[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Smt M A Shahnaz vs Sri Anthony Stephen on 16 February, 2026
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RFA No. 318 of 2012
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 318 OF 2012 (DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. M.A. SHAHNAZ
D/O MOHAMMAD ARIFULLA
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
R/AT NO.2, 8/4 10TH "A" CROSS
ANEPALYA, BANGALORE-560047.
...APPELLANT
(BY RASHEED KHAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. ANTHONY STEPHEN
S/O S.A. JOICE
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
R/AT NO. 1504, BDA QUARTERS
AUSTIN TOWN, III STAGE
Digitally signed
by AL BHAGYA BANGALORE-560047.
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA 2. SRI. GUNDAPPA
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS
(A) SMT. KULLAMMA
W/O LATE GUNDAPPA
AGED MAJOR
(B) SRI. CHINNATHAYAPPA
S/O LATE GUNDAPPA
AGED MAJOR
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RFA No. 318 of 2012
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(C) SMT. LAXMAMMA
D/O LATE GUNDAPPA
AGED MAJOR
(D) SMT. GANGAMMA
D/O LATE GUNDAPPA
AGED MAJOR
3. SRI. G. SATISH
S/O GUNDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
R2(A) TO R2(D) AND R3 ARE
R/AT NO.28, MARIAMMA KOIL STREET
NEELASANDRA
BANGALORE-560047.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. P. VENKATARAMANA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1;
V/O DATED 06.11.2016 APPEAL DISMISSED AGAINST
R2(A AND B);
V/O DATED 08.01.2021 NOTICE TO R2(C AND D) ARE
DISPENSED WITH;
R3 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
THIS RFA IS FILED U/SEC. 96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 24.01.2012 PASSED IN
O.S.NO.10910/1998 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVIII-ADDL. CITY
CIVIL JUDGE, MAYO HALL, BANGALORE, DECREEING THE SUIT
FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR DICTATING JUDGMENT,
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
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RFA No. 318 of 2012
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ORAL JUDGMENT
The captioned appeal is by the defendant No.3
assailing the judgment and decree rendered in
O.S.No.10910/1998, wherein the plaintiff's suit seeking
relief of declaration of title and for possession is decreed.
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred
to as per their rank before the trial Court.
3. Facts leading to the case are as under:
Plaintiff instituted a suit seeking declaration of title
based on registered sale deed obtained by plaintiff from
one A.P. Srinivasulu under registered sale deed dated
01.07.1998. Plaintiff specifically asserted that plaintiff's
site bearing No.8-C measures 20x30 feet and the same is
part and parcel of Sy.No.7. Alleging that defendant No.3
on the strength of sale deed executed by defendant No.1
under registered sale deed dated 10.05.1999 pertaining to
Site No.2 illegally trespassed and dispossessed plaintiff
and therefore, suit is filed asserting title over Site No.8-C.
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4. On receipt of summons, defendant No.3 entered
appearance, filed written statement and stoutly denied the
entire averments made in the plaint. Per contra, defendant
No.3 asserted title to the property measuring 23x30 feet
pertaining to Site No.2 in Sy.No.8/4. Defendant No.3
asserted that post-purchase, she has put up construction
and she is residing and plaintiff has no semblance of right
insofar as site No.2 is concerned. Defendant No.3 alleged
that plaintiff cannot seek relief of declaration and
injunction without producing layout plan pertaining to
Sy.No.7. Defendant No.3 specifically contended that
defendant No.3's property bearing Site No.2 is part and
parcel of Sy.No.8/4 situated at 10th cross and it measures
23x30 feet while plaintiff's site bearing No.8-C is part and
parcel of Sy.No.7 measuring 20x30 feet.
5. Based on rival claims, trial Court formulated
appropriate issues. Plaintiff and defendant No.3 were
permitted to lead oral and documentary evidence in
support of their claim. The core issue that was raised by
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the trial Court was in regard to identity of the suit
schedule property and whether defendant No.3 illegally
dispossessed plaintiff on 14.10.1998.
6. Trial Court on assessing oral and documentary
evidence, while answering Issue No.1 in the affirmative
recorded a categorical finding that the sale deed obtained
by defendant No.3 pertaining to site No.2 does not convey
title under Ex.P-21 as defendant No.1 had already
conveyed the site in favour of one Muniswamy through
sale deed dated 30.05.1968 who in-turn sold it in favour
of M. Kharar Hussain under registered sale deed dated
19.12.1979, which are marked as Exs.P-24 and P-25
respectively. The trial Court also adverted to the
encumbrance certificate indicating that Site No.2 is formed
in Sy.No.8/4. Consequently, suit was decreed and
defendant No.3 is directed to hand over possession.
7. Learned counsel appearing for defendant No.3
reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memo would
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point out that defendant No.3 has not seriously questioned
plaintiff's title. Since defendant No.3 is asserting title over
Site No.2 which is part and parcel of Survey No.8/4 and
therefore, both the properties being distinct and separate,
plaintiff's fictitious suit seeking possession of Site No.8-C
has virtually tried to lay a claim over defendant No.3's Site
No.2 situated in Survey No.8/4.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiff straight away taking this Court through Ex.P-51
has demonstrated that two private layouts were formed
while the plaintiff's Site No.8-C is part and parcel of
Sy.No.7, the disputed Site No.2 is part and parcel of a
layout formed in Site Nos.8/4, 9/1 and 10. The layout
formed in Sy.Nos.7 and 8/4, 9/1 and 10 are adjacent to
each other. The same can be gathered from the layout
plan marked at Ex.P-51. Referring to these crucial
documents and also the manner in which defendant No.1
has reconveyed Site No.2 having already sold Site No.2 in
Sy.No.8/4 in favour of one Muniswamy vide Ex.P-24 under
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sale deed dated 30.05.1968, he would point out that
defendant No.1 had no subsisting right to convey Site
No.2 situated in Sy.No.8/4. He would also highlight the
mischievousness of defendant No.1 and defendant No.3.
Referring to the sale deeds, he would point out that
defendant No.3 obtains sale deed pertaining to Site No.2
without referring to survey number and cleverly later
obtains a rectification deed and then inserts Survey
No.8/4. He would further point out that the execution
petition filed in Ex.Petition No.25124/2023 based on
decree passed in O.S.No.10910/1998 is executed and
possession is taken by plaintiff.
9. Having heard learned counsels on record, this
Court has meticulously examined the pleadings in the
plaint and in the written statement. This Court as a final
fact-finding authority has independently assessed the oral
and documentary evidence. The following points would
arise for consideration:
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i) Whether the trial Court was justified in
holding that defendant No.1 having already
alienated Site No.2 in Sy.No.8/4 under registered
sale deed dated 10.05.1999, had no subsisting
right, title or interest to execute a rectification deed
dated 04.10.2000 in favour of defendant No.3?
ii) Whether sale deed obtained by defendant
No.3 under Ex.P-21 read with rectification deed
vide Ex.P-22 pertains to fictitious or non-existent
property?
iii) Whether the Trial Court was justified in
concluding that the plea of defendant No.3 that he
purchased a distinct and different property is
illusory, and that in substance his claim overlaps
with the suit schedule property, and further holding
that the plaintiff has established valid title and is
consequently entitled to seek recovery of
possession of the suit schedule property?
iv) Whether the trial Court committed any
perversity or illegality and would warrant
interference at the hands of this Court?
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Finding on Point Nos.i and ii:
10. The admitted factual matrix clearly discloses
that Site No.2 measuring 33×40 feet in old Sy.No.8/4 was
originally purchased by defendant No.1 on 05.11.1965.
The subsequent chain of alienations is not in dispute.
Defendant No.1 sold the very same Site No.2 to
Muniswamy under Ex.P-24 dated 30.05.1968 and
thereafter under Ex.P-25 dated 19.12.1979, the property
stood alienated in favour of Kharar Hussain, both
documents consistently describing the property as Site
No.2 in Sy.No.8/4 with identical boundaries.
11. Despite the aforesaid alienations, defendant
No.1 once again purported to sell Site No.2 under a
registered sale deed dated 10.05.1999 in favour of one
Shahnaz. This transaction assumes critical significance.
Once defendant No.1 had conveyed the property under a
registered instrument, his right, title, and interest stood
completely extinguished. From that date onwards,
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defendant No.1 was divested of all authority to deal with
or correct any aspect of the said property.
12. In this backdrop, the subsequent sale deed
dated 10.05.1999 relied upon by defendant No.3 under
Ex.P-21 and the rectification deed dated 04.10.2000 under
Ex.P-22 require close scrutiny. The rectification deed seeks
to introduce Sy.No.8/4 and to cure alleged defects in the
earlier sale deed. However, a rectification deed cannot
create title, nor can it revive a right that had already been
extinguished by a prior alienation.
13. The law is well settled that a rectification deed
can only correct clerical or typographical errors in a
subsisting and valid transaction. It cannot be used as an
instrument to convey property or perfect title where the
executant had none on the date of execution. On the date
of execution of Ex.P-22, defendant No.1 had no semblance
of right or interest left in Site No.2, having already sold it
under a registered deed dated 10.05.1999.
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14. The Trial Court has therefore rightly concluded
that defendant No.1 could not have executed the
rectification deed dated 04.10.2000 in favour of defendant
No.3, and that the very foundation of defendant No.3's
claim collapses. The inevitable consequence is that the
sale deed in favour of defendant No.3, read with the
rectification deed, relates to a fictitious and non-existent
property, incapable of identification on ground.
15. This Court finds no infirmity in the reasoning of
the Trial Court on this aspect. The finding is firmly rooted
in documentary evidence and settled principles governing
conveyance. Accordingly, Point Nos.(i) and (ii) are
answered in the Affirmative.
Finding on Point No.iii:
16. This Court has carefully and independently
examined the documentary evidence relied upon by the
plaintiff in support of his claim of title and possession. The
plaintiff's sale deed dated 01.07.1998, marked as Ex.P-6,
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clearly discloses that the plaintiff purchased a site
measuring 20 feet × 30 feet, bearing Sy.No.7, Site No.8-
C. The boundaries recited therein are definite,
unambiguous, and internally consistent. Of particular
significance is the eastern boundary, which expressly
refers to Site No.4 comprised in Sy.Nos.8/4, 9/1, and 10,
thereby clearly identifying the location of the suit schedule
property and eliminating any ambiguity as to its identity.
17. The plaintiff has further substantiated his claim
of possession by producing municipal records and tax paid
receipts marked at Exs.P-7 to P-20. These documents
demonstrate continuous assessment and payment of taxes
in respect of the suit schedule property. Significantly,
these records both precede and succeed the alleged
purchase set up by defendant No.3, and their evidentiary
value has not been impeached in cross-examination nor
rebutted by any contra evidence.
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18. When the evidence produced by defendant No.3
is examined in juxtaposition, it becomes apparent that the
plea that he has purchased a distinct and different
property is illusory. The boundaries recited in the sale
deed relied upon by defendant No.3 do not correspond
either with the boundaries of the plaintiff's property or
with the description of Site No.2 in Sy.No.8/4. The
unexplained change in dimensions, the conspicuous
absence of the survey number in Ex.P-21, and the
inconsistent boundary descriptions cumulatively establish
that the property claimed by defendant No.3 lacks clear
identity. In substance, while professing to claim a different
property, defendant No.3 is virtually asserting a right over
the suit schedule property.
19. It is also borne out from the material on record
that defendant No.3, on the strength of a fictitious and
legally unsustainable sale deed marked at Ex.P-21, has
unlawfully interfered with and dispossessed the plaintiff
from the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has
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convincingly established the very existence and identity of
Site No.8-C situated in Sy.No.7 through the registered sale
deed at Ex.P-6, corroborated by municipal records, tax
paid receipts, and the sketch marked at Ex.P-51. These
documents cumulatively demonstrate that the suit
schedule property is a distinct, identifiable site recognized
by statutory authorities.
20. In contrast, the sale deed relied upon by
defendant No.3 at Ex.P-21 suffers from fundamental
infirmities, including absence of survey number,
inconsistent boundaries, and a defective chain of title
emanating from a vendor who had no subsisting right to
convey the property. The so-called title set up by
defendant No.3 is therefore not merely defective but is
tainted by fraud and misrepresentation, rendering the
document incapable of conferring any lawful right. Acting
under the guise of such a fraudulent instrument,
defendant No.3 has dispossessed the plaintiff, who was
otherwise in lawful possession of the suit schedule
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property. The records thus clearly establish that the
dispossession of the plaintiff was not lawful but was a
direct consequence of defendant No.3 asserting rights
under a void and non-existent conveyance.
21. Accordingly, this Court has no hesitation in
holding that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving both
lawful title and prior possession over Site No.8-C in
Sy.No.7 and that the subsequent dispossession by
defendant No.3, founded on Ex.P-21, is illegal and
unsustainable in law. The Trial Court has also rightly
placed reliance on Ex.P-51, the sketch, which provides a
visual depiction of the properties in question. The sketch
unmistakably demonstrates that the suit schedule property
claimed by the plaintiff does not overlap with the vague
and indeterminate property described in defendant No.3's
documents. This finding assumes added significance in
light of the admitted fact that the plaintiff has already
executed the decree and taken lawful possession through
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due process of Court, thereby reinforcing the conclusion
that the plaintiff's title and possession stand crystallized.
22. The interlocutory applications filed by the
appellant/defendant No.3 seeking to introduce a
Commissioner's report pertaining to unrelated litigation
and to recall the order dated 06.11.2016 were also rightly
rejected by the Trial Court. These applications were clearly
aimed at filling lacunae in the appellant's case and
reopening issues that had already attained finality. It is
well settled that an appellate Court cannot permit a party
to improve its case by introducing collateral material at a
belated stage, particularly when such material has no
direct bearing on the identity of the suit schedule
property.
23. On overall assessment of the aforesaid
evidence, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion of
the Trial Court that defendant No.3's assertion of having
purchased a different property is unsustainable and that,
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in effect, she is laying claim to the suit schedule property.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, has clearly established
lawful title and possession and is therefore entitled to seek
and retain recovery of possession of the suit schedule
property. Accordingly, Point No.(iii) is answered in the
Affirmative.
Finding on Point No.iv:
24. At this juncture, it becomes necessary for this
Court to advert to the statutory scheme under the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which squarely governs the
rights of the parties. Section 7 of the Act mandates that a
person competent to transfer property must be entitled to
the transferable interest in the property at the time of
transfer. Once defendant No.1 executed a registered sale
deed dated 10.05.1999 conveying Site No.2 in old
Sy.No.8/4 in favour of Shahnaz, his entire right, title, and
interest in the said property stood divested.
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25. Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act further
clarifies that unless a different intention is expressed, a
transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all
the interest which the transferor is capable of passing in
the property. Consequently, upon execution of the sale
deed dated 10.05.1999, defendant No.1 ceased to retain
any residuary or reversionary interest in Site No.2 so as to
deal with the same in any manner whatsoever.
26. In the absence of any subsisting right, title, or
interest, defendant No.1 was legally incapacitated from
executing either a fresh conveyance or a rectification deed
in respect of the very same property. A rectification deed,
in law, presupposes the existence of a valid and subsisting
transaction. It cannot be employed as a device to re-
transfer property or to validate an otherwise void
conveyance executed by a person who had already
exhausted his title.
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27. Further, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property
Act defines "sale" as a transfer of ownership in exchange
for a price paid or promised. Once ownership stood
transferred under the registered sale deed dated
10.05.1999, defendant No.1 was completely denuded of
ownership rights. Any subsequent document executed by
him in respect of the same property is therefore rendered
void ab initio, being hit by the doctrine that no one can
convey a better title than what he possesses.
28. In that view of the matter, the rectification
deed dated 04.10.2000 relied upon by defendant No.3
does not merely suffer from a curable defect but is
fundamentally void, as it emanates from a person who had
no transferable interest on the date of its execution. The
Trial Court was therefore fully justified in holding that the
sale deed obtained by defendant No.3 pertains to a
fictitious and non-existent property, incapable of
conferring any legal right.
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29. This Court also takes note of the subsequent
events placed on record. The decree for possession
granted in favour of the plaintiff has already been
executed, and possession has been lawfully delivered to
the plaintiff through due process of Court. The learned
counsel appearing for the plaintiff has produced the
relevant execution records evidencing delivery of
possession, which remain uncontroverted.
30. Once a decree has attained finality and has
been executed, the appellate Court would be slow to
unsettle settled possession, particularly when the decree
itself is founded on sound findings of fact and law. The
attempt of the appellant to indirectly challenge the
execution by relying on collateral documents or
proceedings from unrelated litigation is wholly
misconceived and legally impermissible.
31. Therefore, viewed both from the standpoint of
statutory provisions under the Transfer of Property Act and
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the subsequent enforcement of the decree, this Court finds
no ground to interfere with the judgment and decree
passed by the Trial Court.
32. This Court, sitting in first appeal under Section
96 CPC, is conscious of its duty as a final fact-finding
authority. However, interference is warranted only when
the findings of the Trial Court are perverse, illegal, or
based on no evidence. In the present case, the Trial Court
has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the
documentary evidence, the chain of title, and the legal
effect of prior alienations. The conclusions arrived at are
logical, well-reasoned, and supported by the record.
33. This Court finds no perversity or misapplication
of law warranting interference. On the contrary, the appeal
appears to be a speculative attempt to resurrect a claim
founded on a void transaction. Accordingly, Point No.iv is
answered in the Negative.
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34. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court
holds that the appellant/defendant No.3 has failed to make
out any ground to interfere with the well-reasoned
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
35. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds
to pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The appeal is dismissed;
(ii) The judgment and decree dated
24.01.2012 passed in O.S.No.10910/1998 by
the Trial Court are hereby confirmed.
(iii) All pending interlocutory
applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(iv) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
JUDGE
CA
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16
