[Cites 29, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Mr Karunakara Shetty vs The State Of Karnataka on 21 February, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.34072 OF 2024 (LA - KIADB)
BETWEEN:
MR.KARUNAKARA SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS,
LATE MARAPPA NAIK,
R/O. NO.9/133, TAROLI HOUSE,
KUKKATTE POST, MOGARU,
DAKSHINA KANNADA - 574 144
AADHAAR NO. 5499-0050-1449.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.S.BHAGWAT, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI KRISHNA S.VYAS, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
VIKAS SOUDHA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. THE KARNATAKA STATE INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR, EAST WING,
2
KHANIJA BHAVANA,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.
3. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA STATE
INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
BYKAMPADI, MANGALURU,
DAKSHIN KANNADA - 575 011.
4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND PRESIDENT,
PRICE FIXATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT,
MANGALURU,
DAKSHIN KANNADA - 575 011.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SESHU V., HCGP FOR R1 AND R4;
SRI BASAVARAJ V.SABARAD, SR. ADVOCATE A/W
SRI H.L.PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 AND R-3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I. DECLARE
THAT THE IMPUGNED FINAL NOTIFICATION BEARING NO.CI 312
IPQ 2009, DATED 08/01/2010, PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE ON 11/01/2010 VIDE ANNEXURE-G, ISSUED BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT, INSOFAR AS IT PERTAINS TO THE SCHEDULE
PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE PETITIONER, BEING THE PROPERTY
AT SL.NO.12 CARVED OUT OF SY.NO.164/2 OF BADAGA ULIPADI
VILLAGE, HAS LAPSED BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS UNDER
SECTION 24(2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND
TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION, AND
RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013, AND DUE TO THE FAILURE TO
IMPLEMENT THE ACQUISITION WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD;
iA: ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHING THE IMPUGNED GENERAL
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AWARD BEARING NO.L.A.Q.SR.2/2006-07 DATED 18/08/2022
(ANNEXURE -P), PASSED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT; ii. ISSUE A
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE NECESSARY
CORRECTIONS IN THE RTCS, THEREBY SETTING ASIDE THE
CHANGES EFFECTUATED IN THE RTC BY UNLAWFULLY REPLACING
THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER WITH THAT OF THE 2ND
RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT, WITH RESPECT TO THE SCHEDULE
PROPERTY; iiB: IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS
TO DETERMINE AND PAY COMPENSATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND
TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHAVILITATION AND
RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013, BASED ON THE MARKET VALUE AS ON
THE DATE OF AWARD DATED 18/08/2022, TOGETHER WITH
CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question a Final
Notification dated 08-01-2010 issued by the 1st respondent
contending that acquisition has lapsed by virtue of the provisions of
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
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2. Heard Sri M.S. Bhagwat, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner; Sri Seshu V, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 4 and Sri Basavaraj
V.Sabarad, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents 2 and
3.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The petitioner claims to be the owner of land measuring
4.5 acres in Sy.No.164/2 and land measuring 2.11 acres in
Sy.No.232/4 of Badaga Ulipadi Village, Gurupura Hobli, Mangalore
Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District. The petitioner is said to have set
up a rubber processing industry in the subject property after
obtaining all statutory clearances. On 19-08-2006, the Board issues
a preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Act' for short) seeking to acquire vast area of land including the
lands of the petitioner for the purpose of setting up of industries.
On 31-10-2006, notice is issued to all the stake holders including
the petitioner to participate in an enquiry under Section 28(3) of
the Act scheduled to be held on 02-12-2006.
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3.2. In terms of the said notice, the enquiry was held on
02-12-2006. The petitioner participates in the said inquiry. As a
result of the inquiry, 1 acre in Sy.No.164/2 belonging to the
petitioner out of 4.5 acres was dropped from acquisition, as the said
area of land was being used for industrial purpose and land in
Sy.No.232/4 which was measuring 2.11 acres was completely
dropped owing to the objection or the enquiry, as the industry has
already been established in the said land. An order under Section
28(3) of the Act comes to be passed on 02-03-2007. On
08-01-2010, the final notification comes to be issued under Section
28(4) of the Act, declaring the lands acquired for the purpose of
setting up of an industry. Insofar as lands of the petitioner is
concerned, the total extent that was acquired was 3.05 acres. A
notice was issued under Section 28(6) of the Act to the petitioner
even for taking possession of the land so acquired - 3.05 acres. The
notice was served on the petitioner on 26-02-2010. Pursuant to
the receipt of notice, on 13-05-2010 the 3rd respondent/Special
Land Acquisition Officer takes possession of the acquired land and
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transfers it to the Board in terms of Section 28(8) of the Act, 4 days
later.
