(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
2. The appellant filed a suit for recovery of a sum of
rate of 2% p.m. from 30.10.2020 till realization of the amount
with costs. The said suit, after contest, came to be dismissed
with cost. Being aggrieved, the present appeal is filed along
3. Sri.P.B.Raju, learned counsel appearing for the
cause to condone the delay. It is submitted that due to Covid-
approached the counsel and thereafter the appeal was filed. It
due to the covid pandemic. It is also submitted that the
4. Sri.Prakash B.N., learned counsel for the
truth. It is submitted that the suit came to be dismissed in the
appellant. It is further submitted that the delay cannot be
condone the enormous delay. In support of his contention, he
in the case of Jharkand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. and
another vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited1 and in the
Department) Represented by Executive Engineer vs.
Limited2. He seeks to reject the application filed for
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned
on record. The point that arises for consideration is "Whether
6. The answer to the above point is negative for the
7. Before considering the cause shown by the
on the subject. In the case of Jharkand Urja Utpadan Nigam
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as
a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the logic
of counting the period of limitation from the date of
communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot be
applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial entities
are parties.
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24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be treated as
only directory and not mandatory. So notwithstanding the
provision contained in the amended Order XX Rule
1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the parties to the
dispute through electronic mail or otherwise), if such copies
are not issued within a reasonable time, the parties to the
dispute have to apply for the same, and after obtaining it,
prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in Section 13(1-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and object of
the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any interpretation of the
nature advanced by the counsel for the applicants would
defeat the whole purpose of the object of the Commercial
Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy disposal of high value
commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for
the applicants that the period of limitation for filing the appeal
to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court would
not commence unless the judgment of the Commercial Court
in the Commercial suit was communicated by the said
Commercial Court to the parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days
in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise of
power conferred on this Court under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and may
result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to why they
should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the
context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute.
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In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression
"sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period
provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the
expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for
the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in
exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on
which the appeal could have been filed can be condoned (i.e.,
below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of the
judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides,
such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely
because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for
condonation of delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would
thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like the
applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause has
been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in
the applicants or the appellants to have the delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
"63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration An and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under section 37 of
the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117
of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days.
respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not
by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise
acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay
beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, he
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in
equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's
inaction, negligence or laches."
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of
Maharashtra (2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond
60 days in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act
only by way of exception and not by way of rule. If the
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applicants for condonation of delay had not acted bona fide
and had acted in a negligent manner as in the instant case,
the delay is not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is
301 days - way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days
permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be
condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay
caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
condoned.
(emphasis supplied)
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by counsel
and the judgment was obviously pronounced in the presence
of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it
appears that the application for issuance of certified copy was
made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024, and
the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy
of its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable time, it
was incumbent on the part of the counsel for the applicants or
the employees in the Legal Department of the applicants to
apply for issuance of certified copy from the Commercial
Court, but they have failed in their duty to apply for it when
they did not receive it within a reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal and
for not making any demand of payment in terms of the decree
of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants
about the judgment of the Commercial Court. This is because
the applicants have a Legal Department and employees
engaged by the applicants in that department have a duty to
monitor what is happening in the cases to which the
applicants are parties, keep track of the progress of the said
cases and the decisions therein, and ensure that applications
for issuance of certified copy are made to the concerned court
so that the appeals, if required, can be preferred within the
period of limitation prescribed by law."
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21. We are in complete agreement with the line of
reasoning assigned by the High Court."
8. In the case Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Private Limited referred supra at para 58 to 63
it has been held as under:
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved under
both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act,
that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
"sufficient cause" is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself. Besides, the expression "sufficient
cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC
81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the
purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude,
which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing
in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of
a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not
acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the
facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he
was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
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explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely
a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964
SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770]
, Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545
: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient
cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of
good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given
a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice
is done, but only [Ed. : The matter between two
asterisks has been emphasised in original.] so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter
between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.]
, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can
be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal,
(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC
195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result flowing from
a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
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power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.' The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience
to a particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard
but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It
has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community,
to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and
to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the
past which have not been agitated unexplainably and
have from lapse of time become stale. According
to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence
to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.'
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment
or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510]
, Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik
Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating
and would fly in the face of law laid down by the
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Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his
part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] ["Postmaster
General"], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29)
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation,
we are posing a question why the delay is to be
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condoned mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
60. The decision in Postmaster General [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] has been followed in the
following subsequent judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur [State of
Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592] at
paras 8-8.2;
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(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of
U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at paras 2-
3;
(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3
SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] at paras 11-
13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC
(Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC
(L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of M.P. v. Chaitram
Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111
: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] ,
this Court referred to Postmaster General [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as follows : (SCC
pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the
same thing again and again and the conduct seems to
be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed
after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal
with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the
State of Madhya Pradesh in State of
M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri)
117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] in terms of our order
dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that
case and we see no purpose in repeating the same
reasoning again except to record what are stated to be
the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned.
