Karnataka High Court
Mr C Gopalan vs State Of Karnataka on 13 October, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 13519 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
MR C GOPALAN
S/O LATE P K PANICKER
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
HAVING OFFICE AT: NO.5, RICHMOND ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 025.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. K.N. PHANEENDRA, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SMT. KRUTIKA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH H.A.L POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
2. N M NARENDRA S/O OF N.C. MUNIREDDY
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
NO. 103/6, 6TH MAIN ROAD,
KOTE N C MUNIREDDY NILAYA,
Digitally signed DODDANEKKUNDI,
by CHANDANA BANGALORE - 560 037.
BM ...RESPONDENTS
Location: High
Court of (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1
Karnataka SRI. ASHOK.N. NAIK AND
SMT. SUKANYA.H.D, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SECTION 482 OF THE CPC PRAYING TO
QUASH THE COMPLAINT DATED 29.04.2024 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
NO. 2 AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN WITH THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
AT ANNEXURE -A.
THIS PETITION IS BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 16.07.2025
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CAV ORDER
In this petition, petitioner - sole accused seeks quashing of
the impugned complaint and FIR dated 29.04.2024 registered in
Crime No.366/2024 by the 1st respondent - Police, pursuant to a
complaint dated 29.04.2024 lodged by the 2nd respondent - de
facto complainant for alleged offences punishable under Sections
406, 420, 465, 468 and 471 IPC and for other reliefs.
2. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and
learned Addl.SPP for 1st respondent-State and learned counsel for
the 2nd respondent and perused the material on record.
3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior
counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned
complaint and FIR in order to contend that necessary ingredients
constituting the alleged offences have not been made out by the
2nd respondent. It was submitted that the petitioner and 2nd
respondent and his brothers Sri.N.M.Tulasi Ram and Sri.N.M.Ravi
had entered into agreements in relation to immovable property from
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2003 onwards and the 2nd respondent is illegally attempting to
convert an alleged civil dispute into a criminal action by filing the
impugned complaint, which deserves to be quashed. In support of
his contentions, learned Senior counsel placed reliance upon the
following judgments:-
(i) Binod Kumar and others vs. State of Bihar and
Another - (2014)10 SCC 663;
(ii) R.Nagender Yadav vs. State of Telengana and
Another - (2023) 2 SCC 195.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would
reiterate the various contentions urged in the statement of
objections and submits that there is no merit in the petition and the
same is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments:-
(i) Bhaskar Lal Sharma and Another vs. Monica -
(2009) 10 SCC 604;
(ii) Lallan Chaudhary & others vs. State of Bihar
& Anr. - (2006) 12 SCC 229;
(iii) Santosh B.Reddy & others vs. The State -
Crl.P.No.8448/2023 Dated 19.07.2024;
(iv) Supertech Limited vs. Emerald Court Owner
Resident Welfare Association & others - (2021) 10 SCC
1;
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(v) Sri.Kirti K.Mehta & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka
& others - Crl.P.No.6658/2024 & connected matters
Dated 21.10.2024;
(vi) Ram Lal Yadav. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh -
Crl.Misc.5939/1978 Dated 02.01.1989;
(vii) Pramod Kumar Gadia vs. State of West
Bengal - C.R.R.No.1450/2005 dated 02.10.2006;
(viii) Aniruddh Singh vs. State of Rajasthan -
S.B.Crl.Mis.(P) No.5116/2017 Dated 09.02.2018;
(ix) Sanjay Pandey & Anr. vs. State of West
Bengal & Anr. - C.R.R.No.2342/2018 Dated 02.12.2019.
5. Both sides have filed their written synopsis in support of
their contentions and the same are taken on record.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
7. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
apposite to extract the impugned complaint dated 29.04.2024
(translated version) which reads as under:-
To,
The Police Inspector,
HAL Police Station,
Bengaluru - 560037.
Subject: Complaint against C. Gopalan, M/s Gopalan
Enterprises, No.5, Richmond Road, for cheating, fraud,
creating documents, and constructing buildings illegally-reg.
Respected Sir,
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I, the complainant, N.M. Narendra Reddy, son of N.C.
