[Cites 26, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri Somashekar vs M/S Saijayini Housing Developers on 2 February, 2026
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COMAP No.530/2022
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO.530/2022
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. SOMASHEKAR
S/O LATE SRI. M. VENKATAPPA
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS.
2. SMT. NANDA REDDY
W/O SRI. V. SOMASHEKAR
Digitally signed AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS.
by
3. SMT. S. PAVITHRA
RUPA V D/O SRI. V. SOMASHEKAR
HIGH COURT AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS.
OF KARNATAKA
4. SRI. S. KARTHIK
S/O SRI. V. SOMASHEKAR
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS.
ALL ARE R/AT. SY. NO.80/1 AND 43
VENKATESHWARA LAYOUT
SOS POST, JP NAGAR 8th PHASE
UTTRAHALLI HOBLI
BANGALORE 560076.
...APPELLANTS
(BY MISS. SAMARTHANA SURESH, ADV., FOR
MR. K.B. NAVEEN KUMAR, ADV.,)
AND:
M/S. SAIJAYINI HOUSING DEVELOPERS
OFFICE AT NO.37, 1st FLOOR
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COMAP No.530/2022
HC-KAR
SURABHI NAGAR, 5th CROSS
JAMBU SAVARI DINNE
J P NAGAR , 8th PHASE
BENGALURU 560076
REP. BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER
MANISH AGARWAL.
...RESPONDENT
(RESPONDENT SERVED)
*******
THIS COMAP/COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
13(1-A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 READ WITH
SECTION 37(1-C) OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT,
PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN COM.A.S.NO.69/2015, ON
THE FILE OF THE LXXXIV ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
(CCH-85-COMMERCIAL COURT) BENGALURU AND IN A.C.NO.18/2013
ON THE FILE OF THE ARBITRATOR TRIBUNAL AND SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED.17.04.2021 PASSED IN
COM.A.S.NO.69/2015 AND CONFIRM THE AWARD DATED.26.02.2015
PASSED BY THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL IN A.C.NO.18/2013, BY
ALLOWING THE APPEAL WITH COSTS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
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COMAP No.530/2022
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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
This appeal is filed by the appellants under Section 13(1-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the 2015 Act') read with Section 37(1-c) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1996
Act'), challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.04.2021
passed in Com.A.S.No.69/2015 by the LXXXIV Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-85-Commercial
Court, Bengaluru).
2. The brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are
that the Joint Development Agreement (JDA) dated 01.03.2007
executed between the appellants, owners of the suit schedule
property, and the respondent-developer, pursuant to which a
General Power of Attorney (GPA) was also executed. The
disputes having arisen, the respondent initiated arbitration in
A.C.No.18/2013 seeking for refund of the amount and for other
reliefs. The Arbitral Tribunal, by award dated 26.02.2015,
dismissed the claim. The respondent challenged the said award
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, in Com.A.S.No.69/2015,
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which came to be allowed by judgment dated 17.04.2021.
Being aggrieved, the present appeal is filed along with an
application in I.A.No.1/2022 under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 234 days in filing
the appeal.
3. Miss Samarthana Suresh, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants submits that the appellants have
filed an affidavit accompanying the application on 16.12.2022
and the averments in the affidavit shows sufficient cause to
condone the delay. It is submitted that the delay in filing the
present appeal is neither willful nor deliberate but has occurred
due to bona fide reasons beyond the control of the appellants.
It is further submitted that when the case was transferred to
the Commercial Court during the Covid-19 pandemic, neither
the appellants nor their lawyer received any notice about the
transfer. After knowing about the Court's judgment dated
05.11.2022, they acted quickly to get the necessary documents
and to file the appeal. It is also submitted that if the delay is
not condoned, it would cause prejudice to the appellants as
they would lose their chance to present their case, while the
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other side would not be harmed by allowing the case to move
forward. Therefore, she seeks to condone the delay and hear
the appeal on its merits.
4. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, perused the material
available on record and have given our anxious consideration to
the submissions advanced.
5. The point that arises for our consideration is
"Whether the appellants have shown 'sufficient cause' to
condone the delay of 234 days in filing the appeal?"
6. The answer to the above point is negative for the
following reasons:
(a) The affidavit accompanying the application seeking
condonation of delay indicates that the respondent filed an
application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, on 02.06.2015
before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, which was registered as
Com.A.S.No.69/2015 challenging the award of the Arbitral
Tribunal dated 26.02.2015. The appellant appeared before the
said Court and contested the case. The averments indicate
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that the respondent prolonged the matter for 5 years. During
the Covid-19 pandemic, the Court had been closed and the
matter was adjourned. As per the notification dated
24.08.2020, the case was transferred to the Commercial Court.
It is averred that the case status reflected that the case was
disposed on 17.08.2020 which was during the Covid-19
pandemic. It is further averred that the case was transferred
from the City Civil Court to Commercial Court and there was
neither any notice to the appellants nor their counsel. It is also
averred that the appellants were awaiting the notice of the
Court and due to Covid-19 pandemic, the appellants could not
get the status of the case. It is contended that on 05.11.2022,
the appellants approached their counsel to enquire about the
status of the case and after due verification, they came to know
that on 17.04.2021, the impugned judgment came to be
passed without issuing any notice to the appellants and their
counsel. The matter was disposed of on merits and thereafter,
the counsel applied for the certified copy on 07.11.2022 which
was received on 01.12.2022 and thereafter, the appeal was
filed on 16.12.2022. It is further averred that from the date of
knowledge, there is no delay in filing the appeal and the
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sufficient cause is shown to condone the delay and hence,
seeks to allow the application.
(b) The affidavit accompanying the application is bereft of
details and no sufficient cause is shown seeking condonation of
delay of 234 days in filing the commercial appeal. The certified
copy of the judgment enclosed with the appeal indicates that
the copy application was filed on 07.11.2022, the applicants
were required to appear for collecting the copy on 21.11.2022.
However, though the copy was ready on 14.11.2022, the
applicants appeared on 01.12.2022. The said event clearly
indicates that the appellants have delayed in collecting the copy
for more than one week. The affidavit indicates that the
appellants were not aware about the transfer of the case. The
said explanation is liable to be rejected as the case status can
be ascertained from the e-portal of the Court, which clearly
demonstrates the dates and there is absolutely no material to
indicate that the case status was not shown in the e-portal of
the Court and hence, the explanation that he was not aware
about the transfer of case from the City Civil Court to the
Commercial Court cannot be accepted. The affidavit further
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indicates that due to Covid-19 pandemic, the appellants could
not ascertain the status of the case and only upon enquiry on
05.11.2021, did they become aware of the passing of the
impugned judgment. Hence, even this explanation cannot be
accepted. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered zero period insofar
as limitation during the Covid pandemic from 15.03.2020 to
28.02.2022. In the case on hand, the impugned judgment is
passed on 17.04.2021 and the Covid pandemic duration came
to an end on 28.02.2022. There is absolutely no explanation
for the delay from 01.03.2022 to 07.11.2022 till the filing of
the application seeking for the certified copy of the order. The
said delay is more than eight months. We do not find any
justifiable ground to condone the delay. The appellants have
failed to show the sufficient cause to condone the delay in the
instant case.
(c) It would be useful to refer to the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject. In the case of
JHARKAND URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. Vs. BHARAT
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HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED1 at paragraphs 20 and 21, it
was held as under:
"20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to
answer the aforesaid question as under:
"19. In order to answer this question, we
cannot lose sight of the whole purpose of
enactment of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of high
value commercial dispute.
20. No doubt there was a similar provision in
Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 which was considered by the Supreme
Court in the case of Housing Board, Haryana (1
supra).
The said provision in the Haryana Consumer
Protection Rules, 1988 also provided for
communication of the order of the District forum
to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the
delay as well as to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may he incurred for
obtaining the certified copy.
The Supreme Court held that the scheme of
the Consumer Protection Act was to provide for
better protection of the interest of the consumers
as a measure for economical and speedy remedy
for the settlement of the dispute and the matters
connected therewith and therefore, the said rule
should be understood in a manner so that it
would protect the interest of the parties before
the District forum by making it obligatory on the
District forum to provide a copy of the order duly
2025 SCC Online SC 910
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signed and dated by the members of the Bench;
and the period of limitation prescribed with
regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of
the said Act therefore, has to be computed as
commencing from the date of communication of
the order in the manner laid down in the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that
mere pronouncement of an order in the open
Conn would not be enough, but under the
scheme of the rules copy of the said judgment
has to be communicated to the parties affected
by the said order so that the parties adversely
affected therefrom may have a fair and
reasonable opportunity of knowing the text,
reasons and contents thereof so as to formulate
grounds of attack before the appellate or before
the higher forums. In absence of such
communication of signed and dated order, it was
held that the parties adversely affected by it will
have no means of knowing the contents of the
order so to challenge the same and get it set
aside by the appellate authority or by the higher
forums.
21. Normally petitioners before the District
forums under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 are individuals and not corporate entities
like the appellant/instrumentality of the State.
So, there is justification for taking the view as
regards petitioners in District forums that the
provisions in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 which mandated communication of
the order of the said forums to the parties free of
charge was to save the parties from the burden
of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining
the certified copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the
provision contained in Haryana Consumer
Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
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Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be applied
to the litigants before the Commercial Court. For
Commercial entities and in particular litigants like
the applicants herein who are the State
Government Undertakings, the expenses of
obtaining a certified copy of a judgment of the
Commercial Court would be very small compared
to the stakes involves in the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the
same footing as a petitioner before the District
Consumer forum; and the logic of counting the
period of limitation from the date of
communication of the order of consumer forum,
cannot be applied to a Commercial dispute to
which Commercial entities are parties.
24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as
amended and made applicable to the Commercial
Courts is to be treated as only directory and not
mandatory. So notwithstanding the provision
contained in the amended Order XX Rule
1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the
parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise), if such copies are not issued within a
reasonable time, the parties to the dispute have
to apply for the same, and after obtaining it,
prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of
high value commercial dispute cannot be lost
sight of. Such an interpretation would be in tune
with the scheme and object of the Commercial
Couns Act, 2015 and any interpretation of the
nature advanced by the counsel for the
applicants would defeat the whole purpose of the
object of the Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to
provide for speedy disposal of high value
commercial disputes.
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26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the
counsel for the applicants that the period of
limitation for filing the appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Division of the High Court would not
commence unless the judgment of the
Commercial Court in the Commercial suit was
communicated by the said Commercial Court to
the parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay
of 301 days in filing this Commercial Appeal can
be condone in exercise of power conferred on this
Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for
consideration of the Supreme Court
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's
judgment in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra) discussed the statement of objects and
reasons behind enacting of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be
arbitrary and may result in some hardship, but
this is no reason as to why they should not be
strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 has to be seen in the context of the object
of speedy resolution of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given
the object sought to be achieved under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the speedy
resolution of the disputes, expression "sufficient
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cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond
the period provided by the appeal provision
itself; and that the expression "sufficient cause"
is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated
that in exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 a delay beyond the
period of 60 days from the date on which the
appeal could have been filed can be condoned
(i.e., below 120 days from the date of
pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but where
there is negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides,
such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that
merely because the Government is involved, a
different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down. (This rule would thus apply
equally to instrumentalities of Government like
the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of
a given case, there is no right in the applicants or
the appellants to have the delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
"63. Given the aforesaid and the object of
speedy disposal sought to be achieved both
under the Arbitration An and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals pled under section 37 of
the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles
116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section
13(l-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay
beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days.
respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
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which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and
not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, he
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what
may now be lost by the first party's inaction,
negligence or laches."
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government
of Maharashtra (2 supra) permitted condonation
of delay beyond 60 days in a case falling under
the Commercial Courts Act only by way of
exception and not by way of rule. If the
applicants for condonation of delay had not acted
bona fide and had acted in a negligent manner as
in the instant case, the delay is not liable to be
condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the
appeal is 301 days - way beyond 60 days + 60
days = 120 days permitted by the judgment of
the Supreme Court to be condoned in exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by
negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
condoned.
(emphasis supplied)
32. We may also point out that the applicants
were represented before the Commercial Court,
Ranchi by counsel and the judgment was
obviously pronounced in the presence of the
counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on
09.10.2023 it appears that the application for
issuance of certified copy was made on
30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024,
and the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
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If the Commercial Court had not
communicated the copy of its judgment to the
applicants within the reasonable time, it was
incumbent on the part of the counsel for the
applicants or the employees in the Legal
Department of the applicants to apply for
issuance of certified copy from the Commercial
Court, but they have failed in their duty to apply
for it when they did not receive it within a
reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate
delay of 301 days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the
respondent for not communicating to them about
the disposal of the appeal and for not making any
demand of payment in terms of the decree of the
Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the
negligence of the counsel engaged by them in
not informing the applicants about the judgment
of the Commercial Court. This is because the
applicants have a Legal Department and
employees engaged by the applicants in that
department have a duty to monitor what is
happening in the cases to which the applicants
are parties, keep track of the progress of the said
cases and the decisions therein, and ensure that
applications for issuance of certified copy are
made to the concerned court so that the appeals,
if required, can be preferred within the period of
limitation prescribed by law."
21. We are in complete agreement with the line
of reasoning assigned by the High Court."
