Friday, 08, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

G T Dinesh Kumar vs Director Of Enforcement
2026 Latest Caselaw 269 Kant

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 269 Kant
Judgement Date : 20 January, 2026

[Cites 61, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

G T Dinesh Kumar vs Director Of Enforcement on 20 January, 2026

Author: S Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S Sunil Dutt Yadav
                                     -1-
                                                  NC: 2026:KHC:3030
                                            CRL.P No. 14793 of 2025


            HC-KAR




              IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
                                                                      R
                   DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
                                   BEFORE
                THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV
                     CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 14793 OF 2025
            BETWEEN:
            G. T. DINESH KUMAR
            S/O THIPPERUDRAPPA,
            AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
            FLAT NO.A1-107, BLOCK-A,
            VAISHNAVI NORTH, HEBBAL,
            BENGALURU-560024
            (CURRENTLY PETITIONER IS IN
            JUDICIAL CUSTODY FROM 16.09.2025)
                                                      ...PETITIONER
            (BY SRI. SANDESH J CHOUTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W
                SRI. MADESH V M., ADVOCATE)

            AND:
            DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
Digitally   REP. BY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
signed by   GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
VIDYA G R
Location:   BENGALURU ZONAL OFFICE,
HIGH        3RD FLOOR, B BLOCK, BMTC,
COURT OF
KARNATAKA   SHANTHINAGARA-TTMC,
            K H ROAD, SHANTHINAGARA,
            BENGALURU-560 027.
                                                     ...RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. ARVIND KAMATH, ADDL. SOLICITOR GENERAL A/W SRI. MADHUKAR DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE)

THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (SECTION 483 OF BNSS, 2023) R/W 45 OF PMLA ACT, 2002 PRAYING THAT TO RELEASE THE PETITIONER FROM CUSTODY IN THE CASE REGISTERED

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

BY THE RESPONDENT IN ECIR/BGZO/25/2024 REGISTERED BY ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE PENDING ON THE FILE OF HONBLE LXXXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-82) (SPECIAL COURT EXCLUSIVELY TO DEAL WITH CRIMINAL CASES RELATED TO ELECTED FORMER AND SITTING MPS/MLAS IN THE STATE OF KARNATAKA) FOR THE O/P/U/S 45 OF PMLA ACT AND ETC.,

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 18.12.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV

CAV ORDER

S. SUNIL DUTT YADAV. J

This Order has been divided into the following

Sections to facilitate analysis:

 I    BRIEF FACTS                                        3 - 12
 II   TWIN CONDITIONS FOR GRANT OF BAIL UNDER           12 - 26
      SECTION 45 OF THE PMLA
III   OTHER CONTENTIONS                                 26 - 28
IV    LEGALITY REGARDING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED             28 - 30
      DURING ARREST
 V   DEFAULT BAIL                                       31 - 41
VI   MEDICAL BAIL                                       41 - 43
VII  LONG INCARCERATION AND DELAYED TRIAL AS A          43 - 66
     CONSIDERATION FOR GRANT OF BAIL
VIII CONCLUSION                                         67 - 71

                                                  NC: 2026:KHC:3030



 HC-KAR




The present petition has been filed seeking to release

the petitioner from custody in the case registered by the

respondent-Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter

referred to as 'ED') in Case No.ECIR/BGZO/25/2024

pending on the file of LXXXI Additional City Civil and

Sessions Judge and Special Court for Trial of MPs/MLAs

Cases at Bengaluru (CCH-82).

[I] BRIEF FACTS:-

2. The brief facts are that the petitioner has been

arraigned as an accused in Case No.ECIR/BGZO/25/2024

('hereinafter referred to as 'ECIR'). It is made out from

the records that initially, a Private Complaint came to be

filed in PCR No.28/2024 as well as FIR in Crime

No.11/2024 which was registered by the Karnataka

Lokayukta Police, Mysuru. The FIR has been registered for

the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 166, 403,

406, 420, 426, 465, 468, 340, 351 of IPC, 1860 read with

Sections 9 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 ['P.C. Act' for brevity] and read with Sections 3, 53

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

and 54 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions

Act, 1988 and read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Karnataka

Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011.

3. It is asserted that pursuant to PCR No.28/2024

(Crime No.11/2024), the Karnataka Lokayukta Police,

Mysuru has filed 'B' Final Report only against accused

Nos.1 to 4 in the PCR and had sought permission to

conduct further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ['Cr.P.C.' for

brevity].

4. The Court, while keeping open acceptance or

rejection of 'B' Final Report had adjourned the

proceedings. In the interregnum, Case No.ECIR/BGZO/

25/2024 was registered on 01.10.2024 for the scheduled

offences punishable under the Prevention of Money

Laundering Act, 2002 ['PMLA' for brevity].

5. It is stated that there had been search under

Section 17 of PMLA by the respondent - 'ED' in the house

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

of the petitioner on 18.10.2024, that the respondent-'ED'

has recorded the statement of Mr. Prashant Raju, who is

the Personal Assistant of petitioner, that on 28.10.2024,

the respondent - 'ED' had conducted search and seizure

under Section 17 of PMLA in the house of father-in-law

and brother-in-law of the petitioner and Panchanama was

drawn, that the respondent - 'ED' had also conducted

search and seizure by exercise of power under Section 17

of PMLA in the house of accused from 28.10.2024 to

29.10.2024, that the statement of petitioner was recorded

on 09.11.2024 and 20.11.2024 and accordingly, the

investigation was conducted.

6. It is submitted that the respondent - 'ED' has

recorded the statement of accused under Section 17(1)(f)

of PMLA on 16.09.2025 and on the same day, the

petitioner was arrested and remanded for custody and

subsequently he has been remanded to judicial custody

from 29.09.2025 onwards.

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

7. The petitioner had filed an application seeking

enlargement on bail, which however, has been rejected.

In light of the same, the petitioner is now seeking to be

enlarged on bail.

8. Insofar as the grant of bail under the provisions

of PMLA, Section 45 stipulates that notwithstanding

anything contained under Cr.P.C., no person accused of an

offence shall be released on bail, unless (a) the Public

Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the

application for bail and (b) the Court is satisfied that there

are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty

of such offence and not likely to commit any offence while

on bail.

9. It may also be necessary to keep in mind the

provision of Section 19 of PMLA which refers to the power

of arrest and specifies that the arrest could be resorted to,

if the Authorized Officer on the basis of material in his

possession has reason to believe that any person has been

guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA. The said

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

provision further stipulates that upon arrest, the accused

must be informed of the grounds of such arrest. Apart

from Section 45 of PMLA, Section 19 of PMLA would be of

relevance, as the petitioner has raised a contention

regarding violation of Section 19 of PMLA while resorting

to arrest and other procedural lapses in such process of

arrest warranting release on bail irrespective of the

compliance under Section 45 of PMLA.

10. It is necessary to also note that an application

under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 45 of

PMLA seeking to be enlarged on statutory/default bail on

the ground that the respondent - 'ED' had failed to file a

complete and final Prosecution Complaint within the

statutory period.

11. The petitioner's contentions in the petition were

essentially on the grounds:-

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

(i) That the investigation of the predicate offence

not having concluded, the Prosecution ought not to have

proceeded to file the Prosecution Complaint;

(ii) That the PMLA offence is not a stand alone

offence and is intertwined with the predicate offence and

accordingly, the proceedings under the PMLA ought to

have been deferred till Final Report was filed in the

predicate offence;

(iii) That the criminal activity relating to predicate

offence could not have been adjudicated upon by the

investigating machinery under the PMLA;

(iv) That the Former Commissioner of MUDA Sri

D.B.Natesh has had the summons in proceedings under

PMLA quashed as per the order dated 27.01.2025 passed

in W.P.No.32956/2024 [GM-RES];

(v) That the proceedings against others stated to

have been involved in money laundering have been stayed

by orders passed in petitions filed challenging the

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

summons issued (details of the proceedings mentioned at

para-24 of the memorandum of petition);

(vi) That there have been procedural lapses during

the procedure of arrest;

(vii) That the petitioner has co-operated with the

investigation by appearing on relevant dates;

(viii) That the Tripod Test for grant of bail was

satisfied;

(ix) That the petitioner has been continuing under

prolonged incarceration and there is no further necessity

of continuing him in incarceration after Final Report is

filed;

(x) That the petitioner has been singled out, while

the other alleged co-accused have not been arrested;

(xi) That there is a possibility of delayed trial, as

investigation is pending in respect of the predicate offence

though FIR was registered on 27.09.2024;

- 10 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

(xii) That there has been no incriminatory material

seized from the petitioner during search.

(xiii) Though the predicate offence that was made

out consequent to FIR lodged pursuant to PCR was as

regards body of offenders, including petitioner's relatives,

real estate agents, and private persons, however, the

Prosecution Complaint was filed only vis-à-vis the

petitioner solely with the view to prevent the petitioner

from obtaining default bail.

(xiv) A contention was also raised that the petitioner

was entitled for bail on medical grounds.

12. The respondent - 'ED', on the other hand, has

taken a stand contending that the proceedings under PMLA

are not necessarily tied to the predicate offence, that once

an FIR is registered, the proceedings under PMLA can

continue. It is contended that unless the conditions

mentioned by the Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal

- 11 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

Choudhary and Others v. Union of India and Others1

[Vijay Madanlal Choudhary] are satisfied, viz., where

there is acquittal on merits after trial as regards the

predicate offence, when the person accused of the

predicate offence is absolved from the allegations on

merits, when it is established through evidence that the

property in question was rightfully owned by the person

and was not derived from any criminal activity and only

under such enumerated circumstances it could be said that

the proceedings under PMLA would come to a close.

Such conditions, it is submitted, are not found in the

present case.

13. The respondent - 'ED' has further contended

that there is substantial evidence in establishing the

involvement of accused, that the grounds of arrest and

reasons to believe are detailed and sufficient, that in light

of the statutory presumption under Section 24 of PMLA

and the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 of

(2023) 12 SCC 1

- 12 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

PMLA, no grounds are made out to enlarge the petitioner

on bail.

14. It is also contended that no grounds are made

out for enlarging the petitioner on default bail on the

ground of incomplete chargesheet and once a Final Report

has been filed in the form of Prosecution Complaint (in

the present case, complaint is to be taken as referring to

chargesheet), the right of claiming default bail does not

arise.

15. Various other contentions have also been

raised, including that the findings of Special Court on the

bail application are detailed and that the Economic

Offences warrant a differential approach in case of bail.

[II] TWIN CONDITIONS FOR GRANT OF BAIL UNDER SECTION 45 OF THE PMLA :-

16. While the statutory mandate of Section 45 of

PMLA lays down two essential requirements to be fulfilled

for grant of bail which are referred to as twin conditions,

viz., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the

- 13 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) accused is

not likely to commit an offence while on bail. However,

such requirement must not be taken to require findings to

be recorded based upon the burden of proof which is of a

higher requirement, i.e. as may be required in the case of

judgment of conviction.

17. The observations made in Vijay Madanlal

Choudhary (supra) would be of relevance in the present

context. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision is

extracted hereinbelow:-

"288. The successive decisions of this Court dealing with analogous provision have stated that the court at the stage of considering the application for grant of bail, is expected to consider the question from the angle as to whether the accused was possessed of the requisite mens rea. The court is not required to record a positive finding that the accused had not committed an offence under the Act. The court ought to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.

- 14 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

Further, the court is required to record a finding as to the possibility of the accused committing a crime which is an offence under the Act after grant of bail.

302. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. While dealing with a similar provision prescribing twin conditions in MCOCA, this Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma2, held as under :

(SCC pp. 318-19, paras 44-46)

"44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the

(2005) 5 SCC 294

- 15 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.

45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.

46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.

- 16 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby."

(emphasis supplied)

303. We are in agreement with the observation made by the Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma3. The Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on available material on record is required. The court will not weigh the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of course, the work of the trial court. The court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material

Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra - (2005) 5 SCC 294

- 17 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken into consideration by the trial court in recording its finding of the guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during the trial. As explained by this Court in Nimmagadda Prasad4, the words used in Section 45 of the 2002 Act are "reasonable grounds for believing" which means the court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt."

18. Accordingly, it is clear that the Court while

considering grant of bail on the twin conditions under

Section 45 of PMLA is to arrive at a finding on the basis of

broad probabilities, while being fully conscious that the

stage at which such findings are being made is on the

basis of pre-trial stage investigation records and

pleadings. It is also a settled position that such findings

required to be made while referring to the twin tests of

Section 45 of PMLA would be tentative and would not

Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466

- 18 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

prejudice the conclusive findings still to be arrived at after

trial.

