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34. They also cannot take advantage of the
negligence of the counsel engaged by them in not
informing the applicants about the judgment of the
Commercial Court. This is because the applicants
have a Legal Department and employees engaged by
the applicants in that department have a duty to
monitor what is happening in the cases to which the
applicants are parties, keep track of the progress of
the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure
that applications for issuance of certified copy are
made to the concerned court so that the appeals, if
required, can be preferred within the period of
limitation prescribed by law."
21. We are in complete agreement with the line of
reasoning assigned by the High Court."
b) In the case Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department) Represented by
Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Private Limited2 at paragraph Nos.58 to 63
it has been held as under:
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of
disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14
SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court
has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or
was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
(See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [Manindra Land & Building
Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336]
, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770]
, Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC
545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.
of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3
SCC (Civ) 24] .)
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10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that
every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can only
be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of
"sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been emphasised
in original.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks
has been emphasised in original.] , whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal,
(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory provision
is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that
provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation.' The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is
hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
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"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.'
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's
own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat &
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat &
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC
510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ)
907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
830] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and
would fly in the face of law laid down by the
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Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there
was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously
stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
["Postmaster General"], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-
74, paras 27-29)
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"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with the
issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a
special leave petition in this Court. They cannot
claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted
to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
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benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
60. The decision in Postmaster
General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
has been followed in the following subsequent
judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan
Mathur [State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur,
(2014) 1 SCC 592] at paras 8-8.2;
(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of
U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at
paras 2-3;
(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721]
at paras 11-13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 :
(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] , this Court referred
to Postmaster General [Postmaster General v.
Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as follows :
(SCC pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)
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"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do
the same thing again and again and the conduct
seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition
has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an
occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed
filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh
in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] in terms of our order dated 15-10-
2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that
case and we see no purpose in repeating the same
reasoning again except to record what are stated to
be the facts on which the delay is sought to be
condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the
Government Advocate was approached in respect of
the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP
1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of
the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020.
Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17
months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be
filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal
Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look
into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department
as it appears that the Department is unable to file
appeals within any reasonable period of time much
less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as
already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
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4. We have also expressed our concern that
these kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases"
to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the
Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The
object is to save the skin of officers who may be in
default. We have also recorded the irony of the
situation where no action is taken against the
officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded,
the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose
costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be
deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation
Project Committee. The amount be deposited within
four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and
sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the
said amount be also filed in this Court within the
said period of time. We have put to Deputy
Advocate General to caution that for any successive
matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up."
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the
facts of a given case, there is no right in the
appellant to have delay condoned. This was
felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as follows : (SCR p. 771 :
AIR p. 365, para 12)
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
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proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed
on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the Court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect
of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that
diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to
such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It
cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of
bona fides or due diligence are always material and
relevant when the Court is dealing with applications
made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the Court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined
provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our
opinion, considerations which have been expressly
made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14."
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60
days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and
not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
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side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence
or laches."
c) The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the
object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, has held that
the object of the Act is speedy resolution of disputes,
expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, is not elastic enough to cover long delays
beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself,
and that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale
claims. In commercial matters, the condonation of delay
should not be done in a routine manner, and it should be
an exception on showing sufficient cause for the delay. In
a fit case, in which a party otherwise acted bonafide and
not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such
period can in the discretion of the Court be condoned,
always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is
that the opposite party may have acquired both equity and
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justice what may now be lost by the first party's inaction,
negligence, or latches.
d) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the cause
shown by the appellant in the affidavit accompanying the
application seeking for condonation of delay, it can be said
that the appellant was negligent and tried to give a vague
explanation for the enormous delay of 467 days in filing
the appeal. The affidavit of the appellant indicates that
the appellant had given a Special Power of Attorney to one
Mr.K.Nagendra, but he has not informed him about the
dismissal of the suit. The said explanation given is a self-
serving statement without any supporting material and it
cannot be accepted in a routine manner. The affidavit
further indicates that the appellant had to undergo a heart
surgery and also suffered from comorbidities (Chronic
Diabetes, Hypertension), but there are no medical records
or details placed to justify the said explanation. The plain
reading of paragraphs No.4 to 7 of the affidavit indicates
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that the appellant has tried to give vague explanation for
filing of an appeal belatedly and such explanation cannot
be construed as "sufficient cause" for the purpose of
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Therefore, in the absence of
any acceptable material particulars with regard to such
assertion, the same is required to be disbelieved.
7. On considering the cause shown by the
appellant in the affidavit filed along with the application,
the same does not show any sufficient cause to condone
the enormous delay of 467 days. Hence, we are of the
considered view that the application in I.A.No.1/2023 filed
seeking condonation of delay is devoid of merits and
accordingly, the same is rejected. Consequently, the
appeal stands rejected.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
ABK
