[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Shri. Mohansa Alias Mohanlal S/O. ... vs Shri. Hoovasa S/O. Bhimasa Malaji on 17 February, 2026
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RFA No.100381 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.100381 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SHRI. MOHANSA @ MOHANLAL
S/O. BHIMASA MALAJI
AGE. 68 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. R.K. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SHRI. HOOVASA S/O. BHIMASA MALAJI
AGE. 56 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
2. SHRI. JAVAHARSA @ JAVAHARALAL
S/O. BHIMASA MALAJI
AGE. 66 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
3. SHRI. RAJENDRASA @ RAJENDRAKUMAR
Digitally signed
by
MOHANKUMAR
S/O. BIMASA MALAJI,
B SHELAR
Location: High
AGE. 61 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
Court of
Karnataka, R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
Dharwad Bench
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
4. SMT. SUNDARABAI W/O. BHALKRISHNASA MEHARWADE
AGE. 64 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. MANGALWAR PETH, KSHATRIYA GALLI,
SOLAPUR, TQ. AND DIST. SOLAPUR.
5. SMT. SARSWATIBAI W/O. VITTALSA RANGAREJ
AGE. 62 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. GUDUR, TQ. HUNUGUND, DIST. BAGALKOT.
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RFA No.100381 of 2025
6. SMT. MANJULABAI W/O. VASUDEV KHATAVATE
AGE. 58 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. BHUMARADDI CIRCLE,
TQ. AND DIST. GADAG.
7. SMT. SHOBHATAI W/O. SHAMDUNDRASA MALAJI
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
8. SMT. ROOPA W/O. SRIKANTHASA KOLHAPURE
AGE. 41 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. NEAR JAIN MANDHIR, SOLAPUR,
TQ. AND DIST. SOLAPUR.
9. SHRI. VINAYAK S/O. SHAMSUNDRASA MALAJI
AGE. 39 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
10. SHRI. PRASHANT S/O. SHAMSUNDRASA MALAJI
AGE. 37 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. RAMAPUR PETH, AT AND TQ. RAMDURG,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591123.
...RESPONDENTS
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96
READ WITH ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF CPC, 1908, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE COMPROMISE DECREE DATED 22.09.2016 PASSED IN
O.S.NO.65/2016 BY THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, RAMDURG
AT RAMDURG AND TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL WITH COSTS, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS RFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT
ON 03.02.2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
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RFA No.100381 of 2025
CAV JUDGMENT
1. This Regular First Appeal is filed under Section 96 of
the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC' for short), 1908, assailing the
judgment and decree dated 22.09.2016 passed in O.S.
No.65/2016 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC,
Ramdurg, whereby the suit for partition and separate possession
came to be disposed of in terms of a compromise arrived at
between the parties.
2. Brief facts of the case are that, respondent No.1
instituted O.S. No.65/2016 against the appellant and
respondents No.2 to 10 seeking partition and separate
possession of the suit schedule properties. During the pendency
of the suit, the parties filed a joint compromise petition under
Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC, and the Trial Court, being
satisfied that the compromise was lawful, voluntary and signed
by all parties, recorded the same and passed a compromise
decree on 22.09.2016
3. After a lapse of nearly nine years, respondent No.1
initiated Execution Petition No.3/2025 for enforcement of the
compromise decree. Thereafter, the appellant has filed the
present appeal contending that the compromise decree was
obtained by fraud, taking advantage of his alleged illness.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that at
the time of compromise, the appellant was suffering from cancer
and was not in a sound mental condition and taking undue
advantage of his illness, respondent No.1 played fraud and
hurriedly obtained the compromise decree within two days of
filing the suit. He further submits that the alleged fraud came to
the knowledge of the appellant only upon receipt of notice in
Execution Petition No.3/2025. Hence, he prays that the
compromise decree is liable to be set aside.
5. The point that arises for consideration is:
"Whether a Regular First Appeal under Section 96
of the CPC is maintainable against a compromise
decree, even when allegations of fraud are raised?"
6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant.
7. Considering the submission, it is an admitted position
that the decree under challenge is a compromise decree passed
on the basis of a joint compromise petition filed by the parties.
Statutory Bar under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure
categorically provides:
"No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the
Court with the consent of parties."
8. The language of the provision is clear, mandatory
and admits of no exception. Once a decree is passed with the
consent of parties, an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC is
expressly barred. The appellant has sought to overcome the
statutory bar by alleging that the compromise was obtained by
fraud and while he was suffering from illness.
9. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to Order XXIII
Rule 3A of the CPC, which provides:
"No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which the decree is
based was not lawful."
10. The combined reading of Section 96(3) and Order
XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC makes it abundantly clear that a
compromise decree cannot be challenged by way of an appeal
and the allegations of fraud, coercion or misrepresentation do
not create a right of appeal. The only remedy available to an
aggrieved party is to approach the very Court which recorded the
compromise, seeking recall or setting aside of the compromise
decree in accordance with law.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held
that even allegations of fraud do not render a Regular First
Appeal maintainable against a compromise decree.
12. In the present case, the compromise decree was
passed on 22.09.2016. The appellant remained silent for nearly
nine years and has chosen to question the decree only after
execution proceedings were initiated in 2025. Such prolonged
silence further strengthens the conclusion that the present
appeal is not a bona fide invocation of appellate jurisdiction but
an attempt to delay execution of a lawful decree. Since the
appeal itself is not maintainable, the application for condonation
of delay does not survive for consideration.
13. In view of the express bar under Section 96(3) of the
CPC, the remedy prescribed under Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule
3A of the CPC, and the admitted fact that the impugned decree is
a compromise decree, this Court holds that the present Regular
First Appeal is not maintainable in law.
14. For the foregoing discussions, this Court proceeds to
pass the following:
ORDER
i. The Regular First Appeal is dismissed as not
maintainable.
ii. The application for condonation of delay stands
rejected.
iii. It is made clear that dismissal of this appeal shall not
preclude the appellant from availing such remedy as is
permissible in law before the appropriate forum.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO)
JUDGE
KGK / CT:VP
