Sri Muttanagouda S/O. Fakkirappa Alias ... vs State Of Karnataka
2025 Latest Caselaw 9634 Kant

Karnataka High Court

Sri Muttanagouda S/O. Fakkirappa Alias ... vs State Of Karnataka on 31 October, 2025

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

                                                 -1-
                                                           NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813
                                                       CRL.P No. 103813 of 2023


                      HC-KAR




                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD
                               DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
                                               BEFORE
                               THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
                                CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 103813 OF 2023
                                       (482(Cr.PC)/528(BNSS)-)
                      BETWEEN:

                      1.   SRI. MUTTANAGOUDA
                           S/O. FAKKIRAPPA @ FAKKIRGOUDA PATIL,
                           AGE. 59 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
                           R/O. MALAWAD, TQ. RON- 582203,
                           DIST. GADAG.

                      2.   SRI. KSHIGOUDA
                           S/O. SHIVANAGOUDA KALLANANGOUDRA,
                           AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTUE- 582203,
                           R/O. MALAWAD, TQ. RON,
                           DIST. GADAG.
                                                                     ...PETITIONERS
                      (BY SRI. NEELENDRA D. GUNDE, ADVOCATE)

                      AND:
Digitally signed by
VISHAL NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL              1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA,
Location: High             BY RON POLICE STATION,
Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench,
Dharwad
                           REPRESENTED BY
                           THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
                           HIGH COURT BUILDING,
                           DHARWAD- 580001.

                      2.   SMT. SUREKHA W/O. HANAMAPPA KITTALI,
                           AGE. 40 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
                           R/O. MALWAD, TQ. RON- 582203,
                           DIST. GADAG.
                                                                  ...RESPONDENTS
                      (BY SRI. T. HANUMAREDDY, AGA FOR R1,
                          SRI. S.P. KANDAGAL, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
                                 -2-
                                           NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813
                                      CRL.P No. 103813 of 2023


HC-KAR




     THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS PRAYING TO QUASH
ORDER DATE 24.11.2023 PASSED BY LEARNED ADDL. DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, GADAG, IN SPL.C.(SC/ST) NO.39/2023,
THEREBY TAKING COGNIZANCE FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTION 323, 354, 447, 504, 506, R/W 34 OF IPC AND
SECTION 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(Va) OF SC/ST (PA) ACT-2015
AND ALLOW THE ABOVE CRIMINAL PETITION IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

     THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

                         ORAL ORDER

(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)

1. The petitioners initially were accused Nos.1 and 2.

During the subsistence of the subject petition, it transpires that

accused No.2 is no more. Therefore, the proceedings against

accused No.2 has stood abated, what remains is against accused

No.1.

2. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question

the proceedings before the concerned Court in Special Case

No.39 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections

447, 323, 354(b), 392, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC

and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) & 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act,

2015.

3. Heard the learned counsel Sri.Neelendra D.Gunde

appearing for the petitioners, learned AGA Sri.T.Hanumareddy

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

for the respondent-State and the learned counsel

Sri.S.P.Kandagal appearing for respondent No.2.

4. The 2nd respondent is the complainant. Long before

the registration of the complaint, it transpires that the husband

of the 2nd respondent and the accused had certain dispute and

the dispute was pending before the concerned Civil Court in

O.S.No.443 of 2022. The concerned Court had granted

temporary injunction in favour of the present petitioner, the

accused. Long thereafter, when the temporary injunction was not

vacated, a crime comes to be registered on 03.01.2023 against

several persons. The police conduct investigation and dropped

accused No.3 from the array of accused and retained accused

Nos.1 and 2, out of whom, the accused No.2 is no more.

Therefore, the accused No.1 is now alleged of the aforesaid

offences.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

submits that the entire issue has a counter blast to the civil case

registered by the petitioners, in which there is a temporary

injunction granted in favour of the present petitioners. The

learned counsel would submit that there is no ingredient of the

offences under the Atrocities Act even made out to the remotest

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

sense in the case at hand. Insofar as the other offences are

concerned, the learned counsel would take this Court to the

statement of the complainant herself that she had given a

complaint in a haste and did not have any substance of the kind

to give a complaint. Therefore, in all, he would submit that the

proceedings will be quashed against the accused as there is no

case made.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the

complainant would submit that mere pendency of the civil suit or

a temporary injunction being granted by the concerned Court,

would not mean that the criminal proceedings should be quashed

on that. It is a case that there is abundant material for the

framing of the charge and therefore the petitioner, accused No.1,

should now face trial and may come out clean in a full-blown

trial. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the

parties and perused the materials on record

8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. A civil

suit comes to be registered to institute a crime against the

present petitioner in O.S.No.443 of 2022 and the concerned

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

Court grants temporary injunction answering an application filed

under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC on 13.09.2022. There

was disturbance by the complainant and the family. Therefore

the petitioners again filed an application before the concerned

Court seeking police protection. The order of police protection

also is granted on 08.11.2022. It is then, long thereafter, the

complaint comes to be registered on 02.01.2023 alleging the

aforesaid offences. Since the entire issue is now triggered from

the complaint, I deemed it appropriate to notice the same, which

reads as follows:

"UÉ, ªÀiÁ£Àå ¦J¸ïL ¸ÁºÉçgÀÄ gÉÆÃt ¥ÉÇð¸ï oÁuÉ gÉÆÃt, E ªÀgÀ°è

«µÀAiÀÄ: ¦üAiÀiÁð¢ü zÁR°¸ÀĪÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ.

ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉ,

£Á£ÀÄ ¸ÀÄgÉÃSÁ PÉÆA ºÀ£ÀªÀÄ¥Àà QvÀÛ° ªÀAiÀiÁ: 40 ªÀµÀð eÁw: »AzÀÆ ªÁ°äÃQ GzÉÆåÃUÀ: PÀÆ° ¸Á: ªÀiÁ¼ÀªÁqÀ ªÉÆ: 6364741206 §gÉzÄÀ PÉÆqÀĪÀ ¦üAiÀiÁð¢ü K£ÉAzÀgÉ,

£Á£ÀÄ gÉÆÃt vÁ®ÆPÀ ªÀiÁ¼ÀªÁqÀ UÁæªÀÄzÀ SÁAiÀÄA gÀºÀªÁ¹ EgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. £À£ßÀ eÉÆvÉUÉ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ªÀÄPÀ̼ÀÄ EzÀÄÝ CzÀgÀ°è »jAiÀÄ ªÀÄUÀ ¥sÀQÌgÀ¥Àà ¨É¼ÀUÁAªÀ C°è SÁ¸ÀV PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ EgÀÄvÁÛ£É ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄUÀ¼ÁzÀ ¥sÀ®è« EªÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀgÀUÄÀ AzÀ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ°è £À¹AðUÀ ²PÀët ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ EgÀÄvÁÛ¼É ºÁUÀÆ QjAiÀÄ ªÀÄUÀ£ÁzÀ CeÉÓñÀ EªÀ£ÄÀ 10 £Éà vÀgÀUÀwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß M¢PÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä eÉÆvÉUÉ EgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.

¢£ÁAPÀ: 02-01-2023 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄzsÁåºÀß 12-05 UÀAmÉUÉ £Á£ÀÄ UÁæªÀÄzÀ j. ¸À £ÀA:

151/1 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄä ºÉÆ®zÀ°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀĪÁUÀ £ÀªÀÄä UÁæªÀÄzÀ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ ²ªÀ£ÀUËqÀ PÀ®è£ÀUËqÀ EªÀ£ÀÄ MAzÀÄ PÉÆrèAiÀÄ£ÀÄß »rzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä ºÉÆ®zÀ §zÀÄ«£À°è CqÁØqÀÄvÁÛ £Á£ÀÄ M§â¼É EgÀĪÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ ¥sÀQÌÃgÀUËqÀ ¥Ánî EªÀ¤UÉ ¥sÉÇãÀ ªÀiÁr ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

ºÉÆ®zÁUÀ M§â¼Éà CzÁ¼À ¨ÁgÉÆà CAvÁ PÀgɹPÉÆAqÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ ºÉÆ®zÀ°è PÀ¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß vÉUÉAiÀÄĪÁUÀ £ÀªÀÄä ºÉÆ®zÀ°è §AzÀÄ ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ EªÀ£ÀÄ KPÁKQ §AzÀÄ £À£Àß CAVAiÀÄ£ÀÄß »rzÀÄ J¼ÉzÁr £À£Àß PÉÆgÀ¼À°èzÀÝ JgÀqÀÄ vÉÆ¯É §AUÁgÀzÀ ªÀiÁAUÀ®åzÀ ¸ÀgÀªÀ£ÀÄß QvÀÄÛPÉÆArzÁÝgÉ. ºÁUÀÆ £À£Àß CAVAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÀjAiÀÄÄzÀ®èzÉà £À£ÀߣÀÄß ¨ÉvÀÛ¯Éà ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ GzÉÝñÀ¢AzÀ KgÀÄzÀݤAiÀÄ°è CªÀ¼À §mÉÖAiÀÄ£ÀÄß J¯Áè ©ZÀÑ UËqÀ ¨ÉvÀÛ¯Éà ªÉÄgÀªÀtV ªÀiÁr¸ÉÆÃt CAvÁ ¹nÖ¤AzÀ £À£Àß ¹ÃjAiÀÄ ¸ÉgÀUÀ£ÀÄß »rzÀÄ J¼ÉzÁqÀĪÀ ¸ÀAzÀ¨ÀsðzÀ°è £Á£ÀÄ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À£ÁzÀ AiÀÄ®è¥Àà ¥sÀQÌgÀ¥Àà QvÀÛ° EªÀ¤UÉ ¥ÉÇãÀ ªÀiÁr ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ ºÁUÀÆ PÁ²UËqÀ EªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊ ªÉÄ°£À §mÉÖAiÀÄ£ÀÄß K¼ÉzÁqÁPÀwÛzÁÝgÉ CAvÁ w½¹ ¨ÉÃUÀ §gÀ®Ä ºÉýzÁUÀ £À£Àß ¥ÉÇãÀ£ÀÄß PÀ¸ÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.

¯Éà ¨ÉÆøÀr ¤ªÀÄä ¨ÁåqÀgÀ eÁwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß HgÁUÀ PÀ¸À© (zÉêÀzÁ¹) ªÀiÁqÀPÀ ©qÀwÛzÀÝgÀ £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄA¢UÉ ¸ÉgÀUÀ ºÁ¹Û¢Ýj EªÀvÀÛ £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄÄAzÀ £ÀªÀÄä ºÉÆ®PÀÌ ºÉÆÃUÁPÀ ºÀgÀPÀvÀÛ ªÀiÁrÛgÉ£À ¯Éà ºÁzÀgÀVwÛ CAvÁ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ ºÉüÀÄwÛgÀĪÁUÀ CzÉà ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è PÁ²ÃUËqÀ£À CtÚ£À ªÀÄUÀ£ÁzÀ ²ªÀ£ÀUËqÀ £ÁUÀ£ÀUËqÀ PÀ®è£ÀUËqÀæ CªÀ£ÀÄ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ£À ¥ÉÇäUÉ ¥ÉÆãÀ ªÀiÁr PÁPÁ K£ï CAvÁ DQ wAr zÁj E®è CAvÁ¼À£À CQ, PÁPÁ zÀÄqÀÄØ JµÁÖgÀ RZÀÄð DUÀ° £Á£ÀÄ E¢Ý¤ CªÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄqÀðgÀ ªÀiÁqÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ ¤£Àß eÁ«Ää£À ªÉÄÃ¯É PÀgÀPÉÆAqÀ §wð¤ CAvÁ ºÉýzÁUÀ PÁ²UËqÀ£ÀÄ ¤®è EªÀvÀÄÛ EªÀ¼ÀÄ gÁf DUÀ°®è CAzÀgÀ EªÀvÀÛ E¯Éèà CªÀ¼À ºÉÆ®zÁUÀ ºÀÆvÀ §qÀw¤ CA§ ºÉýgÀÄvÁÛ£É.

