[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Smt Devamma vs The Deputy Commissioner on 23 February, 2026
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W.A. No.880/2023
C/W W.A. No.936/2023
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.880/2023 (SC/ST)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.936/2023 (SC/ST)
IN W.A. No.880/2023:
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. DEVAMMA
W/O LATE MARIDEVA NAYAKA
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS.
2. SRI. SIDDARAJU
W/O LATE MARIDEVA NAYAKA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS.
Digitally signed
by ARSHIFA
BAHAR KHANAM 3. SMT. SAKAMMA
D/O LATE MARIDEVA NAYAKA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS.
KARNATAKA
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
KUMARABEEDU VILLAGE
ILUWALA HOBLI,
MYSURU TALUK
MYSURU 570026.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. VIJAY A.M. ADV.,)
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W.A. No.880/2023
C/W W.A. No.936/2023
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AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
MYSURU DISTRICT
MYSURU 570001.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
MYSURU SUB DIVISION
MYSURU 570001.
3. SMT. MANJULA
W/O N. SWAMY
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS.
4. SRI. N. SWAMY
S/O B.P. SIDDALINGEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS.
RESPONDENT NOS.3 & 4
ARE R/AT NO.1026
4TH BLOCK, BANK COLONY
BOGADI, MYSURU 570026.
5. SRI. SHIVANNA
S/O LATE BODARA NAYAKA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/OF KUMARABEEDU VILLAGE
ILWALA HOBLI,
MYSURU TALUK
MYSURU 570026.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. KIRAN KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 & R2
SRI. Y.K. NARAYANA SHARMA, ADV., FOR R3 & R4
R5 SERVED)
---
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS IN
WRIT PETITION No.14987/2022 (SC-ST) ON THE FILE OF THE
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W.A. No.880/2023
C/W W.A. No.936/2023
HC-KAR
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE COURT. SET ASIDE
THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 28/06/2022 PASSED IN WRIT
PETITION No. 14987/2022 (SC-ST), THEREBY DISMISSING THE
SAID WRIT PETITION & ETC.
IN W.A. NO.936/2023:
BETWEEN:
SRI. CHENNAIAH ALIAS CHENNANAIKA
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
S/O LATE HETTA NAIKA
R/AT. KUMARABEEDU VILLAGE
NO.1, ILAWALA HOBLI
MYSURU TALUK 570 026.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. VIJAY A.M. ADV.,)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
MYSURU DISTRICT
MYSURU 570001.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
MYSURU SUB-DIVISION
MYSURU 570001.
3. SMT. MANJULA
W/O N. SWAMY
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS.
4. SRI. N. SWAMY
S/O B.P. SIDDALINGEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS.
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W.A. No.880/2023
C/W W.A. No.936/2023
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RESPONDENT NOS.3 & 4 ARE
RESIDING AT NO.1026
4TH BLOCK, BANK COLONY
BOGADI, MYSURU 570026.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. KIRAN KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 & R2
SRI. Y.K. NARAYANA SHARMA, ADV., FOR R3 & R4)
---
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
RECORDS IN WRIT PETITION No.14989/2022 (SC-ST) ON
THE FILE OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS
HON'BLE COURT. SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 12.07.2023 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION No.
14989/2022 (SC-ST), THEREBY DISMISSING THE SAID
WRIT PETITION & ETC.
THESE WRIT APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 18.02.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A.
PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
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W.A. No.880/2023
C/W W.A. No.936/2023
HC-KAR
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
Writ Appeal No.880/2023 is filed challenging the
order of the learned Single Judge dated 28.06.2023
passed in W.P.No.14987/2022 (SC-ST).
Writ Appeal No.936/2023 is filed challenging the
order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.07.2023
passed in W.P.No.14989/2022 (SC-ST).
2. Sri.Vijay A.M, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants in both the appeals submits that the learned
Single Judge has committed an error in allowing the writ
petitions without appreciating the material available on
record in its proper perspective. It is submitted that the
learned Single Judge has committed an error in holding
that the lands in question are not granted lands as defined
under Section 3(e) of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)
Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') as the
same were purchased through a public auction. The said
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finding is erroneous as the lands were transferred at the
auction at an upset price of only Rs.20/- and not at the
then prevailing market value. It is further submitted that
the learned Single Judge has also committed an error in
relying on the cases of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI Vs.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER1 and VIVEK
M.HINDUJA Vs. M.ASWATHA2, wherein the delay in
filing the application was over 20-25 years, whereas in the
instant case, the delay is only of 8 years, which is required
to be condoned. In support his contentions he placed
reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
SATYAN Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS3
and SIDDEGOWDA Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
AND OTHERS4. Hence, he seeks to allow the appeals.
3. Per contra, Sri.Y.K.Narayana Sharma, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents No.3 and 4 in both
the appeals, submits that the learned Single Judge has
(2020) 14 SCC 232
(2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC
AIR 2019 SC 2797
AIR 2003 SC 1290
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passed the impugned orders after considering the facts
and the law in its proper perspective. It is submitted that
the learned Single Judge has rightly considered that the
lands in question are not granted lands as per the
provisions of the Act as the same were purchased in a
public auction, which is evident from Annexure-B. It is
further submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly
relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and
this Court in the cases of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI
referred supra and VIVEK.M.HINDUJA referred supra,
respectively and held that the application is filed after an
unreasonable delay. Therefore, the impugned orders
passed by the learned Single Judge do not call for any
interference. In support of his contentions, he placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in SMT.
GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA Vs. THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS5 and ERAPPA Vs.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS6.
W.A.No.100101/2004 dtd 29.07.2024
W.A.No.100265/2023 dtd 23.06.2023
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Hence, he seeks to dismiss the appeals.
4. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for
respondent Nos.3 and 4 and meticulously perused the
material available on record. We have given our anxious
consideration to the submissions advanced on both the
sides.
5. The material on record indicates that the
appellants in W.A.880/2023 are the legal heirs of the
original grantee-Sri.Marideva Nayaka, who was granted
land measuring 2 acres in Sy.No.95/Block 8 of the
Kumarabeedu Village, Iluwala Hobli, Mysuru Taluk, vide
grant certificate dated 19.12.1979 and the appellant in
W.A.No.936/2023 was granted 2 acres of land in
Sy.No.95/Block 7 of the Kumarabeedu Village, Iluwala
Hobli, Mysuru Taluk, vide grant certificate dated
01.12.1979.
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6. In W.A.No.880/2023, the original grantee-one
Marideva Nayaka executed a General Power of Attorney in
favour of respondent No.4, who executed a sale deed
dated 02.09.2006 in favour of respondent No.3 with
respect to the land granted to the original grantee. The
appellants filed an application under Section 5 of the Act
before the respondent No.2 bearing PTCL No.1/2015-16
seeking a declaration that the sale deed is null and void
and also sought for restoration of the land back to the
appellants. The respondent No.2, after considering the
application, allowed the same vide order dated 28.12.2018
and declared that the alienation was bad in law. The
respondent Nos.3 and 4 challenged the order of the
respondent No.2 in PTCL A No.5/2019 under Section 5A of
the Act before the respondent No.1, who dismissed the
same vide order dated 16.03.2022. The respondent Nos.3
and 4 assailed the said order before the learned Single
Judge in W.P.No.14987/2022. The learned Single Judge,
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placing reliance on the facts of the case and the law on the
point proceeded to pass the impugned order.
7. In W.A.No.936/2023, the appellant-original
grantee executed a GPA in favour of respondent No.4, who
executed a sale deed dated 02.09.2006 in favour of
respondent No.3 with regard to the granted land. The
appellant-original grantee filed an application in PTCL
No.3/2014-15 before the respondent No.2 seeking for
restoration and resumption of the land on the ground that
the land was sold in violation of the Act. The respondent
No.2 allowed the application and ordered for restoration
and resumption vide order dated 28.12.2018. The
respondent Nos.3 and 4 filed an appeal under Section 5A
of the Act before the respondent No.1 in PTCL A
No.6/2019, which was dismissed vide order dated
16.03.2022. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 assailed the said
order before the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.14989/2022. The learned Single Judge, placing
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reliance on the facts of the case and the law on the point
proceeded to pass the impugned order.
8. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ
petitions filed by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively
in both the appeals mainly on the ground that the
initiation of the proceedings for restoration of the lands is
beyond the reasonable period. The learned Single Judge
has further recorded the finding that the lands in question
are not granted lands but are purchased in a public
auction, which is disputed by the learned counsel for the
appellants. Insofar as the contention that the lands are
granted as per the Act or acquired in a public auction, the
same need not be gone into in the present proceedings in
view of the serious dispute between the grantees and the
purchasers. The grantees initiated the proceedings before
the authorities mainly on the premise that the lands in
question are granted lands, however, the learned Single
Judge, based on a sentence in the certificate at Annexure-
B came to a conclusion that the acquisition of properties is
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by way of a public auction. In our considered view, the
said question need not be adjudicated either in the writ
proceedings or in the appeals. We are of the considered
view that the dispute between the parties is required to be
proceeded by considering that the lands in question were
granted under the provisions of the Act as the parties to
the proceedings are contesting the proceedings from the
year 2015. Hence, we hold that for all the purposes, the
subject properties are considered as granted lands.
However, it is to be noticed that the learned Single Judge
also interfered with the order of the Authorities on the
ground that the initiation of the proceedings is beyond the
reasonable time.
9. It would be useful to refer to the decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of NEKKANTI
RAMA LAKSHMI referred supra, VIVEK M.HINDUJA
referred supra, CHHEDI LAL YADAV Vs. HARI KISHORE
YADAV7 and NINGAPPA Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
(2018) 12 SCC 527
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AND OTHERS8, wherein it was held that the application
for resumption or restoration cannot be entertained
beyond a reasonable period. The Co-ordinate Bench in the
case of SRI.KESHAVAMURTHY AND ANOTHER Vs.
SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS9 and
in the case of SMT.M.MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs. THE
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGLAURU AND
OTHERS10, considering the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred supra as well as the decision in
the case of SMT.GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA Vs.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HAVERI AND OTHERS11
held that the application seeking restoration should be
made within a reasonable period of time. In the case of
GOURAMMA referred supra, the Co-ordinate Bench at
paragraphs 3(f), 3(g), 3(h) and 3(i) has held as under:
"3(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates
might have taken place about the observations of
the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases
while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se
(2020) 14 SCC 236
2025 SCC OnLine Kar 6517
ILR 2024 KAR 4953
W.A.No.100101/2024 dated 29.07.2024
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does not lend credence to the contention that the
said amendment intends to invalidate the law
declared by the highest court of the country which
it did after considering all aspects of the matter
including the sense of equity & justice. If the
Legislature intended to silence the voice of
Nekkanti, it would have employed a different
terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation
prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided
keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are
repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches
in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
3(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay
& laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation &
delay' that obtain in law. The following
observations of the Apex Court in Union of India
Vs. N.Murugesan12 make out this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus
to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However, there
(2022) 2 SCC 25
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may be a case where acquiescence is involved,
but not laches. These principles are common
law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various
statutes which restrict the period of limitation
and create nonconsideration of condonation in
certain circumstances.... The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one
of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an
important issue to be taken note of by the
court.
Laches.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the
French language meaning "remissness and
slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay
or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party
to do an act which law requires while asserting
a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of
the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the nature of acts done
during the interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would
be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a
remedy on a party who knocks its doors when
his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right.
By his conduct, he has put the other party in a
particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the
court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct
on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail
a remedy."
3(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject
Amendment has been put in challenge in
W.P.No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending
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consideration. We make it clear that construction
of a statute is one thing and its validity is another.
We do not want to say even a word about the
validity, that is being examined by the learned
Single Judge before whom the matter is pending.
We have only placed our interpretation on the
amended provisions of the Act and nothing
beyond.
3(i) Before parting with this case, we are
constrained to observe that, legislative process is
not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with
a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks
through language. If language is not properly
employed what is said is not what is meant; if
what is said is not what is meant, what needs to
be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic
defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation.
More is not necessary to specify."
10. The learned counsel for the appellants placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case SATYAN referred supra, wherein a delay of 8
years in filing the application under the Act, was held to be
condonable. However, the said aspect ought to be
considered in view of the particulars in each case. In the
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instant case, there is no explanation whatsoever given by
the appellants to justify the delay of more than 8 years.
Hence, in absence of any justifiable reason for the said
delay, the initiation of the proceedings after a period of
more than 8 years cannot be called as a reasonable
period. The Co-ordinate Bench in the case of ERAPPA
referred supra has held that the delay of 7 years in filing
an application for resumption is an unreasonable period.
Keeping in mind the consistent view of this Court in similar
matters where the delay in initiation of the proceedings
under the provisions of the Act was beyond a reasonable
period, the Courts have declined to consider the request
for restoration of the lands.
11. In view of the preceding analysis, the
unexplained delay of more than 8 years from the date of
sale deed in filing an application under Section 5 of the Act
for resumption and restoration of the lands cannot be
termed as a reasonable time. The learned Single Judge
has rightly considered that there is an inordinate delay and
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interfered with the orders of the Authorities, by allowing
the writ petitions. We do not find any error in the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge calling for
interference in these appeals.
12. Accordingly, the appeals are devoid of merit
and are accordingly rejected. Consequently, the pending
interlocutory applications stand disposed of.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
List No.: 3 Sl No.: 5
