[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

The Karnataka Lokayukta vs The State Of Karnataka on 18 February, 2026

Author: S.G.Pandit

Bench: S.G.Pandit

                                              -1-
                                                       NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB
                                                        WP No. 3796 of 2025


                 HC-KAR



                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                        DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

                                           PRESENT

                            THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT

                                             AND

                           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

                          WRIT PETITION No. 3796 OF 2025 (S-KSAT)

                 BETWEEN:

                 1.    THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
                       REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR,
                       M.S. BUILDING,
                       DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
                       BANGALORE - 560001.
                                                                 ...PETITIONER
                 (BY SRI JOSEPH ANTHONY, ADVOCATE)

                 AND:
Digitally
signed by        1.    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
VINUTHA B S
Location: High         REP. BY ITS ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY,
Court of               DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
Karnataka
                       INLAND WATER WORKS,
                       VIKASA SOUDHA,
                       BANGALORE - 560001.

                 2.    SRI R. K. SHASHIDHAR,
                       AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
                       S/O LATE KALAIAH,
                       R/AT No.19/20, 8TH CROSS, 2ND STAGE,
                       J.P.NAGAR SECOND STAGE,
                       BANGALORE - 560078.
                                   -2-
                                            NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB
                                                WP No. 3796 of 2025


HC-KAR



3.   SRI MAHADEVAIAH K. P.,
     AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
     S/O SRI PUTTAISH,
     RETIRED EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
     R/AT No.159, 3RD CROSS,
     1ST PHASE, BSK 3RD STAGE,
     GIRINAGAR,
     BANGALORE - 560085.
                                                    ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SHIVAREDDY, AGA FOR R1)

      THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.01.2023 IN A.No-5962 AND
5963/2021 (ANNEXURE-A).


      THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:


CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
              and
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

                             ORAL ORDER

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND)

Heard Sri.Joseph Anthony, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri. V. Shivareddy, learned Additional

Government Advocate for respondent No.1.

2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated

17.01.2023 passed in Application Nos.5962 & 5963/2021 by

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore (for

short, "the Tribunal").

2.1 Respondent Nos.2 and 3 were visited with a penalty

order dated 18.10.2021 passed under Rule 214 of the

Karnataka Civil Services Rules (for short, "KCSRs"). Aggrieved

by the said order of penalty, respondent Nos.2 and 3 preferred

applications before the Tribunal challenging the same on

various grounds.

2.2 The Tribunal, by the impugned order, set aside the

penalty order dated 18.10.2021 as well as the enquiry report

dated 18.05.2020. The Tribunal further directed payment of all

consequential monetary benefits to the applicants.

2.3 Challenging the said order, the petitioner/Lokayukta

has presented the present writ petition on 01.02.2025.

3. Sri Joseph Anthony, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner, submits that the Tribunal, without properly

considering the enquiry report based on the evidence recorded

during the course of the enquiry, committed an error in setting

aside the order of punishment. Learned counsel further submits

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with

and setting aside the order of penalty. It is contended that the

Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded in the

enquiry report or the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary

authority.

4. Sri. V. Shivareddy, learned counsel appears for

respondent No.1.

5. We have considered the submissions of learned

counsel for the petitioner and learned AGA appearing for

respondent No.1.

6. The order of the Tribunal is dated 17.01.2023. The

present writ petition has been filed on 01.02.2025, after a

delay of nearly two years. No explanation whatsoever is offered

in the pleadings for the inordinate delay in preferring the writ

petition. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is unable

to offer any explanation for the delay in filing the writ petition.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in MRINMOY MAITY

v. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS, reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 551, while considering the issue of delay in

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India, has held that when the extraordinary

jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it must be examined

whether such jurisdiction has been invoked within a reasonable

time. The Apex Court further observed that the mere

submission of memorials or representations would not revive a

dead cause of action or resurrect a cause that has naturally

come to an end. Relevant paragraphs read as follows:

"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non- suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."

12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:

"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:

"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."

8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

[(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:

"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise

- 10 -

NC: 2026:KHC:10535-DB

HC-KAR

whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant