Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 6001 Ker
Judgement Date : 19 February, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
FRIDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 30TH MAGHA,1942
WA.No.2039 OF 2019
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 15-02-2019 IN WP(C) 39889/2018(I) OF
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
P.S.NIMMY,
SKILLED LABORER, CENTRE FOR PIG PRODUCTION AND
RESEARCH, MANNUTHY, RESIDING AT PALLIKUDATHIL P.O.,
MADAKKATHARA, THRISSUR.
BY ADV. SRI.G.KRISHNAKUMAR
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE KERALA VETERINARY AND ANIMAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY,
POOKOT, WAYANAD -673576,
REP. BY ITS VICE CHANCELLOR.
2 THE REGISTRAR,
THE KERALA VETERINARY AND ANIMAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY,
POOKOT, WAYANAD - 673 576,
REP. BY ITS VICE CHANCELLOR.
3 THE PROFESSOR AND HEAD,
THE KERALA VETERINARY AND ANIMAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY,
CENTRE FOR PIG PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH, MANNUTHY,
THRISSUR -680 651.
R1-3 BY ADV. AYSHA YOUSEFF (B/O)
R1-3 BY SMT.AYSHA YOUSEFF, SC, KERALA VETERINARY AND
ANIMAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 21-01-2021, THE
COURT ON 19-02-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2039/2019 -2-
'C.R.'
JUDGMENT
A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar, J:
The petitioner in W.P (C) No.39889/2018 is the appellant before us
aggrieved by the judgment dated 15-02-2019 of the learned Single Judge. The brief
facts necessary for disposal of the writ appeal are as follows:
2. The appellant is stated to be a skilled causal worker who was
appointed as such in the Kerala Agricultural University in 2003. It is stated that
consequent to the formation of the Kerala Veterinary and Animal Sciences
University, she was transferred as a casual worker under the said University in
2010. During the period between 24-03-2016 and 15-06-2016 the petitioner
availed, and was sanctioned, a maternity leave and it is not in dispute that she
rejoined duty as a casual labourer on 16-06-2016 itself. It is also not in dispute that
during the leave period she received the maternity benefits from the respondent
University for a total period 84 days.
3. The grievance of the petitioner in the writ petition was as regards the
ranking of casual labourers effected by the respondent University, on the basis of
the number of days actually worked as casual labourer. It was pointed out by the
petitioner that, Ext.P1 Leave Rules contemplated that casual labourers who had
discharged service of 160 days in a year would be entitled upto 12 weeks of
maternity leave which would be treated as continuous service and that it was
further made clear in the said Rules that the average daily wage together with the
D.A that was paid to the casual labourer for the period of 3 months (90 days)
immediately prior to the date of delivery would be basis for computation of the
maternity benefit. It was her case that while the respondent University had
granted her the maternity benefits as above, while drawing up the seniority list of
casual labourers prepared based on the number of days actually worked by them,
the petitioner was placed at Sl. No.68 as against Sl.No.23 which she claimed. This
change in the seniority position apparently arose on account of the respondent
University having computed the number of working days during the maternity
leave period by reckoning only 6 days in a week as against 7 days in a normal
week. It was the contention of the petitioner that in as much as the leave Rules
mandated a grant of maternity leave computed in weeks, the respondent
University could not have taken 6 days as constituting those weeks for the
purposes of the seniority list aforementioned.
4. The learned Single Judge who considered the writ petition found that
as per the University Rules, a weekly off is compulsory for every casual employee.
It followed therefore that a casual labourer could work only for 6 days in a week
and had necessarily to be given the seventh day as an off. It was found therefore
that when ordinarily a casual employee could not claim to have worked on the 7 th
day of the week, the petitioner who had proceeded on maternity leave could not
claim a differential treatment. It was accordingly found that the University was
justified in counting 6 days in a week, during the maternity period, for the
purposes of reckoning the position of the petitioner in the seniority list
aforementioned. A review petition filed by the petitioner against the said judgment
of the learned Single Judge did not meet with any success and the same was also
dismissed by order dated 22-08-2019 in R.P No.680/2019.
5. Before us it is contention of Sri. Krishnakumar, learned counsel for
the appellant that the University having reckoned 7 days a week for the purposes
of grant of maternity benefits, was not justified in resorting to a different
computation for the purposes of reckoning the actual number of days worked by
the petitioner, during the maternity period, for inclusion in the seniority list. He
places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (1997) 4 SCC 384 =
1977 KHC 220: [B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore
and others] where while dealing with a computation of the benefits contemplated
under the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 the court found that in as much as the Act
did not contain any definition of the word "week" it had to be understood in its
ordinary dictionary meaning which implies a period of 7 days, and that the benefit
of the wages for all the Sundays and rest days falling within the period defined
would ultimately be conducive to the interests of both woman worker and her
employers.
6. It must be noticed here that the judgment aforesaid was rendered while
interpreting the provisions of Section 5 of Maternity benefits Act that provided for
a formula that governed the payment of maternity benefits to the woman
employee. As per the said formula, the employer would be liable for payment of
maternity benefits at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of actual
absence immediately preceding and including the day of delivery, and for the 6
weeks immediately following that day. Through an explanation it was also provided
what had to be paid by the employer was the average of the daily wages payable to
her for the days on which she has worked during the period of 3 calender months
immediately preceding the date from which she absented herself on account of
maternity or one rupee a day whichever was higher. In other words, the provision
that came up for consideration before the court clearly mandated that the average
daily wage paid to the woman employee, for the days actually worked during the
immediately preceding 3 months from which she absented herself on account of
maternity, had to be first determined, and then the said figure applied to the
period during which the woman employee proceeded on maternity leave.
7. On the facts of the case before us, we note that the maternity benefits
due to the petitioner, computed in accordance with the Rules, has already been
paid to the petitioner and this is not in dispute. We are concerned here with the
computation that should govern the appellant's position in a seniority list prepared
based on the actual number of days worked by her as a casual employee for the
purposes of regularisation of her services. In that context, the number of days
which the petitioner is deemed to have worked during the maternity leave period
can only be taken as a reference to the number of days on which she was
exempted from presenting herself for work at the University. By that yardstick, the
Sundays that fell during the maternity period, on which days the petitioner was
not even otherwise expected to present herself for work at the University, and
which therefore did not attract the exemption from work offered by the leave, had
to be necessarily excluded. It might not also be out of place to point out that, even
going by the Leave Rules produced as Ext.P1 in the writ petition, the number of
working days that would have accrued to the credit of the petitioner if she had not
availed the maternity leave would have been the same as computed by the
University.
We therefore find no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned
Single Judge in the impugned judgment, which we uphold for the reasons stated
therein, as supplemented by the reasons contained in this judgment. The Writ
appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
(Sd/-) A.K. JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR JUDGE
(Sd/-) GOPINATH P.
JUDGE AMG
APPENDIX PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE I TRUE COPY OF THE REVIEW PETITION NO.680/2019 IN W.P(C) NO.39889/18 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.
ANNEXURE II TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION TO CONDONE DELAY IN FILING REVIEW PETITION WHICH WAS FILED ALONG WITH R.P.NO.680/2019 IN W.P.(C) NO.39889/18 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.
ANNEXURE III CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22/8/2019 OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN REVIEW PETITION NO.680/2019 IN W.P.(C) NO.39889/18 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.
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