CzÉà ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À£ÁzÀ AiÀÄ®è¥Àà£ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä ºÉÆ®zÀ PÀqÉUÉ §gÀĪÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß UÀªÀĤ¹zÀ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ EªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß ¥ÉÇãÀ£ÀÄß C°èAiÉÄà MUÉzÀÄ EªÀvÀÄÛ §zÀÄQ¢ ¯Éà ºÁzÀgÀVwÛ ªÀÄUÀ¼À CAvÁ ºÉüÀÄvÁÛ AiÀiÁªÀUÀ®è zÁjAiÀÄ PÀqÉUÉ Mr ºÉÆVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. £À£Àß UÀAqÀ£ÀÄ CªÀiÁAiÀÄPÀ£ÀÄ EzÀÄÝ CªÀ£ÀÄ zsÀ£À PÁAiÀÄ®Ä ºÉÆÃVzÀÄÝ CªÀ£ÀÄ ºÀwÛgÀ ¥ÉÇãÀ EgÀzÉà EzÀÄÝzÀÝjAzÀ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À£ÄÀ ß PÀgɹPÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛãÉ.

¸ÀzÀgÀ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ EªÀgÀÄ JgÀqÀÄ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ¢£ÀUÀ½AzÀ £À£ÀߣÀÄß £À£ÀUÉ w½AiÀÄzÀ jÃwAiÀÄ°è »A¨Á°¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. EzÀjAzÀ £À£ÀUÉ UÁæªÀÄzÀ°è DqÁØqÀ®Ä fêÀzÀ ¨sÀAiÀÄ GAmÁVzÉ.

¸ÀzÀgÀ «µÀAiÀĪÀ£ÀÄß £Á£ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä ¸ÀªÀiÁdzÀ UÀÄgÀÄ »jAiÀÄgÀ eÉÆvÉUÉ «ZÁj¹ FUÀ vÀqÀªÁV §AzÀÄ F ¦üAiÀiÁð¢üAiÀÄ£ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ.

PÁgÀt ¸ÀzÀgÀ ªÉįÁåt¹zÀ PÁ²ÃUËqÀ ²ªÀ£ÀUËqÀ PÀ®è£ÀUËqÀ, ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ ¥sÀQÌgÀUËqÀ ¥Ánî, ²ªÀ£ÀUËqÀ £ÁUÀ£ÀUËqÀ PÀ®è£ÀUËqÀæ EªÀgÀÄ »AzÀÆ °AUÁAiÀÄÄvÀ ºÁUÀÆ »AzÀÆ ¸ÁzÀgÀ eÁwUÉ ¸ÉÃgÀzÀªÀgÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. EªÀgÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯É £À£ÀßzÀÄ ¦ü¯Áå¢ EzÀÄÝ ¸ÀzÀj ¦üAiÀiÁ¢üAiÀÄ£ÀÄß zÁR°¹PÉÆAqÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ ºÁUÀÆ £À£Àß PÀÄlÄA§PÉÌ Hj£À°è ¸ÀÆPÀÛ gÀPÀëuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃqÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ CAvÁ §gÉzÀÄPÉÆlÖ ¦ügÁå¢ü."

9. The police conduct investigation and filed a charge

sheet. Prior to filing of the charge sheet, it transpires that the

statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 164 of

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate. The statement of the

complainant reads as follows:

"¸ÁQëAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¢. 16-02-2023 gÀAzÀÄ PÀgɹ, ¥ÀæªÀiÁtÂÃPÀj¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ.

: zÀAqÀ ¥ÀæQæAiÀiÁ ¸ÀA»vÉAiÀÄ PÀ®A 164(5) CrAiÀÄ°è ¸ÁQëAiÀÄ ºÉýPÉ :

1. ¢£ÁAPÀ 02-01-2023 gÀAzÀÄ 12.00 UÀAmÉ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è PÁ²ÃUËqÀ vÀAzÉ ²ªÀ£ÀUËqÀ PÀ®è£ÀUËqÀ, ¥sÀQÌÃgÀUËqÀ ªÀÄÄvÀÛ£ÀUËqÀ ¥Ánî gÀªÀgÀ d«ÄãÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä d«Ää£À ¥ÀPÀÌzÀ°èzÀÄÝ CªÀgÀÄ CªÀgÀ d«Ää£À°è PÉÆqÀ° »rzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ CqÁØqÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ. DUÀ £Á£ÀÄ M§â¼Éà d«Ää£À°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÉÝ. DUÀ CªÀgÀÄ£ÀªÄÀ ä ºÉÆ®zÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ºÁAiÀÄÄÝ ºÉÆÃUÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ. DUÀ £Á£ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀĪÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É AiÀiÁPÉ PÉøÀÄ ªÀiÁr¢ÝÃgÁ. JAzÀÄ PÉýzÁUÀ ¯Éà ¨ÉƸÀr ¤£Àß ªÉÄÃ¯É £ÁªÉÃPÉ PÉøÀÄ ªÀiÁr¢Ýë. ¤Ã£ÀÄ PÀ¸À§Ä ªÀiÁqÀPÉ §gÀÄwÛÃAiÀiÁ JAzÀÄ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¨ÉÊAiÀÄÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ. DUÀ £Á£ÀÄ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À¤UÉ ¥ÉÇÃ£ï ªÀiÁr w½¹zÀÄÝ ºÁUÉ ªÀiÁvÀ£ÁqÀÄwÛzÁÝUÀ £À£Àß ¥ÉÇãÀ£ÀÄß QvÀÄÛ J¸ÉzÀÄ £À£ÀߣÀÄß J¼ÉzÁr §rzÀÄ, £À£Àß vÁ½ QvÀÄÛ ºÁQzÀgÀÄ. CµÀÖPÉÌ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À §AzÀÄ ¤AvÀÄPÉƽî JAzÀÄ PÀÆVzÁUÀ CªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß ©lÄÖ Nr ºÉÆÃzÀgÀÄ. G½zÀÄPÉÆAr¢AiÀiÁ E£ÉÆßAzÀÄ ¢£À ¤£ÀߣÀÄß PÉÆ¯É ªÀiÁqÀzÉà ©qÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ DUÀ F¢£À ¤Ã£ÀÄ ºÁQ ºÉÆÃzÀgÀÄ. DUÀ £À£Àß ªÉÄÊzÀÄ£À £À£ÀߣÀÄß ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃzÀ."

10. The complainant herself indicates that there was no

incident of pulling her or abusing her which would become an

offence under Section 354 of the IPC. After this, the police filed a

charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtained in

Column No.17 reads as follows:

"ªÀiÁ£Àå WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ ªÁå¦ÛUÉƼÀ¥ÀqÀĪÀ gÉÆÃt ¥Éǰøï oÁuÉAiÀÄ ºÀ¢ÝAiÀÄ ¥ÉÊQ ªÀiÁ¼ÀªÁqÀ UÁæªÀÄzÀ°è EzÀgÀ°è ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ UÀAqÀ ºÀ£ÀªÀÄ¥Àà vÀAzÉ ¥sÀQÃgÀ¥Àà QvÀÛ° EªÀgÀ ºÉ¸Àj£À°è EgÀĪÀ d«ÄãÀÄ j.¸À.£ÀA: 151/1 £Éà d«ÄãÀPÉÌ ºÉÆA¢ zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀvÀæ PÁ®A £ÀA: 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆzÀ DgÉÆævÀgÀ d«ÄãÀÄUÀ¼ÄÀ ºÉÆA¢PÉÆArzÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. DgÉÆævÀgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ d«ÄãÀÄ j.¸À.£ÀA:

151/1 £ÉÃzÀÝgÀ°è ºÁAiÀÄÄÝ ºÉÆÃUÀ®Ä vÀªÀÄUÉ zÁj EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ CAvÁ dUÀ¼À ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛ §A¢zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

¢£ÁAPÀ:02.012023 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄzsÁåºÀß 12-05 UÀAmÉUÉ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÄÀ vÀªÀÄä d«ÄãÀÄ j.¸À.£ÀA: 151/1 £ÉÃzÀÝgÀ°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÁUÀ zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀvÀæ PÁ®A £ÀA: 12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆzÀ ªÀiÁrzÀ DgÉÆævÀj§âgÀÄ PÀÆrPÉÆAqÀÄ vÀªÀÄä ¸ÀªÀiÁ£À GzÉÝñÀ¢AzÁ

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ d«ÄãÀzÀ°è CwÃPÀæªÀÄt ¥ÀæªÉñÀ ªÀiÁr, d«ÄãÀzÀ°è ºÁAiÀÄÄÝ ºÉÆÃUÀÄwÛgÀĪÁUÀ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀÄ DgÉÆævÀjUÉ £ÀªÀÄä ªÉÄÃ¯É AiÀiÁPÉ PÉøÀÄ ªÀiÁrj, CAvÁ PÉýzÀÝPÉÌ DgÉÆævÀj§âgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¹mÁÖV, ¯Éà ¨ÉÆøÀr ¤ªÀÄä ¨ÁåqÀgÀ eÁwAiÀĪÀgÀÄ HgÁUÀ PÀ¸À© ªÀiÁqÁPÀ ©qÀwÛzÀÝgÉ £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄA¢UÉ ¸ÉgÀUÀ ºÁ¹Û¢Ýj CAvÁ eÁw JwÛ ¨ÉÊzÁrzÀÄÝ, DUÀ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 04 £ÉÃzÀªÀjUÉ ¥ÉÇÃ£ï ªÀiÁr «µÀAiÀÄ w½¹zÀÄÝ. DUÀ DgÉÆævÀgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ PÉÊAiÀÄ°è EzÀÝ ¥ÉÇãï PÀ¹zÀÄ ªÀÀUÉÀ¢zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. DgÉÆævÀj§âgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ PÉÊ »rzÀÄ J¼ÉzÁr, PÉʬÄAzÁ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀjUÉ ºÉÆr§r ªÀiÁr. ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀ ªÉÄʪÉÄð£À ¹ÃgÉ »rzÀÄ dUÁåqÀÄwÛgÀĪÁUÀ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 04 £ÉÃzÀªÀgÀÄ §A¢zÀÄÝ, DUÀ DgÉÆævÀj§âgÀÄ ZÁ.¸Á.¸ÉÃ.£ÀA: 01 £ÉÃzÀªÀjUÉ ¯Éà ºÁzÀgÀVwÛ E£ÉÆߪÉÄä M§â¼É ¹UÀÄ ¤£ÀUÉ PÉÆ¯É ªÀiÁqÀÄvÉÛÃªÉ CAvÁ fêÀzÀ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQ PÀ®A:: 323, 354, 447, 504, 506 gÉ/ªÀÅ 34 L¦¹ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®A 3(1)(r),3(1)(ss), 3(2)(Va) SC/ST [Amendment] ACT-2015 £ÉÃzÀÝ gÀ Cr C¥ÀgÁzsÀ J¸ÀVgÀÄvÁÛ£É."

11. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under

Sections 447, 354 & 323 and the Atrocities Act. Let me first

consider whether there are any ingredients of the offences under

the Atrocities Act. What is alleged is the offence under Sections

3(1)(r) & 3(1)(s) and Sections 3(1)(r) & 3(1)(s) would mandate

hurling of abuses intentionally taking the name of the caste of

the complainant in a public place or in a place of public view.

