[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Hanumakka vs M Nagaraju on 21 February, 2026
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WA No. 1334 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1334 OF 2024 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
HANUMAKKA
W/O. CHIKKATHIMMARAYAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS.,
VIJAYAMMA. J
W/O. THIMMARAYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/AT HULIMANGALA VILLAGE,
JIGANI HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK,
Digitally BANGALORE-562 106.
signed by
NIRMALA
DEVI ALSO R/AT NO. 215,
Location: 24TH MAIN ROAD, 25TH CROSS,
HIGH COURT NEAR PARANGIPALYA,
OF HSR LAYOUT,
KARNATAKA
BANGALORE-560 102.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PRAKASHA K V, ADVOCATE)
AND:
M. NAGARAJU
S/O LATE MUDDAIAH SHETTY
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WA No. 1334 of 2024
HC-KAR
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES
1. SMT N LAKSHMI
W/O. LATE M. NAGARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
2. SRI. N. ABHILASH
S/O. LATE M. NAGARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
BOTH ARE R/AT NO. 27/8,
MARUTHI NILAYA, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
HANUMANTHNAGARA,
BANGALORE-560 019.
3. SMT. M. B. ANUPAMA
D/O. LATE M. NAGARAJU,
W/O. SRI. M.B. BALAJI,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 259, KAMADHENU,
NARYANAPILLAI STREET,
SHIVAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU-560 001.
4. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP BY ITS SECRETARY,
REVENUE BUILDING,
MS. BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560 001.
5. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
KANDAYA BHAVANA,
K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 009.
6. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE SOUTH
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WA No. 1334 of 2024
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SUB-DIVISION,
KANDAYA BHAVAN,
K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE-560009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY MISS. NILOUFER AKBAR, AGA FOR R4 TO R6
SRI. S.K. MITHUN, ADVOCATE FOR R2
R1 AND R3 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS IN
RESPECT OF WP No. 23797/2017 (SC-ST), SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 1.08.2023 PASSED BY THE
HONBLE SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No. 23797/2017 (SC-ST)3.
PASS ANY SUCH OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS
HONBLE COURT DEEMS FIT AND PROPER UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT PETITION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA)
1. The present appeal is filed by the legal representative
of one Smt. Hanumakka, who was arrayed as respondent No.4 in
the writ petition calling in question the order dated 01.08.2023
passed in Writ Petition No.23797/2017 (SCST), whereunder the
writ petition was allowed and the orders dated 27.03.2012 passed
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by the Assistant Commissioner and the order dated 29.11.2016
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, were set aside.
2. The relevant facts are that an extent of 2 acres of land
bearing No.155/27 (New No.323) situated at Hulimangala Village,
Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk, [subject property] was granted to one
Sri Chikkathimmarayappa [original grantee] vide order dated
06.12.1940 in case No.13/1940-41. The original grantee sold the
subject property to one Smt. Giddamma vide registered Sale Deed
dated 13.05.1974. Smt. Giddamma sold 1 acre of the subject
property to one Smt. Fathima Bi and another 1 acre to one Smt.
Neelamma under two separate Sale Deeds dated 28.06.1974. The
said Smt. Neelamma sold the land she had purchased to one Sri
M. Nagaraju vide registered Sale Deed dated 13.11.1995. Smt.
Fathima Bi sold 1 acre of the subject property to one Sri. K.M.
Poovaiah, who in turn sold to one Smt. Bhagyalakshmi.
3. The original grantee filed an application [case
No.K.SC.ST.48/1987-88] for restoration of possession before the
Assistant Commissioner under Section 5(1) of the Karnataka
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of
Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [PTCL Act]. However, the said
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proceedings were dropped by an order dated 27.08.1992. This
order was neither challenged by the original grantee nor by
anybody else.
4. Subsequently, one Smt. Hanumakka, daughter of the
original grantee, filed an application under the PTCL Act in respect
of the entire extent of the subject property before the Assistant
Commissioner, which was allowed by order dated 27.03.2012.
Being aggrieved, Sri M. Nagaraju filed an appeal (case
No.SC/ST(A)8/2012-13) before the Deputy Commissioner. Smt.
Bhagyalakshmi also preferred an appeal (in case
No.SC/ST(A)13/2012-13) before the Deputy Commissioner. The
Deputy Commissioner vide common order dated 29.11.2016
dismissed the appeal filed by Sri M. Nagaraju and allowed the
appeal filed by Smt. Bhagyalakshmi. Being aggrieved, the legal
representatives of Sri M. Nagaraju preferred Writ Petition
No.23797/2017, challenging the orders passed by the Assistant
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.
5. The learned Single Judge noticed that the proceedings
initiated by the original grantee under the PTCL Act for resumption
of the land had been rejected/dropped. Hence, it was held that a
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subsequent application for resumption was not maintainable.
Hence, the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner were set aside.
6. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings initiated by
the original grantee for the resumption of land (No.
K.SC.ST.48/1987-88) were dropped by the Assistant Commissioner
vide order dated 27.08.1992. In the said order, it was noticed that
the land was granted vide Saguvali Chit dated 26.07.1948, and the
non-alienation period mentioned was 10 years. It was also noticed
that the grant was made in favour of a person belonging to the
scheduled caste category and the non-alienation period was to be
taken as 15 years from the date of the grant. The Assistant
Commissioner noticed that the alienation was made in the year
1974, i.e., 26 years after the date of the grant. Hence, it was held
that the alienation did not contravene the 15-year non-alienation
period. It was also noted that the purchaser was a relative of the
grantee, and that the first alienation occurred before the PTCL Act
came into force. Hence, it was held that the provisions of the PTCL
Act were not applicable and the proceedings were dropped.
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7. In the proceedings initiated by Smt. Hanumakka
(daughter of the original grantee), it was noticed that the Saguvali
Chit dated 17.12.1940 was produced and the land was granted free
of cost. It was further held that, according to the then-existing
rules, the land granted in favour of the depressed class/scheduled
caste persons could not be alienated ever. Hence, it was held that
the first alienation made vide Sale Deed dated 13.05.1974 was in
violation of the provisions of the PTCL Act, and hence, the
subsequent alienations were also null and void. Accordingly, the
Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated 27.03.2012, allowed the
application for resumption and ordered the change of revenue
entries in favour of Smt. Hanumakka.
8. The Deputy Commissioner, while considering the
appeal, noticed that the original records pertaining to the grant to
the original grantee were not produced either in the said appeal or
before the Assistant Commissioner. The appeal filed by Sri M.
Nagaraju (No. SC.ST(A)8/2012-13) was dismissed as filed beyond
time, and the appeal filed by Smt. Bhagyalakshmi (No.SC.ST(A)
13/2012-13) was allowed. Being aggrieved, the legal
representatives of Sri. M. Nagaraju filed a writ petition.
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9. Admittedly, in the proceedings for resumption filed by
the original grantee, the Assistant Commissioner recorded findings
that the alienation was made beyond the 15-year period and that
the first alienation occurred 26 years after the grant. However, in
the application for resumption filed by the daughter of the original
grantee, the Assistant Commissioner held that the grant in respect
of land made in favour of the depressed class/scheduled caste,
could not be alienated forever. In the subsequent proceedings, the
Assistant Commissioner did not refer to the findings recorded in the
earlier proceedings, when the application for resumption made by
the original grantee was dropped. Further, the Deputy
Commissioner had categorically recorded a finding that the original
grant records were not produced either before the Assistant
Commissioner or in the appeal.
10. Be that as it may, it is clear that the application for
resumption that was allowed was initiated by the daughter of the
original grantee in the year 2011-12. It is further forthcoming that
the original grant was made in the year 1940. 71 years had
elapsed when the daughter of the original grantee made the
application for resumption.
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11. Undisputedly, the question whether the application for
resumption can be entertained after an inordinate delay is no
longer res integra. The Supreme Court in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi V/s State of Karnataka1 and in Vivek M.Hinduja v.
M.Aswatha2 held that an inordinate delay in filing an application for
restoration of granted land which was allegedly alienated in
violation of the provisions of the PTCL Act could not be maintained.
The provisions of Section 5 of the PTCL Act were amended by
introduction of clauses (c) and (d), by virtue of Act No.30 of 2023.
The import of the said amendment came to be considered by the
Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma
Vs. The Deputy Commissioner and others3 and the Court
observed as under:
"3.***********
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for
the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the
provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c)
& (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the
concept of "limitation and delay" has to remain miles away.
These new clauses read as under:
(2020) 14 SCC 232
(2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC
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"(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there
shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this
Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases
pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of
Law adjudicating the cases under this section."
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978
Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application
for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal
position. Such duplication happened even in English
legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The
question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is
silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section
5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory
scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute
has been all through, so far as the limitation period is
concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation
period earlier and there is no limitation period now too.
Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the
Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation period" at
all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between
alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its
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resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision
lend support to this view:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms
of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person
to make an application for having the transfer annulled as
void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which such an application can be
made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo
motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi
Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs., (2017) 6
Scale 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy.
Commissioner (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether
Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the
Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo
motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief
was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River
which make agricultural operations impossible. An
application for restoration was made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it
was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for restoration of land
made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on
that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka
High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner,
(2000) 1 Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State
of Karnataka, (2006) 4 Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
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Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga, (2000) 2 Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that
there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time, are
overruled. ....."
(emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the
above case has not been altered by the subject amendment,
even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have
taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the
contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the
law declared by the highest court of the country which it did
after considering all aspects of the matter including the
sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to
silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a
different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by
law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of
factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay
and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches'
that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that obtain in
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law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of
India v. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25] make out this
point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many
occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and
distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to
which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly,
laches might be called a genus to a species by name
acquiescence. However, there may be a case where
acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles
are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various statutes which
restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration
of condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important
issue to be taken note of by the court.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the French
language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus
involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a
claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to
the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an
act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
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22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of
the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the
party approaching the court apart from the change in position
in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a
Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its
doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right.
By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular
position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate
a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his
conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a
remedy."
12. In view of the factual matrix in the present case as well
as the legal position as noticed above, we find no error in the
ultimate conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge in
allowing the writ petition.
13. Accordingly, the above appeal is dismissed.
14. Pending IAs., if any, also stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE
ND List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16
