Karnataka High Court
Venkatesh vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 October, 2025
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WA No. 799 of 2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
WRIT APPEAL NO. 799 OF 2024 (SC-ST)
BETWEEN:
1. VENKATESH
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
2. RAMESH
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
BOTH SONS OF LATE KRISHNA
RESIDING AT NO.615/16, 7TH CROSS
LAKSHMINARAYANA TEMPLE ROAD
MUNNENAKOLALA POST
BANGALORE - 560 037.
...APPELLANTS
Digitally (BY SRI CHAITANYA HEGADE, ADVOCATE)
signed by
SRIDEVI S
AND:
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
VIDHANA SOUDHA
DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE DISTRICT
BANGALORE.
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WA No. 799 of 2024
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3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE SUB-DIVISION
BANGALORE.
4. M. B. SHANKAR REDDY
S/O. LATE M. BHOOMI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
R/AT NO. 3276, HAL II STAGE
INDIRANAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 038.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH, AGA FOR R-1 TO 3 &
SRI P.B. RAJU, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 21/07/2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE IN W.P. NO.11112/2021 AND MAY ALLOW THE SAID WRIT
PETITION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. The appellants have filed the present appeal impugning an
order dated 21.07.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
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Court, dismissing their writ petition being W.P.No.11112/2021 (SC-
ST).
2. The appellants had filed the said writ petition seeking orders
directing the respondents to forthwith restore possession of the
land measuring one acre, bearing Survey No.37/6 (Plot No.37/6)
situated at Munnenakolalu Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore South
Taluk (subject property), which was granted in favour of their
father, since deceased. The appellants claim that their father was
working as labourer in the brick manufacturing unit of late M.
Bhoomi Reddy (father of respondent No. 4). The appellants claim
that their father along with twenty others belonging to scheduled
caste were granted lands measuring one acre each. At the
material time, ten of the grantees including the appellants' father,
were working as labourers in the brick manufacturing unit of Sri.
Bhoomi Reddy (father of respondent No.4). The upset price for the
land in question was fixed at Rs.300/- per acre. However, Rs.200/-
per acre was waived as the grantees fell under the scheduled caste
category, and only a sum of Rs.100/- per acre each was collected
from them. The appellants claim that it was specifically mentioned
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in the grant order that the lands granted would not be alienated for
a period of 15 years.
3. The appellants states that the said condition was not
complied with and the father of the appellants as well as nine
labourers, who were working in respondent No.4's father's factory,
agreed to sell the lands granted to them at a price which was five
times more than the amount paid by them. The appellants' father
executed the sale deed dated 04.08.1967 in favour of Shri Bhoomi
Reddy, father of respondent No.4. The appellants' claim that the
said sale is void as the same was in contravention of the terms and
conditions on which the lands were granted.
4. The appellants contend that the Karnataka Scheduled
Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Act, 1978 [the PTCL Act] came into force with effect from
01.01.1979 and pursuant to Section 4 of the said Act, the sale of
the subject land in favour of respondent No.4's father was required
to be declared as null and void.
5. After the PTCL Act came into force, proceedings were
initiated under Section 5 of the PTCL Act in respect of the lands
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acquired by respondent No.4's father including the subject land.
Respondent No.3 (Assistant Commissioner) passed an order dated
25.07.1986 declaring that the sale of the land by grantees including
the appellants' father in favour of respondent No.4's father (Sri. M.
Bhoomi Reddy) were null and void. Accordingly, the said lands,
including the subject lands were directed to be resumed.
Aggrieved by the said order, Shri Bhoomi Reddy preferred appeals
being SC/ST Appl.11 to 20/1096-87, under Section 5A of the PTCL
Act before the Deputy Commissioner. However, the said appeals
were dismissed by an order dated 14.08.1987 and the order dated
25.07.1986 passed by the respondent No.3 was upheld.
6. Aggrieved by the same, Shri. Bhoomi Reddy preferred a writ
petition being WP.No.12518/1987 in this Court, questioning the
decision for resumption of lands in question including the subject
land granted to the father of the appellants. The said petition was
allowed in terms of an order dated 09.04.1991 passed by the
learned Single Judge of this Court.
7. The learned Single Judge held that there could be no
restriction on alienation of land in view of Rule 43 (G) of the Mysore
Land Revenue (Amendment) Rules, 1960. The Court reasoned
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that restriction under Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 43(G) of the said Rules
postulated that if the grant was made free of cost or made at a
price which was less than the full market value, the land would not
be alienated for a period of 15 years from the date of the grantee
taking possession of the land. The Court also found that in terms
of Rule 1 of Rule 43(G) of the said Rules, in the case of lands
granted to applicants belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes, the occupancy rates could be waived upto an amount of
Rs.200/- and the balance was to be recovered in 3 instalments.
However, the learned Single Judge held that in the present case
price of the land was not reduced. The same were granted at full
price of Rs.300/- per acre, but Rs.200/- had been waived. Thus, the
grant of land could not be considered as a grant made free of cost
or at a price which is less than the market value.
8. The father of the appellants was arrayed as respondent No.9
in the said petition.
9. Some of the grantees filed an appeal against the order dated
09.04.1991 before the Division Bench of this Court being
W.A.No.1481/1991. The father of the appellants was arrayed as
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respondent No.8 in the said appeal. However, the said appeal
was dismissed by an order dated 13.04.1994 for non-prosecution.
10. The State preferred a separate appeal against the order
dated 09.04.1991 passed by the learned Single Judge in
WP.No.12518/1987, being WA.No.2142/1992. The said appeal
was also dismissed by an order dated 22.01.1996. Thereafter,
some of the grantees including the father of the appellants
preferred a petition for seeking review of the order dated
22.01.1996 passed in WA.No.2142/1992. However, the said civil
petition was dismissed as well.
11. Thus, the decision of the Division Bench in
WA.No.2142/1992 had attained finality.
12. Notwithstanding that the decision of the Division Bench had
attained finality, the appellants instituted the present writ petition
contending that the Rule 43(G) of the Rules had been incorrectly
interpreted in the previous round of litigation. They relied on a
subsequent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in
Siddegowda v. Assistant Commissioner : (2003) 10 SCC 675.
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13. However, the learned Single Judge rejected the said petition
on the principles of res judicata. Concededly, the father of the
appellants was party to the proceedings where the sale of subject
land in favour of Sri. Bhoomi Reddy was challenged as void in
terms of Section 4 of the PTCL Act. As noted above, the said
challenge had been rejected on the interpretation of Rule 43(G) of
the Rules. Additionally, it was noted that Saguvali Chit did not
contain any condition restricting the transfer or alienation of the
subject land.
14. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
learned Single Judge has grossly erred in declining to entertain the
writ petition on the ground of res judicata, in view of the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in Siddegowda (supra). He
contended that since the issue involved was limited to an issue of
law the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in
WA.No.2142/1992 could be considered as foreclosing the
challenge on the basis of the decision of the Supreme court. The
learned counsel for the appellants referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai B.
Jeejeebhoy : AIR 1971 SCC 2355 in support of his contention.
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15. We find no merit in the contention as advanced on behalf of
the appellants. The appellants claim their rights through their
deceased father, who was the original grantee. Undisputedly, the
father of the appellants was party to the writ petition being
WP.No.12518/1987. The question whether the alienation of subject
land in favour of Sri. Bhoomi Reddy was void, was considered and
determined by the Court in this said petition. The decision of the
learned Single Judge rested on the interpretation of Rule 43(G) of
the Rules. The said decision merged with the order dated
22.01.1996 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
WA.No.2142/1992. The Division Bench upheld the learned Single
Judge's interpretation of Rule 43G of the Rules. Additionally, the
Division Bench had also held that the Saguvali Chit did not provide
for any restriction regarding alienation of the subject land. The
appellants' father had also filed a review petition seeking review of
the order dated 22.01.1996 (being Civil Petition No.897/1996),
which was dismissed by an order dated 15.02.1999. Thus, the
disputes sought to be raised in the present writ petition are the
same which were the subject matter of the writ appeal
No.2142/1992.
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16. The decision in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra) does
not support the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants. In
the said decision the Supreme Court had held as under:
"10. It is true that in determining the application of the
rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the
correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The
matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the
earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a
subsequent litigation between the same parties be
regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A
mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier,
proceeding between the same parties may not, for the
same reason, be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding between the same parties. But, where the
decision is on a question law, i.e. the interpretation of a
statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding between the same parties where the cause
of action is the same, for the expression "the matter in
issue" in S. 11, Code of Civil Procedure, means the right
litigated between the parties, i. e. the facts on which the
right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the
determination of that issue. Where, however, the
question is one purely of law and it relates to the
jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court
sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the
rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will
not be precluded from challenging the validity of the
order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of
procedure cannot supersede the law of the land".
17. In the present case, the dispute between the parties involved
several questions including (a) whether the grant was subject to
any restriction regarding alienation as the Saguvali Chit did not
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contain any such restricted condition; and (b) whether the Rule
43(G) of the Rules prohibited transfer of the subject land. The
cause of action was also identical - sale of the subject land
allegedly contrary to the restriction imposed. The aforesaid were
finally decided by the Division Bench and the said decision is final
and binding on the parties. It was impermissible for the appellants
to seek re-agitation of the same disputes on the ground of a
subsequent decision.
18. We may also note the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and others : (2024) 7
SCC 433. In the said case, the Supreme Court considered the
question of condoning the delay in filing an appeal or application on
account of change in law. The Court rejected the contention that
condonation of delay could be granted on the ground of a
subsequent change in law, inter alia, for the reason that
subsequent ruling of a judgment only takes away the binding
nature of that judgment, but does not reopen the lis of the parties.
The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below.
37. Another ground taken by the appellants for
seeking condonation of delay is the subsequent
change of law brought in by Shailendra and
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Manoharlal. However, we are unable to agree with
this contention because of four primary reasons.
44. Finally, the fourth reason why subsequent
overruling of a judgment cannot be a sufficient cause
is because when a case is overruled, it is only its
binding nature as a precedent that is taken away and
the lis between the parties is still deemed to have
been settled by the overruled case. It is a settled
principle of law that even an erroneous decision
operates as res judicata between the parties. Hence,
when Manoharlal overruled Pune Municipal Corpn.
and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn., as well as
all other cases relying on them, it only overruled their
precedential value, and did not reopen the lis
between the parties. The mere fact that the
impugned orders in the present case were overruled
by Manoharlal would not, therefore, be a sufficient
ground to argue that the cases should be reopened.
19. In the present case, the appellants are seeking to re-open
the lis that was finally closed three decades earlier.
20. We find no infirmity in the decision of the learned Single
Judge. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE
SD