On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate
was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on
13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018
SCC OnLine MP 1632] and the Law Department
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permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order
on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost
about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to
be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence
would there be for the Legal Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into
the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it
appears that the Department is unable to file appeals
within any reasonable period of time much less within
limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded
in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of
the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media
(India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these
kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a
certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of
officers who may be in default. We have also recorded
the irony of the situation where no action is taken
against the officers who sit on these files and do
nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded, the
wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on
the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with
the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The
amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in
filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery
of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the
said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate
General to caution that for any successive matters of
this kind the costs will keep on going up."
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts
of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have
delay condoned. This was felicitously put
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in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as
follows : (SCR p. 771 : AIR p. 365, para 12)
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is
not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a
matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient
cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on
that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the
Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is
at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot
justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle
during all the time available to it. In this connection we
may point out that considerations of bona fides or due
diligence are always material and relevant when the
Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14
of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications
the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the
combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in
our opinion, considerations which have been expressly
made material and relevant by the provisions of Section
14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner
be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14."
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that
are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation
Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively,
is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way
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of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise
acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short
delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the
court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the
other side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now
be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or
laches."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the object
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, has held that the object of
the Act is speedy resolution of disputes, expression "sufficient
cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not elastic
enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the
appeal provision itself, and that the expression "sufficient
cause" is not in itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and strayed claims. In commercial matters, the
condonation of delay should not be in a routine manner, and it
should be an exception on showing sufficient cause. In a fit
case, in which a party otherwise acted bonafide and not in a
negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can in the
discretion of the Court be condoned, always bearing in mind
that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both equity and justice what may now be lost by
the first party's inaction, negligence, or latches.
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10. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the cause shown by the
appellant in the affidavit accompanying the application seeking
for condonation of delay, it can be said that the appellant was
negligent and tried to give explanation for the enormous delay
of 354 days in filing the appeal. The affidavit of the appellant
indicates that the appellant contacted his advocate along with
earlier advocate to file an appeal before this Court and on
verification, the present counsel filed an appeal. The affidavit
further indicates that due to Covid-19 virus, the entire country
was suffering from pandemic and in the meantime, he met with
certain mishap in between, and due to failing health and family
issues, he could not meet the advocate to discuss with regard
to filing of appeal. It is stated that in the first week of June
2003, he contacted the counsel with the certified copy of the
judgment in the suit and requested to prepare the appeal and it
is also stated that he is not well versed with the legal procedure
and he has good case on merits. Reading of paragraphs No.4 to
7 of the affidavit indicates that the appellant has given a vague
explanation for filing of an appeal belatedly and such
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explanation cannot be construed as "sufficient cause" for the
purpose of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It is asserted that the
appellant suffered certain mishap and suffered ill-health and
also there were family issues. However, no cogent material is
placed before the Court to accept such assertion. The assertion
of certain mishap, ill-health and family issues are routine
explanations offered to condone the delay. However, in the
absence of any acceptable material particulars with regard to
such assertion, the same is required to be disbelieved. The
appellant has filed additional affidavit dated 11.07.2025, in the
said affidavit he has again stated with regard to the Covid-19
pandemic and also stated that the appellant has sustained loss
in the business and was in financial difficulty for payment of
Court fees due to lockdown and subsequent month and
thereafter until normalcy was restored and it took more than a
year for the company to salvage its financial position. In the
additional affidavit, the appellant raised a new ground of
financial difficulty and difficulty for payment of Court fees, the
said assertion of financial loss of the company and financial
difficulty is a bald statement without being supported by any
cogent and legally acceptable material.
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11. It is to be noticed that the impugned judgment is
dated 12.04.2022 and on the said date the effect of Covid-19
pandemic had subsided and the Courts were functional, during
that time period, hence, the explanation of covid-19 pandemic
would not help the appellant seeking for condonation of delay.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the
condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court which is
required to be exercised sparingly for a short delay and that too
as an exception. On considering the cause shown by the
appellant in the affidavit filed along with the application as well
as the additional affidavit, they do not show any sufficient
cause to condone the enormous delay of 354 days. Hence, we
are of the considered view that the application in I.A.No.1/2023
filed seeking condonation of delay is devoid of merits and
accordingly, the same is rejected. Consequently, the appeal
stands rejected.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
