Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 11659 Ker
Judgement Date : 9 April, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.M.BADAR
FRIDAY, THE 09TH DAY OF APRIL 2021 / 19TH CHAITHRA, 1943
OP(LC).No.6 OF 2021
AGAINST THE AWARD IN ID 40/17 DTD.10.03.20 OF HON'BLE LABOUR
COURT, KOZHIKODE.
PETITIONERS:
1 KERALA MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION LTD.
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, HEAD OFFICE,
BEHIND WOMEN & CHILDREN HOSPITAL,
P.O. THYCAUD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695 014.
2 THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, KERALA MEDICAL SERVICES
CORPORATION LTD., HEAD OFFICE, BEHIND WOMEN &
CHILDREN HOSPITAL, P.O. THYCAUD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695 014.
3 THE DEPOT MANAGER, KARUNYA MEDICAL DEPOT, KERALA
MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION LTD., MALAPARAMBA,
KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673 009.
BY ADV. SHRI.M.AJAY
RESPONDENTS:
1 SANTHOSH T.S.,
SAPNA, CHELANNUR P.O., KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673 616.
2 THE LABOUR COURT, KOZHIKODE, B-BLOCK, CIVIL STATION,
WAYANAD ROAD, ERANHIPPALAM, KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673020
THIS OP (LABOUR COURT) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
09.04.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
O.P (LC) No.6/2021 2
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 9th day of April 2021
Heard the learned counsel appearing for petitioners.
2. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners drew my
attention to the order at Ext.P2 dated 11.12.2013 issued to the
1st respondent-workman appointing the workman with petitioners
on contract basis for a period of one year. Thereafter my attention
is also drawn to the contract of employment at Ext.P5 dated
01.04.2015 for the period from 01.04.2015 to 30.03.2016.
Learned counsel for petitioners accepted the fact that the
1st respondent was in employment with them from 22.12.2013 to
01.09.2016 with a break of only one day during that period.
3. It is argued that according to the terms of contract, the
1st respondent was to be terminated at any time by the competent
authority of the petitioner-Corporation if he is found guilty of any
insubordination, misconduct etc. or if it is proved beyond doubt
that the Corporation has incurred loss, damage etc. due to willful
act of the 1st respondent so also if the 1 st respondent is incapable
of discharging the duties upto the desired level assigned to the
post for which he bound to do according to the job demand.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not disputed the
fact that after the second contract, Ext.P5 which was for the
period from 01.04.2015 to 30.03.2016, there was no formal
contract entered into between the parties and the 1 st respondent
continued thereafter till he was terminated on 01.09.2016. With
this, it is argued that, as termination of the 1 st respondent was on
expiry of the contract period and as the contract was not renewed,
same cannot be termed as 'retrenchment' within the meaning of
the said term. The contractual period is required to be exempted
from the definition of the term 'retrenchment'.
5. I have considered the submissions so advanced and also
perused the materials placed before me including the Award
passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the appointment
order at Ext.P2 and contract at P5 which are stated to be marked
as Exts.M2 and M5 before the learned Labour Court. At this
juncture, it is apposite to quote the observations of the learned
Labour Court recorded in the Award after due appreciation of
evidence of the parties. Paragraph 15 of the impugned Award
needs reproduction and it reads thus:
"15. The evidence tendered by MWI would show that though the dispensation of service of the workman was prima facie by way of non-renewal of contract of employment
virtually the dispensation of service was for the reason that in his performance appraisal for the period 2016-17 he did not secure the sufficient grade more than 60% as it is stated in Ext.M8 that the workman and others obtained below 60% scoring. It is pertinent to note that incorporation of such a condition and clause i.e, to secure a minimum score in the performance appraisal does not find a place in Ext.M5 agreement executed between the parties. To bind a party to a condition in a contract/agreement the same should find a place in the contract/agreement executed between the parties. Had there been such a clause in the agreement to the effect that minimum score in the performance appraisal would be a pre-condition for the renewal of contract of employment definitely the workman would have been bound by the same. As stated above, no such contract/agreement incorporating such a condition are seen executed between the parties. The exemptions provided to S.2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 will not cover the performance appraisal conducted by the management establishment. The fact that the workman did not secure a cut off grade or score is not itself is a reason for retrenchment. If that be so, it can safely be concluded that the dispensation of service of the workman was not in terms of contractual agreement entered into between the parties, nor saved by clause (bb) of S.2(00) of the I.D. Act. Therefore, it can be found that the dispensation of service of the workman qualifies the termination as one of retrenchment within the meaning of S.2 (00) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947".
6. Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines
the term 'retrenchment' and it reads thus:
(oo) "retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health".
A perusal of the definition of the term 'retrenchment' makes it
clear that termination of service of workman as a result of non-
renewal of contract of employment between the employer and
workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein
does not amount to retrenchment.
7. In the case in hand, the 1st respondent was continued
upto 01.09.2016 after the second contractual period running from
01.04.2015 to 30.03.2016 (Ext.P5). Thus it cannot be said that
the employment of the 1st respondent with petitioners was
governed by any contract at the time of his termination with effect
from 01.09.2016. In September 2016, the relationship as master
and servant/ employer and employee between the parties was not
governed by any contract of employment. There is no document
evidencing this fact which is duly signed by the 1 st respondent-
workman. Therefore, I find no merit in the contention of the
learned counsel for petitioners that the services of the
1st respondent-workman were terminated as per the stipulation
contained in the contract of employment entered into between the
parties. Further I see no merit in the contention of the learned
counsel for petitioners that there was extension to the contract of
employment for want of any evidence on that aspect much less
any documentary evidence showing the fact that petitioners had
continued contract of employment of the 1st respondent with
approval of the 1st respondent subsequently to the period from
30.03.2016. There is no iota of evidence to show that the
1st respondent/workman has further agreed to any terms and
conditions for extension of contract for the period after
30.03.2016. It is attempted to submit that the 1 st respondent's
performance was not upto the mark as per the performance
appraisal report. If that is so, then, certainly, termination of the
1st respondent is stigmatic termination. Neither the 1 st respondent
was served with any notice nor any enquiry was held to show that
the 1st respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory performance.
In the light of these observations, it cannot be said that the
impugned Award suffers from any perversity or illegality. There is
no scope for interference in the Award passed by the learned
Labour Court which is based on the evidence adduced by the
parties on record.
This original petition as such is devoid of merit and the same
is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
A.M.BADAR
JUDGE smp
APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION, KMSCL/ADMIN/25/2012 DATED 23.09.13 WITH TRANSLATION.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION ISSUED BY THE SECOND PETITIONER, KMSCL/ADMN/25/2012 DTD.11.12.13.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE EXTRACT OF RESOLUTION NO.41.09.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE SECOND PETITIONER ORDER NO.KMSCL/ADMIN/10/2014 DATED 18.03.2015.
EXHIBIT P4(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P4.
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KMSCL AND THE FIRST RESPONDENT DATED 01.04.2015.
EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE CIRCULAR OF THE KMSCL DATED 18.03.2016.
EXHIBIT P6(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P6.
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL REPORT OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT FOR THE PERIOD 01.04.2015 TO 30.03.2016.
EXHIBIT P7(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P7.
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.KMSCL/HR/429/2016 ISSUED BY THE SECOND PETITIONER DATED 31.05.2016.
EXHIBIT P8(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P8.
EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER No.KMSCL/ADMN/42/2014 DTD.22.7.16.
EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL REPORT OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT FOR THE PERIOD 1.6.16 TO 31.08.2016.
EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE DEPOT IN-CHARGE, KARUNYA MEDICINE DEPOT, KOZHIKODE TO THE DEPUTY MANAGER, CPS SALES,
KMSCL DTD.6.4.16.
EXHIBIT P11(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P11.
EXHIBIT P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE EXPLANATION LETTER OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT DTD.5.4.16.
EXHIBIT P12(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P12.
EXHIBIT P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT UNDER S.2 A(2)(3) OF THE ID ACT BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DTD.11.5.17.
EXHIBIT P13(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P13.
EXHIBIT P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY FILED BY 3RD AND 2ND PETITIONERS BEFORE 2ND RESPONDENT DTD.4.4.18.
EXHIBIT P14(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P14.
EXHIBIT P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER FILED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DTD.2.5.18.
EXHIBIT P15(a) A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT P15.
EXHIBIT P16 A TRUE COPY OF THE AWARD OF THE SECOND RESPONDENT IN ID 40/17 DTD.10.3.20
EXHIBIT P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE CLAIM PETITION 18/21 FILED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE SECOND RESPONDENT DTD.29.1.21.
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS: NIL.
True Copy
P.S to Judge
smp
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