 2020,
or refuse to give effect to the terms of that order. In the
result, this original petition fails and the same is accordingly
dismissed. No order as to costs.
45. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would
submit the tenant's daughter is studying in the 10th standard.
Considering the said fact that, the tenant may be permitted to
continue to occupy the petition schedule building for a period
of two months.
46. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlady
would submit that admittedly the amount of arrears of rent
payable by the tenant comes to Rs.5,69,000/-. The tenant,
who has suffered Ext.P1 order under Section 12(3) of the Act,
which has attained finality in the absence of an appeal filed
under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act, is not legally entitled to
continue in occupation of the petition schedule building. Even
then, considering the fact that the tenant's daughter is
studying in the 10th standard, the landlady has no objection in
the actual delivery of the petition schedule building in terms
of Ext.P6 order being deferred for a period of 45 days from
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
this date, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire
arrears of rent while surrendering vacant possession of the
petition schedule building, within the aforesaid period.
47. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would
submit that the tenant is prepared to accept the aforesaid
condition for deferring actual delivery of the petition schedule
building for a period of 45 days from this date.
48. In the above circumstances, based on aforesaid
submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-
judgment debtor-tenant and the learned counsel for the
respondent-decree holder-landlady, and considering the
peculiar facts of this case, the Principal Munsiff Court, Thrissur
is directed to defer the actual delivery of the petition schedule
building for a period of 45 days from this date, subject to the
condition that the judgment debtor-tenant shall deposit before
the execution court for payment to the decree holder-landlady
a sum of Rs.50,000/- within a period of one week from this
date and a further sum of Rs.50,000/- within a further period
of one week and shall file an undertaking before the execution
court that he shall surrender the vacant possession of the
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
petition schedule building to the landlady within 45 days from
this date, after clearing the balance amount due towards
arrears of rent.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE
MIN
O.P.(RC) NO.59 OF 2022
APPENDIX OF O.P.(RC)NO.59 OF 2022
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF RENT CONTROL
COURT IN RENT CONTROL PETITION NO.53
OF 2020 DATED 30.10.2021 OBTAINED FROM
THE WEBSITE OF E-COURT SERVICE.
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE EXECUTION PETITION
NO.1641 OF 2021 ON THE FILE OF
PRICIPAL MUNSIFF'S COURT, THRISSUR
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE A DIARY PROCEEDING
DATED 11.02.2022 IN EXECUTION PETITION
NO.1641 OF 2021 ON THE FILE OF THE
PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF'S COURT, THRISSUR
Exhibit P4 THE TRUE COPY FO THE PETITION FILED BY
THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER BEFORE
THE COURT BELOW
Exhibit P5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL
CERTIFICATE DATED 15.02.2022 ISUED BY
DR. BIJU
Exhibit P6 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
21.02.2022 IN EXECUTION PETITION
NO.1641 OF 2021 ON THE FILE OF THE
PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF'S COURT, THRISSUR.
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS: NIL.