3.3. Between 17-06-2010 and 01-09-2013 the petitioner and
other land losers submitted several representations seeking the
properties mentioned in those representations to be dropped from
acquisition. The representations were not considered and several
persons whose representations were not considered or rejected had
approached this Court in Writ Petition No.9143 of 2011 and
connected matters wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court had
quashed the final notification qua lands of those petitioners and
directed proceedings under Section 28(3) to be conducted again, on
the score that enquiry was conducted on the same day and the
order was passed on the same day. Except those lands which
formed part of the order passed by the coordinate Bench, for other
lands meetings were called for the purpose of fixation of price for
compensation and compensation was determined on 27-09-2010.
3.4. The petitioner again on 01-10-2010 is said to have
submitted a representation. The representation was not considered
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and the petitioner kept quiet for close to a decade. In 2022, the
Board decides second stage of acquisition of surrounding
properties. A notice is issued by the Board to the petitioner to
submit his rights and the amount of compensation desired by him
for the second stage of acquisition, which also included the lands of
the petitioner. The petitioner now replies to the notice contending
that acquisition of land is illegal, in the light of Circular dated
03.03.2007, issued by the Government, where operational
industries including sick industries and fertile lands yielding multiple
crops should be dropped from acquisition. The Board then passes a
general award on 18-08-2022 determining compensation to the
lands of the petitioner as well. Award notice is issued under Section
12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and in the light of the
absence of the petitioner in the award proceedings, award is
determined. The petitioner then files the subject writ petition
challenging those actions on 04-12-2024. During the pendency of
the subject Writ petition, a successive final notification is issued by
the 1st respondent notifying 2.11 acres in Sy.No.232/4 for
acquisition on 29.03.2025.
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4.1. The learned senior counsel Sri M.S.Bhagwat appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that the order under Section
28(3) of the Act was passed without following appropriate
procedure and it was erroneously claimed that the petitioner had
been heard. The petitioner, in fact, had not been provided
adequate opportunity. The RTC records of the subject property
started reflecting the Board instead of the petitioner without proper
mutation entries regarding the same being recorded. The petitioner
continues to remain in possession of the subject property even after
a decade of issuance of final notification, which demonstrates
acquisition process lacking genuine intent of setting up of industry.
He would contend that the general award passed by the Board on
18-08-2022 is after an inordinate delay of 16 years from issuance
of preliminary notification.
4.2. The further contention is that despite lapse of time no
notice was issued under Section 29(4) of the Act and thereby the
petitioner has been denied opportunity to participate in the
determination of compensation. He has placed reliance upon
several judgments of the Apex Court or the coordinate Benches of
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this Court to buttress his submission, all of which would bear
consideration qua their relevance.
5. Per contra, the learned senior counsel, Sri. Basavaraj V
Sabarad appearing for the respondents would vehemently refute
the submissions in contending that in terms of sub-section (5) of
Section 28 of the Act, the land vests with the State after the final
notification is passed. There is a delay of 14 years in challenging
the acquisition proceedings since the final notification is of the year
2010. The Act, is a self-contained code and the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act becomes applicable only in certain actions of
acquisition. The acquisition proceedings stood completed in the year
2010. The petitioner was issued a notice on 16-02-2010 for taking
possession of the acquired land. The possession of acquired land
was taken on 13-05-2010, possession of land was handed over to
the Board under Section 28(8) of the Act on 17-05-2010. Award
proceedings were initiated in 2010 and price fixation for
compensation was determined in the year 2010 at ₹10.50 lakhs per
acre. The constructed property of the petitioner was completely
dropped from acquisition as it was a running industry. All other
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contentions would not hold water. One Smt. Geetha Shetty who
was the owner of adjacent land had filed Writ Petition No.10983 of
2022 challenging the very acquisition proceedings which comes to
be dismissed and the said dismissal is challenged before the
Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.27 of 2024. The writ appeal also is
dismissed on 29-10-2025.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record. In furtherance whereof, the threshold issue
that calls for consideration is, whether delay in filing the subject
writ petition laying the challenge to the acquisition proceedings
could be condoned and the final notification of the year 2010 be
quashed?
7. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are
all a matter of record and they would not require any reiteration.
The land owners of the adjacent lands had approached this Court in
Writ Petition No.9143 of 2011 challenging the enquiry conducted
under Section 28(3) of the Act, which comes to be disposed of on
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21-07-2011. The coordinate Bench remits the matter back to the
hands of the Board to redo the process from the stage of
consideration under Section 28(3) of the Act, but did not quash the
acquisition proceedings in its entirety. The petitioners therein did
not participate in the proceedings under Section 28(3) even after
the coordinate Bench had fixed the date for the same. Submissions
galore before this Court after about 18 years of the preliminary
notification and 14 years of the final notification which is
undoubtedly hit by gross delay. The Apex Court in the case of
BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MOTI LAL AGARWAL1
considers the issue of delay in challenging acquisition proceedings
and holds as follows:
".... .... ....
16. In our view, even if the objection of delay and
laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf
of BDA and the State Government, the High Court was
duty-bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of
nine years between the issue of declaration under Section
6(1) and filing of the writ petition, and declined relief to
Respondent 1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches
because the acquired land had been utilised for
implementing the residential scheme and third-party
rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about
six years between the passing of award and filing of the
writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain
the prayer made in the writ petition.
1
(2011) 5 SCC 394
12
17. It is true that no limitation has been prescribed
for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
but one of the several rules of self-imposed restraint
evolved by the superior courts is that the High Court will
not entertain petitions filed after long lapse of time
because that may adversely affect the
settled/crystallised rights of the parties. If the writ
petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed
for filing a civil suit for similar cause, the High Court will
treat the delay unreasonable and decline to entertain the
grievance of the petitioner on merits.
18. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC
1006] the Constitution Bench considered the effect of
delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution and held: (AIR pp. 1011-12, paras 17 & 21)
"17. ... It has been made clear more than once that
the power to give relief under Article 226 is a
discretionary power. This is specially true in the case
of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus.
Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly
take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is
the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this
special remedy and what excuse there is for it. ... It is not
easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal
application. It may however be stated as a general rule
that if there has been unreasonable delay the court
ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this
extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
***
21. ... The learned counsel is right in his
submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act
do not as such apply to the granting of relief under
Article 226. It appears to us however that the
maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time
within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must
be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a
reasonable standard by which delay in seeking
remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This
Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it
is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a
civil action for the remedy but where the delay is
more than this period, it will almost always be proper
for the court to hold that it is unreasonable."
19. In matters involving challenge to the
acquisition of land for public purpose, this Court has
consistently held that delay in filing the writ petition
should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the
petitioner if he fails to offer plausible explanation for the
delay. The Court has also held that the delay of even few
years would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner, if the
acquired land has been partly or wholly utilised for the
public purpose.
20. In Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar [(1974) 2
SCC 501] this Court approved dismissal by the High Court
of the writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing the
acquisition of his land and observed: (SCC p. 506, para 23)
"23. The High Court held that the appellants were guilty
of delay and laches. The High Court relied on two important
facts. First, that there was delivery of possession. The
appellants alleged that it was a paper transaction. The High
Court rightly rejected that contention. Secondly, the High
Court said that the Trust invested several lakhs of rupees
for the construction of roads and material for development
purposes. The appellants were in full knowledge of the
same. The appellants did not take any steps. The High
Court rightly said that to allow this type of challenge to an
acquisition of large block of land piecemeal by the owners of
some of the plots in succession would not be proper. If this
type of challenge is encouraged the various owners of small
plots will come up with writ petitions and hold up the
acquisition proceedings for more than a generation. The
High Court rightly exercised discretion against the
appellants. We do not see any reason to take a contrary
view to the discretion exercised by the High Court."
(emphasis supplied)
21. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi [(1996) 6 SCC
445] this Court referred to Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade
(7th Edn.) at pp. 342-43 and observed: (SCC p. 453, para 10)
"10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power,
becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the
action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events.
Though the order may be void, if the party does not
approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always
a question of fact and have the order invalidated or
acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be
exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has
been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate
case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the
order was void. The net result is that extraordinary
jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such
circumstances."
22. In Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 2 SCC 83] , the delay of 17 months was
considered as a good ground for declining relief to the
petitioner. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P)
Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] this Court held: (SCC p. 452,
para 9)
"9. ... It is thus, well-settled law that when there
is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when
all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have
become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the
notifications. The High Court has, no doubt,
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the notification under Section
4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be
exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was passed and
possession was taken, the Court should not have
exercised its power to quash the award which is a
material factor to be taken into consideration before
exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that
no third-party rights were created in the case, is hardly a
ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High
Court was not right in interfering with the discretion
exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ
petition on the ground of laches."
23. In Urban Improvement Trust v. Bheru
Lal [(2002) 7 SCC 712] this Court reversed the order of
the Rajasthan High Court and held that the writ petition
filed for quashing of acquisition of land for a residential
scheme framed by the appellant Urban Improvement
Trust was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the
same was filed after two years.
24. In Ganpatibai v. State of M.P. [(2006) 7 SCC
508] , the delay of 5 years was considered unreasonable
and the order passed by the High Court refusing to
entertain the writ petition was confirmed. In that case also
the petitioner had initially filed a suit challenging the acquisition
of land. The suit was dismissed in 2001. Thereafter, the writ
petition was filed. This Court referred to an earlier judgment
in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar [(1995) 4 SCC 229] and
observed: (Ganpatibai case [(2006) 7 SCC 508] , SCC p. 510,
para 9)
"9. In State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar [(1995) 4 SCC
229] this Court had observed that the civil suit was not
maintainable and the remedy to question notification under
Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
was by filing a writ petition. Even thereafter the appellant,
as noted above, pursued the suit in the civil court. The
stand that five years after the filing of the suit, the decision
was rendered does not in any way help the appellant. Even
after the decision of this Court, the appellant continued to
prosecute the suit till 2001, when the decision of this Court
in 1995 had held that suit was not maintainable."
25. In Sawaran Lata v. State of Haryana [(2010) 4
SCC 532 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 220] the dismissal of writ
petition filed after seven years of the publication of
declaration and five years of the award passed by the
Collector was upheld by the Court and it was observed:
(SCC p. 535, para 11)
"11. In the instant case, it is not the case of the
petitioners that they had not been aware of the
acquisition proceedings as the only ground taken in
the writ petition has been that substance of the
notification under Section 4 and declaration under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act had been published in the
newspapers having no wide circulation. Even if the
submission made by the petitioners is accepted, it
cannot be presumed that they could not be aware of
the acquisition proceedings for the reason that a very
huge chunk of land belonging to a large number of
tenure-holders had been notified for acquisition.
Therefore, it should have been the talk of the town.
Thus, it cannot be presumed that the petitioners
could not have knowledge of the acquisition
proceedings."."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in terms of the afore-quoted judgment holds that
delay in challenging acquisition proceedings is fatal. The delay in
the case at hand is not one or two years, but it is 14 years, as the
notification of 2010 is called in question in 2024. It is not that the
petitioner was not aware of what is happening. At every stage he is
aware and sits on the fence. Possession is taken by the Board after
issuance of notice to the petitioner in the year 2010. Even then, he
does not challenge as he was happy with the land in which the
rubber industry was being run had been dropped from acquisition.
8. The coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition
No.10983 of 2022 concerning the adjacent land in which the very
same acquisition proceedings had been challenged, rejects the
challenge by the following order:
".... .... ....
4. It was further contended that under similar
circumstances, this Court in W.P.no.9555/2011 had allowed writ
petition and quashed acquisition notification by order dated
21.07.2011. But, similar benefit was not extended to petitioner
by respondents, thereby constraining her to file present petition.
5. It was submitted that contrary to Section 28 of KIAD
Act, respondents had failed to issue notice to owner/occupier of
land and therefore acquisition was without proper notice. It was
also contended that no mahazar was conducted at time of
service of notice. In any case, petitioner had continued in
possession, and land proposed for acquisition had thick growth
of rubber plantation, rendering it unsuitable for acquisition as
per guidelines issued by respondent no.1. On above grounds
sought for allowing writ petition.
6. On other hand, Sri Manjunath V. Rayappa, learned AGA
for respondents no.1, 4 and 5 and Sri Ashok N. Nayak, learned
counsel for respondents no.2 and 3 opposed writ petition. It was
submitted that writ petition filed in year 2022, challenging
acquisition notifications of year 2010 was highly belated and
liable to be dismissed as such.
7. It was further submitted that circular dated 03.03.2007
was in nature of guideline/administrative instruction, which
would not confer enforceable right. It was further submitted that
as per petitioner herself, she acquired interest in respect of
schedule properties under deed of assignment only on
03.09.2016, which was much after issuance of Preliminary and
Final notifications. It was therefore contended that petitioner as
acquirer of right in respect of land under acquisition would not
be entitled to question acquisition. Therefore, writ petition was
not tenable. It was submitted that admittedly petitioner's
husband was khatedar and acquisition notifications reflected his
name against lands under acquisition and even individual
notices were issued to him. Thereafter as per Annexure-R1
mahazar drawn on 14.05.2010 and order dated 17.05.2010 at
Annexure - R2, possession of acquired lands was handed over to
respondent no.2. It was also submitted that respondent no.3
had also deposited compensation before Civil Court. Thus,
acquisition stood concluded in accordance with law.
8. Relying on decision in case of M/s Ahuja Industries
Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC
3519, it was submitted that where petitioner had acquired
interest in land, but, took no efforts to get his name entered in
revenue records, non-service of notice on him would not vitiate
acquisition. It was also held that there was no obligation cast
upon land acquisition authorities to make roving enquiry to
locate owner.
9. Reliance was placed on decision in case of Banda
Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal &
Ors. - (2011) 5 SCC 394 to contend that it would suffice for
authorities to take possession symbolically by drawing mahazar
in presence of independent witnesses and obtaining their
signatures thereon. It was therefore, contended that respondent
had concluded acquisition proceedings in accordance with law
and same did not suffer from any material violation, calling for
interference.
10. Heard learned counsel and perused writ petition
record.
11. From above, it is seen that main grounds on which
petitioner is challenging acquisition are that it was in violation of
guidelines issued by respondent no.1 and principles of natural
justice, as it was without notice to owner/occupier. While,
respondents oppose writ petition on ground of petitioner having
approached Court belatedly after completion of acquisition in
accordance with law and also on ground that petitioner had
acquired interest in lands under acquisition after issuance of
acquisition notifications.
12. Admittedly, writ petition is filed more than 12
years after initiation of acquisition proceedings.
Explanation offered by petitioner is that lands under
acquisition were earlier purchased by her husband and
subsequently, interest therein assigned in favour of
petitioner. It is stated in para no.12 that petitioner and her
predecessor had drawn attention of different authorities
including Minister for Large and Medium Industries about
acquisition being contrary to guidelines. In fact, there is
reference to request by petitioner's husband against dispersal of
compensation in Annexure-J dated 20.11.2010. This would
establish that petitioner/her predecessor had notice of
acquisition proceedings.
13. Moreover, careful perusal of record of rights -
Annexure - A series would indicate that name of petitioner's
husband was mutated only on 26.11.2011 as per MR
no.138/2011-12, whereas, acquisition notifications were issued
earlier reflecting name of khatedar, shown in them. Even if
acquisition of interest by petitioner in year 2016 be
discounted on account of assignment being from her
husband, failure to approach this Court within reasonable
time would stand vindicated.
14. Even insofar as challenge based on decision in
W.P.No.9555/2011, it is seen that petitioner therein had
approached this Court without any delay alleging
violation of Section 28(3) of KIAD Act while considering
objections filed by petitioner therein. Admittedly, in
instant case, neither petitioner nor her predecessor in
interest had filed objections and therefore, cannot
maintain challenge on ground of violation of procedure in
Section 28(3) of KIAD Act.
15. Insofar as contention about acquisition being in
violation of guidelines, it is seen that same is heavily dependent
upon petitioner establishing existence of plantation prior to or as
on date of issuance of acquisition notification. Photographs
produced at Annexure - K series, would rather support
contention of learned counsel for respondent no.2 that said
growth may be between large time gap between date of
issuance of acquisition notifications and petitioner approaching
this Court. In fact, agreement dated 31.03.2015 with Sri
Venkataramana Food Specialties Ltd., which itself is about five
years after initiation of acquisition, would also not support
petitioner. Even perusal of order dated 31.10.2006 passed
under Section 28(3) of KIAD Act, produced by counsel for
respondents no.2 and 3 along with synopsis dated 10.10.2023
would indicate that respondent no.3 had taken note of
objections submitted by land owners had overruled same on
specific ground that lands were suitable for formation of
industrial area and there were no plantations/development
therein.
16. Even delay in dispersal of compensation, even if
can be considered as a ground of challenge, same would
be at behest of petitioner herself as indicated in letter by
respondent no.4/5 to respondent no.3 in Annexure - J as
early as in year 2010.
17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kapi Laben
Ambalal Patel & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat - (2021) 12 SCC
95 and in M/s Ahuja Industries and Banda Development
Authority (supra) has held belated challenge to land
acquisition, as not tenable."
(Emphasis supplied)
The said judgment is tossed before the Division Bench. The Division
Bench is said to have dismissed the claim in Writ Appeal No.27 of
2024 in terms of its judgment dated 29-10-2025. The grounds
urged in the said petition and the appeal are identical to what is
projected in the case at hand. Therefore, the petition does not
warrant any interference or a consideration on merit of the matter,
as it is hit by gross delay and it is trite that delay defeats equity. It
is altogether a different circumstance if the petitioner was claiming
compensation. If compensation is not paid even after 10 decades, it
would not become a delay in claiming compensation. The case at
hand is not claiming compensation but challenging the acquisition.
Therefore, the challenge to the acquisition cannot be entertained
after 14 years of issuance of final notification.
9. The petition lacking in merit stands rejected.
Interim order of any kind operating shall stand dissolved.
SD/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ
