quashed the proceedings. I deem it appropriate to notice the
The petitioner/accused No.1 in Sessions Case
No.1164 of 2010 pending before the 69th Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru is knocking at the
doors of this Court calling in question continuance of
proceedings in the aforesaid Sessions case registered for
offences punishable under Sections 304 and 338 read
with Section 34 of the IPC.
2. Heard Sri S. Shankarappa, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned
Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondent.
3. The facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
4. The learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner Sri S. Shankarappa taking this Court through
the orders passed by 4 this Court quashing the
proceedings against all other accused would submit that
the petitioner also stands on the same footing, as the
petitioner was not even present in the Commercial
complex at the time when the mishap took place. The
entire mishap happens due to accused No.21 installing
cable duct and the cable duct was used to supply power
to the shops. The short circuit that happened in the cable
duct has resulted in the mishap. The allegation is directly
against accused No.21 who installed aluminum cable and
not got the place cleaned due to which short circuit
occurred. All other civil remedies were held in favour of
the accused, as the Electrical Inspector who had
inspected the property has held that there was no fault of
any of the persons and it was due to short circuit that has
happened and the unit owners of Unit Nos. 111 to 113
had not taken proper care of aluminum cables. With these
findings and notwithstanding the same, the Police had
filed a charge sheet and proceedings were registered as
S.C.No.1164 of 2010. He would, therefore, on parity
along with other reasons, seek quashment of the
proceedings.
5. Per-contra, the learned Additional State
Public Prosecutor would seek to refute the submissions to
contend that the petitioner is accused No.1. All other
accused had no role of play. Though the petitioner has
literally no role to play, the proceedings against him need
not be quashed. He would submit that it is a matter of
trial in which the petitioner should come out clean and
seeks dismissal of the petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and
have perused the material on record.
8. The Company which had its office in
the same Towers had entered into an agreement
for annual maintenance and house-keeping at
Carlton Towers with the Carlton Towers Owners
Association. The agreement was entered into on
01-05-2009 and it was an annual maintenance
contract. On 16-12-2009 M/s Shivaji Electricals was
entrusted to rectify the defects in compliance with
the Electrical Inspector's report who had found
certain defects in electrification. The defects were
rectified by M/s Shivaji Electricals on 17-12-2009
and the same was communicated to the Electrical
Inspector, Bangalore East Division under whose
jurisdiction the building came.
9. After the said job being entrusted to
M/s Shivaji Electricals, the Carlton Towers Owners
Association also communicated to the Electrical
Inspector that the defects have been rectified by
M/s Shivaji Electricals. This communication was
sent on 15-02-2010. In the interregnum the
petitioner travelled abroad i.e., to the United
Kingdom on 31-01-2010 and returned to India on
5-03-2010. A memo along with immigration details
is also placed on record which would clearly depict
that the petitioner was out of the country from 31-
01- 2010 up to 05-03-2010.
10. The fire mishap occurred on 23-02-
2010. Admittedly the petitioner was not in the
country at that point in time. A FIR came to be
accused for offences punishable under Sections
338, 304(A) and 304 read with Section 34 of the
IPC. A report was called for from the Deputy Chief
Electrical Inspector with regard to the incident. The
Deputy Chief Electrical Inspector submits his report
on 1-03-2010 opining that if electrical instruments
had been maintained in a sustainable condition
when electrical 7 arcing occurred and paper, cloth
pieces and other material which are vulnerable to
fire were not dumped into the cable duct and also
other precautions had been taken the fire could
have been avoided. This had led to the fire mishap.
The report reads as follows:
After all the aforesaid events, charge sheet is
also filed by the Police in which the petitioner is
arrayed as accused No.18 and an additional charge
sheet is filed against one Sri Suresh Kumar S.K.,
11. It is not in dispute that among the
accused, one of them had approached this Court
i.e., accused No.3 one Mr. T.G. Mandanna in
Criminal Petition No.769 of 2011 under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. This Court by its order dated 21-02-
2011 holding that the petitioner therein was not the
owner of any of the units in the building, allowed
the petition by observing as follows:
4. Having thus heard the petitioner's
Counsel and after going through the charge sheet
material, though there are 20 accused persons
named in the charge sheet, except this petitioner,
others according to the petitioner's Counsel are the
owners of the building. Therefore, having regard to
the nature of the incident that took place on the
aforementioned date and the charge sheet also
putting the blame entirely on the building owners
being negligent in taking necessary precautions to
prevent the occurrence of fire in the building, in my
view, continuation of proceedings as far as this
petitioner is concerned is not warranted as there
are no specific mention in the charge sheet against
this petitioner attracting the aforesaid offence.
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5. For the above said reasons, petition is
allowed and proceedings against this petitioner in
S.C.No.1164/10 pending on the file of the Presiding
Officer, FTC-XV (Sessions), Bangalore, stands
quashed. But, however as regards the other
accused persons are concerned, i.e., accused
Nos.1, 2 & 4 to 20, the trial court shall proceed
with the matter in accordance with law."
The subject petition has to be now
considered on the grounds that are urged by the
petitioner on the facts that are narrated
hereinabove.
12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner
is one of the Directors of the Company and the
Company is not arrayed as an accused. The
Company not being arrayed as one of the accused
and only the Director of the Company being
arrayed, the complaint cannot be maintainable and
the proceedings cannot be continued in the light of
the law laid down by the Three Judge Bench of the
Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA v.
GODFATHER TRAVELS AND TOURS PRIVATE
LIMITED - (2012) 5 SCC 661. Therefore, the
complaint against the petitioner who is the Director
of the Company without arraigning the Company as
a party was not even maintainable.
13. The allegations against the petitioner
in the charge sheet are for offences punishable
under Sections 304 and 338 of the IPC. This Court
in identical circumstances in the case of MELVIN
KUMAR AND OTHERS v. K.S. HARISHA AND
ANOTHER (Crl.P.No.2619 of 2014 decided on 31st
January 2019) which concerned offences
punishable under Section 304A read with Section
34 of the IPC against several accused who were
teachers of Mother Theresa School who had taken
the children studying 3rd, 4th and 5th standards for
a school picnic at Residency Holiday Resort and the
students got drowned in the swimming pool, a
complaint was registered against the owner or the
management, the Head Master as well as the
Manager of Residency Holiday Resort. The teachers
of the school who had been arrayed as accused had
approached this Court in Criminal Petition No.2619
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of 2014 for offences punishable under Section 304-
A of IPC. This Court after considering the purport of
Section 304-A of IPC which deals with causing
death by negligence has held as follows:
"12. Viewed from another angle, in order to
fasten criminal liability for the offence under section
304A of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is
required to prove that the act of the accused was
the proximate and immediate cause of death and
that the death was caused without the intervention
of another person's negligence. As held in SUSHIL
ANSAL's case, supra, it must have been the causa
causans; and not mere causa sine qua non.
14. In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli
Bangawalla's case, referred to supra, the allegation
against the appellant therein was that he allowed
the burners to be used in the same room in which
varnish and turpentine were stored, which were
alleged to be negligent act and fire resulted
because of the proximity of the burners. But the
said contention was not found favour with the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of the above
proposition of law.
.... .... .... ....
17. The law casts a higher degree of care
on the occupiers of the building or premises
wherein visitors or the licensees are allowed to use
the facilities provided therein. What is the degree of
care expected from the occupiers of a Cinema
building came up for consideration of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of SUSHIL ANSAL,
referred to above. In paragraph No.95 thereof, it is
observed thus:
"What is the degree of care expected from
the occupier of a cinema is the next question to
which we must advert at this stage. Two
fundamental principles must be noticed at the
threshold while answering that question. The first is
that the degree and nature of care expected of an
occupier depends upon the fact situation in which
the duty to care arises. The second and equally
important principle at common law is that the
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degree of care in a given fact situation would
depend upon whether the person to whom the duty
is owed is a contractual visitor, invitee, licensee or
trespasser. Of these the occupier owes the highest
degree of care to a contractual visitor viz., a person
who pays consideration to be present on the
premises for some purpose; whatever that purpose
be. At common law there is an implied term in the
contract between the occupier and the visitor that
the occupier's premises shall be reasonably safe.
The occupier's duty must be held to have been
breached if any injury is caused to a contractual
visitor by any defect in the premises apart from a
latent defect."
On the aforesaid reasoning, the criminal
petition was allowed and the proceedings against
those teachers were quashed.
14. In an yet another circumstance, this
Court in the case of M.SRINIVAS v. STATE -
(Criminal Petition No.9124 of 2016 decided on 15th
February 2019) again considering offences
punishable under Section 304A of IPC in a case
where the allegations against the petitioner therein
who was a Supervisor-Engineer of M/s Malu
Constructions (India) Private Limited which was
executing works in terms of a work order issued by
the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
pertaining to laying down of water pipes had
negligently left a heap of mud on the road without
taking precautionary measures leading to accident
which resulted in death of a rider of a motorcycle
and the allegation against the said Supervisor
Engineer was for offences punishable under Section
304-A of IPC inter alia. This Court allowed the
criminal petition holding as follows:
"11. It is now well settled that in order to
constitute an offence under section 304A of Indian
Penal Code, the negligence imputed to the accused
must be gross in nature. Though the term "gross"
has not been used in section 304A of Indian Penal
Code, in JACOB MATHEW vs. STATE OF PUNJAB &
Others in (2005) 6 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while examining a case of criminal medical
negligence by a Doctor under section 304A of
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Indian Penal Code, has reviewed the case law on
the subject and in para 48 thereof, has held as
under:
"(5) The jurisprudential concept of
negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What
may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily
be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to
amount to an offence, the element of mens rea
must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to
criminal negligence, the degree of negligence
should be much higher i.e., gross or of a very high
degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a
higher degree may provide a ground for action in
civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution.
(6) The word 'gross' has not been used in
Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal
law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must
be of such a high degree as to be 'gross'. The
expression 'rash or negligent act' as occurring in
Section 304-A IPC has to be read as qualified by
the word 'grossly'."
12. xx xx xx xx
13. It is now well settled that, in order to
fasten criminal liability for the offence under section
304A of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is
required to establish that the act of the accused
No.1 was the proximate and immediate cause of
death and that the death was caused without the
intervention of another person's negligence. As held
in SUSHIL ANSAL's case, supra, it must have been
the causa causans; and not mere causa sine qua
non.
14. In the instant case, petitioner herein is
implicated in the alleged offence on the allegation
that he was responsible for causing 12 the accident
by leaving heap of mud on the accident site. In
Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla, supra,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with an identical
situation. In the said case, the allegation against
the appellant therein was that he allowed the
burners to be used in the same room in which
varnish and turpentine were stored, which were
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alleged to be negligent act and fire resulted
because of the proximity of the burners. But the
said contention was negatived by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court by endorsing the view taken in
EMPEROR vs. OMKAR RAMPRATAP in (1902) 4
Bombay LR 679, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed that,
"This view has been generally followed by
High Courts in India and is in our opinion the right
view to take of the meaning of S.304-A. It is not
necessary to refer to other decisions, for as we
have already said this view has been generally
accepted. Therefore, the mere fact that the fire
would not have taken place if the appellant had not
allowed burners to be put in the same room in
which turpentine and varnish were stored, would
not be enough to make him liable under S.304-A,
for the fire would not have taken place, with the
result that seven persons were burnt to death,
without the negligence of Hatim. The death in this
case was, therefore, in our opinion not directly the
result of a rash or negligent act on the part of the
appellant and was not the proximate and efficient
cause without the intervention of another's
negligence. The appellant must, therefore, be
acquitted of the offence under S.304-A."
15. In the instant case also, the
proposition laid down in the above decision, in my
view, is squarely applicable to the facts of this case.
A plain reading of the charge-sheet discloses that
the material allegations constituting negligence are
directed only against accused No.1. The material on
record indicates that the deceased died on account
of the rash and negligent act of accused No.1 in
hitting the motorcycle driven by the accused.
Therefore, the act of accused No.1 was the
proximate and immediate cause of death of the
deceased. The act of the petitioner/accused No.2 in
leaving heap of mud on the road may amount to an
offence under section 134 of Indian Motor Vehicles
Act, but the same does not amount to an act of
negligence within the meaning of section 304A of
Indian Penal Code. Thus, on consideration of all the
above facts and circumstances of the case, in the
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light of the law applicable to the facts of this case, I
am of the clear opinion, that petitioner/accused
No.2 cannot be proceeded for negligence in causing
the death of the deceased within the meaning of
Sections 304A and 279 of Indian Penal Code.
Consequently, the prosecution of the petitioner
being illegal, the same amounts to abuse of process
of Court.
As a result, the petition is allowed. The
proceedings initiated against the petitioner in
C.C.No.10878/2016 pending on the file of
Metropolitan Magistrate Traffic Court-III, Bengaluru
is hereby quashed."
Therefore, the offence of Section 304A of IPC
alleged against the petitioner who is the Director of
the Company and was not present at the place of
incident and the negligence attributable to accused
No.21, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted or trial
cannot be continued against the petitioner for the
said offence of Section 304A of IPC. Section 338 of
IPC which is the other offence alleged against the
petitioner deals with causing grievous hurt by act
endangering life or personal safety of others and
reads as follows:
"338. Causing grievous hurt by act
endangering life or personal safety of others.--
Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by
doing any act so rashly or negligently as to
endanger human life, or the personal safety of
others, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both."
The section makes it clear that whoever
causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any
act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human
life shall be punishable in terms of law. There is no
act committed by the petitioner which attracts
Section 338 of the IPC.
15. In the light of the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of ANEETA HADA and the law laid
down by this Court in the afore-extracted
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judgments, the petitioner cannot be held to be
responsible for the act of other accused. Therefore,
continuance of the proceedings against the
petitioner would result in miscarriage of justice and
be an abuse of the process of law."
This order has been subsequently followed by this
Court in Criminal Petition No.2376 of 2022 decided on 07-
04-2022 in the case of SHRI SHYAM KEDARE V. STATE.
Further, in Criminal Petition 14 No.7687 of 2022 decided
on 22-08-2022 in the case of SMT. MALTI HIRANI V.
STATE OF KARNATAKA and also in Criminal Petition
No.11620 of 2022 decided on 29-11-2022 in the case of
KEMPEGOWDA V @ KIRAN V. STATE OF KARNATAKA.
