Shahid Khan vs The State Of Karnataka
2026 Latest Caselaw 453 Kant

Karnataka High Court

Shahid Khan vs The State Of Karnataka on 23 January, 2026

Author: H.P.Sandesh

Bench: H.P.Sandesh

                             -1-
                                     CRL.A No. 1475 of 2025



    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

       DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

                          PRESENT
           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
                            AND
       THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1475 OF 2025 [21(NIA)]
BETWEEN:

    SHAHID KHAN
    S/O. ANWAR KHAN
    AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
    RESIDING AT NO.13/2
    BISMILLA MANJIL, NEAR MEHARAJ MOSQUE
    SHIVAJI ROAD, LASHKAR MOHALLA
    SHIVAMOGGA - 577 202.
                                                ...APPELLANT
    (BY SRI MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:

    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
    BY K.G. HALLI P.S., BENGALURU
    REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
    ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICE
    HIGH COURT COMPLEX
    OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
    BENGALURU-560 001.
                                               ...RESPONDENT
    (BY SRI P. PRASANNA KUMAR, SPECIAL P.P.)

                            ***
     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 21(4) OF
THE N.I.A ACT READ WITH SECTION 25 OF UAP ACT, PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 2-5-2025 AT ANNEXURE-A AND
CONSEQUENTLY, APPRECIATE THE REGULAR BAIL APPLICATION FILE
BY THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.14 AT ANNEXURE-F AND SET THE
APPELLANT INTO THE LIBERTY IN SPECIAL CASE NO.744 OF 2023
FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 153A AND 120B OF
IPC AND SECTIONS 17 AND 18 OF UAP ACT, PENDING ON THE FILE
OF HON'BLE XLIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
(SPECIAL COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF NIA CASES), CCH-50,
BENGALURU.
                                          -2-
                                                  CRL.A No. 1475 of 2025




    THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 13-1-2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY,
VENKATESH NAIK T. J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
              and
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T

                             CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T)

The appellant/accused No.14 has filed this appeal under

Section 21(4) of The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008

(for short, 'NIA Act') read with Section 25 of The Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short, 'UAP Act')

challenging dismissal of his bail application dated 2.5.2025 in

Special Case No.744 of 2023 on the file of XLIX Additional City

Civil and Sessions Judge (Special Court for trial of NIA Cases),

CCH-50, Bengaluru.

2. The appellant and nineteen other accused are being

prosecuted in Special Case No.744 of 2023 for the charges for

the offences punishable under Sections 153A and 120B of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') and under Sections

13, 17, 18, 18A, 18B and 22B of UAP Act on the basis of the

charge-sheet filed in Crime No.328 of 2022 by

Kadugondanahalli Police.

3. The allegations against the accused are as follows:

(i) Accused Nos.1 to 19 being the office bearers,

members and cadres of the Popular Front of India/accused

No.20 (for short, 'PFI') had extreme religious views. They were

enraged by laws like Citizens Amendment Act, 2019 (for short,

'CAA'), National Register of Citizens Laws (NRC), Hijab and

Babri Masjid judgment, and laws passed by the duly elected

Government of India. They entered into conspiracy to radicalise

Muslim youth towards terrorist acts with intention to create

enmity between various sections of the society on the line of

religious disharmony and to create unrest in the nation by

indulging into terrorist activities, to eliminate duly elected

prominent leaders of the Hindu Religion, to strike terror

amongst the members of the Hindu Religion, to defy the

Government established by law, to threaten the unity, integrity

and sovereignty of India and to wage internal war against the

Government of India. Through PFI, they planned to radicalise

Muslim youth by indoctrination form service teams of such

youths, train them in handling arms and indulge in violent acts

like murder, bomb blast, etc.

(ii) Accused Nos.1, 3, 11 and 12 along with other

accused were involved in murder of Praveen Nettaru, a Hindu

leader. On 28.11.2021, the appellant conspired with accused

Nos.1, 4, 6, 7, 11 and 13 and one Mr.Shaheed Nazir and again

on 06.01.2022, the appellant conspired with other accused

Nos.1, 6, 11, 12, 13 and 19 to organise terrorist activities.

Accused No.1 was the State President of PFI, accused No.3 was

associated with PFI organisation in various capacities in 2017,

accused No.7 was working as State Secretary of PFI from 2022,

accused No.11 was working as State Executive Committee

Member since 2019, accused No.13 was working as State

General Secretary from April 2022 and accused No.14 was

working as District President of Davanagere Zone from 2019.

All the aforesaid accused were participating in various

capacities for functioning, organising and recruiting Muslim

youth for the purpose of activities of unlawful association, i.e.

PFI. They were involved in organising various meetings, events,

training camps, etc. to strengthen the aforesaid cause of Islam

by stating that by 2047, India should be ruled by Muslims or it

should become Islamic Country. They were propagating that

Hindus have destroyed Babri Masjid and indulged in atrocities

against the Islamic religion. Accused were involved in

networking the likeminded people of their mission through

social media and by organising meetings at various places.

Accused used Freedom Educational and Charitable Trust located

at Mittur, Bantwala Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District, etc. for

the purpose of unlawful activities and conspiracy to commit

terrorist acts. During such meetings, they used to impart

training to several Muslim youth. They had involved in fund

raising for the purpose of those activities. By such means,

between 2011 and 2022, the accused raised a sum of

Rs.9,10,81,649/- for their illegal activities in Karnataka, Kerala

and Tamil Nadu, etc. thereby, they have committed the

aforesaid offences.

4. The appellant was arrested on 22.09.2022. The trial

Court by the impugned order rejected the bail application

holding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he

has committed the offences alleged against him. The trial Court

further held that having regard to the material available on

record with regard to prima-facie proof of commission of

offences under the provisions of UAP Act, the Court is barred

from granting bail in view of Section 43D of UAP Act.

Challenging the said order, the above appeal is filed.

5. Sri Mohammed Tahir, learned counsel appearing for

the appellant/accused No.14, submits that as on the date of

registration of an F.I.R., PFI was neither a scheduled

organisation, nor an unlawful association and therefore, Section

16 of UAP Act does not attract. He further submits that the

allegations against the appellant are that he was training the

service team and raising funds. The offences under Sections

18, 18A and 18B of UAP Act carry punishment of imprisonment

upto five years. There are 707 witnesses in the charge-sheet

and charges are yet to be framed. There is no sufficient

material to presume that the appellant has committed the

offences alleged against him and ultimately, if he is acquitted,

liberty lost by him cannot be compensated. He further submits

that accused Nos.2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 19 have already

been granted bail.

6. Learned counsel further contended that though

allegations under Sections 17 and 18 of UAP Act are narrated in

the charge-sheet, sanction is granted only in respect of Section

17 of UAP Act. So the trial Court cannot give any findings in

respect to Section 17 of UAP Act or can frame charge-sheet

under Section 17 of UAP Act. More importantly, Section 17 of

UAP Act deals with raising funds for the terrorist activities. He

further contended that the trial Court has given vague reason

stating that the requirements of law is the prosecution sanction

and granting sanction against particular accused is not limited,

and these observations clearly overturned the legal position

and same is contrary to law. He further contended that the

Police have illegally seized cash from the appellant, in fact, said

cash is his legitimate funds earned from his real estate business

and therefore, the Investigating Officer has not followed the

mandatory provisions of Section 25/Chapter V of UAP Act,

which made the allegations against the appellant weak and

fabricated and hence, no offence is made out under Section 17

of UAP Act. He has further contended that the appellant has

spent more than two years and four months in judicial custody

and with the voluminous charge-sheet; the trial cannot be

concluded in the near future. Therefore, the detention of the

appellant/accused No.14 is not at all necessary as bail is a rule

and jail is an exception. Thus, the learned counsel prayed to

allow the appeal and to grant bail to the appellant.

7. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for

the appellant relied on the following judgments:

a. Mohammad Tapseer @ Mohammed Tafseer v. State of Karnataka1

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.12446 of 2025 dated 31.10.2025

b. Vernon v. State of Maharashtra and another2 c. R. Dineshkumar Alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and others3 d. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Another4 e. Athar Parwez v. Union of India5

8. Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public

Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State, vehemently

contended that the appellant/accused No.14 previously

approached the trial Court seeking bail and the same was

rejected on 21.02.2024 and the appellant has not indicated any

change in law or circumstances to justify the filing of successive

bail application before the trial Court and without any such

change, successive bail application was not maintainable before

the trial Court. He further contended that during the course of

investigation, the Investigating Officer collected material

evidence indicating that the appellant was an active worker of

the unlawful organisation, PFI. The appellant and other co-

accused actively participated in operations, organisational

(2023) 15 SCC 56

(2015) 7 SCC 497

(2004) 7 SCC 528

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762

framework and recruitment drives of PFI. The appellant has

taken part in organising multiple meetings, public events and

training camps with the objective of enhancing radical Islamic

ideology across the globe. The investigation material clearly

reveals that the appellant and others have propagated the

narrative that "India has been under Hindu Rule since

independence and blamed the Hindu community in the

demolition of Babri Masjid and for perpetrating violence against

members of Muslim community". He further contended that the

appellant and others disseminated the content suggesting that

laws such as, CAA and NRC, were enacted with the intent to

marginalise Muslims and therefore, the appellant and others

purportedly advocated for the establishment of Islamic

community in India by the year 2047, drawing parallels with

the historic Islamic governance. The investigation report further

reveals that the Freedom Educational and Charitable Trust,

located in Mittur, Bantwala, Dakshina Kannada District, etc.

were used as a front for unlawful activities aimed to facilitate

larger conspiracy to commit the terrorist acts. Several training

camps were allegedly conducted at the said location, where

selected individuals were indoctrinated and trained, and

eventually formed covert service team. The appellant and other

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co-accused were engaged in mobilising funds to support these

unlawful activities, which were utilised from weapon training

and other illegal activities. Further, during the course of

investigation, a significant amount of cash was recovered from

the residence of the appellant, which further corroborated the

financial link to the conspiracy. There is reasonable ground to

believe that the accusations made against the appellant are

prima-facie true and therefore, in view of statutory bar under

Section 43D(5) of UAP Act, the bail application filed by the

appellant before the trial Court was not maintainable and

hence, the trial Court has rightly rejected the bail application of

the appellant and thus, the appeal is also not maintainable.

Thus, he prayed to dismiss the appeal.

9. In support of his contentions, the learned Special

Public Prosecutor has relied on the following judgments:

a. Girish Sharma and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others6

b. Vinod Ramnani and Another v. Station House Officer and another7

(2018) 15 SCC 192

2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1269

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10. Considering the submissions made by both side and

examining the material available on record, the point that

arises for determination of this Court is as under:

Whether the impugned order of rejection of bail suffers from any arbitrariness, or illegality warranting interference at the hands of this Court?

11. Admittedly, the appellant/accused No.14 has filed

successive bail petitions before the trial Court. It is trite law

that personal liberty cannot be taken away, except in

accordance with the procedure established by law. Personal

liberty is a constitutional guarantee. It is also trite law that

person's bail application once rejected is not precluded from

filing a subsequent application for grant of bail, if there is a

change in the fact situation. At the same time, the issues which

had been canvassed earlier would not be permitted to be

re-agitated on the same grounds, as the same would lead to

speculation and uncertainty in the administration of justice and

may lead to forum hunting. The Hon'ble Apex Court in various

judicial pronouncements held that successive bail applications

are not barred per se. They can be entertained only if there is

demonstrable change in circumstances since the prior rejection.

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12. In the instant case, the appellant has taken several

grounds amongst others and some grounds were urged in the

earlier applications. Now, the learned counsel for the appellant

relies upon three new contentions viz., 1.Non-compliance by

the Investigating Officer with the procedure under Chapter V of

UAP Act during seizure. 2. Absence of sanction under Section

18 of UAP Act. 3. Delay in commencement of trial.

13. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that

Section 18 of UAP Act has been invoked against the appellant

and the Government has not accorded sanction for prosecution

under the said provision. Therefore, the trial Court cannot

frame charge or proceed against the appellant for the offence

punishable under Section 18 of UAP Act. It is contended that

the appellant is charge-sheeted for being member of PFI and

his alleged acts do not attract the definition of terrorists act.

Therefore, UAP Act does not apply to him. It is further

contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there

are no allegations against the appellant or committing any act

of murder, or any offence punishable with death or

imprisonment for life, as contemplated under Section 17 of UAP

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Act and on that count also, the provisions of UAP Act does not

gets attracted.

14. Hence, it is just and necessary to analyse Section 45

of UAP Act which governs the requirement of sanction for

taking cognizance of offences:-

"45. Cognizance of offences.-[1(1)] No court shall take cognizance of any offence-

(i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf;

(ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, and 2[if] such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government.

3[(2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time as may be prescribed to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.]"

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Perusal of the above proposition of law and the facts of

the present case goes to show that though the prosecution has

made allegations against the appellant that he committed the

offences under Sections 17 and 18 of UAP Act, admittedly, no

sanction has been accorded in respect of Section 18 of UAP Act.

15. A plain reading of Section 45 of UAP Act makes it

clear that the bar against taking cognizance applies to offences

covered under Chapter IV and VI of UAP Act, unless prior

sanction is obtained from the appropriate Government. The

term 'cognizance' refers that, it has to be taken in respect of

offences and not against an individual. Thus, Section 45 of UAP

Act mandates that sanction is pre-condition for the Court to

take cognizance of an offence and not necessarily tied to a

particular accused. Thus, the absence of sanction in respect to

particular accused specifically does not by itself preclude the

framing of charges or continuation of the proceedings, if

cognizance has been taken for the offences alleged.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant would further

contend that during the course of investigation, cash was

seized from the residence of the appellant, but the

Investigating Officer has not followed the procedure under

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Section 25 of UAP Act regarding forfeiture and seizure of

property, including cash and therefore, the offence under

Section 17 of UAP Act is not attracted in the present case. A

perusal of Chapter V of UAP Act lays down a procedure relating

to the seizure of property and cash, and that Section 25 of UAP

Act specifically outlines the steps to be followed. In the present

case, the Investigating Officer did not strictly comply with the

procedure prescribed under Section 25 of UAP Act at the time

of seizure. However, the failure to follow this procedural

formality does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient ground for

granting bail to the appellant, particularly, when there is

material on record connecting him to the offence under Section

17 of UAP Act. Any procedural lapse in the seizure of cash may,

at best, be treated as an irregularity and does not go to the

root of the case of the prosecution. There are specific

allegations and supporting material to show that the appellant

has been involved in raising funds for the commission of

terrorist activities. The ingredients of Sections 17 and 18 of

UAP Act are complied or not is a matter of trial. Hence, at this

juncture, the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial.

17. Further, in this appeal, the appellant has also filed

I.A. No.2 of 2025 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

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Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') to summon the case-diary

from the date of registration of F.I.R. to till date, to use the

same as an aid in this appeal, which is arising out of the bail

rejection order dated 02.05.2025.

18. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that

the material collected by the Investigating Officer is vague and

lacks clarity and in order to consider this appeal, all the

materials collected by the Investigating Officer right from

registration of F.I.R. till filing of the charge-sheet are necessary

for the purpose of deciding the appeal in effective manner and

relevant for proper appreciation of facts, contradictions or

inconsistencies in the investigation. He further highlighted that

the entries of case-diary will reflect the case of the prosecution,

of the beginning, at the time of seizure, time of remand, visit of

the Investigating Officer, material collected during investigation

and statement of the witnesses, etc. which aid to render

justice. He further contended that some protected witnesses

are summoned several times and forced to give statements,

which is contrary to mandate of Section 306 of Cr.P.C. Hence,

he prays to summon the case-diary.

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19. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for

the respondent-State vehemently contended that I.A. No.2 of

2025 filed by the appellant is barred by law and is not

maintainable.

20. We have perused Section 172(2) of Cr.P.C., which

states that a criminal Court can send the case-diary of a case

under trial to use the case-diary, not as evidence, but to aid

inquiry, or trial. However, the appellant is not entitled to call for

the case-diary to examine the same. More importantly, the

appellant has no locus to file the said application. In similar

appeals filed by the co-accused, summoning case-diary was not

done and this Court having considered the material collected by

the Investigating Officer and evaluating the credibility of the

case of the prosecution, disposed off said appeals. Whereas,

the appellant has filed I.A. No.2 of 2025 to summon the case-

diary, which is not permissible and it cannot be summoned at

the instance of the appellant and it is only for the purpose of

reference of the Court and if the Court requires, it can be called

for and look into the same, and the same cannot be made

available to the accused. Therefore, there are no merits in the

application and hence, the application filed by the appellant to

summon the case-diary is dismissed.

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21. Considering the material available on record and the

fact that the trial Court has dealt with all aspects of the

material in its order and has rightly rejected the bail application

of the appellant, the same does not require interference at the

hands of this Court. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the

following

ORDER

i. The appeal is dismissed.

ii. I.A. No.2 of 2025 filed under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, is also dismissed.

iii. Consequently, pending interlocutory applications, if any,

stand dismissed.

Sd/-

(H.P.SANDESH) JUDGE

Sd/-

(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE

KVK / MN