Munireddy, aged about 57 years, residing at No.103/6, 6th Main Road,
Kote N.C. Munireddy Nilaya, Doddanekkundi, Bangalore - 560037,
hereby submit the following complaint:
Mobile : 9880127208 on 07/03/03 to on 29/04/2024
2. My brothers 1) N.M. Ravi and 2) N.M. Tulasi Ram and I are
the owners of land in Chinnappanahalli village, Survey No.16, area 5
acres 6 guntas, and Survey No.45, area 2 acres 39 guntas, totalling 8
acres 5 guntas. The accused, C. Gopalan, operates a partnership firm
under the name M/s Gopalan Enterprises and has been engaged in
building construction business in Bengaluru city. In this context, C.
Gopalan approached us and proposed that if we give him the above-
mentioned land according to a joint agreement, he would construct
apartments and give us 47.5% of the apartments. The remaining 52.5%
of the apartments would be taken by him. Based on this understanding,
an agreement existed between myself, my two brothers, and the
accused, C. Gopalan.
3. Despite this, C. Gopalan, with the intention of cheating us,
took us to the Bengaluru East Taluk Sub-Registrar's office and
fraudulently created documents by getting signatures from us on some
blank papers, claiming he would construct 47.5% of the apartments for
us, while he would take 52.5% for himself. According to this, out of the
396 apartments already constructed, we are entitled to 188 apartments
representing our 47.5% share. However, he has not given them to us
till date.
4. Further, he has constructed approximately 126 apartments
on the top of the A to H Block without obtaining project approval from
BBMP, and did so without the consent of my two brothers and me.
During this construction, C. Gopalan has defrauded us as well as
BBMP and the government.
5. With the intention of making illegal profits, C. Gopalan has
cheated us by constructing buildings and not giving us our entitled
47.5% share of a total of 247 apartments. Similarly, he has fraudulently
sold apartments to other parties and has not given us the proceeds of
the apartments that were due to us.
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Therefore, I request that legal action be taken against C.
Gopalan, M/s Gopalan Enterprises, residing at No.5, Richmond Road,
Bengaluru - 25, for cheating, obtaining signatures by fraud, and
committing other fraudulent acts.
Thanking you,
Sd/-xxx
Complainant
(N M Narendra Reddy)
Place: Bengaluru
Date: 29-04-2024
On 29.04.2024 at 18:30 Hrs, the complainant appeared at the
police station and submitted the complaint, which was received, and a
case has been registered in the station Cr. No. 366/2024 under Section
420, 406, 465, 468, 471 of the IPC.
Sd/-xxx
ASI
8. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
after referring to the agreements, documents etc., entered into
between the 2nd respondent and his brothers Sri.N.M.Ravi and Sri.
N.M.Tulasiram with the petitioner, who is the partner of
M/s.Gopalan Enterprises, who carries on business / activity of
development of lands , the 2nd respondent merely alleges that the
petitioner had committed breach of contract under the aforesaid
agreements, documents etc., and necessary ingredients
constituting the alleged offences are conspicuously absent, missing
and not forthcoming in the complaint, which contains vague, bald,
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omnibus and general allegations which taken at their face value
cannot be said to incriminate the petitioner for the alleged offences;
in fact, the specific details, dates, events, material particulars etc.,
pertaining to the commission of the alleged offences are also not
contained in the impugned complaint which merely repeats the
expressions 'fraud', 'cheating' etc., without expressly stating
specific instances of the commission of the alleged offences by the
petitioner; interestingly, though the documents, agreements,
transactions etc., are entered into between the 2nd respondent and
his brothers with M/s.Gopalan Enterprises, of which, the petitioner
is a partner, the remaining partners and the partnership firm have
not been arraigned as accused persons in the FIR. Under these
circumstances, I am of the view that continuation of the impugned
proceedings pursuant to the impugned complaint would amount to
an abuse of process of law and the same deserve to be quashed.
9. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
even according to the complainant, the alleged offences are said to
have been committed during the period from 2003 - 2006, when the
said documents, agreements, transactions etc., were entered into
between the 2nd respondent and his brothers with M/s.Gopalan
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Enterprises; so also, litigations are pending between M/s.Gopalan
Enterprises, Sri.N.M.Tulasiram - brother of the complainant from
2017 onwards in relation to the subject matter of the complaint; in
fact, the complaint itself alleges that it is being given by the 2nd
respondent on behalf of himself as well as his two brothers
Sri.N.M.Ravi and Sri.N.M.Tulasiram and all three of them are
arraigned as complainants in the impugned FIR; so also, absolutely
no explanation whatsoever is offered or put forth in the complaint
as to the long and inordinate delay and latches of more than 20
years in filing the complaint. Under these circumstances, in the
absence of any explanation offered by the complainant as to the
delay in filing the complaint in relation to the alleged offences said
to have been committed by the petitioner more than 20 years back,
the impugned complaint and FIR are vitiated on account of delay
and latches and the same deserve to be quashed on this ground
also.
10. In the case of Chanchalapathi Das vs. State of West
Bengal and Another - 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650, the Apex Court
held as under:
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"18. It cannot be gainsaid that the High Courts have
power to quash the proceedings in exercise of powers
under Section 482CrPC to prevent the abuse of process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Though the powers under Section 482 should be
sparingly exercised and with great caution, the said
powers ought to be exercised if a clear case of abuse of
process of law is made out by the accused. In State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] the
Supreme Court had held that the criminal proceedings
could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 if
the court is of the opinion that allowing the proceedings to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or
that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to
be quashed.
19. This Court, way back in 1992 in the landmark
decision State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] , after considering relevant provisions
more particularly Section 482CrPC and the principles of
law enunciated by this Court relating to the exercise of
extraordinary powers under Article 226, had laid down
certain guidelines for the exercise of powers of quashing,
which have been followed in umpteen number of cases.
The relevant part thereof reads as under : (SCC pp. 378-
79, para 102)
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
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by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
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efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
20. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State
of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] this Court had observed that the
court would be justified to quash the proceedings if it
finds that initiation or continuance of such proceedings
would amount to abuse of the process of court.
21. As regards inordinate delay in filing the
complaint it has been recently observed by this Court
in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N. [Hasmukhlal D.
Vora v. State of T.N., (2022) 15 SCC 164 : (2024) 2 SCC
(Cri) 632] that though inordinate delay in itself may not be
a ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, however
unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into
consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for
quashing a criminal complaint.
22. In the light of the aforestated legal position, if the
facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no
shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the
respondent complainant after an inordinate unexplained
delay of eight years was nothing but sheer misuse and
abuse of the process of law to settle personal scores with
the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious
prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of
process of law, more particularly when neither the
allegations made in the complaint nor in the charge-
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sheet, disclose any prima facie case against the
appellants. The allegations made against the appellants
are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient
ground for proceeding against the appellants-accused.
23. Before parting, a few observations made by this
Court with regard to the misuse and abuse of the process
of law by filing false and frivolous proceedings in the
courts need to be reproduced. In the Court in Dalip
Singh v. State of U.P. [Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.,
(2010) 2 SCC 114 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 324] it was
observed that : (SCC p. 116, para 1)
"1. For many centuries Indian society
cherished two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth)
and "ahimsa" (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam
Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to
ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth
constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery
system which was in vogue in the pre-
Independence era and the people used to feel
proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the
consequences. However, post-Independence
period has seen drastic changes in our value
system. The materialism has overshadowed the old
ethos and the quest for personal gain has become
so intense that those involved in litigation do not
hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the
court proceedings."
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24. In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of
India [Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8
SCC 470 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 424 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri)
712] it was observed as under : (SCC p. 642, para 191)
"191. The Indian judicial system is grossly
afflicted with frivolous litigation. Ways and means
need to be evolved to deter litigants from their
compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill-
considered claims."
25. We would like to add that just as bad coins drive
out good coins from circulation, bad cases drive out good
cases from being heard on time. Because of the
proliferation of frivolous cases in the courts, the real and
genuine cases have to take a backseat and are not being
heard for years together. The party who initiates and
continues a frivolous, irresponsible and senseless
litigation or who abuses the process of the court must be
saddled with exemplary cost, so that others may deter to
follow such course. The matter should be viewed more
seriously when people who claim themselves and project
themselves to be the global spiritual leaders, engage
themselves into such kind of frivolous litigations and use
the court proceedings as a platform to settle their
personal scores or to nurture their personal ego.
26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the present case and for the reasons stated hereinabove,
we deem it appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings
pending against the appellants in the Court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, arising out of FIR No. 33 of
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2009 registered at Ballygunge Police Station, and quash
the same."
11. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
the primary / main allegation made by the complainant is that the
petitioner was guilty of committing breach of contract in not fulfilling
or performing the obligations in terms of the agreements entered
into by him with the 2nd respondent and his brother in relation to
immovable property; it follows therefrom that in the light of the
specific allegation regarding alleged breach of contract and in the
absence of any specific instances and material particulars / details
of any criminality alleged by the complainant, the impugned
complaint and FIR seeking enforcement of the alleged rights of the
2nd respondent in pursuance of alleged breach of contract is not
maintainable and the same deserves to be quashed on this ground
also.
12. In the case of Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and
Another - (2023) 5 SCC 360, the Apex Court held as under:
"13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction.
Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will
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not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the
facts available on record, it is evident that Respondent 2
had improved his case ever since the first complaint was
filed in which there were no allegations against the
appellant rather it was only against the property dealers
which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the
appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only
request was for return of the amount paid by Respondent
2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first
complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved
version making allegations against the appellant as well
which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire
idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and
put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount
allegedly paid. The criminal courts are not meant to be
used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil
disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are
made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The
complaint in question on the basis of which FIR was
registered was filed nearly three years after the last date
fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the
proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of
the court."
13. In the case of Naresh Kumar and Another vs. Sate of
Karnataka and Another - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268, the Apex
Court held as under:
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"8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates
to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the
parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case,
as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC
360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of
cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court,
in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has
held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of
cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise."
14. In the case of Rikhab Birani and Another vs. Sate of
Uttar Pradesh and Another- 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, the Apex
Court held as under:
"18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh; (2023) 6 SCC 109, this
Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab; (2023) 5 SCC
360 wherein it was observed that a breach of contract does not
give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise
will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the
dishonest intention on the part of the party who is alleged to have
committed the offence of cheating should be established at the
time of entering into the transaction with the complainant,
otherwise the offence of cheating is not established or made out."
15. A perusal of the material on record will also indicate that
the dispute between the parties being essentially, predominantly
and overwhelmingly of a civil nature / character, arising out of
documents, agreements, transactions etc., relating to immovable
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property, the 2nd respondent is illegally attempting to convert the
said civil dispute into a criminal action by giving the same a criminal
colour / flavour / texture, which is impermissible in law and the
impugned FIR and complaint deserve to be quashed on this score
also.
16. In the case of Urmila Devi and Others vs. Balram and
Another - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1574, the Apex Court held as
under:
8.1. At the outset, we may place reliance on the
seminal judgment of this Court in the case of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ("Bhajan
Lal") with particular reference to paragraph '102' therein
and sub-paras 1, 3, 5 and 7, which read as under:
"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
***
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
***
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
***
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge."
8.2. On perusal of the record, it is noted that based on
the complaint filed by complainant-respondent No. 1, a
complaint case No. 627/2002 was registered against the
appellants under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of
the IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections
are extracted as under:
"419. Punishment for cheating by
personation.-Whoever cheats by personation shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to three years, or with
fine, or with both.
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby
dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to make, alter or
destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security,
or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx xxx xxx
467. Forgery of valuable security, will etc.-
Whoever forges a document which purports to be a
valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a
son, or which purports to give authority to any
person to make or transfer any valuable security, or
to receive the principal, interest or dividends
thereon, or to receive or deliver any money,
movable property, or valuable security, or any
document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt
acknowledging the payment of money, or an
acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any
movable property or valuable security, shall be
punished with [imprisonment for life], or with
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imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and also be liable to fine.
xxx xxx xxx
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.-
Whoever commits forgery, intending that the
[document or electronic record forged] shall be
used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
xxx xxx xxx
471. Using as genuine a forged document or
electronic record.- Whoever fraudulently or
dishonestly uses as genuine any document or
electronic record which he knows or has reason to
believe to be a forged document or electronic
record, shall be punished in the same manner as if
he had forged such document or electronic record."
8.3. Upon giving our thorough consideration to the
arguments advanced at the bar, we fail to understand as
to how the allegations against the appellants herein who
are only legatees under the Will in question, could be
sustained in light of the material on record.
8.4. The allegations against the accused-appellants,
in sum and substance, are that they entered into a
conspiracy with other individuals to fabricate a forged will
after the death of the testator that was then used to
circumvent the sale deed dated 25.04.1994.
8.5. Upon appreciating the facts and circumstances,
we do not find that the offences aforementioned are
made out in the present case. Neither do we find any
criminal breach of trust nor do we find any cheating by
impersonation. We also do not find any cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property. In these
circumstances, we fail to see how it could be alleged that
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the accused-appellants cheated and dishonestly induced
the complainant-respondent No. 1.
8.6. It is writ large on the face of the record that the
complaint case has been employed as a circuitous tool to
abuse the process of law, especially after the
complainant-respondent No. 1 failed to pursue the
remedies available to it. The chronology of events
indicates that the criminal proceedings in the year 2001
were instituted only after approximately seven years of
the mutation order dated 27.09.1994, four years after
the ex-parte ad-interim order issued on 30.07.1997 and
three years after the rejection of the objections to the
Mutation Order vide Order dated 09.01.1998.
8.7. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras
42-44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, dealing with
Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which are extracted
hereunder:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is
manifest that in the definition there are two separate
classes of acts which the person deceived may be
induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be
induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver
property to any person. The second class of acts is
the doing or omitting to do anything which the
person deceived would not do or omit to do if he
were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the
inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the
second class of acts, the inducing must be
intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest.
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Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the
offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the time of making the
promise. From his mere failure to subsequently
keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all
along had a culpable intention to break the promise
from the beginning.
43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of
Section 467 IPC. ...
44. The following ingredients are essential for
commission of the offence under Section 467 IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it;
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the
aforementioned section.
xxx
46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with
an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On
analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the
opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down an inflexible rule that would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction
of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when it is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal
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position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained."
(underlining by us)
8.8. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1
SCC 692, (Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia) reasoned that
the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique
purpose. This Court also observed that the court should
quash those criminal cases where the chances of an
ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is
likely to be served by continuation of a criminal
prosecution.
8.9. In R.K. Vijayasarathy, this Court held that while
exercising powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., a
High Court can examine whether a matter which is
essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a
criminal offence. Recently, in Vishal Noble Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680, this Court
held that courts have to be vigilant to ensure that the
machinery of criminal justice is not misused for achieving
oblique motives and agendas. Tacitly endorsing such
misuse only unnecessarily burdens the courts and the
criminal justice system. In Anand Kumar Mohatta, this
Court, whilst quashing the FIR and chargesheet therein,
highlighted the following words of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, that
describe the fundamental principle for exercise of powers
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:
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"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power,
the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it
comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the Court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent
powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is
designed to achieve a salutary public purpose
which is that a court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the
veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of
justice."
(underlining by us)
9. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged
against the accused-appellants herein are made out. The
instant case is just another one in a string of cases filed in
recent years that seek to disguise a civil dispute as
criminal. The complaint case against the accused-
appellants has been pending for over two decades and its
continuation would not serve any purpose. The
observations made by this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia inform our decision and the judgment of this
Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-
paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102 extracted
above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our
view, it is in the interest of justice that present
proceedings be quashed."
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17. In the case of Anukul Singh vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, the Apex
Court held as under:
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd.; (2006) 6 SCC 736, it was held that criminal law
cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or
contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to
abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the
decision are apposite:
"9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out the case alleged against the
accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to
be examined as a whole, but without examining
the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material
nor an assessment of the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is
warranted while examining prayer for quashing of
a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is
a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when
the criminal proceeding is found to have been
initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking
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vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution.
The power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid
in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the
complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely
a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or
(c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking
remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal
offence. As the nature and scope of a civil
proceedings are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to
quash the criminal proceedings. The test is
whether the allegations in the complaint disclose
a criminal offence or not.
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10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles
to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases.
This is obviously on account of a prevalent
impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the
interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is
seen in several family disputes also, leading to
irretrievable break down of marriages/families.
There is also an impression that if a person could
somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,
there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
not involve any criminal offence, by applying
pressure though criminal prosecution should be
deprecated and discouraged."
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal; (2007) 12 SCC 1, it was emphasized that
criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an
instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga
Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam; (2015) 9 SCC 647, this
Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect
of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass
the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Criminal
Appeal No. 2963/2025 decided on 14.07.2025 : 2025
INSC 869, this Court disapproved the practice of using
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criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies,
observing that money recovery cannot be enforced
through criminal prosecution where the dispute is
essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to
direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled
principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are
relevant in this context:
"9. What we have been able to understand is
that there is an oral agreement between the
parties. The Respondent No. 4 might have parted
with some money in accordance with the oral
agreement and it may be that the appellant -
herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the
Respondent No. 4. However, the question is
whether prima facie any offence of cheating could
be said to have been committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,
there has to be something more than prima facie
on record to indicate that the intention of the
accused was to cheat the complainant right from
the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does
not disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a
recent pronouncement of this Court in the case
of "Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of
Uttar Pradesh", (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said
decision, the entire law as to what constitutes
cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively
has been exhaustively explained. It appears that
this very decision was relied upon by the learned
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counsel appearing for the petitioner before the
High Court. However, instead of looking into the
matter on its own merits, the High Court thought
fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and
that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to
the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We
fail to understand why the High Court should
undertake such exercise. The High Court may
either allow the petition saying that no offence is
disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no
case for quashing is made out. Why should the
High Court make an attempt to help the
complainant to recover the amount due and
payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or
Commercial Court as the case may be to look into
in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or
in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of
the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to
understand that the entire dispute between the
parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his
client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any
other proceedings for recovery of the money. It
appears that no civil suit has been filed for
recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be
recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute
between the parties by filing a First Information
Report and seeking the help of the Police. This
amounts to abuse of the process of law.
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14. We could have said many things but we
refrain from observing anything further. If the
Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular
amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other
appropriate remedy available to him in law. He
cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in
which the High Court has passed the impugned
order. The High Court first directed the appellant
to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4
and thereafter directed him to appear before the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose
of settlement. That's not what is expected of a
High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous
application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any
other criminal proceedings. What is expected of
the High Court is to look into the averments and
the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the
other material on record, if any. The High Court
seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles
as enunciated in the decision of this Court in
the "State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal", 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335"
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the
present case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning
repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in
execution of documents - is purely civil in character. The
essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima
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facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick
succession, particularly after the appellant had already
initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of
mala fides.
21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the
proceedings, misdirected itself in law by failing to apply
the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent
authorities referred to above, which uniformly hold that
the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be
misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance."
18. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
the 2nd respondent alleges the offences of both criminal breach of
trust and cheating which cannot co-exist with each other as held by
the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940)
Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh - (2024) 10 SCC 690 followed
by Arshad Neyaz Khan vs. State of Jharkhand and Another -
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058.
19. In Arshad Neyaz Khan 's case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:
"16. The contents of the complaint as well as the FIR
would have to be read in light of the ingredients of
Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the law settled by this
Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of the
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complaint dated 29.01.2021, it is noted that the
complainant/respondent No. 2 has filed the said
complaint invoking Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. For
ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted
as under:
"406. Punishment for criminal breach of
trust.-- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
xxx
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and
thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived
to deliver any property to any person, or to make,
alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
valuable security, or anything which is signed or
sealed, and which is capable of being converted
into a valuable security, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
xxx
120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.-
(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to
commit an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for
a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no
express provision is made in this Code for the
punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in
the same manner as if he had abetted such
offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy
other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
not exceeding six months, or with fine or with
both."
17. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 ("Inder Mohan Goswami"),
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while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed
thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is
manifest that in the definition there are two separate
classes of acts which the person deceived may be
induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be
induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property
to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or
omitting to do anything which the person deceived
would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived.
In the first class of cases, the inducement must be
fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the
inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent
or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the
gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it
is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise,
one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable
intention to break the promise from the beginning."
18. In light of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, we find that the complainant/respondent
No. 2 has failed to make out a case that satisfies the
basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC.
We fail to understand as to how the allegations against
the appellant herein could be brought within the scope
and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare perusal of
the FIR as well as the complaint, we do not find that the
offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is
made out and we do not find that there is any cheating
and dishonest inducement to deliver any property or a
valuable security involved in the instant case.
19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of
cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 2 was required
to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or dishonest
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intention at the time of making a promise or
representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of
the said property. Such a culpable intention right at the
beginning when the promise was made cannot be
presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In
the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of
dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the
appellant during the agreement for sale. We must hasten
to add that there is no allegation in the FIR or the
complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any
intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on
the part of the appellant right from the time of making the
promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on
what the misrepresentations were and how the appellant
intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 2.