19. The nature of such findings in a factual matrix

is best elucidated by referring to the findings on prima

facie case vis-à-vis twin tests of Section 45 of PMLA in the

case of Manish Sisodia-1 (supra) at paras-24 to 28

which would demonstrate the manner in which the Court

had recorded findings as regards Section 45 of PMLA in the

particular factual context.

20. The Prosecution Complaint is detailed and

makes out a case against the petitioner herein. As

regards prima facie case made out regarding the money

laundering offence under Section 3 of PMLA, the

investigation is stated to have revealed the following:-

(i) The illegal allotment of sites in the guise of allotment of sites in lieu of compensation made to the ineligible beneficiaries;

- 19 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

(ii) Such allotment was made on the basis of false facts, forgery, cheating and use of undue influence;

(iii) The illegally allotted sites constitute the proceeds of crime;

(iv) Such proceeds of crime were layered/routed through Power of Attorney, Sale Deeds to obfuscate the true nature of proceeds of crime;


     (v)     The criminal activities associated with the
     scheduled         offence          included         undue

gratification/bribe obtained by accused persons for making the illegal allotment;

(vi) Charts are enclosed evidencing the manner of commission of offences;

21. A reference is made to the illegal allotment of

48 sites in favour of Chamundeshwari Nagara Sarvodaya

Sangha, all of which were made by G.T.Dinesh Kumar, the

petitioner herein (See para-11.7 of Prosecution

Complaint).

- 20 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

22. It is stated that when G.T. Dinesh Kumar was

confronted regarding such illegalities during custody, he

has admitted that Government of Karnataka did not grant

any permission to allot sites to the said Chamundeshwari

Nagara Sarvodaya Sangha though MUDA had requested.

It is specifically observed that he has not provided any

"plausible answers to the fact that 03 out of 48 sites

allotted in the case has been obtained by his relatives

through Sale Agreements without paying any money and

also the fact that huge sums of money were received by

his relatives from Sri N. Manjunath, who is a major

beneficiary of illegal allotment in this case." (See para-

11.7(d) of Prosecution Complaint).

23. It is specifically recorded in the Prosecution

Complaint that the allotment of sites to the aforesaid

Chamundeshwari Nagara Sarvodaya Sangha have been

obtained through GPA by real estate businessman

Sri N. Manjunath and one of the allottees of site No.65

Smt.J.S.Sunanda Devi had submitted to the adjudicating

- 21 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

authority that the site was obtained by Sri N. Manjunath

under undue pressure [see para-11.7(f) of Prosecution

Complaint].

24. It is narrated that, there is a specific finding

that the sites allotted to Chamundeshwari Nagara

Sarvodaya Sangha have been transferred to the close

relatives and associates of the petitioner, G.T.Dinesh

Kumar through Sale Agreements and the details are

provided at para-11.7(i) of the Prosecution Complaint and

the further assertion that the amount for such Agreement

was paid by Sri N. Manjunath is evidenced by the Bank

payments by way of Demand Draft [see para-11.7(j) of

the Prosecution Complaint].

25. It is also stated that the said Sri N. Manjunath

in his statement under Section 50 of PMLA has not given

any explanation for such payments made.

- 22 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

26. It is made out that huge payments have been

made to the relatives of G.T. Dinesh Kumar by N.

Manjunath including to maternal grandfather of wife of

G.T. Dinesh Kumar, brother of mother-in-law of

G.T. Dinesh Kumar, maternal grandmother of wife of

G.T. Dinesh Kumar and sister of mother-in-law of

G.T. Dinesh Kumar and no explanation has been made as

regards such payments.

27. Such details referred to above would make out

an offence of money laundering in terms of the ingredients

of the offence. The Flow Chart reflecting generation,

layering, routing and integration of proceeds of crime at

para-11.1 of the Prosecution Complaint is self-explanatory,

which is extracted as below:-

- 23 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

Criminal activities associated with Illegal allotment of Sites in the form Scheduled Offence for generation of of compensation in ineligible cases Proceeds of by officers and officials of MUDA in Crime. collusion with real estate businessmen/Influential persons/private persons.



Layering/routing   of   Proceeds   of               Transfer of sites through General
Crime                                               Power        of       Attorney/Sale
                                                    Agreement/Sale           Deeds/Gift
                                                    Deeds/Settlement Deeds


Possession and use of Proceeds of                  Possession and use         of   illegally
Crime                                              allotted MUDA sites.




Sale of the sites and projecting the Projection or claiming as untainted profits as income or projecting the property. sites as untainted i.e. compensation received from MUDA.

28. On similar lines, it is stated that offence has

been made out in the case of Chamundeshwari Nagara

Sarvodaya Sangha. A reference is also made to the illegal

allotments to Cathedral Parish Society, JSS MVP

Employees House Building Co-operative Society (EHBCS),

Smt. Neelamma and Others, K. Chandra, R. Jayamma,

and A. Papanna. The Prosecution Complaint contains the

- 24 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

details as regards each of the said illegal allotment made

and includes the aspect of proceeds of crime, undue

gratification, payments made to relatives illustrated by

appropriate Flow Charts and tabular depictions.

29. Para-13 of the Prosecution Complaint discusses

the specific role of G.T.Dinesh Kumar, the petitioner herein

as regards the offence of money laundering as also the

aspect of proceeds of crime, there is a detailed table

explaining the alleged proceeds of crime pursuant to illegal

allotments made, which is extracted below:-

   PAO No.            No. of Sites             Value

02/2025                   160             Rs.81.91 Crores
17.01.2025
14/2025                    92             Rs.36.29 Crores
09.06.2025

28/2025                    31             Rs.20.60 Crores
04.10.2025



30. The further details of proceeds of crime are

detailed in para-13 of the Prosecution Complaint and the

Table illustrating the same is extracted below:-

- 25 -

                                                   NC: 2026:KHC:3030



HC-KAR




    Sl.           PoC obtained in the case                Value of Poc
    No.                                                     (in Rs.)

1           Cash collected                                  34,65,000

2           Misuse of high security bond papers            8,28,80,000

3           Members of Chamundeshwari Nagara               5,86,80,000
            Sarvodaya Sangha

4           Shri Abdul Waheed                              3,62,20,000

5           Cathedral Parish Society                       1,70,00,000

6           Smt.Ningamma        (Sy.No.157/1      in       1,13,30,000
            Hinkal Village)

7           JSS MVP EHBCS                                  1,02,74,000

8           Smt.Ningamma (incentive allotment)              49,00,000

                                               Total      22,47,49,000



31. The petitioner has however not specifically

adverted to the factual contents of the Prosecution

Complaint, while contending that the Prosecution

Complaint itself was filed during the pendency of the

present proceedings. However, the filing of the

Prosecution Complaint is an aspect that needs to be

adverted to and taken note of, though filed subsequent to

- 26 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

the petition. The Prosecution Complaint crystallises the

stand of the Prosecution.

[III] OTHER CONTENTIONS:-

32. As regards other contentions, the same are

dealt with infra. As regards the contention relating to the

proceedings under PMLA having overshot by investigation

of the predicate offence, it could be stated that the legal

requirement of a First Information Report would be

sufficient for the progress of proceedings under PMLA.

The proceedings under PMLA would fail only if the

proceedings relating to the predicate offence vis-à-vis the

accused has resulted in discharge/acquittal or quashment

of the predicate offence as against the accused. In the

absence of such termination of such proceedings of the

predicate offence, it could be stated that there is no bar

for continuance of the proceedings under PMLA.

33. It would also be necessary to notice that the

present proceedings being limited to grant of bail, the

- 27 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

finding regarding prima facie case as regards the offence

of money laundering cannot result in conversion of present

petition to one under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. / Section 528

of BNSS or petition to discharge and accordingly, a

detailed consideration of the ingredients of the offence of

money laundering, including adjudication relating to

criminal activity in relation to scheduled offence need not

be entertained.

34. Insofar as the contention that the petitioner is

entitled to be enlarged on bail on the ground of parity, it

must be noticed that the orders relied on by the petitioner

are the orders passed in exercise of Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

quashing the summons and proceedings. The ground of

parity must rest on bail to a co-accused and cannot be

permissible to take note of the orders passed quashing the

proceedings against other co-accused.

35. The mere stay of proceedings against other

accused would be no ground to seek for enlargement of

bail and considerations for enlargement of bail are distinct.

- 28 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

36. At this stage of pre-trial proceedings looking

into the detailed narration made regarding the offence of

money laundering, criminal activity in relation to

scheduled offence, proceeds of crime, the Court is not in a

position to record a finding that there are no reasonable

grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of

such offence. Though various contentions have been

raised by the learned counsel appearing for accused,

suffice it to state that the contents of Prosecution

Complaint could not permit negativing the prima facie role

of the petitioner in the commission of offence.

[IV] LEGALITY REGARDING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED DURING ARREST:-

37. The petitioner has also raised contentions

regarding the validity of arrest on various grounds and had

submitted that the petitioner is entitled to be enlarged on

bail.

- 29 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

38. The identical contentions raised before the trial

Court has been rejected by a well reasoned order and

relevant findings are made at paras-13 to 25 of the order

rejecting bail. No doubt, the present proceedings are in

the nature of concurrent jurisdiction requiring fresh

consideration. However, the elaborate discussion and

sound reasoning appeals to the Court and this Court is in

broad agreement with the observations made.

39. As regards the contention that the satisfaction

of the Officer that he has reasons to believe that the

accused is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act

and only there upon power of arrest could be exercised,

the trial Court after having perused the records has stated

that the remand application and grounds of arrest when

perused would make out a case for exercise of power of

arrest. This Court has no reason to disagree with such

finding and endorses such conclusion.

- 30 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

40. The trial Court has also recorded a finding after

consideration that grounds of arrest are communicated,

that reasons for arrest are also communicated.

41. Further, the trial Court at para-21 has referred

to the grounds of arrest and in para-22 regarding reasons

to believe. A finding has been recorded as regards non-

circumvention of Section 19 of PMLA.

42. The remand applications are detailed and record

that grounds of arrest have been communicated and

acknowledged by him.

43. At paragraphs-14 to 18 of the order of the trial

Court, there is detailed analysis of adherence to the

factual guidelines of Apex Court in D.K. Basu v. State of

W.B.5 and such factual finding also requires endorsement

and petitioner has failed to make out a case for a

divergent view.

(1997) 1 SCC 416

- 31 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

[V] DEFAULT BAIL:-

44. The petitioner has filed an application under

Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. [Section 187(3) of BNSS] read

with Section 45 of PMLA. It is the case made out by the

petitioner that the arrest was on 16.09.2025 and the sixty

day period for completion of investigation had expired on

15.11.2025, while the 'ED' though had filed the

Prosecution Complaint on 14.11.2025, the same was

incomplete and defective and accordingly, have sought for

release of the petitioner on statutory/default bail.

45. It is contended that the incomplete chargesheet

is no chargesheet at all and that the investigation as

regards the other accused as on the relevant date was still

to be completed and accordingly, the mere filing of

Prosecution Complaint against the petitioner has been

made only to defeat the indefeasible right of the

petitioner.

- 32 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

46. The statement of objections has been filed by

the respondent and it is contended that the Prosecution

Complaint has been filed within the stipulated period of

sixty days.

47. It is further submitted that the observations

made in the office note by the Registry cannot form the

basis to come to a conclusion that incomplete complaint

has been filed. It is submitted that the clarifications and

compliances pointed out by the Pending Section of the

Court relate to minor discrepancies, including pagination of

relied upon documents and description in Index, which

office objections have been duly complied with. It is

submitted that such observations made by the Registry

cannot form the basis for the petitioner to claim default

bail.

48. It is further submitted that the technical defects

do not have the effect of overruling the substantive

contents of the chargesheet.

- 33 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

49. The defects that were noticed by the Registry

have been complied and the Court has noticed that the

discrepancies noted as regards the relied upon documents

have been rectified by the Investigating Officer as on

27.11.2025. It is further observed that the learned SPP

had submitted that they had not been intimated regarding

the discrepancies in time.

50. It is to be noticed that the nature of defects

appear to be formal in nature, including as regards the

corrections in the Index Sheet of the Prosecution

Complaint.

51. In the present case, the chargesheet has

always continued to remain as a part of the Court record

and there has been rectification of defects, and in the

absence of any defect which the Court feels is fatal to the

Final Report, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the

benefit of default bail. The Special Court has not found the

defects to be of such nature so as to vitiate the

chargesheet itself. If that were to be so, it cannot be held

- 34 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

that the defects such as Index Sheet as noticed in the

present case cannot have the effect of vitiating the

chargesheet.

52. In the case of Sajith v. State of Kerala6 relied

on by the petitioner, the chargesheet was not

re-presented after it was returned as defective.

Accordingly, the said order would not come to the aid of

the petitioner.

53. Insofar as the aspect of incomplete chargesheet

being a ground for default bail, it must be noticed that as

regards the petitioner is concerned, a Final Report was

filed within the period of sixty days. No doubt,

investigation against other accused is still under progress,

however, by virtue of the law laid down by the Apex Court

in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil

Wadhawan and Another7 [Kapil Wadhawan (supra)],

wherein it is clarified that once the chargesheet is filed

against the particular accused, the statutory right of

(2024) 3 SCC 734

- 35 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

default bail cannot be claimed on the ground that

investigation qua other accused was pending, the question

of contending that there was incomplete chargesheet

warranting extending of relief of default bail does not

arise.

54. The further contention is that while filing the

Prosecution Complaint, liberty has been sought for

Additional Prosecution Complaint by the prosecution for

further investigation.

55. Once the essential contents of chargesheet are

found, mere liberty reserved for further investigation

would not take away the effect of filing of chargesheet, as

long as the requirements of a Final Report under Section

173(2) of Cr.P.C. are found.

56. Accordingly, in the present case, it is not

demonstrated that the requirements of Section 173(2) of

Cr.P.C. is absent. If that were to be so, the Prosecution

Complaint filed would fulfil the requirement of filing of the

- 36 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

Final Report within the time stipulated and liberty sought

for to file Additional Prosecution Complaint after further

investigation would not take away the effect of first

complete Prosecution Complaint that was filed on

14.11.2025. This position would emanate from the

reading of paras-21 to 24 of the decision in Kapil

Wadhawan (supra). The same are extracted

hereinbelow:-

"21. In our opinion, the Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India8 has aptly explained the scope of Section 173(2) : (SCC p. 716, para 76)

"76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police officer under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. The Section 173(2) provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must be in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom

(1991) 3 SCC 655

- 37 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

(e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he had been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar9 that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an intimation to the magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the Investigating Officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2) purports to be an opinion of the Investigating Officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more need be stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence."

(emphasis supplied)

(1980) 3 SCC 152

- 38 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

22. In view of the above settled legal position, there remains no shadow of doubt that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. The report under Section 173 is an intimation to the court that upon investigation into the cognizable offence, the investigating officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). As settled in the aforestated case, it is not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated.

23. ... It may be noted that the right of the investigating officer to pray for further investigation in terms of sub-section (8) of Section 173 is not taken away only because a charge-sheet is filed under sub-section (2) thereof against the accused. Though ordinarily all documents relied upon by the prosecution should accompany the charge-sheet, nonetheless for some reasons, if all the documents are not filed along with the charge-sheet, that reason by itself would not invalidate or vitiate the

- 39 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

charge-sheet. It is also well settled that the court takes cognizance of the offence and not the offender."

57. The reliance may also be placed upon the Apex

Court decision in Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI10 [also referred

to by the Apex Court in Kapil Wadhawan (supra)]. The

relevant paragraph is extracted hereinbelow:-

"39. ... The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under sub-section (8) thereof.

Whereas only when a charge-sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of sub- section (8) of Section 173 of the Code."

(emphasis supplied)

(2007) 8 SCC 770

- 40 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

58. Further, it must be noticed that, as this Court

finds that the Prosecution Complaint filed in the first

instance cannot be stated to be incomplete merely on the

ground that further Prosecution Complaint would be filed

upon further investigation. Accordingly, the question of

granting default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. does

not arise. The petitioner has not been able to point out

that the essential requirements of a chargesheet are

absent.

59. Though the Apex Court in Ritu Chhabaria v.

Union of India and Others11 [Ritu Chhabaria (supra)]

had observed that without completing investigation of a

case, the Prosecution Complaint cannot be filed by the

Investigating Agency only to deprive the accused of right

of default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. However, in

the case of Director of Enforcement v. Manpreet Singh

Talwar12, the Apex Court by its order of 12.05.2023 has

clarified that the application for grant of default bail could

(2024) 12 SCC 116 - [W.P.(Crl.) No.60/2023]

SPL (Crl.) 5724/2023

- 41 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

be proceeded independent of and without relying on the

judgment in W.P.(Crl.) No.60/2023, disposed of on

26.04.2023. In effect, the Apex Court has held as

hereunder:-

"In continuation of the interim order of this Court dated 1 May 2023, we clarify that the order shall not preclude any trial court or, as the case may be, High Court from considering an application for the grant of default bail under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 independent of and without relying on the judgment dated 26 April 2023 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No 60 of 2023."

[VI] MEDICAL BAIL:-

60. The petitioner has also raised the medical

ground and seeks for bail on such ground as well.

Reliance is placed on the First Proviso to Section 45 of

PMLA, while seeking bail. Proviso to Section 45 reads as

follows:-

"Provided that a person who is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm or

- 42 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

is accused either on his own or along with other co-accused of money-laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:"

61. It is averred in the petition that the petitioner is

suffering from health issues, such as Haemorrhoids,

Asthma, Hamstring injury and also that the Doctor has

advised him to undergo 2D Scan for chest pain. The

medical documents are enclosed at Annexure-'V6' to the

petition.

62. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

the petitioner is required to be operated regarding

Haemorrhoids. It must be noticed that for the purpose of

being enlarged on bail, it is to be established that the

petitioner is to be sick or infirm. However, it is the settled

position of law that sickness or infirmity must be of such

nature that medical assistance cannot be provided in

penitentiary hospitals. The nature of illness pleaded is

such that it could be treated in Government Hospitals and

- 43 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

the respondents can be directed to ensure that medical

treatment as may be required for the purpose of present

medical ailment be provided. The material on hand does

not make out a case of any serious life threatening ailment

that cannot be treated in jail/Government Hospital.

Further, it cannot be stated that the medical ailment is

such that his continuance in custody would endanger life

of the accused.

63. Accordingly, the bail sought on medical grounds

is liable to be rejected, while observing that the

respondent Authorities have to take appropriate action to

ensure that the petitioner is given adequate treatment for

his health ailment.

[VII] LONG INCARCERATION AND DELAYED TRIAL AS A CONSIDERATION FOR GRANT OF BAIL:-

64. While the satisfaction of twin conditions under

Section 45 of PMLA are indeed necessary in order to

consider grant of bail, the question as to whether general

- 44 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

principles of bail which may be considered to be the facets

of Article 21 of the Constitution of India could be read into

so as to enlarge the accused on bail in case the

circumstances are made out, is a matter that has been

dealt with by the Apex Court. The observations made by

Apex Court in Manish Sisodia v. Central Bureau of

Investigation13 [Manish Sisodia-1] are extracted

hereinbelow:-

"28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated, we are not inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail at this stage.

29. However, we are also concerned about the prolonged period of incarceration suffered by the appellant Manish Sisodia. In P. Chidambaram v. Enforcement Directorate14, the appellant therein was granted bail after being kept in custody for around 49 days15, relying on the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab16 and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI17, that even if the

(2024) 12 SCC 691

(2020) 13 SCC 791

(2020) 13 SCC 337, the appellant therein was granted bail after being kept in custody for around 62 days.

(1980) 2 SCC 565

(2012) 1 SCC 40

- 45 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case. Ultimately, the consideration has to be made on a case-to-case basis, on the facts. The primary object is to secure the presence of the accused to stand trial. The argument that the appellant therein was a flight risk or that there was a possibility of tampering with the evidence or influencing the witnesses, was rejected by the Court.

30. Again, in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI18, this Court referred to Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab19 and Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab20, to emphasise that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right within the broad scope of Article 21 of the Constitution.

31. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary 21, this Court while highlighting the evil of economic offences like money-laundering, and its adverse impact on the society and citizens, observed that arrest infringes the fundamental right to life. This Court referred to Section 19 of the PML Act, for the in-built safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officers to ensure fairness, objectivity and accountability22.

(2022) 10 SCC 51

(2005) 7 SCC 387

(1977) 4 SCC 291

(2023) 12 SCC 1

See also Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India - (2024) 7 SCC 576

- 46 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

32.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary23, also held that Section 436-A of the Code24 can apply to offences under the PML Act, as it effectuates the right to speedy trial, a facet of the right to life, except for a valid ground such as where the trial is delayed at the instance of the accused himself. In our opinion, Section 436-A should not be construed as a mandate that an accused should not be granted bail under the PML Act till he has suffered incarceration for the specified period. This Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra25, held that while ensuring proper enforcement of criminal law on one hand, the court must be conscious that liberty across human eras is as tenacious as tenacious can be.

34. Detention or jail before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not become punishment without trial. If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of

(2023) 12 SCC 1

436-A of the Code reads:

"436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained.--Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

Explanation.--In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded."

(2021) 2 SCC 427

- 47 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

the prosecution, and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to equate these cases with those punishable with death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnaping for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where 100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded. The allegations have to be established and proven.

35. The right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be read into Section 439 of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted, that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, may well be guided to exercise the power to grant bail. This would be truer where the trial would take years."

- 48 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

65. The observations at para-35 referred to above

would indicate that constitutional protection flowing from a

higher law could be read into the jurisprudence of bail and

into Section 439 of Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of PMLA. The

said principle has been reiterated in Manish Sisodia v.

Directorate of Enforcement26 [Manish Sisodia -3].

The relevant portions of the decision are extracted

hereinbelow:-

"25. Before considering the submissions of the learned ASG with regard to maintainability of the present appeals on account of the second order of this Court, it will be apposite to refer to certain observations made by this Court in its first order.

66. The Court had reiterated the observation made

in paras-29 to 35 of Manish Sisodia-1 and has made

certain other relevant observations that are extracted

below:-

(2024) 12 SCC 660

- 49 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

36. In view of the assurance given at the Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next six to eight months, we give liberty to the appellant Manish Sisodia to move a fresh application for bail in case of change in circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted and proceeds at a snail's pace in next three months. If any application for bail is filed in the above circumstances, the same would be considered by the trial court on merits without being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail application, including the present judgment. Observations made above, re.: right to speedy trial, will, however, be taken into consideration. The appellant Manish Sisodia may also file an application for interim bail in case of ill health and medical emergency due to illness of his wife. Such application would be also examined on its own merits."

67. The relevant facts indicating the length of

imprisonment are:-

(a) Date of registration of FIR:- 27.09.2024 - Pursuant to direction of the Special Court in PCR No.28/2024,

- 50 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

wherein matter was referred for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

(b) Date of arrest:- 16.09.2025

(c) Period of incarceration as on date of pronouncement of order:- 127 days (from the date of arrest till the date of pronouncement).

68. It is to be examined as to whether such period

of incarceration would be sufficient to treat it as infringing

upon rights of the petitioner under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India and thus entitling the petitioner to be

enlarged on bail.

69. It is to be noticed that the Apex Court in Manish

Sisodia-3 (supra) while dealing with request for being

enlarged on bail in light of the liberty granted under

Manish Sisodia - 1(supra) has granted bail on the sole

ground of long incarceration compounded by prospects of

a delayed trial.

- 51 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

70. The Apex Court, while considering the objection

of learned ASG that provisions of Section 45 of PMLA

would come in the way of consideration of grant of bail to

the accused has observed that the observations made in

Manish Sisodia -1 (supra) at para-34 would be

sufficient to proceed to consider grant of bail despite

restrictions under Section 45 of PMLA. Para-37 of the

decision in Manish Sisodia-3 (supra) is extracted

hereinbelow:-

"37. In the light of the specific observations of this Court in para 34 of the first order27, we are not inclined to accept the submission of the learned ASG that the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA would come in the way of consideration of the application of the appellant for grant of bail."

71. A close scrutiny of the context in which bail was

rejected in Manish Sisodia-1 (supra) would reveal that

the application for bail was rejected on its merits after

recording a finding regarding prima facie case made out as

Manish Sisodia v. CBI - (2024) 12 SCC 691

- 52 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

regards the ingredients of the offence of money

laundering. Such rejection is detailed in the discussion at

para-1 to para-25, what would be of substantial

significance is the latter part of the order from para-26

onwards. The Apex Court has consciously adverted to the

effect of long incarceration and the object of bail being to

secure the accused to stand trial. The Apex Court has

referred to the right of speedy trial flowing from Article 21

of the Constitution of India. A specific reference is made

to the judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)

insofar as it refers to Section 436A of the Code as being

applicable to offences under PMLA and observes that

Section 436A effectuates the right to speedy trial being a

facet of right to life, except where such delay is

attributable to the accused himself. It re-emphasizes

that:-

"34. Detention or jail before being pronounced of guilty of an offence should not become punishment without crime. If the trial gets protracted despite assurances of the Prosecution

- 53 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

and it is clear that case will not be decided within a foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be meritorious...."

72. It is relevant to notice that it is in the context of

an order granting bail under PMLA that the Apex Court has

reiterated the principle, 'bail is rule and jail is exception'.

The observations at para-52 of Manish Sisodia-3 reads

as follows:-

"52. The Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case28 further observed that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straightforward open-and-shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should

(2024) 9 SCC 813

- 54 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

recognize the principle that "bail is rule and jail is exception".

73. It is significant that the decision in Manish

Sisodia - 3(supra) reiterates that Section 45 of PMLA

would not come in the way of considering grant of bail due

to long incarceration and delay in time.

74. That apart, what is noticeable is that the

reiteration of the principle, 'bail is rule and jail is

exception', which observation is made even in the context

of PMLA.

75. The other orders of the Apex Court in the same

line of reasoning would require reference. The Apex Court

in Padamchand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate29 has

specifically clarified that the law laid down in Manish

Sisodia-3 (supra) was not under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India and that the twin conditions under

Section 45 of PMLA cannot override the constitutional

SLP No.(Cri.) 17476/2025

- 55 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

safeguard as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. The observations at paras-6 and 7 of the decision

would read as hereunder:-

"6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court, while considering the law laid down by this Court in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine 1920, has observed that this Court has granted bail in the said matter in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

7. We may clarify that in the case of Manish Sisodia (supra) the Court has not exercised the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Court has held that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA cannot override the constitutional safeguards, as provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

This Court has held that a prolonged incarceration cannot be permitted to be converted pre-trial detention into a sentence without trial. Like in the case of Manish Sisodia (supra) in the present case also thousands of documents are required to be considered at the stage of trial, so also around 50 witnesses are required to be examined. The main evidence in the present case is documentary in nature, which is already seized by the prosecution agency. As such,

- 56 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

there is no possibility of the same being tampered with."

76. What would be of significance is that the

observations were made by the Apex Court as extracted

hereinabove, while specifically dealing with the contention

of the learned Additional Solicitor General that, no bail

could be granted unless twin conditions of Section 45 of

PMLA are complied with (see para-4).

77. Accordingly, the Three Judge Bench of Apex

Court while reiterating the order in Manish Sisodia-3

(supra) has set at rest the primacy of constitutional rights

flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India vis-à-

vis the statutory provisions of Section 45 of PMLA.

78. It is also an independent principle of bail

jurisprudence that the object of pre-trial detention cannot

be punitive nor could it be construed to constitute moral

conviction.

- 57 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

79. The Apex Court has reiterated that the right to

personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of

India that is to be safeguarded where there is indefinite

detention in cases involving voluminous documents and

heavy material where trial is unlikely to begin promptly.

The observations of Apex Court at para-27 in V. Senthil

Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of

Enforcement30 [Senthil Balaji (supra)] is extracted

hereinbelow:-

"27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three years, and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is higher when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long time, especially when there is no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will depend on the provisions under which the accused is being tried and

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626

- 58 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

other factors. One of the most relevant factor is the duration of the minimum and maximum sentence for the offence. Another important consideration is the higher threshold or stringent conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit provided by the relevant law for the completion of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb31, can only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if the Judges conclude that there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the power of granting bail can always be exercised by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory provisions. The Constitutional Courts can always exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases under the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the maximum sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and

(2021) 3 SCC 713

- 59 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can be substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts can always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs. An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary."

80. It thus becomes clear that the Apex Court has

reiterated the supremacy of rights flowing from Part-III of

the Constitution of India which stand abridged where there

is no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time

and the constitutional courts on such principle enlarge the

accused on bail "notwithstanding the statutory provisions".

- 60 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

81. The observations in Senthil Balaji (supra) has

been reiterated by the latest judgment of the Apex Court

in Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement32 at

paras-13 and 14.

"13. In V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, of which, one of us was a member (Augustine George Masih, J.,), this Court, particularly in para 27, held that where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged, constitutional courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21. The Court further emphasised that Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention in cases involving voluminous, document-heavy material where trial is unlikely to begin promptly.

14. Upon considering the material placed before us, we find that several co-accused, whose alleged roles will ultimately be evaluated at trial, have already been granted bail. The Appellant has remained in custody for over seven months. The record

SLP (Crl.) No.13737/2025 vide order dated 03.12.2025.

- 61 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

is entirely documentary, as of now there are 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages are involved, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC. In our view, these circumstances indicate that the commencement of trial is not imminent and that the trial itself is not likely to conclude once started in the near future. The continued detention of the Appellant requires closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations.

82. The Apex Court in Udhaw Singh v.

Enforcement Directorate33 has noticed the judgment in

Union of India Through Assistant Director v.

Kanhaiya Prasad34 [Kanhaiya Prasad (supra)]which

appeared to strike a discordant note has specifically

observed at para-5 that the observations made in the said

judgment was in the context of a particular factual matrix

where the orders in Senthil Balaji (supra) were not

Crl.A No.799/2025 vide order dated 17.02.2025

(2025) SCC OnLine SC 306

- 62 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

applicable and accordingly, the order in Kanhaiya Prasad

(supra) does not refer to the judgment in Senthil Balaji

(supra).

83. The latest judgment of the Apex Court in the

context of long detention being a ground to seek release

on bail is that of the Apex Court in Arvind Dham v.

Directorate of Enforcement35. The observations at

para-15 to para-18 reiterate and sum up the legal

position, which is as follows:-

"15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and have carefully perused the record. The court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of offences is also the term of sentence i.e., prescribed for the offence, the accused is alleged to have committed36. The court has also to take into account the object of the special Act, the gravity of offence and the attending circumstances along with period of

2026 SCC OnLine SC 30

P.Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791

- 63 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

sentence. All economic offences cannot be classified into one group as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one group and deny bail on that basis37. It is well settled that if the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime38. The aforesaid proposition was quoted with approval by another two-Judge Bench of this Court and it was held that long period of incarceration for around 17 months and the trial not even having commenced, the appellant in that case has been deprived of his right to speedy trial39.

16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Senthil Balaji's case40 has held that under the statutes such as PMLA, where maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional Courts, if there is no

Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51

Javed Gulam NAbi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813

Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660

V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626

- 64 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention in violation of Article 21.

17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Chand Jain (supra), reiterated that prolonged incarceration cannot be allowed to convert pretrial detention into punishment and that documentary evidence already seized by the prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering with the same.

18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of trial, cannot be countenanced, as it has the effect of converting pretrial detention into form of punishment. Economic offences, by their very nature, may differ in degree and fact, and therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class warranting a blanket denial of bail."

84. The Apex Court took note of the arrest of only

the petitioner therein who was one of the 28 individuals,

that the maximum sentence was seven years, that there

- 65 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

was no likelihood in the commencement of trial in the near

future. It is observed at para-19 as follows:-

"19. ..There is no likelihood of trial commencing in the near future. The continued incarceration in such circumstances particularly where the evidence which is primarily documentary in nature, is already in custody of the Prosecution, violates the right of the appellant to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. "

Accordingly, taking note of all the above factors, the

Court in the above factual matrix enlarged the accused on

bail.

85. The consistent legal reasoning adopted while

enlarging the accused on bail is in the context of long

detention, factually dense material relied upon and

absence of any possibility of trial being concluded early.

Further, the Apex Court in Senthil Balaji (supra) has

emphasized that judicial discretion is vested in the

constitutional courts which is to be exercised in light of the

particular factual matrix.

- 66 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

86. Accordingly, it is clear that the ground of

speedy trial, context of delay in trial and long incarceration

are by itself independent grounds to seek for being

enlarged on bail on the premise of rights flowing from

Article 21 of the Constitution of India which could be

pressed into service de hors merits of the application in

terms of Section 45 of PMLA. The Apex Court has

referred to constitutional mandate being higher law must

be read into Section 439 of Cr.P.C.

87. In light of the above legal framework, the

request of the petitioner for being enlarged on bail in the

present case is to be considered.

88. However, taking note that the length of

incarceration is 127 days as of now, it can be stated that it

would not qualify to be long incarceration entitling the

petitioner to be released on bail for the present.

- 67 -

                                                 NC: 2026:KHC:3030



HC-KAR




[VIII]       CONCLUSION:-


89. The approach of Apex Court in Manish Sisodia

- 1 (supra) could be adopted in the present case as well.

The Apex Court while recording a positive finding though

for the purposes of Section 45 of PMLA that the prayer for

grant of bail could not be considered, as a prima facie case

of involvement of the petitioner was made out, however,

reserved liberty to approach, if there was delay in the trial

while discussing the effect of prolonged incarceration.

90. The observations made at paras-29 to 32

extracted supra in Manish Sisodia-1 (supra) as well as

the observation at para-36 which is extracted as

hereunder:-

"36. In view of the assurance given at the Bar on behalf of the prosecution that they shall conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps within next six to eight months, we give liberty to the appellant Manish Sisodia to move a fresh application for bail

- 68 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

in case of change in circumstances, or in case the trial is protracted and proceeds at a snail's pace in next three months. If any application for bail is filed in the above circumstances, the same would be considered by the trial court on merits without being influenced by the dismissal of the earlier bail application, including the present judgment. Observations made above, re.: right to speedy trial, will, however, be taken into consideration. The appellant Manish Sisodia may also file an application for interim bail in case of ill health and medical emergency due to illness of his wife. Such application would be also examined on its own merits."

would indicate that the Apex Court taking note of the

stand of the Prosecution regarding trial, reserved liberty to

the appellant therein to move a fresh application for bail in

case of change in circumstances or if trial is protracted and

proceeds at a snail's pace in the next three months or if

the trial is not concluded within six to eight months.

91. Subsequently, in Manish Sisodia v.

Directorate of Enforcement41 [Manish Sisodia-2]

(2024) SCC OnLine SC 1498

- 69 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

when the accused had approached the Apex Court once

again, the Apex Court noticing that the period of six to

eight months fixed by the previous order

[Manish Sisodia-1 (supra)] not having expired,

reserved liberty to revive his prayer to move afresh after

filing of complaint/chargesheet.

92. Finally, the Apex Court in the third round of

approach whereby a challenge was made to the rejection

of application by the High Court in Manish Sisodia-3

(supra) enlarged the petitioner on bail recording that

there was remote possibility of trial being concluded in the

near future, that keeping the appellant behind the bars for

an unlimited period of time would deprive his fundamental

right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of

India, that prolonged incarceration before being

pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to

become punishment without trial.

93. Finally, the Apex Court proceeded to grant bail

after taking note of the aspect of long incarceration. In

- 70 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

the present case as well having held that the length of

incarceration cannot qualify to be long incarceration, as

the petitioner has been in custody for 127 days as of now,

it would be appropriate to reserve liberty to the petitioner

to approach this Court after a lapse of three months.

94. The petitioner then would have to point out as

regards Prosecution having taken steps for

commencement of trial and that there may be the

possibility of joint trial contributing to further delay and

that there was no possibility of trial concluding within a

reasonable time.

95. The Prosecution also would have to keep such

aspects in mind so as to demonstrate that trial would be

concluded within a reasonable time. Upon consideration of

such aspects, the Court may take an appropriate decision.

96. Reserving liberty would be justified while

noticing that, as on date, it is the petitioner alone who has

been arrested amongst the several accused, that prior to

- 71 -

NC: 2026:KHC:3030

HC-KAR

his arrest, he had subjected himself to interrogation and

that the investigation of the predicate offence is not yet

concluded.

97. Accordingly, in light of the observations made

above, the grant of bail for the present is rejected.

However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to

re-approach after a period of three months directly before

this Court and to make a renewed plea for bail.

98. Accordingly, the petition is rejected, while

reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach afresh in

terms of the relevant observations supra.

Sd/-

(S. SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE

VGR

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter