Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 16097 Ker
Judgement Date : 3 August, 2021
W.A.NO.1635 OF 2014 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
TUESDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF AUGUST 2021 / 12TH SRAVANA, 1943
WA NO. 1635 OF 2015
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WPC 17161/2012 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT:
1 K.M.VARKEY
AGED 82 YEARS
S/O.LATE ABRAHAM, AREETHADATHIL HOUSE, MANNATHOOR
KARA, THIRUMARADY VILLAGE, PIN-686 723.
A2 MARY
AGED 60 YEARS
W/O.JOSE, AREETHADATHIL HOUSE, MANNATHOOR KARA,
THIRUMARADY VILLAGE, PIN - 686 723.
A3 VALSA
AGED 50 YEARS
W/O.JAMES, CHUNDAKARAYIL HOUSE, MANNATHOOR PO.,
THIRUMARADY VILLAGE, PIN - 686 723.
ADDITIONAL A2 & A3 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
23.2.2018 IN I.A.NO.181/18.
BY ADVS.
SRI.ABRAHAM VAKKANAL (SR.)
SRI.DIJO SEBASTIAN
SRI.PAUL ABRAHAM VAKKANAL
SMT.VINEETHA SUSAN THOMAS
RESPONDENTS:
1 A.V.ABRAHAM
AGED 54 YEARS
S/O.K.M.VARKEY, JOJI NIVAS, POROTTUKONAM.P.O., NEAR
W.A.NO.1635 OF 2014 2
MAR EVANIOSE COLLEGE, NALAMCHIRA,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, NOW RESIDING AT MRC 37, CHELLAM
LINE, PANAM VILLA, VALAMCHIRA-695 015.
2 MAINTENANCE TRIBUNAL/REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER
VAZHAPPILLY, MUVATTUPUZHA, PIN-686 661.
3 APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
DISTRICT COLLECTOR, CIVIL STATION, THRIKKAKARA,
KOCHI, PIN-682 021.
BY ADV SRI.REJI GEORGE FOR R1
SRI.TEK CHAND, SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR R2 &
R3
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
03.08.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
W.A.NO.1635 OF 2014 3
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 3rd day of August, 2021
S. MANIKUMAR,CJ.
Being aggrieved by the judgment in W.P.(C) No.17161/2012 dated
24.6.2015, setting aside the order of the appellate authority under the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the instant
writ appeal is filed.
2. Short facts leading to the appeal are as follows; writ petitioner/1 st
respondent is the son of appellant. The matter arises under the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. At the time of filing of the
instant appeal i.e., on 23rd July, 2015, appellant was aged 82 years. According to
him, he is a patient and unable to move about. He is a freedom fighter and
getting Rs.7150/-per month as pension but, it is insufficient to meet his medical
expenses, incidental expenses etc., with the amount. He had 2.77 acres of land,
with rubber plantation and that was the main source of income. Appellant has
three children, two daughters and one son. A.V.Abraham - 1 st respondent, is the
son, who is employed as Senior Superintendent in the Fire Fighting Department of
Airport Authority of India, Thiruvananthapuram drawing more than Rs.50,000/-
per month and settled at Thiruvananthapuram. Appellant is residing in his
ancestral house at Mannathur, near Muvattupuzha. According to the appellant,
in the year 1986, appellant executed a sale deed No.1847/86 of Koothattukulam
S.R.O., transferring 37 cents out of 2.77 acres including the ancestral house, in
his son's favour on the belief that it was necessary to avail a loan to reconstruct
the house. However, the repayment of loan availed for the construction had to be
made by appellant's daughter, as 1st respondent defaulted to remit the loan
installments. Later, in December 2009, 1st respondent wanted a Will to be
executed in his name as regards balance property of 2.40 acres, on a condition to
maintain parents. According to the appellant, the sale deed was executed
fraudulently stating consideration for it as "amount paid previously". Thereafter
about 6 months, 1st respondent prevented the appellant from taking income from
the property stating that he is the owner. Thereupon, appellant filed a complaint
in Police Station stating about the fraud and 1 st respondent agreed to give Rs.
5000/- to the mother for maintenance.
3. As there was no other alternative to maintain themselves, the appellant
and his wife filed M.P No.34/2010 before the Maintenance Tribunal and Revenue
Divisional Officer, Muvattupuza under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents &
Senior Citizens Act, 2007, for maintenance and to declare that the sale deed,
obtained by the 1st respondent was by practising fraud and undue influence. The
Maintenance Tribunal, after considering evidence, finding that the document
No.1766/2009 was executed based on the condition of giving proper
maintenance, basic amenities and basic physical needs to the appellant., declared
that sale deed is void under Sec. 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, Tribunal also found that the 1 st respondent did not
allow the appellant to take income from the property and pension received by the
appellant was not sufficient for his monthly maintenance. The Tribunal held that,
the transfer of the property in Sale deed No.1766/2009 of Koothattukulam S.R.O.
comes within Section 23 of the Act and it was declared that the same was
deemed to have been made by fraud, coercion and undue influence. Accordingly,
the Maintenance Tribunal allowed M.P.No.34/2010. Being aggrieved, 1 st
respondent filed the writ petition.
4. It is also the submission of the appellant that the writ court found that
since the condition to maintain the father was not specifically incorporated in the
deed, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction and the order declaring the deed as void, is
not sustainable. Writ court also observed that if there is no consideration paid for
sale, it is a matter for the civil court to decide.
5. Therefore, the issue relates to the interpretation of Section 23 of
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. According to
him, the question arises for consideration is whether the written stipulation
agreeing to maintain the transferor is necessary in the deed itself to invoke the
legal fiction that if the transferee refuses to maintain the transferor, the deed
would be void or is it enough, if evidence on such a condition and refusal is
established by evidence before the Tribunal, as in the case on hand. Besides, the
alleged consideration shown in the deed as "amount previously paid" and the
amount of consideration shows as Rs.5.80 lakhs for 2.40 Acres, when the
prevalent value of the land was Rs.1.20 Crores. Therefore, according to the
appellant, looking at the object and purpose of the Maintenance and Welfare of
Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, a liberal interpretation favourable to the
parents/aged people ought to have been taken. Further it was submitted that the
observation of the writ court that the appellant can go to the civil court to
establish the non-payment of consideration, is also illegal, as the provisions made
in the new Act for a speedy remedy, to overcome the delay caused in proceeding
under Civil Procedure Code or Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, in the
estimation of the appellant, writ court has failed to consider all these aspects and
hence, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is per se illegal and rendered
against the objective and purpose of the new enactment to provide speedy
remedy for the redressal of grievances of the aged and disabled parents like
appellant. Hence the instant writ appeal is filed.
6. Though the judgment in W.P.(C) No.17161/2012 is assailed on various
grounds, in our considered view the matter is squarely covered against the
appellant by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Subhashini v. District
Collector [2020(5)KLT 533(F.B)], which in effect was fairly agreed to by the
learned Senior Counsel Sri Abraham Vakkanal who appeared for the appellant.
Matters being so, adjudication of the issues raised in the appeal placing reliance
on Section 23 of Act 2007 is not required, but in order to co-relate the legal
aspects involved in the appeal vis-a-vis the Full Bench Judgment, we propose to
extract the relevant portions of the Judgment. After analysing a catena of cases,
the Hon'ble Full Bench concluded thus:
"51. Very pertinent is the fact that Section 23(1) is prospective and applies only to agreements executed after the enactment came into force. Section 23 applies only to transfers after the commencement of the Act. This further fortifies our interpretation that the provision insists on there being an express condition, written as part of the recitals, in the deed. If it were otherwise and the circumstances which led to the execution or a reservation clause could be relied on to infer or imply such a condition having regulated the execution, it would have been made applicable to deeds of all times, executed by senior citizens of a like nature. The measures of publicity as spoken of in Section 21, under Chapter 5 is also intended at informing every senior citizen about the speedy remedy provided for maintenance as also revocation of a gratuitous transfer and to alert them of the condition to be specified; which has to be a part of the recitals of the document.
52. We conclude by answering the reference, that the condition as required under Section 23(1) for provision of basic amenities and basic physical needs to a senior citizen has to be expressly stated in the document of transfer, which transfer can only be one by way of gift or which partakes the character of gift or a
similar gratuitous transfer. It is the jurisdictional fact, which the Tribunal will have to look into before invoking Section 23(1) and proceeding on a summary enquiry. We answer the reference agreeing with the decision in W.A.No.2012 of 2012 dated 28.11.2012 [Malukutty Ponnarassery v. P.Rajan Ponnarassery]. We find Shabeen Martin v. Muriel [2016 (5) KHC 603] and Sundhari v. Revenue Divisional Officer [2018 KHC 4655 = 2013 (3) KLT 1082] to be wrongly decided. We approve Radhamani v. State of Kerala [2016 (1) KHC 9] which had a recital in the document akin to that required under Section 23(1)."
7. Mr. Abraham Vakkanal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
requested that time spent in litigating before this Court may be excluded so as to
enable the appellant to pursue his remedy before a competent civil court by filing
a suit. There the question is , can it be done by this court ? In this context it is
profitable to extract Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads thus:
"Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction. - (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time
during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of the appeal or revision,
against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the
same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such
proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a count of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply
in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under
rule of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first
suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court of other cause
of a like nature.
Explanation - For the purpose of this section, -
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction."
8. Therefore, it is explicit that exclusion of time spent litigating in a properly
constituted judicial proceeding is a matter for consideration of the competent
civil court, in an application filed for condonation of delay, as is discernible from
the provision extracted above, and accordingly it is always open to the appellant
to prefer an application for exclusion of time before the civil court, if the
appellant chooses to file any suit challenging the validity of the sale deed
No.1766/99 of Koothattukulam S.R.O. It is also clear from Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 that in order to exclude the time so spent, various aspects
specified therein would have to be taken into account, by the Civil Court which
may not be possible to be undertaken by a writ court, discharging its functions
in a summary manner exercising the powers conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, and especially in view of the distinct scheme of the
provisions extracted above .
With the above observations, the writ appeal is disposed of.
Sd/-
S.MANIKUMAR
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
SHAJI P.CHALY
smv JUDGE
APPENDIX
APPELLANT'S ANNEXURES:
ANNEXURE A1: TRUE COPY OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
ANNEXURE A2: TRUE COPY OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
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