Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1519 Kant
Judgement Date : 20 February, 2026
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CRP No.100020 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
®
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.100020 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
M/S SHYAMARAJU & COMPANY (INDIA) LTD.,
A PRIVATE COMPANY INCORPORATED
UNDER THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1955
CORPORATE OFFICE AT DHIVYASHREE CHAMBERS,
A WING, #11 O' SHAUGENSSY ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 025.
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
MR. V.M. MATHEW
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. CHETAN MUNNOLI, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed AND:
by
MOHANKUMAR
B SHELAR 1. THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER,
Location: High
Court of CITY MUNCIPAL COUNCIL ILKAL,
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench TALUKA HUNGUND
BAGALKOT DISTRICT-587125.
2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,
KARNATAKA URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT AND
FINANCE CORPORATION (KUIDFC),
NAGARABHIVRUDDHI BHAVAN,
#22, 17 F CROSS,
BINAMANGAL 2ND STAGE,
OLD MADRAS ROAD,
INDIRA NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560 038.
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CRP No.100020 of 2022
3. THE PROJECT MANAGER,
KARNATAKA URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT AND
FINANCE CORPORATION,
NORTH KARNATAKA URBAN SECTOR
INVESTMENT PROGRAMME
KUIDFC-NKUSIP,
DIVISIONAL OFFICE,
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT
1ST FLOOR, CORPORATION SHOPPING COMPLEX,
GOAVES, HINDWADI, BELAGAVI-590 011.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. NARAYAN G. RASALKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3)
THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CPC., PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 26.10.2021 PASSED ON IA NO.V IN OS NO.95/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, HUNGUND AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE SUIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS CRP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 04.02.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
CAV ORDER
1. The petitioner has filed this Civil Revision Petition
calling in question the order dated 26.10.2021 passed by the
Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hungund, rejecting I.A. No.V filed
under Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908('the CPC' for short) seeking rejection of
the plaint in O.S.No.95/2016 on the ground of limitation.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the petition are
that:-
The petitioner and the respondents entered into a contract
on 18.10.2010 for execution of sewerage works. The said
contract came to be terminated by the respondents on
26.04.2012. The petitioner challenged the termination before
this Court by filing a writ petition, which came to be dismissed on
11.01.2013. The writ appeal filed thereafter was also dismissed
on 15.02.2013.
3. Thereafter, the petitioner instituted O.S.No.130/2013
before the competent Civil Court seeking declaration and
injunction in respect of the termination order. During the
pendency of the said suit, liberty was granted by this Court to
file a separate suit for damages after disposal of the said suit.
4. After termination of the contract, the respondents
undertook measurement of the work already executed, prepared
estimates for the balance work, obtained approval from the
competent authority and got the balance work executed through
another contractor at the risk and cost of the petitioner. Based
on such exercise, damages were quantified. On 09.11.2016, the
respondents filed O.S.No.95/2016 before the Senior Civil Judge,
Hungund, seeking recovery of damages and cost of balance
work.
5. After appearance in the said suit, the petitioner filed
I.A.No.V under Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of the
CPC contending that the suit is barred by limitation, as according
to the petitioner the cause of action arose on 26.04.2012 itself,
the date of termination of contract. The Trial Court, by order
dated 26.10.2021, rejected I.A.No.V holding that the issue of
limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be
decided at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
6. Being aggrieved by the said order passed on
I.A.No.V, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the
present Civil Revision Petition.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that
Article 55 of the Limitation Act squarely applies to the case. It is
submitted that the breach occurred on 26.04.2012 when the
contract was terminated and limitation commenced from that
date. It is argued that the suit filed on 09.11.2016 is ex facie
barred by limitation. Reliance is placed on the decisions in
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali reported in
(2020) 7 SCC 366, and Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram
Prasanna Singh reported in (2020) 16 SCC 601, to contend
that where the plaint itself discloses that the suit is barred by
limitation, it must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the
CPC. Reliance is also placed on judgments holding that unilateral
quantification of damages does not extend the period of
limitation and that clever drafting cannot circumvent the law of
limitation.
8. In support of the contentions, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following
judgments:-
• Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and others v.
Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje
Pratapdinh Maharaj Bhonsle and another
reported in (2024) 15 SCC 675;
• M/s.Delta Founation and Constructions, Kochi
and others v. Kerala State Construction,
Corporation Ltd., Ernakulam, reported in AIR 2003 KERALA 201.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents
contends that the plaint discloses a continuing cause of action. It
is submitted that under the terms of the contract, the
respondents were required to measure the executed work,
estimate the balance work, obtain approval from the competent
authority and then execute the balance work at the risk and cost
of the contractor. It is argued that damages could be determined
only after completion of these steps.
10. It is submitted that the petitioner has challenged the
order dated 26.10.2021 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge
and JMFC, Hungund, in O.S.No.95/2016, whereby his application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of the CPC
came to be rejected. The respondent No.1, being the Employer--
City Municipal Commissioner, CMC Ilkal along with respondent
No.2, a Government Company and respondent No.3, its
supervisory representative, were vested with supervisory and
financial control over the project funded under the loan
conditions of the Asian Development Bank, Manila, with
participation of the Central and State Governments. The work
under Agreement dated 18.10.2010 for supplying and laying
sewerage network and construction of FAL type STP of 8.0 MLD
capacity at Ilkal, valued at Rs.35,87,07,060/-, was to be
completed within 18 months from the date of handing over of
site, i.e., on or before 17.04.2012.
11. It is contended that the petitioner failed to complete
the work within the stipulated period and committed
fundamental breaches of contract despite repeated opportunities.
Consequently, after following due procedure and in public
interest, Respondent No.1 terminated the contract by
proceedings dated 26.04.2012. The W.P.No.14760/2012 filed by
the petitioner challenging the termination was dismissed on
11.01.2013, and W.A.No.30106/2013 was also dismissed on
15.02.2013 by the Co-ordinate bench of this Court. Thereafter,
the petitioner instituted O.S.No.130/2013 and pursued multiple
interlocutory proceedings and writ petitions, including
W.P.No.81897/2013, which was disposed of on 24.07.2014
granting liberty to file a separate suit for damages after disposal
of the pending suit, and W.P.No.105613/2014, disposed of on
10.02.2015 with directions regarding preliminary issues. Thus,
the litigation initiated by the petitioner continued, and the
consequences arising out of the termination order dated
26.04.2012 remained sub judice.
12. It is further submitted that upon abandonment of the
work by the petitioner at the time of termination, the Employer
was compelled to undertake damage control measures and
subsequently assess the balance work in accordance with
contractual clauses, including GCC Clause 51.1 and PCC Clause
69.1, which permitted completion at the risk and cost of the
defaulting contractor. The assessment of the balance work,
undertaken with technical and financial assistance of respondents
No.2 and 3, and approved at various levels during the period
2012 to 2014, revealed that against the original contract value of
Rs.35,87,07,060/-, and after deducting RA-2 and Final Bill
amounts of Rs.4,07,91,737/-, the balance amount available was
Rs.31,79,15,323/-.
13. However, it is argued that the actual cost incurred for
completion through a fresh contract with M/s UPL Environmental
Engineers Limited, Vadodara, in joint venture with M/s Gharpure
Engineering and Constructions (P) Ltd., Pune, amounted to
Rs.42,71,42,307/-, resulting in an excess expenditure of
Rs.10,92,26,984/- and additional administrative cost at 20%
amounting to Rs.2,18,45,397/-, totaling Rs.13,10,72,381/-. The
process of evaluation, preparation of estimates, sanction and
calling of fresh tenders was necessarily time-consuming and
could not have been finalized on the date of termination itself.
Hence, the cause of action for recovery of risk and cost amount
arose only upon ascertainment and approval of the actual
expenditure, and the question of limitation is a mixed question of
fact and law requiring evidence and trial.
14. It is submitted that pursuant to evaluation of fresh
tenders, the Joint Venture of M/s UPL Environmental Engineers
Limited, Vadodara, Gujarat with M/s Gharpure Engineering and
Constructions (P) Ltd., Pune, Maharashtra, was found to be
competitive and was accordingly recommended by the expert
committee. The respondent No.1 accepted the said bid with
technical support of respondents No.2 and 3, and a fresh
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Agreement dated 24.03.2014 was executed for completion of the
balance work at a tender price of Rs.42,71,42,307/-, preceded
by Letter of Acceptance dated 05.02.2014 and Notice to Proceed
dated 25.03.2014. As per the terms of the original Agreement
dated 18.10.2010 and the termination proceedings dated
26.04.2012, the Employer reserved the right under Clause PCC
69(1)(ii) and (iii) to complete the unexecuted work at the risk
and cost of the defaulting contractor. After assessment of the
balance work and upon finalization of the excess cost, notice
dated 18.03.2015 was issued to the petitioner intimating the
proposed recovery. Thereafter, by Order dated 09.06.2015, the
damages and interest were determined at Rs.14,44,78,730/-,
and the same was communicated by notice served on
13.06.2016, directing payment within 15 days.
15. It is further submitted that upon failure of the
petitioner to comply with the said demand within 15 days of
service, it was specifically pleaded that the cause of action arose
on 28.06.2015 and continued thereafter. The suit in
O.S.No.95/2016 was instituted on 09.11.2016 before the Senior
Civil Judge, Hungund, seeking recovery of Rs.14,44,78,730/-
with interest at 18% per annum, which is well within three years
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from the pleaded date of cause of action. The plaint clearly
discloses the material facts, including the determination of
damages on 09.06.2015, service of notice on 13.06.2016, failure
to pay within 15 days, and the continuing nature of the cause of
action arising out of termination dated 26.04.2012 and
subsequent completion of balance work at enhanced rates.
Therefore, limitation cannot be reckoned from the date of
termination alone, as the right to sue accrued only upon
ascertainment and demand of the quantified amount.
16. It is also submitted that the scope of Order VII Rule
11(d) of the CPC is confined strictly to the averments in the
plaint, and in the present case, the plaint does not disclose that
the suit is barred by any law. Even assuming applicability of
Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the question as to when
the right to sue accrued whether on the date of termination of
the contract or upon ascertainment and quantification of the
excess expenditure incurred in completing the balance work
depends upon interpretation of the contractual clauses and the
factual matrix pleaded. Such determination cannot be
undertaken without evidence. Therefore, the issue of limitation
constitutes a mixed question of law and fact which cannot be
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adjudicated at the stage of considering an application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. Hence, the order of the Trial
Court rejecting I.A. No.V does not call for interference in exercise
of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC.
17. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the
respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar v. Harbans Warraich
reported in AIR 2000 SC 172; wherein it has been held that the
defendants not refusing either to execute the conveyance or to
perform their part, held that cause of action is continuing.
18. Reliance is also placed on decisions recognizing that
limitation can be a mixed question of law and fact and that
where determination of limitation depends upon factual
adjudication and examination of contractual terms, rejection of
the plaint at the threshold is impermissible under Order VII Rule
11(d) of the CPC.
19. Heard learned counsel appearing on either side and
perused the material on record.
20. Having given anxious consideration to the rival
contentions, it is not in dispute that O.S.No.130/2013,
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O.S.No.16/2015 and O.S.No.95/2016 arise out of the same
contractual transaction and are presently pending before the
Commercial Court for adjudication. However, while considering
an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, the Court
is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments
made in the plaint in the suit sought to be rejected. The
existence or pendency of other proceedings between the parties
cannot, by itself, be a determinative factor for rejecting or
sustaining the plaint. The question that requires consideration is
whether, on a plain reading of the plaint in O.S.No.95/2016
alone, the suit appears to be barred by limitation. Therefore, this
Court proceeds to examine whether from the statements made in
the plaint in O.S.No.95/2016, the bar of limitation is apparent so
as to warrant rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
21. Further, the plea of limitation raised by the petitioner
is not one that can be determined solely on a bare reading of the
plaint. The question as to when the right to sue accrued, whether
the breach was complete on the date of termination or continued
until ascertainment of damages, and whether exclusion of time
or other statutory provisions are attracted, are matters which
require factual determination. It is well settled that limitation, in
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such circumstances, constitutes a mixed question of law and
fact. In Sangramappa v. S. Gangamma, reported in 2019 (1)
KLR 81 (DB), it has been held that where adjudication of
limitation depends upon evidence and disputed facts, rejection of
the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is impermissible.
The present case squarely falls within the said principle and
therefore cannot be decided at the threshold stage.
22. This Court has also perused the citations relied upon
by the learned counsel for the parties, wherein it is observed that
the scope of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the
CPC is well settled. The Court is required to look only at the
averments in the plaint. If from the plaint itself it is clear that the
suit is barred by any law, the plaint must be rejected. However,
where determination of limitation depends upon disputed facts or
requires evidence, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.
23. The legal principles laid down in the judgments relied
upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not in dispute.
The Apex Court has clearly held that if a suit is ex facie barred by
limitation on the basis of plaint averments alone, rejection of
plaint is mandatory and that clever drafting cannot create an
artificial cause of action.
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24. At the same time, the very same line of authorities
also makes it clear that rejection of plaint is permissible only
when the bar of limitation is apparent on the face of the plaint
and does not require factual adjudication.
25. In the present case, the plaint does not merely rely
upon the date of termination of the contract. It specifically
pleads that the respondents were contractually required to
complete measurement, estimation, approval and execution of
balance work and that damages were quantified only thereafter.
The plaint further pleads that the cause of action arose after
completion of these steps.
26. Whether Article 55 of the Limitation Act governs the
case and whether the right to sue accrued on the date of
termination of the contract or on the date of ascertainment and
quantification of the excess expenditure incurred in completing
the balance work are matters which requires examination of the
contractual terms and factual matrix. Such determination cannot
be undertaken without evidence. At this stage, it cannot be
conclusively held that the suit is barred by limitation on the face
of the plaint.
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27. Therefore, on a plain reading of the plaint, it cannot
be said that the suit is clearly barred by limitation. The issue
requires adjudication after trial. The authorities relied upon by
the respondents squarely apply to the present facts, whereas the
authorities relied upon by the petitioner would apply only if the
bar of limitation was apparent on the face of the plaint, which is
not the case here.
28. The Trial Court has rightly held that the issue of
limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and that the plaint
cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC at this
stage. No perversity or jurisdictional error is found in the
impugned order.
29. In view of the fact that the suits arise out of a
contract of the year 2010 and are presently pending before the
Commercial Court, and having regard to the nature of the
dispute and the pendency of interconnected proceedings
between the parties, the Commercial Court is directed to
expedite the trial and dispose of O.S.No.130/2013,
O.S.No.16/2015 and O.S.No.95/2016, on the merits of the case
in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible and in any
event within a period of eight months from the date of receipt of
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a copy of this order, without being influenced by any
observations made in this order.
30. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. The
order dated 26.10.2021 passed on I.A.No.V in O.S.No.95/2016
by the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hungund, is affirmed. All
contentions of the parties on merits, including limitation, are
kept open to be urged before the Trial Court.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO) JUDGE
RSH, CT:VP
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