[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Arvind Kumar R vs State Of Karnataka on 11 April, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 5800 of 2026
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 5800 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
ARVIND KUMAR R.,
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
M/S. VIRTUE INFRA BUILDERS PVT. LTD.,
S/O RAMESH A.,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
OFF/AT NO. 878 AND 879, 3RD FLOOR,
SLV TOWERS, J.P.NAGAR 3RD PHASE,
BENGALURU - 560 078.
...PETITIONER
(BY SMT.HARSHITHA, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI PARAMESH KUMAR H.K., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI S.JAGAN BABU., ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed AND:
by SANJEEVINI J
KARISHETTY
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
Location: High
Court of BY J.P.NAGAR POLICE STATION
Karnataka REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. ASHA N.,
W/O RAMESH,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF NO. 959,
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CRL.P No. 5800 of 2026
HC-KAR
MAHALAKSHMIPURA WARD,
RAJAJINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 010
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP A/W
SRI ANOOP KUMAR, HCGP FOR R-1)
THIS CRL.P FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC (FILED U/S 528
BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED: 09/04/2026
PASSED IN CRIME NO. 261/2026 PASSED BY PRINCIPAL CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU, FOR THE
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 313, 316, 318, 322,
111, 112, 113, 334, 335, 336, 334, 61, 3(5) ALONG WITH
RERA ACT, PMLA ACT, BUDS ACT, KPID ACT.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner, accused in Crime No.261 of 2025, is at the
doors of this Court calling in question an order of the concerned
Court dated 09-04-2026 granting police custody of the accused
for a period of 14 days, in the teeth of the subsistence of
anticipatory bail.
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2. Heard Smt Harshitha, learned counsel along with Sri
Paramesh Kumar H.K, learned counsel appearing for petitioner
and Sri B N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
A complaint comes to be registered by the 2nd respondent
before the jurisdictional police on 25-11-2025, which becomes
a crime in Crime No.261 of 2025 for offences punishable under
Sections 149 and 420 of the IPC. Apprehending arrest, the
petitioner approaches the concerned Court i.e., Court of
Sessions in Crl.Misc.No.9878 of 2025 seeking anticipatory bail.
The concerned Court, by a detailed order dated 16-12-2025
grants anticipatory bail, narrating the complete facts that are
obtaining towards registration of the complaint , which narrated
offences punishable under Sections 316(2) and 318(4) of the
BNS. The concerned Court observes, that no case is yet
registered against the petitioner, though the case had already
been registered in Crime No.261 of 2025, but grants
anticipatory bail by the following order:
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".... .... ....
11. It is true that no any case is registered against
the Petitioners on the alleged apprehension expressed by
Petitioners in the petition averments. The registration of
FIR is not a condition precedent while considering the
anticipatory bail petition. While considering the
anticipatory bail petition, the only requirement is that
Petitioners must make out a case of reasonable
apprehension of being arrested in the case. In the
decision reported (1980) 2 S.C.C. page No.565
(Gurubhaksh Singh Sibbia & Others Vs State of
Punjab), it has been observed and held that the filing of
an F.I.R. is not condition precedent to the exercise of
power under Section of 438 of Cr.P.C. The same principle
has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in the reported decision in (2011) 1 S.C.C page
No.694 (Siddaram Sathlingappa Mhetre Vs State of
Maharashtra & others) In the present case, the
prosecution has stated in the objections that another case
was registered against the Petitioners in J.P. Nagar Police
Station and the Petitioners have cheated the general
public. The said apprehension in view of the above stated
facts cannot be said as unreasonable. Therefore, under
these circumstances, in my opinion, the Petitioner have
made out sufficient ground of reasonable apprehension of
being arrested and as such, the Petitioners are entitled for
anticipatory bail. Consequently, point No.1 for
determination is answered in the Affirmative.
12. Point No.2: In the result, this Court proceeds
to pass the following:
ORDER
The petition filed by Petitioners under Section 482
Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is hereby
allowed.
The Petitioners are ordered to be released on
anticipatory bail in the event of their arrest by the
Respondent-Police Station Bengaluru, on their executing
personal bond for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-each with one
surety for the like-sum amount, subject to following
conditions ;
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1. The Petitioners shall appear before the SHO as and
when directed and co-operate for investigation,
2. They shall not threaten the prosecution witnesses
directly or indirectly.
3. They shall not indulge in any criminal activities.
This bail order shall be inforce for a period of 9
months from the date of this order."
The anticipatory bail so granted, was in subsistence for a period
of 9 months. During the subsistence of the anticipatory bail,
permission is sought from the hands of the concerned Court to
add offences under the KPIDFE Act. Permission was granted to
add Section 9 of the KPIDFE Act, on 27-01-2026 by the
following order:
"The requisition filed by the Investigating Officer
is hereby allowed.
Permission is granted to invoke Section 9 of
the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors
in Financial Establishments Act, 2004 and to
proceed with further investigation in accordance
with law."
While there can be no qualm about the said order, what
happens later is quite disturbing. On 09-04-2026, 3 months
after the said inclusion, a remand application is made before
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the concerned Court, the very Court that had granted
anticipatory bail and had permitted inclusion of Section 9 of the
KPIDFE Act seeking police custody for the purpose of
investigation.
4. The concerned Court, now permits police custody of
the petitioner for a period of 14 days, notwithstanding the
subsistence of the anticipatory bail. The order of the concerned
Court suffers from gross procedural aberration. Mere inclusion
of an offence would not mean that the order granting
anticipatory bail will vanish in thin air, as once anticipatory bail
is granted, it can be cancelled by an application filed after
hearing the parties before the same Court or before any
superior Court alleging any violation of the conditions of
anticipatory bail. None of these things have happened.
5. For the mere asking in the remand application,
completely ignoring the subsistence of the anticipatory bail, the
concerned Court grants police custody of the accused. It is
this aberration in procedure that troubles this Court. It may be
that BUDS Act or KPIDFE Act is included as offence in Crime
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No.261 of 2025. Crime No.261 of 2025 was registered on 25-
11-2025 after which an anticipatory bail was granted on the
fulcrum of the case that was registered, on an apprehension
that the petitioner would be arrested. The said order was in
subsistence for a period of 9 months.
6. While in subsistence, merely because BUDS Act or
KPIDFE Act was invoked, the concerned Court could not have
blissfully ignored its own order granting anticipatory bail to the
petitioner. Anticipatory bail, by its nature itself, is in
anticipation or apprehension of arrest, whether crime is
registered or is to be registered. In the light of the subsistence
of the anticipatory bail, petitioner having been handed over to
the police custody on a remand application is, on the face of it,
illegal. In this regard, it becomes apposite to refer to the
judgment of the Five Judge bench of the Apex Court in the case
of SUSHILA AGGARWAL v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)1,
wherein the Apex Court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
(2020) 5 SCC 1
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80. Earlier, in the decision in Dolat
Ram v. State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]
this Court had observed that : (SCC p. 351, para 4)
"4. ... bail once granted should not be
cancelled in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the
accused to retain his freedom by enjoying
the concession of bail during the trial."
81. This decision was followed, and
its ratio applied, in Hazari Lal Das v. State of
W.B. [Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B., (2009) 10
SCC 652 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 381] The decision
in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of
Gujarat [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of
Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri)
240] stated, after culling out the principles
in Mhetre [SiddharamSatlingappa Mhetre v. State
of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 514] , as follows : (Bhadresh case [Bhadresh
Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC
152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240] , SCC p. 167, para
25)
"25.6. It is a settled legal position that
the court which grants the bail also has the
power to cancel it. The discretion of grant
or cancellation of bail can be exercised
either at the instance of the accused, the
Public Prosecutor or the complainant, on
finding new material or circumstances at
any point of time.
25.7. In pursuance of the order of the
Court of Session or the High Court, once the
accused is released on anticipatory bail by
the trial court, then it would be
unreasonable to compel the accused to
surrender before the trial court and again
apply for regular bail.
25.8. Discretion vested in the court in all
matters should be exercised with care and
circumspection depending upon the facts and
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circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly,
the discretion vested with the court under
Section 438 CrPC should also be exercised with
caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel
beyond it and subject the wide power and
discretion conferred by the legislature to a
rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.
25.9. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket
formula can be provided for grant or refusal of
the anticipatory bail because all circumstances
and situations of future cannot be clearly
visualised for the grant or refusal of anticipatory
bail. In consonance with legislative
intention, the grant or refusal of
anticipatory bail should necessarily depend
on the facts and circumstances of each
case."
82. The three-Judge Bench decision
in Sudhir v. State of Maharashtra [Sudhir v. State of
Maharashtra, (2016) 1 SCC 146 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri)
234 : (2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 48] noticed the decision
in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth [Bhadresh Bipinbhai
Sheth v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1
SCC (Cri) 240] and did not disapprove it. However, the
Court did not grant relief, given that anticipatory bail
was declined initially, and the application to the High
Court was withdrawn, after which a second anticipatory
bail was granted. The High Court cancelled the grant of
relief. This Court affirmed the High Court's view
[Ramesh Manik Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC
OnLine Bom 4994] . In that judgment, Bhadresh
Bipinbhai Sheth [Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of
Gujarat, (2016) 1 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 240]
was noticed, while considering the scope of the power
under Section 439(2). In another decision, Arvind
Tiwary v. State of Bihar [Arvind Tiwary v. State of
Bihar, (2018) 8 SCC 475 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 590]
the issue was whether the anticipatory bail,
granted subject to certain conditions, earlier,
which had been considered by this Court, could be
cancelled. The conditions included, inter alia, that
sums were to be secured by bank guarantee. The
aggrieved corporation directed that the
"defalcated sum" specified in respect of every
accused should be secured through such
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guarantee. Upon failure to comply with that
demand, an order of cancellation was sought. This
Court held that cancellation could not be resorted
to on the assumption that the applicants were
guilty. Similarly, in Chand Nath Yogi v. State of
Haryana [Chand Nath Yogi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1
SCC 326 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 312] , Padmakar Tukaram
Bhavnagare v. State of Maharashtra [Padmakar
Tukaram Bhavnagare v. State of Maharashtra, (2012)
13 SCC 720 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 393] , X v. State of
Telangana [X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511
: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902] , and several other judgments
the same views were expressed.
83. Therefore, unless circumstances to the
contrary : in the form of behaviour of the accused
suggestive of his fleeing from justice, or evading
the authority or jurisdiction of the court, or his
intimidating witnesses, or trying to intimidate
them, or violate any condition imposed while
granting anticipatory bail, the law does not require
the person to surrender to the court upon
summons for trial being served on him. Subject to
compliance with the conditions imposed, the
anticipatory bail given to a person, can continue
till end of the trial. This answers Question 2 referred
to the present Bench."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex court clearly holds that anticipatory bail once
granted, would be deemed to be in operation, notwithstanding
the filing of the charge sheet even, unless, there is any
supervening circumstance that leads to cancellation of the said
anticipatory bail, on an application by the prosecution or by a
petition before the superior Court. Till such a situation ensues,
the anticipatory bail remains in force and when it remains in
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force, the Court cannot grant police custody of the accused.
The concerned Court thus, has blissfully ignored the procedure,
by turning it topsy-turvy. In that light, this is rendered
unsustainable. Legal unsustainability of the said order would
necessarily lead to its obliteration.
7. It is another fact that this factor of grant of
anticipatory bail is neither brought to the notice of the
prosecution at the time of arrest that it is the very Court that
had granted anticipatory bail. It was always open to the
prosecution to file an application seeking cancellation of the
said bail and order to be made on merits, if the offence was so
grave and the accused was necessary for interrogation by
police.
8. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Sri B N
Jagadeesha submits that Section 9 of the KPIDFE Act clearly
bars grant of anticipatory bail. While that may be the fact, but
the KPIDFE Act is added or inserted later by the permission of
the Court, not when the crime is registered and the anticipatory
bail was granted. An addition of an offence to the FIR later
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would not mean that anticipatory bail would lose its efficacy.
Therefore, it was for the prosecution to get the bail cancelled in
accordance with law, if they so desire and then file a remand
application seeking police custody.
9. The corollary of the aforesaid procedural aberration is,
the petitioner being handed over to police custody to be
released forthwith.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 09-04-2026 on remand application,
granting police custody for a period of 14 days till
22-04-2026 stands quashed.
(iii) Petitioner shall be released from police custody
forthwith.
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(iv) Liberty is reserved to the respondent-State, to act
in accordance with law, bearing in mind the
observations made in the course of the order.
(v) In the event any application of such cancellation is
made before the concerned Court by the
respondent-State, the concerned Court shall bear in
mind the observations made regarding the offence
under the KPIDFE Act, in the course of the order,
and hear the accused and then pass necessary
orders, in accordance with law.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
BKP
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1