Mere allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 2
that the appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale
and failed to refund the money paid by the
complainant/respondent No. 2 does not satisfy the test of
dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a
valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.
20. On perusal of the allegations contained in the
complaint, in light of the ingredients of Section 406 IPC,
read in the context of Section 405 IPC, do not find that
any offence of criminal breach of trust has been made
out. It is trite law that every act of breach of trust may not
result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a
manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of
property entrusted to him. In the case of criminal breach
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of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property
and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it
to its own use against the terms of contract, then the
question whether such retention is with dishonest
intention or not and whether such retention involves
criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In
the present case, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has
failed to establish the ingredients essential to constitute
an offence under Section 406 IPC. The
complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to place any
material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted
property to the appellant. Furthermore, the complaint also
omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the
appellant, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted
for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust.
21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is
the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the
offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under
Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is
committed by the accused, then in the same breath it
cannot be said that the accused has also committed the
offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable
under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10
SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between
criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating,
criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false
or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In
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criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is
sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the
offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he
dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case
of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly
induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property.
In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist
simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot
contain both the offences that are independent and
distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously
in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each
other.
22. At this point, we must hasten to add that the
complaint was filed after a delay of nearly eight years.
Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 2
has failed to impress the Court about the reason for the
delay and hence this fact further raises a suspicion about
the bona fides of the complainant/respondent No. 2. The
delay in lodging of the complaint and FIR, coupled with
the vague allegations do not inspire any confidence in the
Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue
against the appellant. Further, the
complainant/respondent No. 2 had an alternative remedy
of filing a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged
violation of his contractual rights which has not been
availed but a route through criminal proceedings, when
no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted.
Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation
of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and
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vendettas. The appellant therefore, in our view, could not
be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations
levelled by the prosecution against the appellant are
unsustainable.
23. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was
held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment
or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive
to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this
Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the
reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to
continue the criminal proceedings against the appellant
herein would cause undue harassment to him because as
observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the
offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC is made out.
24. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the
judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ("Bhajan Lal") with particular
reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court
observed:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
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secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers Under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the Accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate
as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
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motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."
25. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judgment in the light of the facts of this case, we find that
none of the offences alleged against the appellant herein
is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of
criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant
herein have been made with a mala fide intent and
therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case
of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and
7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to
the facts of this case. In our view, it is neither expedient
nor in the interest of justice to permit the present
prosecution to continue.
26. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the
observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 wherein it
was observed that in recent years the machinery of
criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for
their vested interests and for achieving their oblique
motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant
against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission
and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric
of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for
the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2
has made grave allegations against the appellant herein,
he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such
actions would create significant divisions and distrust
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among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain
on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts."
Viewed from this angle also, the impugned complaint and FIR
deserve to be quashed.
20. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
the same contains mutually consistent and destructive allegations,
inasmuch as while on one hand, the complainant alleges that his
signatures were taken on blank papers by the petitioner, in the very
same complaint, the complainant admits the various agreements,
documents etc., which are registered and alleges breach of
contract by the petitioner; this mutually inconsistent and destructive
allegations is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the complaint
contains allegations which are so inherently improbable and cannot
be countenanced in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, especially when the allegation with regard to non-giving of
consent of the land owners or BBMP to the petitioner for putting up
construction would clearly not amount to the commission of any
criminal offence or attracting the ingredients of the alleged
offences. Viewed from this angle also, the impugned complaint
and FIR deserve to be quashed.
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21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that
the continuation of proceedings pursuant to the impugned
complaint and FIR against the petitioner, would amount to an
abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the
present petition.
22. Insofar as the judgments relied upon by the 2nd
respondent is concerned, having regard to the peculiar / unique
facts obtaining in the case on hand as discussed hereinbefore, the
said judgments would not be applicable and as such, the same are
not elaborately dealt with for the purpose of the present order.
23. In the result, I pass the following:-
ORDER
(i) Petition is hereby allowed.
(ii) The impugned complaint and FIR in Crime No.366/2024
registered by the 1st respondent - Police for offences punishable
under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468 and 471 IPC, qua the petitioner
are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
Srl.
