Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 4327 Ker
Judgement Date : 5 February, 2021
Mat.Appeal.No.1166/2018 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS
FRIDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 16TH MAGHA,1942
Mat.Appeal.No.1166 OF 2018
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OPDIV 1082/2018 DATED 04-10-
2018 OF FAMILY COURT, KOLLAM
APPELLANT/S:
BEENA BABU,
AGED 27 YEARS,
D/O.BABU, VILAYIL PUTHENVEEDU, MATHILIL,
PERINAD P.O., THRIKKADAVOOR VILLAGE, KOLLAM.
BY ADV. SRI.AJAYA KUMAR. G
RESPONDENT/S:
ANDRIC GERMIC,
AGED 37 YEARS,
S/O.GEORGE, KINARUVILA HOUSE, KUREEPUZHA,
PERINAD P.O., THRIKKADAVOOR VILLAGE,
KOLLAM TALUK.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.JOHNSON GOMEZ
THIS MATRIMONIAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
05.02.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
Mat.Appeal.No.1166/2018 2
JUDGMENT
C.S.Dias, J.
The 2nd petitioner in O.P.(DA).No.1085 of 2018 of the
Family Court, Kollam is the appellant. The 1 st petitioner
in the said original petition is the respondent in the
appeal.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the appeal are as
follows:
The appellant and the respondent were husband and
wife. They jointly filed O.P.(DA).No.1085 of 2018, under
Section 10(A) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, seeking a
decree of divorce by mutual consent. The respondent is a
police officer. The respondent had misrepresented facts to
the appellant and made her sign the original petition and
affidavit under threat and coercion. Therefore, the
appellant is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and
decree. The marriage between the appellant and the
respondent was solemnized on 20.05.2010. The marital
relationship got strained after the birth of the 1 st child.
The respondent constantly harassed and threatened the
appellant and demanded her to transfer the property in
her name. Even after filing of the joint petition, the
couple was living together at the residence of the
respondent. On 18.11.2008, the respondent showed a
piece of paper to the appellant saying that it was the
divorce order obtained from the court, and he thereafter
deserted her. The respondent forcefully took away the
custody of the children. Appellant has not consented for
divorce by mutual consent. She has not given her free
will while signing the affidavit and joint petition. Hence,
the judgment and decree may be set aside.
3. Heard Sri.G.Ajayakumar, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri.Johnson Gomez appearing for the
respondent.
4. The point that emanates for consideration in the
appeal is whether the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the Family Court is legally sustainable or not.
5. The appellant and the respondent got married
on 20.05.2010. They got separated on 29.09.2016. Both
parties appeared before the court and filed I.A.No.2605 of
2018 to waive the statutory waiting period of six months
to move the second motion. Thereafter, the appellant and
the respondent filed affidavits in lieu of the chief
examination and Exts.A1-(marriage certificate) and
Ext.A2 (agreement executed between the parties) were
marked. The Family Court after interacting with the
parties and on being convinced that there is no collision
between the parties; that their consent was not obtained
by fraud or undue influence and that all financial
transactions between the parties were settled, passed the
impugned decree.
6. The appellant is now before this Court, inter
alia, alleging that her consent for filing the joint petition
was obtained by fraud, undue influence and threat on the
part of the respondent.
7. We do not assume for a moment that the
findings of the Family Court in paragraph No.5 of the
impugned judgment, that the consent of both parties was
not vitiated by fraud or undue influence, is erroneous.
8. It is by now trite, as held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Banwarilal v. Chando Devi &
Another [(1993) 1 SCC 581], that when a compromise
petition is lawfully signed by the parties and when it is
later on alleged that the compromise was entered into by
fraudulent ways, an appeal is not maintainable in view of
the bar under Section 93(3) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to
challenge the compromise before the same court which
passed the decree.
9. In addition to the above categoric declaration of
law, there is also a statutory bar under Section 19(2) of
the Family Courts Act, 1984 which prohibits an appeal
being filed from a compromise/consent decree. This
position is laid down in Velayudhan v. Deepa & Another
[2020 (1) KHC 373].
10. In light of our above findings and the
authoritative pronouncements in Banwarilal (sura) and
Velayudhan (supra), we are of the considered opinion
that this appeal challenging the impugned judgment is
not maintainable. It is up to the appellant, if she so
desirous, to move the Family Court as laid down in
Banwarilal (sura) for setting aside the decree on the
ground that her consent was obtained by fraud, undue
influence or other mitigating circumstances by the
respondent.
In the result, this appeal is dismissed, without
prejudice to the right of the appellant to seek appropriate
reliefs as enjoined in law.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
Sd/-
C.S.DIAS, JUDGE
DG
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