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(d) In the case GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA
(WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT) REPERESNTED BY
ITS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER Vs. BORSE BROTHERS
ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS PRIVATE LIMITED2 at
paragraphs 58 to 63, it has been held as under:
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of
disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14
SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances
existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means
that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee,
AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2
SCC 770] , Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]
and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of
Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that
every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than
that of "sufficient cause".
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11. The expression "sufficient cause" should
be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed
to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter
between two asterisks has been emphasised in
original.] , whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamla
l, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power
to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.'
The statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means "the law is hard but it is the
law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is
not" a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
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been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.'
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or
laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC
448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
830] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and
would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
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applicant has to explain the court as to what was
the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent
a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously
stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
["Postmaster General"], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-
74, paras 27-29)
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
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period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court.
They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or
a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that
in a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
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the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few."
60. The decision in Postmaster
General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
has been followed in the following subsequent
judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan
Mathur [State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur,
(2014) 1 SCC 592] at paras 8-8.2;
(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of
U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at
paras 2-3;
(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S)
721] at paras 11-13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021)
1 SCC (L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 :
(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] , this Court referred
to Postmaster General [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC
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563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as
follows : (SCC pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to
do the same thing again and again and the
conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special
leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588
days. We had an occasion to deal with such
inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the
State of Madhya Pradesh in State of
M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84]
in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in
that case and we see no purpose in repeating the
same reasoning again except to record what are
stated to be the facts on which the delay is
sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated
that the Government Advocate was approached
in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-
2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018
SCC OnLine MP 1632] and the Law Department
permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned
order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department
took almost about 17 months' time to decide
whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What
greater certificate of incompetence would there
be for the Legal Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the
Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh
to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal
Department as it appears that the Department is
unable to file appeals within any reasonable
period of time much less within limitation. These
kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the
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aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view
of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2
SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012)
1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that
these kinds of the cases are only "certificate
cases" to obtain a certificate of dismissal from
the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue.
The object is to save the skin of officers who may
be in default. We have also recorded the irony of
the situation where no action is taken against the
officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the
casual manner in which the application has been
worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we
impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000
to be deposited with the Mediation and
Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be
deposited within four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the
delay in filing and sitting on the files and
certificate of recovery of the said amount be also
filed in this Court within the said period of time.
We have put to Deputy Advocate General to
caution that for any successive matters of this
kind the costs will keep on going up."
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the
facts of a given case, there is no right in the
appellant to have delay condoned. This was
felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
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762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as follows : (SCR p. 771 :
AIR p. 365, para 12)
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise
that even after sufficient cause has been shown a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay
in question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient
cause is shown then the Court has to enquire
whether in its discretion it should condone the
delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts
and it is at this stage that diligence of the party
or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but
the scope of the enquiry while exercising the
discretionary power after sufficient cause is
shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It
cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it. In
this connection we may point out that
considerations of bona fides or due diligence are
always material and relevant when the Court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14
of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the Court is called upon to consider
the effect of the combined provisions of Sections
5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly made
material and relevant by the provisions of Section
14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications
which fall to be decided only under Section 5
without reference to Section 14."
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63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60
days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and
not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence
or laches."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the object
of the 2015 Act, has held that the object of the Act is speedy
resolution of disputes, expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision
itself, and that the expression "sufficient cause" is not in itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and strayed
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claims. In commercial matters, the condonation of delay
should not be in a routine manner and it should be an
exception on showing sufficient cause. In a fit case, in which a
party otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner,
a short delay beyond such period can in the discretion of the
Court be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side
of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired
both equity and justice what may now be lost by the first
party's inaction, negligence, or latches.
8. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the cause shown by the
appellants in the affidavit accompanying the application seeking
for condonation of delay, it can be said that the appellants were
negligent and tried to explain the enormous delay of 234 days
in filing the appeal. Reading of the paragraphs of the affidavit
indicate that the appellants have given a vague explanation for
filing of an appeal belatedly and such explanation cannot be
construed as "sufficient cause" for the purpose of the 2015 Act.
However, in the absence of any acceptable material particulars
with regard to such assertions made in the affidavit, the same
is required to be disbelieved. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
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clearly held that the condonation of delay is the discretion of
the Court which is required to be exercised sparingly for a short
delay, that too as an exception. On considering the cause
shown by the appellants in the affidavit filed along with the
application as well as the additional affidavit, they do not show
any sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 234
days. Hence, we are of the considered view that the application
in I.A.No.1/2022 filed seeking condonation of delay is devoid of
merit and accordingly, the same is rejected. Consequently, the
appeal stands rejected. The pending application also stands
disposed of.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 24
