[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
The Commissioner vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 February, 2026
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W.A. No.213/2022
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.213/2022 (LA-BDA)
BETWEEN:
THE COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD
Digitally signed by KUMARA PARK WEST
ARSHIFA BAHAR BANGALORE-560 001.
KHANAM
...APPELLANT
Location: HIGH
COURT OF (BY SRI. MURUGESH V. CHARATI, ADV.,)
KARNATAKA
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SMT. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS.
3. SRI. BASAVARAJ
S/O LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS.
R2 & R3 ARE R/AT VADDARAPALYA
KUTHNUR VILLAGE
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W.A. No.213/2022
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UTTARAHALLI HOBLI
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BANGALORE-560 083.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. PRAMODHINI KISHAN, AGA FOR R1
R2 & R3 SERVICE OF NOTICE IS H/S V.C.O.DTD:18.12.2025)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED 01.03.2014 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE IN WP No.991-992/2013 AND ALLOW THE WRIT APPEAL
BY DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION & ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 18.02.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A.
PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
This intra-Court appeal is filed by the appellant-
Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) under Section 4
of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the
order dated 01.03.2014 passed by the learned Single
Judge in W.P.Nos.991-992/2013 (LA-BDA).
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2. The brief facts leading to the filing of this
appeal are that respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed a writ
petition seeking to issue writ in the nature of mandamus
to the appellant not to enforce the scheme called
"Jayaprakashnarayan Nagar 8th Stage" as against the
petitioners land bearing Sy.No.31/8 measuring 2 acre of
Kuthnur Village, Uttarahalli Hobil, Bangalore South Taluk,
declaring that the acquisition has lapsed. The appellant
filed objections to said petition contending that the
acquisition proceedings is concluded by passing the award,
taking possession of the land in question and the
compensation amount is also deposited. The learned
Single Judge under the impugned order allowed the writ
petition by declaring that the scheme has lapsed insofar
the petitioners' land is concerned on the ground that there
is enormous delay in drawing the mahazar and passing of
the award from the date of final notification. Being
aggrieved, the BDA is in appeal along with an application
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seeking for condonation of delay of 2162 days in filing the
appeal.
3. Sri.Murugesh V.Charati, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant-BDA submits that the appeal is
filed along with an application seeking for condonation of
delay of 2162 days in filing the appeal. It is submitted
that the delay in filing the appeal occurred due to the
administrative and procedural reasons within the BDA. It
is further submitted that the writ petition was allowed on
01.03.2014 and the advocate appearing for the BDA did
not inform the BDA about the disposal of the matter and
when the law section sought the update of the case from
the advocate, it is noticed that the writ petition was
allowed and immediately instructions were issued to prefer
an appeal, hence, there is delay. It is also submitted that
the delay in filing the appeal is unintentional and for the
bonafide reasons as stated in the affidavit. It is contended
that the acquisition proceedings were completed by taking
possession and passing of the award; the learned Single
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Judge has erred in declaring that the acquisition is lapsed
insofar as petitioners land is concerned. It is further
contended that there cannot be a lapse of acquisition
proceedings under Section 27 of Bangalore Development
Authority, Act, 1976 (for short, 'Act'). The lapse of
acquisition referred under the Act is with regard to the
scheme and not a particular land and appellant-BDA has
good case on merits. He seeks to condone the delay.
4. Though notice is served on the respondent
Nos.2 and 3, they remained absent.
5. Learned Additional Government Advocate
submits that the delay may be condoned and the appeal
may be taken up on merits.
6. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel for the appellant-BDA, the learned Additional
Government Advocate for the respondent No.1 and
meticulously perused the affidavits accompanying the
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application for condonation of delay and other material
available on record.
7. The appellant has filed an affidavit in support of
an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, seeking for condonation of delay. On perusal of the
affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation
of delay, it is noticed that the cause shown by the
appellant-BDA is that on 01.03.2014 the learned Single
Judge has passed the order declaring that the acquisition
has lapsed insofar as the property in question. It is
deposed that the order of the learned Single Judge was
not communicated to the appellant-BDA by the advocate
appearing on their behalf in the writ proceedings and when
the Commissioner, BDA, has directed the law section and
the advocates to update the status of the cases, at that
juncture, it was noticed by the law section of BDA that the
above mentioned case was disposed of and there is an
order of learned Single Judge. It is further deposed that
the law officer of the BDA was of the opinion that it is a
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case to prefer an appeal and the matter was entrusted to
panel counsel as per instruction to file an appeal, memo
dated 11.02.2022, and thereafter the appeal was filed. It
is to be noticed that the appellant tried to show the cause
to condone the delay of 2162 days delay in filing the
appeal by stating that the appellant's advocate did not
intimate about the disposal of the writ petition. The said
statement is not supported by the affidavit of the learned
counsel who has represented the appellant before the
learned Single Judge. It is not forthcoming from the
records as to what steps have been taken by the appellant
against the counsel for his lapses, in the absence of such
material the self-serving statement of the deponent cannot
be accepted. Further, it is deposed that the Commissioner
has directed the law section to secure the update status of
the cases from the panel counsel and they came to know
about passing of the order by the learned Single Judge.
Again the said statement is not supported with any
acceptable document to substantiate the same. It is not
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forthcoming as to when the Commissioner, BDA has
instructed to secure the status of the case to the law
section and when the law section sought the status from
the panel counsel or whether the law section itself had
checked the status of case and came to know about
allowing of the writ petition. There is absolutely no
acceptable justification in the affidavit, which can be called
as a "sufficient cause" to condone the delay of almost six
(06) years in filing an appeal.
8. The explanation offered reflects negligence and
lack of proper follow-up. Condoning such an inordinate
delay would prejudice the rights of the respondents and
defeat the object of the law of limitation. In our considered
view, the cause shown in the affidavit is not at all
sufficient to condone the delay of almost six (06) years in
filing the appeal.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following
cases has laid down the law with regard to consideration
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of the application for condonation of delay. In the
judgment in BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER Vs. SPECIAL
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER1, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in paragraph Nos.11 to 15 held as under:
"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and
no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100]
and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC
195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
(2013) 14 SCC 81
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considers a distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been
agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation
of what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence
or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
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SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR
1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
[(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002
SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and
would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR
1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this
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Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In the case of SHEO RAJ SINGH Vs. UNION
OF INDIA AND OTHERS2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held in paragraph Nos.30 to 36 as under:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions,
there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has
stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of
private parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold simply due to technical considerations of
delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon the
sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of
acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay
being immaterial.
(2023) 10 SCC 531
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31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being
shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods
can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory
and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and an
"excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give
someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for
something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person to point out
that something that has happened is not his fault, if
it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be
taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an
"excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation"
and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find
out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under attack.
It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as
just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation
proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there
is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based
on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be
decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot
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but lament that it is only excuses, and not
explanations, that are more often accepted for
condonation of long delays to safeguard public
interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda
is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach
the higher courts for adjudication.
33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind
that we are not hearing an application for
condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the
former, whether to condone or not would be the only
question whereas in the latter, whether there has
been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant
of the prayer for condonation would be the question.
Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal
should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion
exercised by the courts below". If any authority is
required, we can profitably refer to the decision in
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390] ,
which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel
Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha
[Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes
Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S)
197] where it has been held that:
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"an appellate power interferes not when the
order appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong".
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated
21-12-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC
OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time
when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v.
LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V.
Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996)
10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v.
Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906]
were holding the field. It is not that the said
decisions do not hold the field now, having been
overruled by any subsequent decision. Although
there have been some decisions in the recent past
[State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is
one such decision apart from University of Delhi
[University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC
745] ] which have not accepted governmental
lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting
appeals within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion
by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the
liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in
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the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to
above.
35. We find that the High Court in the present case
assigned the following reasons in support of its
order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public
policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant,
by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation
of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of
justice.
35.2. The expression "sufficient cause" is elastic
enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further,
when substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against one another, the former would
prevail.
35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency
of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay
is not always decisive while exercising discretion in
such matters if the delay is properly explained.
Further, the merits of a claim were also to be
considered when deciding such applications for
condonation of delay.
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between
inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay,
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where in the present case, the first respondent had
sufficiently explained the delay on account of
negligence on part of the government functionaries
and the government counsel on record before the
Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence
would be liable to suffer and not public interest
through the State. The High Court felt inclined to
take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein
did not border on callousness.
36. Given these reasons, we do not consider
discretion to have been exercised by the High Court
in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge
had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for
interference, which it is not."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments has taken note of its earlier judgment in the
case of KATIJI referred to supra and held that the
approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be
pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. In the instant
case, the cause shown by the appellants is not sufficient to
condone the enormous delay of nearly 6 years.
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12. It would also be useful to refer to the another
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY Vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY
COLLECTOR (LA)3, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 26 as under:
"15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which
law of limitation is based, the object behind the law
of limitation and the mandatory and the directory
nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act that we have to examine and strike a balance
between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very
liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient
cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in
order to condone the delay to enable the courts to
do substantial justice and to apply law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v.
Katiji2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach
in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held
that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
2024 SCCOnline SC 513
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lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain
every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since
sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in
throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in
the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it
ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above,
howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning
the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing
the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the
delay. The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-
oriented approach' and cause for the advancement
of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat
the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or
as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and
re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application
under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the
period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal,
substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly
disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
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binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on
such assumption creating new rights.
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by
this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon
public policy that there should be an
end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right
itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has
not been exercised or availed of for a
long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act
have to be construed differently, such as
Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial
justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in
mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of
the Limitation Act;
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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause had been explained, but
that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not
be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors
such as, where there is inordinate
delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained
relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not
required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has
to be decided on the parameters laid
down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that
the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision."
(emphasis supplied)
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13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments has considered its earlier judgments in the case
of KATIJI and BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER referred to
supra and held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice
oriented approach' and 'cause for advancement of
substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law
of limitation so as to allow the stale matter to be revived
and reopened by taking shelter under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Further, it has been held that no Courts
would be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay.
14. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to supra, we
are of the considered view that the appellant has failed to
show sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of
2162 days. The averments made in the affidavit
accompanying the application for condonation of delay are
extremely vague and do not provide a satisfactory
explanation to condone such an enormous delay. The
condoning of such an enormous delay as sought by the
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appellants is nothing but a revival of the dead right of the
appellants. If such an application for condonation of delay
is entertained, without any sufficient cause, it would confer
a right in favour of the litigant who lacks bona fides and
who is not diligent about his rights. Such an approach
would defeat the very object of law of limitation and
allowing the application would run contrary to the public
policy and cause great injustice to the respondent-land
owners, the respondent-land owners may have developed
the land or alienated the same in favour of the third
parties as the lands are situated within the jurisdiction of
Bengaluru city, hence at this juncture interfering with any
rights of the land owners at the instance of developing
authority belatedly would definitely cause prejudice and
injustice. In the absence of any plausible and acceptable
explanation in the affidavit filed by the Authority, the
inordinate delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely
because the statutory authority is in appeal. The cause
shown in the affidavit clearly indicates that the delay is
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caused due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the
part of the officials functioning in the BDA.
15. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the
considered view that the appellants have failed to show
the sufficient cause to condone the delay of 2162 days in
preferring the appeal. Hence, we proceed to pass the
following :
ORDER
I.A.No.1/2022 is dismissed.
Consequently, the appeal and other pending
applications are dismissed.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
BSR
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 2
