[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Smt Poojamma vs The Deputy Commissioner on 23 February, 2026

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                                                          WA No. 711 of 2023


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                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                          DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

                                            PRESENT
                          THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
                                              AND
                         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
                             WRIT APPEAL NO. 711 OF 2023 (SC-ST)
                   BETWEEN:

                   SMT. POOJAMMA,
                   SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS,
                   SRI. RAVI,
                   S/O LATE VENKATAPPA,
                   AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
                   AK COLONY, MUDUGALLAMMA
                   TEMPLE ROAD, DEVANAHALLI TOWN,
                   DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
                   BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT - 562 110.
                                                                 ...APPELLANT
                   (BY SRI AKARSH KUMAR GOWDA, ADVOCATE)

Digitally signed
                   AND:
by ARSHIFA
BAHAR KHANAM
Location: HIGH     1.    THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
COURT OF
KARNATAKA                BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
                         BANGALORE - 560 001.

                   2.    THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
                         DODDABALLAPURA SUB DIVISION,
                         DODDABALLAPUR - 561 203.

                   3.    THE TAHSILDAR,
                         DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
                         DEVANAHALLI - 562 110.
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                                         WA No. 711 of 2023


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4.    SRI G. SHANKAR,
      S/O G. VENKATARAMANA,
      AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
      NO.39, VENKATADRI, M
      22ND MAIN, AYAODYA NAGAR,
      5TH PHASE, J.P.NAGAR,
      BANGALORE - 56 0 011.
                                        ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. PRAMODHINI KISHAN, AGA FOR R-1 TO R-3)

     THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO BE PLEASED TO CALL FOR
RECORDS AND PLEASED TO a) SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER PASSED IN WP No-15068/2015 (SC/ST) DATED
18.01.2019 IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY ETC.


     THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 16.02.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

          and
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL


                      CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)

This appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 4

of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the

order dated 18.01.2019 passed by the learned Single

Judge in W.P.No.59068/2015 (SC-ST).

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2. Sri.Akarsh Kumar Gowda, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant submits that the learned Single

Judge has committed an error in allowing the writ petition

without appreciating the material available on record in its

proper perspective. It is submitted that the learned Single

Judge has failed to take note of the fact that the sale deed

executed is in violation of the grant conditions and solely

on the ground of delay, has proceeded to allow the writ

petition. It is further submitted that the Karnataka

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of

Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'the Act')

is a welfare legislation with a specific object to protect the

interests of the grantee and there is no limitation provided

under the Act to file an application for restoration and

resumption. It is also submitted that on the date of

passing of the order by the learned Single Judge the

contesting respondent No.4 i.e Smt.Poojamma was not

alive as she died on 12.07.2016. Hence, he seeks to allow

the appeal.

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3. Smt.Pramodhini Kishan, learned Additional

Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3

supports the order of the authorities challenged before the

learned Single Judge and submits that the legal heirs of

the grantee's rights are required to be protected. Hence,

she seeks to pass appropriate orders.

4. We have heard the arguments of the learned

counsel for the appellant, the learned AGA for respondent

Nos.1 to 3 and meticulously perused the material available

on record. We have given our anxious consideration to the

submissions advanced on both sides.

5. The material on record indicates that appellant

is the grandson and the legal representative of one Late

Sri.Venkatappa, who was granted land in Sy.No.399

measuring 4 acres 21 guntas situated at Devanahalli

Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bengaluru Rural

District on 11.04.1942. It is averred that the said land was

sold by the original grantee vide registered sale deed

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dated 24.04.1953, which was in violation of the grant

conditions. The appellant filed an application before

respondent No.2-Assistant Commissioner under Section 5

of the Prohibition on Transfer of Certain Lands Act, 1978

(hereinafter referred to as the 'PTCL Act'). The respondent

No.2 after considering the application held that the land

was granted to the original grantee, who belongs to the

scheduled caste, sale by the original grantee was in

violation of the grant conditions and the provisions of the

PTCL Act and thereby ordered for resumption and

restoration of the land to the legal heir of the grantee. The

said order of the respondent No.2 was challenged before

respondent No.3-Deputy Commissioner, who dismissed

the appeal vide order dated 20.04.2015. The respondent

No.4 challenged the orders of the authority in the writ

petition. The learned Single Judge considering the material

on record and the law on the point, passed the impugned

order allowing the writ petition on the ground that the

application for resumption and restoration was filed after

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an inordinate delay of over 50 years from the execution of

the first sale deed, which cannot be considered to be a

reasonable delay.

6. It would be useful to refer to the decisions of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of NEKKANTI

RAMA LAKSHMI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND

ANOTHER1, VIVEK M.HINDUJA VS. M.ASWATHA2,

CHHEDI LAL YADAV VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV3 and

NINGAPPA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND

OTHERS4 wherein it was held that the application for

resumption or restoration cannot be entertained beyond a

reasonable period. The Co-ordinate Bench in the case of

SRI.KESHAVAMURTHY AND ANOTHER V. SPECIAL

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS5 and in the

case of SMT.M.MANJULA AND OTHERS VS. THE

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGLAURU AND

(2020) 14 SCC 232

(2019) 1 Kant.L.J. 819 SC

(2018) 12 SCC 527

(2020) 14 SCC 236

2025 SCC OnLine Kar 6517

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OTHERS6, considering the decisions of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court referred supra as well as the decision in

the case of SMT.GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA V.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HAVERI AND OTHERS7 held

that the application seeking restoration should be within a

reasonable period of time. In the case of Gouramma

referred supra, the Co-ordinate Bench at para 3(f), (g),

(h) and (i) held as under:

"3.(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.

(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan8 make

ILR 2024 KAR 4953

W.A.No.100101/2024 dated 29.07.2024

(2022) 2 SCC 25 at Para 20,21 & 22

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out this point:

"Delay, laches and acquiescence

20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

Laches.

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his

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acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P.No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond.

(i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify."

7. In view of the preceding analysis, the

unexplained delay of more than 50 years from the

execution of the first sale deed and a delay of more than

30 years from the PTCL Act coming into force, in filing an

application under Section 5 of the Act for resumption and

restoration of the land cannot be termed to be within a

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reasonable time. The learned Single Judge has rightly

considered that there is an inordinate delay and allowed

the writ petition, which does not call for any interference.

8. Insofar as the contention that Smt.Poojamma,

mother of the appellant was respondent No.4 in the writ

proceedings and she has died on 12.07.2016 and the

order of the learned Single Judge is against a dead person

is concerned. It would be useful to refer to the decision of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L.Kapoor v

Jagmohan9 wherein it was held as under:

"17. Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non- observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties are discretionary."

(1980) 4 SCC 379

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9. The aforesaid contention of the appellant may

be factually true, however, it is to be noticed that

respondent No.4 i.e mother of the appellant was served

with the notice in the writ petition but she remained

absent. Furthermore, this Court allowed the appellant,

who is a legal heir of respondent No.4 in the writ petition

to urge all the contentions on merit and the same were

considered on merits. Hence, the contention with regard to