K.T.Varghese vs The State Of Kerala
2021 Latest Caselaw 12771 Ker

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                             PRESENT
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS
                                &
              THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU
  TUESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF JUNE 2021 / 18TH JYAISHTA, 1943
                      WA NO. 644 OF 2021
 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 33150/2019 OF HIGH COURT OF
                              KERALA
APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS IN WPC NO.33150/2019:

    1     K.T.VARGHESE
          AGED 80 YEARS,
          S/O. K.V.THOMAN,
          KAVALAKKATTU HOUSE, MAMBRA,
          KARUKUTTY P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-683 576.
    2     M.O.PAUL ,
          AGED 59 YEARS
          S/O. M.P.OUSEPH, MALIEKKAL HOUSE, MAMBRA,
          KARUKUTTY P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-683 576.
    3     THE PARISTHITHY SAMRAKSHANA JANAKEEYA SAMITHY
          REPRESENTED BY ITS PATRON- P.P.PHILIP
          REGISTRATION NO.ER 527/08, KARUKUTTY P.O.,
          MAMBRA,
          ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-683 576.
          BY ADVS.
          ABDUL JAWAD K.
          SMT.A.GRANCY JOSE
 W.A. No.644/21                    -:2:-




RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS IN W.P.(C):

      1      THE STATE OF KERALA
             REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
             INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
             THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
      2      THE DISTRICT SINGLE WINDOW CLEARANCE BOARD
             REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
             (DISTRICT COLLECTOR), DISTRICT COLLECTORATE,
             IST FLOOR, CIVIL STATION, KAKKANAD,
             ERNAKULAM-682 030.
      3      THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR
             DISTRICT COLLECTORATE, CIVIL STATION, KAKKANAD,
             ERNAKULAM-682 030.
      4      THE DISTRICT GEOLOGIST
             OFFICE OF THE MINING AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT,
             CIVIL STATION, KAKKANAD, ERNAKULAM-682 030.
      5      THE STATE ENVIRONMENT IMPACT
             ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY (SEIAA)
             KSRTC BUS TERMINAL COMPLEX, 4TH FLOOR,
             THAMPANOOR, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 001.
      6      THE PARAKKADAVU GRAMA PANCHAYAT
             REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, KURUMASSERY P.O.,
             MOOZHIKKULAM, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT-683 579.
      7      MANJU JOEMON
             PARTNER, SAND ROCK ASSOCIATES, VI/492-A, EDATHALA
             BUILDING, NEELESWARAM P.O., KALADY, ERNAKULAM-683
             574.
             R6 BY ADV SRI.S.GOPINADHAN, SC
             R1 TO R5 BY ADV.SURIN GEORGE IPE, SR.GOVT.
             PLEADER
             R7 BY ADV.BABU S.NAIR
 W.A. No.644/21              -:3:-


THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 13.4.2021,
THE COURT ON 08.06.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 W.A. No.644/21                    -:4:-




                                                              "C.R."


                             JUDGMENT

Dated this the 8th day of June, 2021

Bechu Kurian Thomas, J.

The quarrying operations carried on by the 7 th respondent were

challenged by the appellants. The learned Single Judge rejected the

challenge, against which this appeal is preferred.

2. Challenges raised in the writ petition were under three

heads. They were (i) the lease had lapsed on account of the failure

of the lessee to operate the quarry within the time prescribed under

the Rules, (ii) the conduct of quarrying operations without an

environmental clearance certificate was impermissible, and (iii)

written permission from the Kerala Water Authority, had not been

obtained. As mentioned above, by the impugned judgment, the

learned Single Judge rejected all the aforesaid contentions, resulting

in this appeal.

3. It was pleaded in the writ petition as well as in this appeal

that the 3rd appellant is an association formed to consolidate and

strengthen the agitation against illegal mining and that the individual

appellants are locals who are affected by the mining activities. It was

stated that a lease was issued in favour of one Sri.Joemon Joseph in

the year 2011 by ignoring the objections and objectionable structures

within the vicinity. After the death of the original lessee, his wife - the

7th respondent obtained transfer of the lease into her name and

thereafter obtained other licenses to conduct quarrying operations. It

was also alleged that, albeit the presence of many residential

houses, an irrigation canal, and a huge water tank of the Kerala

Water Authority, located near the land, the quarrying lease was

issued to the 7th respondent, illegally.

4. The counter affidavit of the 4 th respondent-Geologist,

pointed out that a movement permit was issued to the original lessee

Sri.Jomon Joseph on 1-08-2013 for removing 20,000 metric tonnes

of granite building stones and that the said person had operated the

quarry in 2013. It was further stated that since the lease was issued

in 2011, environmental clearance was required only at the stage of

renewal. It was affirmed that all statutory distance criteria

contemplated under the Rules were satisfied and that the water tank

was also beyond the stipulated distance from the quarrying area. It

was also mentioned that the mining plan submitted by the 7 th

respondent was approved on 06-03-2019, and that the movement

permit was issued to the 7th respondent on 09-09-2020.

5. The 7th respondent in her counter-affidavit stated that

originally the lease was issued to her husband on 22-12-2011 which

was valid for 12 years and the same having been issued prior to

18-05-2012, environmental clearance certificate was not required. It

was pleaded that the said issue was considered earlier by this Court

in Ext.R7(a) judgment and it was thereafter that directions were given

to consider the application for grant of license without insisting on the

environmental clearance, pursuant to which license was issued. It

was also pointed out that the mining operations had commenced in

2013 itself and hence the lease had not lapsed.

6. We heard Adv. Abdul Jawad K. for the appellants. We also

heard the learned Government Pleader Adv. Surin George Ipe for

respondents 1 to 5, Adv. Gopinadhan, the learned Standing Counsel

for the 6th respondent and Adv. Babu S. Nair, for the 7 th respondent.

The contentions raised in the writ petition were repeated by the

learned counsel for the appellant with added vigour and we shall deal

with each of them, one by one.

(i) Lapse of lease:

7. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the

appellants was that the lease had lapsed under section 4A(4) of the

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, read

with Rule 29(1)(g) of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules,

1967, due to the failure to commence mining operations within the

time prescribed and that it had also lapsed due to discontinuance of

mining operations for two years.

8. To appreciate the afore contentions, it is necessary to have

a glance at the relevant provisions of law. Section 4A(4) of the Mines

and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short

'MMDR Act') read with Rule 29(1)(g) of the Kerala Minor Mineral

Concession Rules, 1967 (for short '1967 Rules') and Rule 40(1)(g) of

the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 (for short '2015

Rules') deals with lapse of a mining lease or discontinuance of a

mining lease. It is relevant to note that the 1967 Rules have been

now replaced by the 2015 Rules. The above-referred provisions of

law are extracted below:-

Section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act reads as follows: "4A. Termination of prospecting licences or mining leases: (4) When the holder of a mining lease fails to undertake mining

operations for a period of two years after the date of execution of the lease or having commenced mining operations, has discontinued the same for a period of two years, the lease shall lapse on the expiry of the period of two years from the date of execution of the lease or as the case may be, discontinuance of the mining operations:

Provided that the State Government may, on an application made by the holder of such lease before its expiry under this sub- section and on being satisfied that it will not be possible for the holder of the lease to undertake mining operations or to continue such operations for reasons beyond his control, make an order, subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed, to the effect that such lease shall not lapse.

Provided further that the State Government, may on an application by the holder of a lease submitted within a period of six months from the date of its lapse and on being satisfied that such non commencement or discontinuance was due to reasons beyond the control of the holder of the lease, revive the lease from such prospective or retrospective date as it thinks fit but not earlier than the date of lapse of the lease.

Provided also that no lease shall be revived under the second proviso for more than twice during the entire period of the lease."

Rule 29(1)(g) of 1967 Rules reads as follows:

"29. Conditions of quarrying lease:- (1) Every quarrying lease shall be subject to the following conditions, and such conditions shall be incorporated in every quarrying lease deed.

(g) Unless the State Government or the competent authority for sufficient cause permit or permits otherwise the lessee shall

commence mining operations within three months from the date of execution of the lease and shall thereafter conduct such operations in a proper, skilful and workman like manner.

Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause mining operations shall include the erection of machinery, laying of a tramway or construction of a road in connection with the working of the mine."

Rule 40(1)(g) of 2015 Rules reads as follows:

"40. Conditions of quarrying lease.-(1) Every quarrying lease shall be subject to the following conditions and/or any other conditions that may be imposed by the competent authority and such conditions shall be incorporated in every quarrying lease deed.

(g) the lessee shall commence quarrying operations within two years from the date of execution of the lease and shall thereafter conduct such operations in a proper, skillful and workman-like manner. Otherwise the lease shall lapse on the expiry date of the period of two years from the date of execution of the lease:

Provided that the competent authority may, on an application made by the holder of such lease within three years from the date of execution of the lease and, on being satisfied that it will not be possible for the lessee to undertake mining operations or to continue such operations for reasons beyond his control, make an order, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, to the effect that such lease shall not lapse.

Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause, mining operations shall include the erection of machinery, laying of a tramway or construction of a road in connection with the working of the mine."

9. Section 4A of the MMDR Act contemplates two situations

when a mining lease can lapse. The first is when, after execution of

the lease, the lessee fails to undertake mining operations for two

years, while the second is, when the lessee discontinues mining

operations for a period of two years after commencement of mining

operations. In both these situations, the statute prescribes that the

lease shall lapse, of course, subject to extensions that can be

granted as prescribed therein.

10. At this juncture, we notice certain incongruities between the

MMDR Act and the 1967 Rules as well as the 2015 Rules. The

second situation mentioned in the preceding paragraph i.e; lapse of

lease due to discontinuance for two years, is contemplated only in

the MMDR Act and not under the 1967 Rules or the 2015 Rules.

Similarly, when the Act contemplates commencement of mining

operations within two years of execution of the lease, the 1967 Rules

contemplated commencement of mining operations within three

months of the execution of the lease. Further, the word 'mining

operations' though defined under the Act in wide terms, the Rules

provide an explanation to the word mining operations. From the

nature of issues raised in this appeal, it is necessary for us to

appreciate the manner in which these seeming incongruities will

have to be reconciled.

11. It is apposite to bear in mind that the MMDR Act was enacted

in exercise of powers under Entry 54 of List I of the VII Schedule to

the Constitution of India. Section 14 of the MMDR Act specifies that

the provisions of section 5 to 13 of the Act shall not apply to quarry

leases in respect of minor minerals. Initially, the inapplicability of

MMDR Act to minor minerals was in respect of sections 4 to 13,

however, by the Amendment Act of 1986, section 4A was introduced

and the inapplicability was confined to sections 5 to 13. Thus

undoubtedly, section 4A applies to minor minerals also. The MMDR

Act conferred power upon the State Governments, as per section 15,

to make rules relating to minor minerals. It is in exercise of the power

conferred under section 15 of the MMDR Act, that the Kerala

Government enacted the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules,

1967, which has now been replaced by the Kerala Minor Mineral

Concession Rules, 2015.

12. In this context, it is fruitful to refer to the decision in Crystal

Granite Ltd v. State of Kerala (2019 (1) KLT 562), where this court

has in paragraph 21 held, though in a different context, that, "It is in

exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 that the KMMC rules

have been framed. Rule 29 of the said rules provide for payments to

be made under the said rules. Rule 29 lays down the conditions

subject to which quarrying leases are to be granted." It was further

held in paragraph 26 that "As per section 15, the power to frame

rules "for regulating the quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral

concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes

connected therewith" has been conferred on the State. The resultant

position therefore, is that though the Centre had by the MMDR Act

taken upon itself the power to regulate mining and mineral

development, insofar as the minor minerals are concerned, the said

power has been given back to the State. In other words, power of the

Centre in respect of minor minerals including stone quarries has

come to be invested in the State, without being eclipsed by the other

provisions of the MMDR Act".

13. Based on the above discussion and the proposition of law

laid down as mentioned in Crystal Granites Case (supra), it has to be

held that the KMMC Rules supplement the MMDR Act, and neither

the Act nor the Rules can be read in isolation of the other. Both the

Act and the Rules are to be construed harmoniously, except section

5 to section 13 of the MMDR Act, which sections do not apply to

minor minerals.

14. The 1967 Rules provide for a period of three months to

commence mining operation after execution of the lease. Section

4A(4) of the MMDR Act, when brought into the statute book in 1987

by Act 37 of 1986, prescribed a period of one year from the date of

execution of the lease to undertake mining operations. By an

amendment of 1994, the said period of one year in section 4A(4) was

substituted with "two years". Since section 4A applies to minor

minerals and the rules cannot contradict the Act, the period stipulated

in the MMDR Act will prevail. Thus, from 1994 onwards, for a lease to

lapse on failure to commence mining operations, the period to be

reckoned is two years from the date of execution of the lease. it is to

be noted that this incongruity is no longer in existence as far as the

2015 Rules are concerned, as the period stipulated in the 2015

Rules and the MMDR Act are now the same.

15. Similarly, even though the 1967 Rules and the 2015 Rules

do not contemplate discontinuance of lease for two years as a

ground to declare the lease as lapsed, in view of the prescription in

section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act, a lease of a minor mineral can lapse

if there is discontinuance of the mining operations for two years as

prescribed under the Act.

16. The word mining operations is defined under the MMDR

Act in section 3(d) as meaning "any operations undertaken for the

purpose of winning any mineral". By using the term "any" in section

3(d) of the MMDR Act, the Parliament intended a very wide definition

to be given to the word 'mining operations'. As mentioned earlier, as

long as the provisions of the 1967 Rules or the 2015 Rules, as the

case may be, do not contradict the MMDR Act, the provisions of the

Act and the Rules must be read harmoniously and as supplementing

each other in relation to minor minerals. Viewed, in the above

perspective, it can be seen that the explanation given under the 1967

Rules do not contradict but only explain the scope of the word mining

operations. The explanation to Rule 29(1)(g) of the 1967 Rules, as

extracted earlier, makes it lucid that, mining operations will include

the erection of machinery, laying of a tramway, construction of a road

in connection with the working of the mine. The explanation offered

in the 1967 Rules for the word mining operations cannot be thus lost

sight of or ignored. As far as the State of Kerala is concerned, the

word mining operations appearing in section 4A of the MMDR Act will

have to be construed in tune with the explanation given in Rule 29(1)

(g) of the 1967 Rules or Rule 40(1)(g) of the 2015 Rules as the case

may be. In such circumstances, We are of the considered view that

even the erection of machinery or construction of a road inside the

quarry to work the mine would constitute mining operations under

section 4A, of the MMDR Act.

17. It is seen from the counter affidavit of the 4 th respondent

that a movement permit was issued by the Geologist in favour of the

leaseholder in 2013. The lease was issued on 22-12-2011 and the

movement permit was issued only on 01-08-2013, i.e; within 20

months of the execution of the lease. As we have observed earlier,

the MMDR Act and the Rules complement each other and the period

to commence mining operations after execution of the lease will have

to be reckoned as two years. Viewed in the above perspective, the

respondent's predecessor, having extracted and removed the granite

at least on 01-08-2013, can be said to have commenced mining

operations within two years. We are also mindful of the contention of

the lessee and as found on facts by the learned Single Judge that

the lessee had, even prior to 2013, commenced quarrying

operations. Thus the lease issued to the 7 th respondent or her

predecessor cannot under any circumstances whatsoever, be held to

have lapsed.

18. The second limb of the argument of Adv. Abdul Jawad is on

the lapse of lease due to discontinuance of operations for two years.

It is an allegation made by appellants as local residents. No Official

of the Department of Mining and Geology nor the Competent

Authority under the Rules had raised an issue on discontinuance of

the lease. No orders have been passed by the Geologist or the State

Government that the lease had been discontinued. No notice of any

nature had been issued to the 7th respondent by the Geologist or the

Mining and Geology Department alleging discontinuance.

Discontinuance of mining operations under a lease is a question of

fact. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot

adjudicate such a disputed question of fact, more so when the term

'mining operations' is given a very wide meaning as per the MMDR

Act.

19. Further, once the lease is issued and the operations under

the lease commences, it confers vested rights upon the lessee.

These vested rights of the leaseholder cannot be taken away by

mere assumptions or surmises. A quarrying lease is primarily a

contract between the State Government and the lessee. Rights flow

from the contract upon the contracting parties. The lease being a

statutory contract, none of the authorities appointed under the statute

and vested with the power to declare the lease as lapsed have raised

an issue about discontinuance of the lease. They have not issued

any notice nor have they ever formed an opinion that the lease had

lapsed. As mentioned earlier, no notice of any nature has ever been

issued to the 7th respondent or her predecessor alleging lapse of

lease due to discontinuance as mentioned in section 4A of the

MMDR Act.

20. It is relevant in this context, to refer to the decision reported

in Common Cause v. Union of India and Others, [(2016) 11 SCC

455], where the Supreme Court held that "vital vested rights in a

lease holder cannot be curtailed without affording him an opportunity

to repudiate the impressions of the competent authority, namely that

the leaseholder could not have (or had actually not) carried out

mining operations for a continuous period of 2 years".

21. Though the above-referred decision placed reliance upon

Rule 28 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, according to us, the

said principle must apply with equal vigour to the case of minor

minerals also. Thus, once the lease has been granted and mining

operations commenced, to declare the lease as lapsed, it is not

sufficient that an allegation is raised by a stranger who is not privy to

the contract. Lapse of lease due to discontinuance is a matter which

has to be initiated, considered, and decided by the competent

authority constituted under the Act. The impression of lapse of a

lease is a matter within the realm of the competent authority to

consider and decide. A person who is a stranger to the contract, can,

at the most, bring it to the notice of the competent authority and

nothing more. Thereafter, it is for the competent authority to decide

on the question of discontinuance of the lease after granting an

opportunity of being heard to the lessee. In that process, the

competent authority would even be appreciating various factors

including legal interdictions to continue mining operations,

permissible contractual exclusions like force majeure, if available,

etc. In the absence of any decision by the competent authority

alleging discontinuance of the lease issued to the 7th respondent,

this Court cannot declare the lease as lapsed, as alleged.

22. We are further fortified in the above view on account of

Rules 72, 73 and Rule 74 of the 2015 Rules. As per the said

provisions, when there is an abandonment of a quarry or when there

is a temporary discontinuance of work in a quarry for a period

exceeding one month, the owner of the lease or his manager must

intimate the competent authority, by a notice about such

discontinuance. If there is a failure on the part of the leaseholder or

such other person to intimate discontinuance of a lease for more

than one month, then certainly it is upon the competent authority to

issue a notice calling upon the leaseholder to submit an explanation

as to why the lease should not be declared as lapsed. This

reasonable opportunity of defending the allegation of lapse of a lease

due to discontinuance of operations must be afforded before a

vested right, is taken away.

23. Having considered the present case on merits, as

discussed above, we find that the competent authority under the

statute has not issued any notice calling upon the leaseholder to

explain any alleged discontinuance nor has any order been passed

by the competent authority under the Act declaring the lease issued

to the 7th respondent as having lapsed. The admitted continuance of

mining operations at present also stares against the contention of the

appellants. In such circumstances, we are of the firm opinion that the

lease issued to the 7th respondent or her predecessor cannot be

declared as having lapsed.

(ii) Absence of Environmental Clearance Certificate.

24. The second contention urged by Adv. Abdul Jawad was

that the quarrying operations could have continued only after

obtaining environmental clearance, especially after the decision in

Deepak Kumar etc. v. State of Haryana and Others [(2012) 4 SCC

629].

25. Ext.P5 is the quarrying lease issued to the 7th respondent's

husband. The said lease is dated 22-12-2011. The schedule to

Ext.P5 specifies the area as 3.0915 hectares. The lease was

undoubtedly issued before the decision in Deepak Kumar, etc v.

State of Haryana and Others reported in [(2012) 4 SCC 629]. The

environmental regime relating to mining, prevalent till the aforesaid

decision can be summarised as follows: In 1994, a notification (dtd.

27-01-1994) was issued by the Central Government, stipulating that

expansion or modernization or setting up of mining projects of major

minerals covered by leases issued for more than 5 hectares cannot

be carried out without obtaining an environmental clearance from the

Central Government. Minor minerals were not included in the 1994

notification. Subsequently, the 1994 notification was superseded by

another notification dated 14-09-2006, which categorized mining

leases based on their extent, into A and B. Mining of minerals from

an area more than 5 hectares and less than 50 hectares were

categorized as falling under category B. A significant departure from

the 1994 notification was that environmental clearance was made

necessary even for minor minerals whose area exceeded 5 hectares.

In other words, from 2006 onwards, the distinction between minor

minerals and major minerals, where the lease area exceeded 5

hectares, was removed and both types of such leases required

environmental clearance.

26. However, by the decision in Deepak Kumar's case, the

Supreme Court directed that "leases of minor minerals including their

renewal for an area of less than five hectares be granted only after

getting environmental clearance from the MoEF". Pursuant to the

said direction and in compliance thereof, the Government of India

issued a notification dated 18-05-2012, including leases for minor

minerals less than 5 hectares also, as falling into category B.

27. While so, questions arose as to whether all existing leases,

i.e; those leases issued prior to Deepak Kumar's case or the date of

notification 18-05-2012, must require an environmental clearance

certificate to continue their operations. This Court by the decision, in

All Kerala River Protection Council v. State of Kerala, reported in

(2015 (2) KLT 78) held that the existing leases i.e; those in existence

prior to 18-05-2012 do not require an environmental clearance

certificate during the period of their validity. In clauses (i) and (iv) of

the concluding paragraph of the said judgment, it was stated as

follows:

"82. In view of the foregoing discussion, we come to the following conclusions.

(i) In case where quarrying/mining/lease which were existing on the date of issuance of notification dated 14 9 2006 or on the date of issue of the order dated 18-05- 2012 by the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, with regard to area less than 5 hectares no environmental clearance with regard to extraction of minor mineral is required. Notification dated 14-09-2006, contemplated obtaining environmental clearance only with regard to new projects/new activities.

(iv) Judgment of the Apex court in Deepak Kumar's case (supra) did not contemplate environmental clearance for an area less than 5 hectares with regard to existing mining lease/mining permits on the date of judgment. Paragraph 29 of the judgment clearly directed that leases of minor minerals, including their renewal for an area of less than

five hectares be granted by the State/Union Territories only after getting environmental clearance.

28. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by this court again

in Najeeb M K v. Shoukath Ali and others (2015 (3) KLT 396), as

well as in Nature Lovers Forum and others v. State of Kerala and

Others (2016 (1) KLT 75). In view of the above binding decisions,

we have no hesitation to conclude that the lease in question did not

require an environmental clearance certificate, until its renewal

thereof and there is no reason to interfere with the finding of the

learned single Judge.

(iii) NOC from the Kerala Water Authority.

29. The last contention put forth by Adv. Abdul Jawad related

to the absence of permission under section 40(2) of the Kerala

Irrigation and Water Conservation Act, 2003, (for short 'the Irrigation

Act') which according to the appellants must result in interdicting the

quarrying operations of the 7th respondent.

30. As per section 40(2) of the Irrigation Act, written

permission is required from the Irrigation Officer, if a person

conducts mining or quarrying operations using explosives within a

radius of 1 km from any bridge, dams, check dams or any other

work, structure or construction owned, controlled and maintained by

the Government, a local authority or any other authority. In the

decision in Sobin PK v. District Geologist, Ernakulam and

Others, (2020 (1) KLT 79), it was held that even a water tank

belonging to the Kerala Water Authority would fall under the

expression in the aforesaid section.

31. The question as to whether a water tank belonging to the

Kerala Water Authority would be covered under the Irrigation Act and

whether the decision in Sobin's Case (supra) requires

reconsideration in view of the nature and object of the irrigation Act

being solely for irrigation purposes apart from the question as to the

sanctity of the permission that can be granted by an irrigation officer

when the tank is maintained by the water authority, are all matters

on which we need not vex our mind in the instant case, as those will

only be academic in the present case. As rightly observed by the

learned Single Judge, in the instant case, there is a total lack of

pleadings in respect of the distance or the existence of the water

tank from the area of lease.

32. Even though the learned counsel for the appellants invited

our attention to paragraph 3 of the writ petition, as well as ground D,

to impress upon the availability of pleadings, we find that, except for

bald and vague averments, the writ petition falls woefully short of the

necessary pleadings to invite a finding on the said question,

especially under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We also

bear in mind at this juncture, that, at the time of grant of the mining

lease the Geologist had not directed the leaseholder to obtain written

permission. The distance of the alleged water tank from the lease

area has not been specified and further no such objection has ever

been raised by the Irrigation Officer also. In such circumstances, we

agree with the learned single Judge that the averments in the writ

petition are vague and insufficient to justify consideration of the

contentions raised by the learned counsel based on section 40 of the

Irrigation Act.

33. However, if the existence of a water tank as alleged,

comes within the statutory prescription of section 40(2) of the

Irrigation Act and the distance prescribed therein, as the law now

prevails, the leaseholders are bound to obtain appropriate

permissions from the officer concerned. Since we affirm the finding

of the learned Single Judge on this issue solely on the ground of

absence of pleadings, the question relating to the requirement to

obtain permission from the officer concerned is left open for

consideration as and when the occasion arises in appropriate

proceedings.

34. In view of the above, we find no merit in the above appeal,

and the same is accordingly dismissed.

Sd/-

BECHU KURIAN THOMAS JUDGE

Sd/-

K.BABU JUDGE vps

APPENDIX OF WA 644/2021

PETITIONER ANNEXURE ANNEXURE A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 21/12/2020 IN WPC 33150/2019 ON THE FILE OF THIS HONBLE COURT.