8. In all the aforesaid orders, the proceedings
qua the respective accused as on today, stood
obliterated. Whose proceedings are pending in the entire
episode of crime is the petitioner/accused No.1 herein, so
therefore, except the petitioner, every other person is
now free of the rigmarole of proceedings. The allegation
against the petitioner as was the allegation against every
other accused is for offence punishable under Sections
304 and 338 of the IPC. The primary offence being
offence under Section 304 of the IPC, it reads as follows:
"304. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.--Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be
punished with 339[imprisonment for life], or
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death, or of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine,
or with both, if the 15 act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but
without any intention to cause death, or to cause
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."
Section 304 of the IPC deals with culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. The ingredients of Section 304
of the IPC are found in Section 301 of the IPC. It reads as
follows:
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"301. Culpable homicide by causing death of
person other than person whose death was
intended.--If a person, by doing anything which he
intends or knows to be likely to cause death,
commits culpable homicide by causing the death of
any person, whose death he neither intends nor
knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable
homicide committed by the offender is of the
description of which it would have been if he had
caused the death of the person whose death he
intended or knew himself to be likely to cause."
If a person by doing anything which he intends or knows
that it is likely to cause death, commits culpable
homicide, by causing the death of any person, whose
death he neither intends nor knows himself, would
become culpable homicide. Therefore, essential ingredient
of Section 304 of the IPC is mens rea. It becomes
apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of 16 ANBAZHAGAN V. STATE1 , wherein the Apex
Court holds as follows:
"66. Few important principles of law discernible
from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:--
(1) When the court is confronted with the
question, what offence the accused could be said to have
committed, the true test is to find out the intention or
knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention
or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to
(4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even
though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:'A' is
bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver
against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him
instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding
that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him,
though only single injury was caused. The case would,
therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of
Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B'
sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter
is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B'
forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs
away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was
found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to
cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B'
intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be
caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient
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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This
would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300
of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder
although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300
of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise
be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if
the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions
1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 17 enumerated in that
section. In the event of the case falling within any of
those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section
304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall
within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It
would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case
is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the
IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused
may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of
the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence
would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder
under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence
under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part
of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II
of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section
299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an
accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases
of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the
IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If,
however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable
under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore,
the first part of this section would apply when there is
'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply
when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty
knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that
particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of
the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
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(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the
following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under
one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is
covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii)
when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of
likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a
lower degree of likelihood which is 18 generally spoken of
as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not
fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when
the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to
ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury
likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between
the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the
first part, the crime of murder is first established and the
accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions
to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part,
the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore,
for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence
punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the
IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is
distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of
happening are even or greater than its not happening, we
may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching
the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the
situation of the accused and then judge whether the
accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely
to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the
IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while
dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under
the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of
culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not
amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the five
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though
none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima
facie established on the evidence on record, the
prosecution must still be required under the law to bring
the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of
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the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the
prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any
one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, 19
namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be
made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder as described under Section 299
of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question
of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be
applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be
proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of
inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of
the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the
nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured,
extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the
injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding
and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that
makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to
cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of
nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a
murder if death has actually been caused and intention to
cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act
or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a
general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not
have the intention to cause the death or that particular
injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether
an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a
question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the
accused had the intention to cause death of any person or
to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the
death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under
Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the
exceptions applies.
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(12) In determining the question, whether an
accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case
where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury,
would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the
offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the
IPC."
The Apex Court considers what should be the ingredient
of Section 304 of the IPC and holds that Section 304 of
the IPC would become applicable only when the accused
has acted with guilty intention or as observed
hereinabove, the necessary ingredient is mens rea.
Therefore, the petitioner can neither be alleged of offence
of causing death by rash and negligent act nor can be
alleged of offence made penal under Section 304 of the
IPC.
9. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are
considered on the touchstone of the ingredients of Section
301, it can by no stretch of imagination become an
offence under Section 304 of the IPC. It is on this score,
the co-ordinate bench of this Court, as also this Court in
the judgments noted to supra, have obliterated crimes
against all the accused except the petitioner herein,
holding that there was no mens rea on the part of those
accused and what has happened in the case at hand was
a mishap. In that light, permitting further proceedings
against this petitioner would run foul of the very provision
and its interpretation by this Court in the aforesaid
judgments and results in miscarriage of justice.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(i) Proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending
before the 69th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010 stand
quashed.
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NC: 2025:KHC:44943
HC-KAR
Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2023 also stands
disposed."
In the light of the petitioner being the co-accused and the
quashment happening qua the other accused, the petition
deserves to succeed with the same relied that is granted to all
other accused. Accordingly, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before
the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010 stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
RSH/CT-ASC
