Karnataka High Court

Mr.Sampras Anthony vs State Of Karnataka By on 25 October, 2025

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 18.09.2025
Pronounced on : 25.10.2025 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.31144 OF 2024 (GM - RES)

BETWEEN:

MR.SAMPRAS ANTHONY
S/O LATE ANTHONY ALANGARAM,
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.108,
TKN RIDGE APARTMENT,
AVANI SHRINGERI NAGARA,
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 076.
... PETITIONER

(BY SRI ATHREYA C. SHEKAR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
KONANAKUNTE POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY HCGP,
HIGH COURT COMPLEX,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2

2 . MS. XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI B.N.JAGADESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
R-2 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
BHARITHIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITHA, 2023 TO QUASH THE
FIR IN CR.NO. 306/2024 (ANNEXURE-A) AND COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-B) FILED BY THE R-2, REGISTERED BY THE R-1
POLICE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHICH IS NOW PENDING AS CC
NO. 34011/2024 ANNEXURE-D ON THE FILE OF THE XXX
ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU
FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 64 OF
BHARATHIYA NYAYA SANHITA 2023.

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 18.09.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question

proceedings in C.C.No.34011 of 2024 pending before the XXX

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru arising out of
3

Crime No.306 of 2024 registered for offence punishable under

Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita ('BNS'), 2023 for rape.

2. Sans prolixity, the essential narrative is as follows: -

The petitioner and the 2nd respondent are drawn

together in the labyrinth of modern social media, become

acquainted through the virtual corridors of the dating

application 'Bumble' and thereafter, nurtured their

acquaintance for over years through the exchange of images

and conversations upon the platform of Instagram. On the

morning of 11-08-2024, the two resolve to meet in person.

After partaking of a meal at a restaurant - Plan-B on BEL

road, proceed to a hotel, an OYO Flagship hotel, where

physical intimacy is alleged to have ensued. After the night,

on the next day i.e., on 12-08-2024 the petitioner drops the

complainant back to her apartment. On 13-08-2024, the following

day, moved by certain physical discomfort, gets herself examined

at Ramaiah hospital and comes to know that she is a victim of

sexual assault. She goes to the Police Station on 13-08-2024 and
4

lodges a complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.306 of

2024 for offence punishable under Section 64 of the BNS which

punishes for commission of rape. The petitioner then gets arrested,

police conduct investigation and file a final report against the

petitioner arraigning him as the sole accused in C.C.No.34011 of

2024. It is the filing of the charge sheet that drives the petitioner to

this Court in the subject petition.

3. Heard Sri Athreya C. Shekar, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State

Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1. Respondent No.2,

though served, remained unrepresented.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would

vehemently contend that social media platform meeting results in

several activities. Petitioner and complainant met in Bumble dating

app and continued to exchange photographs, video and chats on

Instagram. The photographs and chats would clearly demonstrate

falsity of the claim of the complainant. The Investigating Officer

has deliberately not made that a part of the charge sheet. It is,
5

therefore, a memo along with documents is filed before the Court.

The learned counsel would further submit that they are all purely

consensual acts between the petitioner and the complainant who is

active on bumble, a dating app for long time. He would seek

quashment of proceedings.

5. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor representing

the State would vehemently refute the submissions in contending

that the petitioner has indulged in sexual assault on the

complainant. It cannot be termed as a consensual sex. Even in

case of sex on promise of marriage, BNS punishes. Though this is

not a case of promise of marriage, whether it was a consensual or

not, is a matter of trial. He would, therefore, seek dismissal of the

petition, contending that the petitioner should come out clean in a

full-blown trial.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.
6

7. The factual canvass is narrow, the entire issue being rooted

in the complaint dated 13-08-2024. The complainant avers that

she withdrew her consent midway, but the petitioner nevertheless

proceeded. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the

complaint. It reads as follows:

"13-08-24

"To
Police Inspector
Konanakunte Police Station
Bangalore

From:

XXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXX,

Subject: Sexual Assault Incident involving Sampras
Anthony (7337625635)

Dear sir,

I am writing to formally lodge a complaint regarding an incident
of sexual assault done by Sampras Anthony on 11th August.