What could be public place or a place of public view and to drive

home the offences, need not retain this Court for long or delve

deep into the matter.

12. The three judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case

of Hitesh Verma versus State of Uttarakhand1, has held as

follows:

(2020) 10 SCC 710

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

"12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as "(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view".

13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.

All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste.

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 :

(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the

- 10 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)

"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."

(emphasis in original)

15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the

- 11 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104] , this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under:

"15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was

- 12 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

belonging to "Khangar" Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant- accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable."

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.

19. This Court in a judgment reported as Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] issued certain directions in respect of investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v. State of Maharashtra [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] reviewed the directions issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as under : (Union of India case [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] , SCC p. 797, para

52) "52. There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the

- 13 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC."

20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the amending Act (Central Act 27 of 2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India [Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 657] held that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under : (SCC p. 751, para 12)

"12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and no argument to the contrary has been raised."

21. In Gorige Pentaiah [Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446] , one of the arguments raised was non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale [Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 789 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 20] as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of

- 14 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment.

22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law."

(Emphasis supplied)

13. The Apex Court also observes the impending civil suit

between the parties in the case before the Apex Court in the

case of Hitesh Verma and holds that hurling of abuses or

otherwise is a made up ground for alleging or taking or wrecking

vengeance for having registered a civil suit and secured an

order. In the facts obtaining the case at hand as well, a perusal

of the complaint or in the summary of the charge sheet, the

- 15 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

offence under the Atrocities Act is hardly driven home.

Therefore, the said offences are loosely laid against the accused.

What remains is offences under Sections 354, 323 & 504 of the

IPC.

14. As observed hereinabove, the statement of the

complainant herself before the learned Magistrate under Section

164 of Cr.P.C. would clearly indicate that there was no offence of

outraging the modesty of the complainant as was registered at

the outset. It was only in the spur of the moment, in haste, the

complainant has registered the complaint, invoking the said

provision. In that light, the offence under Section 354 is also

loosely invoked.

15. While it is no law that merely because a civil suit is

pending, the criminal proceedings should be quashed. But in the

case at hand, the civil suit is instituted long ago and a temporary

injunction is granted long ago, police protection as well has

ensued in favour of petitioner. It is then the complaint emerges.

The complainant herself before the learned Magistrate under the

statement under Sections 164 of Cr.P.C. in contenting that she

had registered the complaint only at the spur of the moment.

Therefore, none of the offences can be driven home in the case

- 16 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

at hand. The Apex Court in its latest judgment in the case of

S.N.Vijayalakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka2, has held as

follows:

"42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings. If the element of criminality is there, a civil case can co- exist with a criminal case on the same facts. The fact that a civil remedy has already been availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground to quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P Swaroopa Rani v. M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765 and Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC 528. The obvious caveat being that the allegations, even if having a civil flavour to them, must prima facie disclose an overwhelming element of criminality. In the absence of the element of criminality, if both civil and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it will definitely amount to abuse of the process of the Court, which the Courts have always tried to prevent by putting a stop to any such criminal proceeding, where civil proceedings have already been instituted with regard to the same issue, and the element of criminality is absent. If such element is absent, the prosecution in question would have to be quashed. In this connection, Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 can be referred to:

'12. ... Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1575

- 17 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:14813

HC-KAR

disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.' (emphasis supplied)

43. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, (2023) 15 SCC 135, while quashing the FIR therein and further proceedings based thereon, it was observed '...the factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature."

(Emphasis supplied)

16. In the light of the aforesaid circumstance, permitting

further proceedings against the petitioner would become an

abuse of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of

justice. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER i. Petition is allowed.

ii. The impugned order dated 24.11.2023 passed by learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Gadag, in Spl.C.(SC/ST) No.39/2023 stands quashed.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE