Karnataka High Court
Owusu Collinus Ghanian vs State Of Karnataka on 27 October, 2025
Author: Shivashankar Amarannavar
Bench: Shivashankar Amarannavar
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CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 9552 OF 2025 (439(Cr.PC) /
483(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
1. OWUSU COLLINUS GHANIAN
S/O OWUSU, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT DON RENT HOUSE, SAI EAST LAYOUT
RAMMURTHY CAFFE CUP FACTORY
OPP HIRANDAHALLI, BIDARAHALLI HOBLI
BANGALORE - 560 049.
...PETITIONER
Digitally signed by (BY SRI M R BALAKRISHNA, ADVOCATE)
LAKSHMINARAYANA
MURTHY RAJASHRI
Location: HIGH AND:
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KOTHANURU POLICE
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BANGALORE.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. PUSHPALATHA B ADDL. SPP)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 Cr.PC (FILED
U/S 483 BNNS) PRAYING TO ENLARGE HIM ON BAIL IN CRIME
No.109/2025 OF KOTHANUR POLICE FOR OFFENCE PUNISHBLE
UNDER SECTION 22(C), 8(c) OF THE NDPS ACT AND SECTION
14 OF FOREIGNER ACT PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXXIV
ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(NDPS) BANGALORE.
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CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025
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THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition is filed by accused No.1 under Section
483 of BNSS praying to grant bail in Crime No.109/2025 of
Kothanuru Police Station registered for the offence
punishable under Section 22(c), 8(c) of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS
Act') and Section 14 of Foreigners Act.
2. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned
counsel for respondent.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend
that the petitioner is having Passport and Visa and it was
valid as on the date of alleged offence and therefore,
offence under Section 14 of Foreigners Act is not
attracted. Learned counsel submits that petitioner is
seeking bail only on the ground that grounds of arrest
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have not been communicated as required under Article
22(1) of Constitution of India, Section 47 of BNSS and
Section 52(1) of NDPS Act. The restrictions contained in
Section 37 of NDPS Act for grant of bail does not apply
since grounds of arrest are not communicated to the
petitioner in the language known to him. Learned counsel
has placed reliance on the following decisions:
(i) Pankaj Bhansal vs. Union of India (2023 INSC 866)
(ii) Prabhir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2024 INSC 414)
(iii) Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025 INSC 162)
(iv) Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of A.P.
(2025 INSC 768)
(v) Ashish Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh (Crl.A.1518/2025)
(vi) V.Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director,
Directorate of Enforcement (2024 INSC 739)
4. Learned counsel for respondent would contend
that grounds of arrest have been intimated to the accused
at the time of arrest. Even though the grounds are in
Kannada, the same have been explained in English and
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the petitioner has affixed his signature and LTM on the
same. Even the arrest of the petitioner has been
communicated to his friend who has also affixed his
signature on arrest report dated 01.05.2025. The
contraband has been sent for examination to FSL and test
report indicates that MDMA and quantity seized is
commercial quantity and therefore, limitations/restrictions
contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act apply. There are no
grounds to say that petitioner has not committed offence
under NDPS Act. There is a reverse burden on the
petitioner to show that he has not committed offence
under NDPS Act. The petitioner is a foreigner and he is
dealing with narcotic drugs and it affects society. The
petitioner is caught red-handed possessing MDMA of
commercial quantity and therefore, he is not entitled for
grant of bail. If the petitioner is granted bail, there are
chances of hampering investigation and committing similar
offence. With this, he prayed to reject the petition.
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5. Having heard the learned counsels, the Court has
perused the FIR, complaint and other materials placed on
record.
6. The case of prosecution is that 416 grams of
MDMA was seized from the possession of petitioner. The
said contraband seized has been sent for examination to
FSL. The FSL report indicates that contraband seized from
the possession of the petitioner is MDMA. It is not in
dispute that quantity of MDMA seized from the possession
of the petitioner is of commercial quantity. Section 37 of
NDPS Act reads thus:
37. Offences to be cognizable and non-
bailable. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A
and also for offences involving commercial quantity
shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless--
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity
to oppose the application for such release, and
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(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified
in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in
force on granting of bail.
7. As per Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act, a person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
not be released on bail, unless there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Considering the fact that the petitioner is found in
possession of commercial quantity of MDMA, there are no
grounds to hold that he is not guilty of such offence.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought bail
only on the ground that grounds of arrest have not been
communicated to the petitioner therefore, he is entitled for
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grant of bail. In the cases relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner, the Apex Court has considered whether
accused persons are entitled for grant of bail, if grounds of
arrest are not furnished.
9. In the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India
(2023 INSC 866), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as
under:
35. On the above analysis, to give true
meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the
statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of
2002 of informing the arrested person of the
grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be
necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written
grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested
person as a matter of course and without
exception.
10. In the case of Prabir Purkayashta vs. State
(NCT of Delhi) (2024 INSC 414) the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held as under:
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29. The language used in Article 22(1) and
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding
the communication of the grounds is exactly the
identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions
require that the 'grounds' of "arrest" or "detention",
as the case may be, must be communicated in
writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet
of the fundamental right as made by the
Constitution Bench while examining the scope of
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso
facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India insofar the requirement to communicate the
grounds of arrest is concerned.
30. Hence, we have no hesitation in
reiterating that the requirement to communicate
the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in
writing to a person arrested in connection with an
offence or a person placed under preventive
detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and
22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and
cannot be breached under any situation. Non-
compliance of this constitutional requirement and
statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the
detention being rendered illegal, as the case may
be.
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11. In Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another (2025 INSC 162), the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:
14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person
arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality
but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article
22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under
the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the
fundamental right of every person arrested and
detained in custody to be informed of the grounds
of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of
arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the
arrest, it would amount to a violation of the
fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under
Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the
arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as
provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of
his liberty except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The procedure established by
law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1).
Therefore, when a person is arrested without a
warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed
to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will
amount to a violation of his fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given
case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed
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while arresting a person or after arresting a person,
it will also violate fundamental right to liberty
guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be
rendered illegal. On the failure to comply with the
requirement of informing grounds of arrest as soon
as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated.
Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person
arrested cannot remain in custody even for a
second.
12. In Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and others (2025 INSC 768), the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
27. The object underlying the provision that
the grounds of arrest should be communicated to
the person arrested has been very succinctly
explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra). On learning
about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned
will be in a position to make an application before
the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the
information will enable the arrested person to
prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his
trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the
Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be
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communicated to the person arrested as soon as
possible.
28. For the purposes of Clause (1) of Article
22, it is not necessary for the authorities to furnish
full details of the offence. However, the information
should be sufficient to enable the arrested person
to understand why he has been arrested. The
grounds to be communicated to the arrested person
should be somewhat similar to the charge framed
by the Court for the trial of a case.
13. In Asish Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh
(Crl.A.No.1518/2025), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
as under:
"We are in agreement with the submission
made by the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be
construed as grounds of arrest, as no other
worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him.
This, being a clear non-compliance of the
mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has
been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of
the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to
set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in
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light of the judgment rendered by this Court
reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of
Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in V.Senthil Balaji vs.
The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement
(2024 INSC 739) has held as under:
26. There are a series of decisions of this
Court starting from the decision in the case of K.A.
Najeeb, which hold that such stringent provisions
for the grant of bail do not take away the power of
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India.
We have already referred to paragraph 17 of the
said decision, which lays down that the rigours of
such provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed in a reasonable
time and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. One of the reasons is that if,
because of such provisions, incarceration of an
undertrial accused is continued for an unreasonably
long time, the provisions may be exposed to the
vice of being violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
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15. The object underlying the provision for grounds
of arrest should be indicated to the person arrested has
been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra).
The information will enable the arrested person to prepare
his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. On
learning about the grounds for arrest, the person
concerned will be in a position to make an application
before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. For these reasons, it
has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for
the arrest must be communicated to the person arrested
as soon as possible.
16. It is not necessary for the authorities to furnish
full details of the offence for the purpose of Article 22(1) of
Constitution of India. However, the information should be
sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why
he has been arrested.
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17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan (2025 SCC Online SC
1702) has held as under:
20. In the present case, the High Court, by the
impugned order, enlarged the respondents on bail,
primarily relying on a set of factual and legal
findings. However, a closer examination of these
findings reveals serious infirmities that warranting
interference. We shall discuss the same in detail.
20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest
cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for
grant of bail.
20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents -
accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the
grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in
writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the
Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C (now Section 47
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This
submission, however, is devoid of merit.
20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates
that "no person who is arrested shall be detained in
custody without being informed, as soon as may be,
of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by,
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a legal practitioner of his choice". Similarly, Section
50 (1) Cr.P.C. requires that "every police officer or
other person arresting any person without warrant
shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars
of the offence for which he is arrested or other
grounds for such arrest.
20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework
thus mandates that the arrested person must be
informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither
provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon
written communication in every case. Judicial
precedents have clarified that substantial
compliance with these requirements is sufficient,
unless demonstrable prejudice is shown.
20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, it was
reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the
accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in
substance, even if not conveyed in writing.
Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that when arrest is
made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant
amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post-
Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written,
individualised grounds are not an inflexible
requirement in all circumstances.
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20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the
consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a
prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged
procedural lapses. The mere absence of written
grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal,
unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial
of a fair opportunity to defend.
20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on
the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative
factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence
under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima
facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no
mention in the remand orders about service of
memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest
memos were allegedly template-based and not
personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not
stated that they were present at the time of arrest
or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it
concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023
onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and
individualised grounds of arrest immediately after
arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and
remand records clearly reflect that the respondents
were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They
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were legally represented from the outset and
applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an
immediate and informed understanding of the
accusations. No material has been placed on record
to establish that any prejudice was caused due to
the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of
demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at
best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant
release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court
treated it as a determinative factor while
overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section
302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its
reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is
misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially
different facts and statutory contexts. The approach
adopted here is inconsistent with the settled
principle that procedural lapses in furnishing
grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso
facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to
bail.
18. In the present case, the arrest memo and
remand records clearly reflect that the petitioner was
aware of the reasons for his arrest. The petitioner was
legally represented on the outset and applied for bail
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shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material has been
placed on record to establish that any prejudice was
caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence
of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best,
a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on
bail.
19. The decisions which have been relied upon by the
petitioner are turned on materially different facts and
statutory contexts. The procedural lapses in furnishing
grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail. Even
though the arrest memo is in Kannada, it has been served
on the petitioner and he has affixed his signature and LTM
for having received copy. The arrest of the petitioner has
been intimated to his friend and he also has affixed
signature on arrest report dated 01.05.2025. The fact that
the petitioner immediately approached the
Sessions/Special Court seeking bail itself indicate that he
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was aware of grounds of arrest. The petitioner has affixed
his signature on arrest memo and he has been explained
in English by the IO regarding grounds of arrest, more so,
the petitioner has been caught red handed while
possessing contraband/MDMA of commercial quantity.
20. In V.Senthil Balaji (supra), the Hon'ble Apex
Court has observed thus:
24. There are a few penal statutes that make
a departure from the provisions of Sections 437,
438, and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. A higher threshold is provided in these
statutes for the grant of bail. By way of illustration,
we may refer to Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA, proviso
to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (for short, 'NDPS Act'). The provisions
regarding bail in some of such statutes start with a
non-obstante clause for overriding the provisions of
Sections 437 to 439 of the CrPC. The legislature has
done so to secure the object of making the penal
provisions in such enactments. For example, the
PMLA provides for Section 45(1)(ii) as money
laundering poses a serious threat not only to the
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country's financial system but also to its integrity
and sovereignty.
21. The legislatures have included Section 37 of NDPS
to curb serious offences which have affected entire society,
particularly youngsters of the country.
22. In John Moses D @ Madan Kumar vs. State of
Karnataka (W.P.No.22042/2024 decided on
28.11.2024), a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has
observed as under:
15. The Police Stations, in the country are
close to 20,000, arrests happen day in and day out.
If grounds of arrest is to be informed, as is held by
the Apex Court in PANKAJ BANSAL, PRABIR
PURKAYASTHA and ARVIND KEJRIWAL in every
arrest on any cognizable offence, it would
undoubtedly open a Pandora's box, of interpretation
of what could be the grounds of arrest, and
mushroom huge litigation before the constitutional
Courts.
16. The Apex Court holds it mandatory in the
aforesaid three cases, owing to the fact that
enlargement of an accused for the offences under
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the UAPA and PMLA on grant of bail, is extremely
limited. The burden to prove that he is not guilty
begins at the threshold. It is in fact a reverse
burden on the accused. It is, therefore, in such
cases the grounds of arrest should be informed to
the accused. In the case, before the Apex Court, the
arrest memo did not contain any grounds of arrest
and it was blatant violation of the statute and the
Constitution. Therefore, interpretation that has
stood the test of time, qua Section 50 of the
Cr.P.C., of information of grounds of arrest to the
accused is what is required to be followed even in
the case at hand as the offences are under the IPC
and KCOCA, both of them would not mandate
divergence of grounds of arrest except as found in
Section 50 of Cr.P.C. What is informed to the
petitioner in the case at hand is information of
arrest. Cr.P.C. mandates that the accused should be
informed of the grounds of arrest. In my considered
view, the information of grounds of arrest as is
indicated to the petitioner in the case at hand,
would suffice and it would not vitiate the arrest and
result in enlargement on grant of bail or interim
bail.
23. The mandate in Section 47(1) of BNSS and
Section 52(1) of NDPS Act that the accused should be
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informed of the grounds of arrest has been complied with
and arrest is not vitiated. The petitioner is aware of
grounds of arrest and he immediately made bail
application before the Special Court by engaging the
counsel.
24. Considering all these aspects and looking to the
gravity of offence, petitioner is not entitled for grant of
bail. In the result, petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR)
JUDGE
DKB
