(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal
Kasaba Hobli, Mysuru Taluk, Mysuru. They have further
lapsed. The respondents-authorities opposed the petition
by filing statement of objections. The Learned Single
Smt.Puttamma. Being aggrieved, the petitioners are in
3. Sri.P.N.Manmohan, learned counsel appearing
a. The preliminary notification and final
notifications were issued against the dead person as
late Manchaiah died on 13.08.1981. Hence, the
entire proceedings are vitiated.
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b. No notice of acquisition was served on the
appellants.
c. The possession claims to have been taken on
13.08.2001 under the mahazar by the revenue
inspector, which is impermissible. The law mandates
that the possession has to be taken by the authority
referred under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act
(for short, 'LA Act'). The mahazar is cyclostyled,
prepared in the office of the authority and the
mahazar is silent with regard to taking of physical
possession from the land owner.
d. The notification under Section 16(2) of the LA
Act was published on 13.02.2002, which clearly
shows that the authorities have built the records to
prove the vesting of land.
e. The appellants were not aware about the
acquisition and only on securing the records from the
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Mysore Urban Development Authority (for short,
'MUDA'), the writ petition is filed, and hence, there
was no delay in seeking the relief.
f. The award is passed by the respondent no.2-
MUDA and no notice of award is served on the land
owner or to the appellants. The compensation
amount is neither paid nor deposited in the Court.
g. The Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
petition mainly on the ground of delay and laches.
The learned Single Judge failed to consider that if the
authority failed to follow the procedure contemplated
under law then the entire acquisition stands vitiated.
The right of the land loser is recognized under Article
300A of the Constitution of India, hence, the
authority is required to follow the procedural
requirements strictly as they are depriving the
valuable right over the immovable property.
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h. The reasoning of the Learned Single Judge with
regard to formation of layout and allotment of site is
without any material before him. The application filed
by the appellants for additional document indicates
that the possession is with the appellants and no
layout is formed. Hence, it is required to be declared
that the acquisition has been abandoned.
i. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance
on the following decisions:
i. Urban Improvement Trust vs. Vidya Devi
and others1
ii. Kolkata Municipal Corporation and
another vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and
others2
iii. Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of
Haryana and others3
Hence, he seeks to allow the appeal on merits.
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725
(2024) 10 SCC 533
(2012) 1 SCC 792
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4. Sri.Sharath Gowda G.B., learned counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 supports the
impugned order of the learned Single Judge and makes
the following submissions:
a. The appellants claim to be the legal
representatives of late Manchaiah, however no
material is placed on record to substantiate the
same.
b. The respondent-State and MUDA issued the
notifications in the year 1991 and 1993 to the vast
extent of land, on the date of issuance of notification
the revenue records were standing in the name of
Manchaiah, hence, his name has been reflected as
khatedar/anubhogdar and the same cannot be found
fault with.
c. The mahazar was drawn by the competent
authority and the possession was taken in presence
of villagers as the land owners did not come forward
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to deliver the possession. The contention of appellant
that the officer taking possession was not competent
is only raised in this appeal, otherwise the authority
would have met the said contention in the objection.
d. There is a delay of more than 23 years from the
date of acquisition notification and more than 15
years from the date of publication of notification
under Section 16(2) of the LA Act and no
discretionary relief can be granted to the appellants.
e. The acquisition is for more than 1000 acres and
entire Vijayanagara IV Stage scheme has been
substantially implemented by allotting sites and if
some portion of the land, for any reason is not
developed, the same cannot be a ground to declare
that the acquisition is abandoned.
f. The authority has passed the award which is
produced and it is admitted that no compensation is
deposited for the reasons that there were
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discrepancies with regard to the extent of land. The
non-deposit of amount would not vitiate the
acquisition proceedings.
g. In support of his contentions, he has placed
reliance on the following decisions:
i. Northern India Glasses Industries vs.
Jaswant Singh and others4
ii. Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and
another vs. Shah Hyder Beig and others5
Hence, he seeks to dismiss the appeal.
5. We have heard the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellants, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.2 & 3 and
perused the material available on record. We have given
our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on
both the sides.
(2003) 1 SCC 335
(2000) 2 SCC 48
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6. The appellants claiming to be the legal
representatives of late Manchaiah filed the writ petition
seeking to issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quash
preliminary notification dated 23.12.1991, final notification
dated 10.12.1993 and further relief of declaration that the
acquisition proceedings initiated under the preliminary
notification and final notifications has lapsed insofar as the
land bearing Sy.No.25/2 measuring 4 acre 27 guntas
situated at Basavanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Mysuru
Taluk is concerned. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed
objections to the writ petition contending that the
acquisition proceedings have concluded long ago and the
writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay
and laches. It is averred that the award has been passed,
the possession of the land has been taken, the land is now
vested with the State Government and the same has been
utilized for the scheme evolved by MUDA, which cannot be
now be challenged and sought for dismissal of the writ
petition. The learned Single Judge considering the rival
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contentions negated the challenge to the acquisition on
the ground of delay and laches by reserving liberty to
appellants to submit representation to respondent Nos.2 &
3 claiming compensation and compensatory site on par
with Smt.Puttamma, and the respondent Nos.2 and 3 were
directed to consider the same within three months. With
these factual matrixes, the original petitioners filed this
writ appeal.
7. The contention of the appellants is that the
acquisition proceedings were initiated and the award came
to be passed against a dead person. The notified khatedar
as per the notifications is one Manchaiah, who died on
13.08.1981, i.e., one decade prior to issuance of
preliminary notification. It is to be noticed that the
respondent-authorities have issued the preliminary
notification on 23.12.1991 for acquiring more than 1000
acres of land including the land in question. The names of
Manchaiah S/o Doddalingaiah and Puttamma W/o. late
Ramegowda were shown as khatedar/anubhogdars for
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Sy.No.25 measuring 9 acres 7 guntas and 4 acres 20
guntas respectively. The said names were reflected in the
final notification dated 10.12.1993. It is further noticed
that as on the date of issuance of preliminary notification
and final notifications, the name of late Manchaiah was
found in the revenue records and based on such revenue
records, the respondent-authorities reflected their name in
the notifications. If the assertion of the appellants is that
the said Manchaiah died on 13.08.1981, it is not
forthcoming as to why the appellants, who claimed to be
the legal representatives of Manchaiah, failed to mutate
their names in the revenue records in respect of the
schedule property. It is also noticed that the preliminary
notification was issued nearly after a decade from the
death of Late Manchaiah, which is more than sufficient
time for the appellants to change the records.
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8. It would be useful to refer to the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of W.B.Housing
Board v Brijendra Prasad Gupta6
"8. ... It is no part of the duty of the Collector to
make a roving inquiry into ownership of the persons.
We are of the opinion that the requirements of the
law were met when notices were served upon the
recorded owners as per the Record of Rights. Again
we do not think in a case like the present one, it is
for the Collector to make enquiries from the
registration office to find out if the land had since
been sold by the recorded owners. In Winky
Dilawari v. Amritsar Improvement Trust [(1996) 11
SCC 644] this Court observed that the public
authorities were not expected to go on making
enquiries in the Sub-Registrar's office as to who
would be the owner of the property. The Collector in
the present case was thus justified in relying on the
official record being the Record of Rights as to who
were the owners of the land sought to be
requisitioned and prudence did not require any
further enquiry to be made. We are therefore of the
view that notices were properly served under Section
3(2) of the Act on the owners of the land.
9. It is clear from the aforesaid enunciation of law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
respondent-State is not required to conduct a roving
enquiry into the title of a land, and is solely required to
(1997) 6 SCC 207
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rely on the record of rights for reflecting the names of land
owners in the notifications. Similar view was also taken by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ahuja
Industries Ltd v State of Karnataka and Others7. In
the instant case, the respondent-State and MUDA has
relied on the names reflected in the record of rights as on
the day of issuing of the preliminary notification and the
same cannot be faulted with. Hence, the contention of the
appellants that the notification was issued against a dead
person holds no merit.
10. The appellants tried to justify that the enormous
delay in filing the writ petition by stating that they were
not aware with regard issuance of notification, such an
argument cannot be accepted. It is clear that a large
extent of lands were acquired in Basavanahalli Village and
the acquisition proceedings would be the talk of the town
and the appellants cannot plead ignorance about the
acquisition. It would be useful to refer to the decision of
(2003) 5 SCC 365
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this Court in the case of Collector (LA) v. J.
Sivaprakasam8
"31. The acquiring authority need not prove
actual notice of the proposal to acquire under
Section 4(1) of the Act, to the person challenging
the acquisition. As the purpose of publication of
public notice provided in Section 4(1) of the Act
is to give notice of the proposal of acquisition to
the persons concerned, such notice can also be
by way of implied notice or constructive notice.
For this purpose, we may refer to the difference
between actual, implied and constructive notice:
1. When notice is directly served upon a party
in a formal manner or when it is received
personally by him, there is actual notice.
2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a
party knew about the subject-matter of the
notice, knowledge is imputed by implied notice.
For example, if the purpose of the notice is to
require a party to appear before an authority on
a particular date, even though such a notice is
not personally served on him, if the person
appears before the authority on that date or
participates in the subsequent proceedings, then
the person can be said to have implied notice.
3. Notice arising by presumption of law from
the existence of certain specified facts and
circumstances is constructive or deemed notice.
For example, any person purchasing or obtaining
a transfer of an immovable property is deemed
(2011) 1 SCC 330
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to have notice of all transactions relating to such
property effected by registered instruments till
the date of his acquisition. Or, where the statute
provides for publication of the notification
relating to a proposed acquisition of lands in the
gazette and newspapers and by causing public
notice of the substance of the notification at
convenient places in the locality, but does not
provide for actual direct notice, then such
provision provides for constructive notice; and on
fulfilment of those requirements, all persons
interested in the lands proposed for acquisition
are deemed to have notice of the proposal
regarding acquisition."
(emphasis supplied)
11. The aforesaid enunciation of law makes it clear
that when a statute, provides for publishing in the gazette,
newspapers and public notice in convenient places, then
on fulfillment of such requirements, the interested parties
are deemed to have been notified of the proposal
regarding the acquisition. Hence, in the instant case, the
appellants cannot plead ignorance to the aforesaid
notifications to justify the delay in filing of the petition and
the said contention is rejected.
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12. The another contention of the appellants is that
the possession of the land in question has not been taken
in accordance with law. The mahazar produced at
Annexure-M dated 13.08.2001 clearly indicates that the
Special Revenue Inspector of MUDA has taken physical
possession of the land. The mahazar indicates that the
possession was taken in the presence of villagers. The
learned counsel for MUDA is right in his submission that
the land owners failed to come forward for handing over
physical possession of the land, hence the authority was
compelled to take possession of the land in the presence
of villagers. Therefore, in our considered view the drawing
of mahazar in cyclostyle manner and not taking possession
from the real owner cannot be examined at this length of
time. The records placed by the authority clearly indicate
that the possession of the property in question was taken
by the authority under the mahazar and later notification
under Section 16(2) of the LA Act was issued and
published on 13.02.2002 which further gives evidence of
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taking of physical possession of the land in question as per
law. The appellants cannot ask this Court to examine the
correctness of taking possession under the mahazar dated
13.08.2001 and notification dated 13.02.2002 at this
stage after such a long time. The contention with regard
to competence of the revenue inspector to take possession
is raised for the first time in this appeal, as such the
authority had no opportunity to meet such contention in
the objection. Hence, the said contention cannot be
considered in the appeal.
13. The learned Single Judge considering the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
challenge to acquisition cannot be entertained when there
is an enormous delay. Admittedly, the preliminary
notification was issued on 23.12.1991 and the final
notification was issued on 10.12.1993 and challenging the
said notifications, the writ petition was filed in the year
2017, thus, there is a delay of more than 23 years and
there is no explanation whatsoever for such enormous
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delay in filing the writ petition. The reasons assigned for
such delay is non-receipt of notice and no knowledge of
acquisition proceedings cannot be accepted as already we
have held that the acquisition is a 'talk of town' and that a
constructive notice is deemed to be served under Section
4 of the LA Act. The appellant cannot plead ignorance to
overcome the enormous delay. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Municipal Council Ahmednagar
referred supra at paragraph 14 held as under:
"14. The High Court has thus misplaced the
factual details and misread the same. It is now a
well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate
on this score to the effect that while no period of
limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events,
the period the party is required for filing a civil
proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is
true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to
mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it
is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary
jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts
under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound
equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine,
namely, "delay defeats equity" has its fullest
application in the matter of grant of relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary
relief can be had provided one has not by his act or
conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favours a
vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being
the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an
order as has been passed in the matter as regards
restoration of possession upon cancellation of the
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notification does not and cannot arise. The High
Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that
since the year 1952, the land was specifically
reserved for public purposes of a school playground
and roads in the development plan and by reason
therefor, the notification to acquire the land has,
therefore, been issued under the provisions of the
Act as stated above."
14. It would also be useful to refer to the case of
Pathapathi Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector
(LA)9, wherein it was held at paragraph 16,17,23 to 29 as
under:
"16. It is in the light of the public policy upon
which law of limitation is based, the object behind
the law of limitation and the mandatory and the
directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a
balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
17. Generally, the courts have adopted a very
liberal approach in construing the phrase "sufficient
cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in
order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do
substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice.
23. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of
A.P. [Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., (2011) 4
SCC 363 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 257] , where the High
Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the
delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for
(2024) 12 SCC 336
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condonation of delay, this Court held that the High
Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable
and objective manner. The High Court should have
exercised the discretion in a systematic and an
informed manner. The liberal approach in considering
sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed
to override substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as "liberal
approach", "justice-oriented approach" and
"substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison
the substantial law of limitation.
24. It has also been settled vide State of
Jharkhand v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani [State of
Jharkhand v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani, (2009) 2 SCC
667 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 691 : AIR 2009 SC 1927] ,
that the merits of the case cannot be considered
while dealing with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal.
25. In Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO,
(2013) 14 SCC 81] , this Court held that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. The expression "sufficient cause" as
occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be
liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that
even though limitation may harshly affect rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour
as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no
choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
26. It would be beneficial to quote para 12 of the
aforesaid decision in Basawaraj
case [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] which
clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium
has to be maintained between adopting liberal
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approach and in implementing the statute as it
stands. Para 12 reads as under: (SCC pp. 86-87)
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.' The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law",
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute."
27. This Court in the same breath in the same
very decision vide para 15 went on to observe as
under: (Basawaraj case [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013)
14 SCC 81] , SCC pp. 87-88)
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be
a justified ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on
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time condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
28. On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid
down by this Court, it is evident that:
28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting
the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to
an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to
be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to
be construed liberally;
28.4. In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or
cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but
the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial
law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act;
28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had
been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is established for various
factors such as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
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28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others are also
entitled to the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing
the appeal;
28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
28.8. Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning
the delay and condoning the delay for the reason
that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts
to disregarding the statutory provision."
15. The aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court makes it very clear that the power
to condone delay given to the Courts, has to be considered
keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is also clearly held that in order to advance substantial
justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach
or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in the Limitation Act. It is clear from
the aforesaid proposition of law that a delay in filing a
petition, specially when there is negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fide involved, then the statute of limitation
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has to be applied with full rigour. When a petition is filed
after an inordinate delay, it is to be seen that the settled
rights of one party are not unsettled on the account of
negligence and lack of due diligence of one party. In the
instant case, the reasons given by the appellants for
justifying the delay clearly reflect the lack of due diligence
and negligence on behalf of the appellants leading to an
inordinate delay, which is impermissible.
16. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Urban Improvement Trust referred supra, in
the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered
the aspect of delay in filing the writ petition before High
Court, and held that the delay of 21 years in filing the writ
petition is required to be considered on the facts and
circumstance of the said case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
condoned the delay and considered the grievance of land
loser by taking note of the grave lapses of the acquisition
authority which are referred in para 51 and 52 of the
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judgment and held that: a) individual notice required
under Section 52(2) of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act,
1959 (RUIA Act) Act was not served on the land owner nor
it is affixed at the conspicuous area of the locality where
the property is situated; b) the possession alleged to have
been taken prior to deposit of compensation amount in
contrary to Section 52(7) of RUI Act) the compensation in
respect of Nangli quota land was not paid in terms of the
time line stipulated in sub-section 3 & 4 of Section 60A.
In the case on hand, such a rigor of law is not found under
the provisions of the LA Act nor under the Karnataka
Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987. The respondent
authorities have followed the mandate of law and
concluded the acquisition proceedings; hence, the said
decision would in no way help the appellants.
17. The appellants has further placed reliance on the
decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Kolkata
Municipal Corporation referred supra and submits that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 30 has recognized 7 sub
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rights under Article 300A of the Constitution of India,
which are required to be followed failing which acquisition
proceedings would lapse. For ready reference, para 29 to
34 of the said judgment are extracted herein below:
"29. The constitutional discourse on compulsory
acquisitions, has hitherto, rooted itself within the
"power of eminent domain". Even within that
articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition
being for a public purpose and subjecting the
divestiture to the payment of compensation in lieu of
acquisition were mandated [State of
Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528] .
Although not explicitly contained in Article 300-A,
these twin requirements have been read in and
inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory
deprivation to afford protection to the individuals
who are being divested of property [Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai,
(2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ)
414] . A post-colonial reading of the Constitution
cannot limit itself to these components alone. The
binary reading of the constitutional right to property
must give way to more meaningful renditions, where
the larger right to property is seen as comprising
intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character
but interconnected to constitute the whole. These
sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as
a consequence, State action or the legislation that
results in the deprivation of private property must be
measured against this constitutional net as a whole,
and not just one or many of its strands.
30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of
this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the
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right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be
identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:
(i) The duty of the State to inform the person that
it intends to acquire his property -- the right to
notice,
(ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the
acquisition -- the right to be heard,
(iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of
its decision to acquire -- the right to a reasoned
decision,
(iv) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the
acquisition is for public purpose -- the duty to
acquire only for public purpose,
(v) The duty of the State to restitute and
rehabilitate -- the right of restitution or fair
compensation,
(vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process
of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed
timelines of the proceedings -- the right to an
efficient and expeditious process, and
(vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings
leading to vesting -- the right of conclusion.
31. These seven rights are foundational
components of a law that is tune with Article 300-A,
and the absence of one of these or some of them
would render the law susceptible to challenge. The
judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantation [K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9
SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414] declares that the
law envisaged under Article 300-A must be in line
with the overarching principles of rule of law, and
must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course,
precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-
rights as "procedural", a nomenclature that often
tends to undermine the inherent worth of these
safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be
procedures, but they do constitute the real content of
the right to property under Article 300-A, non-
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compliance of these will amount to violation of the
right, being without the authority of law.
32. These sub-rights of procedure have been
synchronously incorporated in laws concerning
compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by
our constitutional courts while reviewing
administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of
private property. The following will demonstrate how
these seven principles have seamlessly become an
integral part of our Union and State statutes
concerning acquisition and also the constitutional and
administrative law culture that our courts have
evolved from time to time.
33. Following are the seven principles:
33.1.The Right to notice
33.1.1. A prior notice informing the bearer of the
right that the State intends to deprive them of the
right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension
of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a).
The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by
ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent
and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect this
right.
33.1.2. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section
11 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3-A of the
National Highways Act, 1956 are examples of such
statutory incorporation of the right to notice before
initiation of the land acquisition proceedings.
33.1.3. In a large number of decisions, our
constitutional courts have independently recognised
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the right to notice before any process of acquisition is
commenced
33.2.The Right to be heard
33.2.1. Following the right to a meaningful and
effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the
property-bearer to communicate his objections and
concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This
right to be heard against the proposed acquisition
must be meaningful and not a sham.
33.2.2. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section
15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3-C of the
National Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory
embodiments of this right.
33.2.3. Judicial opinions recognising the
importance of this right are far too many to
reproduce. Suffice it to say that that the enquiry in
which a landholder would raise his objection is not a
mere formality.
33.3.The Right to a reasoned decision
33.3.1. That the authorities have heard and
considered the objections is evidenced only through
a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority
to take an informed decision and communicate the
same to the objector.
33.3.2. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Section 3(2) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section
19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
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Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 and Section 3-D of the
National Highways Act, 1956, are the statutory
incorporations of this principle.
33.3.3. Highlighting the importance of the
declaration of the decision to acquire, the Courts
have held that the declaration is mandatory, failing
which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have
effect [ In Mohan Singh v. International Airport
Authority of India, (1997) 9 SCC 132, this Court held
that publication of a declaration under Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory.
In Project Implementation Unit v. P.V.
Krishnamoorthy, (2021) 3 SCC 572, this Court held
that if a declaration is not published under Section 3-
D of the National Highways Act, 1956 then the initial
notification and resultantly, the acquisition
proceedings cease to have effect.] .
33.4.The Duty to acquire only for public
purpose
33.4.1. That the acquisition must be for a public
purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the
discretion of the authorities to acquire. This
requirement, which conditions the purpose of
acquisition must stand to reason with the larger
constitutional goals of a welfare State and
distributive justice.
33.4.2. Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, Sections 3(1) and 7(1) of the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Sections 2(1), 11(1), 15(1)(b) and 19(1)
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 and Section 3-A(1) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 depict the statutory
incorporation of the public purpose requirement of
compulsory acquisition.
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33.4.3. The decision of compulsory acquisition of
land is subject to judicial review and the Court will
examine and determine whether the acquisition is
related to public purpose. If the Court arrives at a
conclusion that that there is no public purpose
involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be
set aside. This Court has time and again reiterated
the importance of the underlying objective of
acquisition of land by the State to be for a public
purpose.
33.5.The Right of restitution or fair
compensation
33.5.1. A person's right to hold and enjoy
property is an integral part to the constitutional right
under Article 300-A. Deprivation or extinguishment
of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it
in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation
or other similar means. Compensation has always
been considered to be an integral part of the process
of acquisition.
33.5.2. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 8 and 9 of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section
23 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3-G and 3-H of
the National Highways Act, 1956 are the statutory
incorporations of the right to restitute a person
whose land has been compulsorily acquired.
33.5.3. Our courts have not only considered that
compensation is necessary, but have also held that a
fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua
non for any acquisition process [ In State of
U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126, this Court held
that payment of compensation is an integral part of
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the process of land acquisition. In M. Naga Venkata
Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam Municipal Corpn., (2007)
8 SCC 748, this Court held that wherever promised,
compensation is ought to be paid. In NHAI v. P.
Nagaraju, (2022) 15 SCC 1 : (2024) 2 SCC (Civ)
414, this Court held that compensation must be
adequate and must be arrived at keeping in mind the
market value of the acquired land. In Vidya
Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1
SCC (Civ) 799, this Court held that even though
compensation is not expressly provided for under
Article 300-A of the Constitution, it can be inferred
therein. In the American jurisprudence, payment of
compensation has been made part of due process
[See Sweet v. Rechel, 1895 SCC OnLine US SC 208 :
40 L Ed 188 : 159 US 380 (1895), Delaware v. Town
of Morristown, 1928 SCC OnLine US SC 33 : 72 L Ed
523 : 276 US 182 (1928) and United
States v. Caltex, 1952 SCC OnLine US SC 105 : 97 L
Ed 157 : 344 US 149 (1952)].] .
33.6.The Right to an efficient and
expeditious process
33.6.1. The acquisition process is traumatic for
more than one reason. The administrative delays in
identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and
evaluating the objections, leading to a final
declaration, consume time and energy. Further,
passing of the award, payment of compensation and
taking over the possession are equally time-
consuming. It is necessary for the administration to
be efficient in concluding the process and within a
reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily
form part of Article 300-A.
33.6.2. Sections 5-A(1), 6, 11-A and 34 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 6(1-A) and 9 of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5),
14, 15(1), 16(1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
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in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 and Sections 3-C(1), 3-D(3) and 3-E(1) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, prescribe for
statutory frameworks for the completion of individual
steps in the process of acquisition of land within
stipulated timelines.
33.6.3. On multiple occasions, upon failure to
adhere to the timelines specified in law, the courts
have set aside the acquisition proceedings
33.7.The Right of conclusion
33.7.1. Upon conclusion of process of acquisition
and payment of compensation, the State
takes possession of the property in normal
circumstances. The culmination of an acquisition
process is not in the payment of compensation, but
also in taking over the actual physical possession of
the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not
complete. With the taking over of actual possession
after the normal procedures of acquisition, the
private holding is divested and the right, title and
interest in the property, along with possession is
vested in the State. Without final vesting, the
State's, or its beneficiary's right, title and interest in
the property is inconclusive and causes lot of
difficulties. The obligation to conclude and complete
the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300-
A.
33.7.2. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 4 and 5 of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3-D and 3-
E of the National Highways Act, 1956, statutorily
recognise this right of the acquirer.
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33.7.3. This step of taking over of possession has
been a matter of great judicial scrutiny and this
Court has endeavoured to construe the relevant
provisions in a way which ensures non-arbitrariness
in this action of the acquirer. For that matter, after
taking over possession, the process of land
acquisition concludes with the vesting of the land
with the authority concerned. The culmination of an
acquisition process by vesting has been a matter of
great importance. On this aspect, the courts have
given a large number of decisions as to the time,
method and manner by which vesting takes place.
34. The seven principles which we have discussed
are integral to the authority of law enabling
compulsory acquisition of private property. Union and
State statutes have adopted these principles and
incorporated them in different forms in the statutes
provisioning compulsory acquisition of immovable
property. The importance of these principles,
independent of the statutory prescription have been
recognised by our constitutional courts and they have
become part of our administrative law
jurisprudence."
18. In the case on hand, the authority has issued
notice of acquisition by publishing the notification in the
gazette and newspaper as required under law. The
acquisition notification was published in the name of
Manchaiah and on the said date of notification he was not
alive, nothing has prevented the appellants to file
objections to the acquisition proceedings. The acquisition
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proceedings carried out by the respondent-State and
MUDA more than two decades ago by following the
appropriate procedural requirements cannot be annulled at
the instance of appellant, who claims to be the legal
representatives of Manchaiah, which is not accepted by
learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The
acquisition proceedings cannot be annulled at the hands of
a litigant who is not diligent with regard to his rights after
an unreasonable delay, hence, the decision relied by the
appellants would not help their case.
19. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Raghbir Singh Sherawath referred supra deals
with the procedure to be followed by the acquiring
authority more particularly under Section 5A of the LA Act,
the said decision would not help the appellants in any way
as the appellants have not objected for acquisition
proceedings, hence, the question of conducting any
enquiry by the authority under Section 5A of the LA Act
would not arise.
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20. Insofar as non-deposit of compensation by the
authority is concerned, the learned Single Judge has
specifically addressed the grievance of the appellants by
permitting the appellants to submit representation
claiming for compensation and compensatory site. The
respondent-MUDA has clearly admitted that they have not
deposited the amount pursuant to the award passed by
them. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore
development authority v Manoharlal and Others
etc10
"366.4. The expression "paid" in the main part
of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a
deposit of compensation in court. The consequence
of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section
24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect
to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries
(landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation
under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of
the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse
of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-
deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for
AIR 2020 SC 1496
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five years or more, compensation under the 2013
Act has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the
date of notification for land acquisition under Section
4 of the 1894 Act."
21. In view of enunciation of law laid down by the
constitution bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred
supra, the acquisition proceeding would not lapse for non-
deposit of compensation amount as long as the possession
of the acquired land has been taken.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh11
referred supra at para 12 held as under:
"10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of
Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] it is stated that the
acquired land remaining unutilized was not intended
to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom
adequate compensation was paid according to the
market value as on the date of notification.
11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the
Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] it is held that
acquired land having vested in the State and the
compensation having been paid to the claimant, he
was not entitled to restitution of possession on the
ground that either original public purpose had ceased
to be in operation or the land could not be used for
other purpose.
(2003) 1 SCC 335
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12. If the land was not used for the purpose for
which it was acquired, it was open to the State
Government to take action but that did not confer
any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of
the land. As already noticed, the State Government
in this regard has already initiated proceedings for
resumption of the land. In our view, there arises no
question of any unjust enrichment to the appellant
Company."
23. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the
non-utilization of land by MUDA would not lead to
abandonment of acquisition as the land is vested with
State Government on passing of the award and after
taking physical possession of land, the authority or the
State can use the vested land for any public purpose. It is
to be noticed that the vast extent of land has been
acquired for formation of Vijayanagar IV Stage and the
acquisition proceedings is concluded long back, layout is
formed and the scheme has been substantially
implemented. Hence, there cannot be any order of
declaring that the scheme has lapsed or acquisition is
abandoned insofar as the property in question is
concerned.
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24. It is trite law that a writ petition challenging the
land acquisition should not be entertained, specially when
its filed after an inordinate delay and when the acquisition
process has attained finality. The Court should seldom
interfere in the land acquisition proceedings, specially after
award is passed, possession is taken and the land vests
with the State, free of all encumbrances. Any interference
by the Court after a long period of time, will cause
prejudice to the Development authority and also
jeopardize the scheme, thereby creating obstacles in its
effective implementation. The land loser, who challenges
the acquisition proceedings after a long delay due to
negligence and lack of due diligence is required to be
considered as a 'fence-sitter', who has failed to enforce his
constitutional and statutory rights available within a
reasonable period. Therefore, in the instant case, we are
of the considered view that the inordinate delay in filing
the petition without any justifiable explanation will
extinguish the right claimed by the appeals.
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25. We are also of the view that the alleged
possession of the appellants over the acquired land even
after completion of acquisition and taking over of
possession by drawing the mahazar is required to
considered as unlawful and authority are empowered to
dispossess such persons. It is not expected of the
acquiring authority to maintain a constant vigil over the
acquired land vested with them, if the vesting is in
accordance with law and any contrary claim with regard to
the possession has no sanctity in the eye of law.
26. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is
dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
BSR/List No.: 4 Sl No.: 1