I met Sampras on a dating app (Bumble) a approximately a
year ago. Recently, we got back in touch on Instagram and
decided to meet in person on 11th of August, he picked me up
from my apartment and took me to an Oyo room OMD Flagship
Green Residency (Room 304) which we reached around 7:30
P.M. Shortly after settling in, Sampras began to seduce me into
sexual intercourse, which I instantly withdrew my consent for. I
explicitly informed him not to continue further. Despite my
7

repeated objections and clear instructions to not proceed
further, Sampras refused to listen. He continued to engage in
sexual intercourse disregarding may express withdrawal of
consent.

I repeatedly requested him to stop and continuously questioned
his motives despite which he persisted in having sex against my
will.

The next morning, Sampras proceeded to drop me back to my
apartment at 7:30 A.M. shortly after which I began experiencing
stomach pain. When the pain worsened, I decided to visit
Ramaiah hospital to get a medical test done, on 13th Aug 2024.

I request that this matter be taken seriously and investigated
thoroughly. I am prepared to cooperate fully with any legal
action that may be necessary, and I expect appropriate action
to be taken against the perpetrator.

Thank you for your attention to this grave issue."

It is the case of the complainant that she met the petitioner on a

dating app called 'Bumble' a year ago and they got back in touch on

Instagram and decided to take a room on 11-08-2024. It is the

complaint that the petitioner began to seduce her to sexual

intercourse, consent for which was withdrawn by her. It is her case

that she informed the petitioner that she would not like to continue

further. In spite of it, the petitioner indulged in sexual intercourse.

The next morning, the petitioner has dropped her back to the

apartment and thereafter she experienced stomach pain and

because of stomach pain she gives a complaint, is what the
8

complaint narrates. The police after investigation file a charge

sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in column

No.17 reads as follows:

"17. ೇ ನ ಸಂ ಪ ಾ ಾಂಶ

ಈ ೋಷ ೋಪ ಾ ಪ ಯ ಾಲಂ ನಂಬ 12 ರ ನಮೂ ರುವ ಎ-1 ಆ ೋ#ಯು
ಾ -1 ರವ$%ೆ &ೇ ಂ' ಆ( ನ ಪ$ಚಯ*ಾ+ದು-, ಎ-1 ಆ ೋ# ಮತು ಾ -1 ರವರು ಪರಸ/ರ
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11.08.2024 ರಂದು ಸು1ಾರು 19.30 ಗಂ;ೆ ಸಮಯದ ೋಣನಕುಂ;ೆ = ೕ> ?ಾ ಾ *ಾ@#ಯ
ಜಂಬೂಸ*ಾ$ ೆBಯ ಒDೕ EಾF ಸGH +IೕF ೆ &ೆJKಯ 3 8ೇ ಮಹMಯ ರುವ ೊಠM ಸಂOೆ@
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ಅಪ ಾಧ*ೆಸ+ರು6ಾ8ೆಂದು ೋಷ ೋಪ ಾ ಪ .

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ಕಳda ದು- ವರ ಬಂದ ನಂತರ ಕಲಂ, 193(9) e.ಎF ಎ> ಎ> ರ 4ೆಚುfವ$ ೋgಾ ೋಪ ೆ
ಪ ಯನು7 1ಾನ@ 8ಾ@hಾಲಯ ೆP J*ೇ ೊಳiVಾಗುವXದು."

Prior to filing of the charge sheet, the statement of the complainant

was recorded. It is specific case of the petitioner that the

Investigating Officer has deliberately ignored the chats between the

petitioner and the complainant, as over a year the petitioner and

the complainant were in touch with each other on Instagram and

has placed a memo along with chats. The chats are not in good
9

taste nor can be reproduced in the course of the order. It would

only indicate that the acts between the petitioner and the 2nd

respondent/complainant are all consensual.

8.1. The Apex Court, in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM

MURLIDHAR SONAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as

follows: :

".... .... ....

20. With this factual background, the Court held that the
girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of
mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that
at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a
case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima
facie accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus :
(Deelip Singh [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 106, para 35)

"35. The remaining question is whether on the
basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible
to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of
inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise
to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold
out the promise to marry her and that was the
predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the
sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to
marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no
evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to
marry her at all from the inception and that the promise
he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances
emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this
fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that
"later on", the accused became ready to marry her but

1
(2019) 18 SCC 191
10

his father and others took him away from the village
would indicate that the accused might have been
prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not
materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his
family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise
to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry.
On this aspect also, the observations of this Court
in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC
46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24 come to the aid of
the appellant."

21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 660] , the Court has drawn a distinction between rape and
consensual sex. This is a case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at
the time of the incident. She had an inclination towards the
accused. The accused had been giving her assurances of the
fact that he would get married to her. The prosecutrix,
therefore, left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to
go with the accused to get married to him. She called the
accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask him
why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided
by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he
finally arrived, she went with him to a place called Karna Lake
where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any
objection at that stage and made no complaints to anyone.
Thereafter, she went to Kurukshetra with the accused, where
she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily
became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason,
went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and
once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir
there. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the
old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the
two of them could get married at the court in Ambala. At the
bus station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court
held that the physical relationship between the parties had
clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix as there
was neither a case of any resistance nor had she raised any
complaint anywhere at any time, despite the fact that she had
been living with the accused for several days and had travelled
with him from one place to another. The Court further held that
it is not possible to apprehend the circumstances in which a
charge of deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused.
11

22. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar v. State of
Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC
204] , disposed of on 6-4-2018, has observed that it is difficult
to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship
which has continued for eight years is "rape", especially in the
face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together
as man and wife. It was held as under : (Shivashankar
case [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] ,
SCC p. 205, para 4)

"4. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against
the appellant who may have possibly, made a false
promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however,
difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a
relationship which has continued for eight years, as
"rape" especially in the face of the complainant's own
allegation that they lived together as man and wife."

23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his
lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If
the accused has not made the promise with the sole
intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual
acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear
case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical
relationship between the parties would not constitute an
offence under Section 376 IPC.
12

24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position
that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the
Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working
as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that
she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant
informed her that he is a married man and that he has
differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to
different communities. It is also alleged that the
accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their
marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she
needed a companion as she was a widow. She has
specifically stated that "as I was also a widow and I was
also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and
since then we were having love affair and accordingly we
started residing together. We used to reside sometimes
at my home whereas sometimes at his home". Thus, they
were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in
a relationship with each other for quite some time and
enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they
had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married
some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not
her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She
had taken a conscious decision after active application of
mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since the complainant has failed
to prima facie show the commission of rape, the
complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be
sustained.

25. Further, the FIR nowhere spells out any wrong
committed by the appellant under Section 420 IPC or
under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Therefore, the
13

High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed
by the appellant under Section 482 CrPC."

(Emphasis supplied)

8.2. The Apex Court, earlier to the case of DR.DHRUVARAM

MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, in the case of TILAK RAJ v. STATE

OF HIMACHAL PRADESH2, has held as follows:

".... .... ....

17. The evidence as a whole, including the FIR,
testimony of the prosecutrix and the MLC report prepared
by the medical practitioner clearly indicates that the story
of the prosecutrix regarding sexual intercourse on false
pretext of marrying her is concocted and not believable.
In fact, the said act of the appellant seems to be
consensual in nature. The trial court has rightly held
thus:

"23. If the story set up by the prosecutrix
herself in the court is to be believed, it does come
to the fore that the two were in a relationship and
she well knew that the accused was duping her
throughout. Per the prosecutrix, she had not
succumbed to the proposal of the accused. Having
allowed access to the accused to her residential
quarter, so much so, even having allowed him to
stay overnight, she knew the likely outcome of her
reaction. Seeing the age of the prosecutrix which
is around 40 years, it can be easily inferred that
she knew what could be the consequences of
allowing a male friend into her bedroom at night.

24. The entire circumstances discussed
above and which have come to the fore from the
testimony of none else but the prosecutrix, it

2
(2016) 4 SCC 140
14

cannot be said that the sexual intercourse was
without her consent. The act seems to be
consensual in nature.

25. It is also not the case that the consent
had been given by the prosecutrix believing the
accused's promise to marry her. For, her
testimony itself shows that the entire story of
marriage has unfolded after 5-1-2010 when the
accused was stated to have been summoned to the
office of the DSP. Prior to 5-1-2010, there is
nothing on record to show that the accused had
been pestering the prosecutrix for any alliance.
The prosecutrix has said a line in her examination-
in-chief, but her cross-examination shows that no
doubt the two were in a relationship, but the
question of marriage apparently had not been
deliberated upon by any of the two. After the
sexual contact, some talk about marriage had
cropped up between the two. Thus, it also cannot
be said that the consent for sexual intercourse had
been given by the prosecutrix under some
misconception of marriage."

18. As far as the conviction of the appellant under
Sections 417 and 506, Part I IPC is concerned, a close scrutiny
of evidence of the prosecutrix (PW 2) along with other
prosecution witnesses is done by this Court. Section 417 IPC
prescribes punishment for the offence of cheating as defined
under Section 415 IPC. Section 415 IPC reads thus:

"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person
so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes
or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.

Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is
a deception within the meaning of this section."

19. The ingredients required to constitute the
offence of cheating have been discussed by this Court
15

in Ram Jas v. State of U.P. [Ram Jas v. State of U.P.,
(1970) 2 SCC 740 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 516] as under : (SCC
p. 743, para 3)

"(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him;

(ii) (a) the person so deceived should be
induced to deliver any property to any
person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property; or

(b) the person so deceived should be
intentionally induced to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived; and

(iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act or
omission should be one which causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to the
person induced in body, mind, reputation or
property."

20. A careful reading of the evidence on record
clearly shows that there is no evidence against the
appellant from which it can be conclusively inferred by
this Court that there was any fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of the prosecutrix by the appellant to
constitute an offence under Section 415 IPC. For
conviction of the appellant for the abovesaid offence, it is
important that all the necessary ingredients constituting
an offence under the said section must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the appellant
cannot be convicted for the offence of cheating
punishable under Section 417 IPC as the prosecution has
failed to prove all ingredients of the said offence beyond
reasonable doubt.

21. Further, Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for
the offence of criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503
IPC. Section 503 IPC reads thus:

"503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever
threatens another with any injury to his person,
16

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of
any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to
cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to
do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to
omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled
to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat, commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of
any deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section."

22. A reading of the evidence on record in the light of the
aforesaid legal provision in Section 503 shows the insufficiency
of evidence to hold the conviction of the appellant for the
offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506,
Part I IPC.

23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the evidence of the
prosecution is neither believable nor reliable to bring home the
charges levelled against the appellant. We are of the view that
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is
not based on a careful reappraisal of the evidence on record by
the High Court and there is no material evidence on record to
show that the appellant is guilty of the charged offences i.e.
offence of cheating punishable under Section 417 IPC and
offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506,
Part I IPC."

(Emphasis supplied)

9. The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, has

etched with clarity, the nuanced distinction between

consensual intimacy and the grave allegation of rape. A

relationship born of mutual volition, even if it founders in

disappointment, cannot, save in clearest of cases, be

transmuted into an offence under the criminal law. If the
17

present prosecution were permitted to meander into a trial,

it would be nothing but a ritualistic procession towards

miscarriage of justice and indeed become an abuse of the

process of the law.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: