Karnataka High Court
Sri. Hombaiah vs Sri. Doddanarasaiah on 5 November, 2025
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WP No. 55155 of 2016
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.55155 OF 2016 (KVOA)
BETWEEN:
SRI HOMBAIAH
S/O LATE SRI NARASIMHAIAH,
SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LRs.
1. SMT. HANUMAKKA,
W/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
2. SRI BASAVARAJU
S/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
3. SMT. HOMBAMMA
D/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/O MELEKOTE, HARIJANA COLONY,
KANAKAPURA TOWN,
RAMANAGARA DISTRICT.
Digitally signed by
MAHALAKSHMI B M
4. SRI NARASHIMAMURTHY
Location: HIGH S/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
COURT OF
KARNATAKA AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
PETITIONERS 1, 2 AND 4 ARE
R/O HEJJALA COLONY, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANGARA TALUK,
RAMANGARA DISTRICT-562116. ...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI V.R. BALARAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI DODDANARASAIAH
S/O LATE SMT. LAKSHMAMMA,
SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LRs.
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1(a) SRI NARASIMHA MURTHY .N
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
1(b) SRI VENKATESH .N
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
1(c) SMT. DURGAMMA
D/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
1(d) SRI GOVINDARAJU
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS 1(a) TO 1(d) ARE
RESIDENTS OF JUTTANAPALYA VILLAGE,
HAMLET OF HEJJALA, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANAGARA TALUK AND DISTRICT-562116.
2. SRI V. HANUMANTHAIAH
S/O LATE SRI VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
3. SRI V. VENKATARAMANA
S/O LATE SRI VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS 2 & 3 ARE RESIDENTS OF
HEJJALA COLONY, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANAGARA TALUK AND DISTRICT-562116.
7. THE TAHSILDAR
RAMANAGARA TALUK,
RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562116. ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.C. RAJANNA, ADVOCATE FOR R-1(A TO D);
SRI B.V. KRISHNAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 & R-3;
SRI RAJ KUMAR M., AGA FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 03.09.2016 PASSED BY THE LEARNED III
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ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, RAMANAGARA IN
M.A.NO.5/2009 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A AND FURTHER TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 06.08.1996 PASSED BY THE LEARNED 4TH
RESPONDENT VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND ETC.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B'
GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner, who was the appellant in
M.A.No.5/2009, is before this Court questioning the
legality and correctness of the Order dated 03.09.2016,
passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Ramanagara (hereinafter referred to as 'trial Court' for
short). By the impugned order, the trial Court rejected the
appeal filed by the appellant-Hombaiah under Section 2(2)
of the Karnataka Village Offices (Abolation) Act, 1961
('KVOA Act' for short), as barred by time. The subject
property land bearing Sy.No.1 of Hejjala Village, Bidadi
Hobli, Ramanagar Taluk, measuring 21 guntas, was
originally a Thoti service inam attached to the Thoti Village
of Hejjala. Upon abolition of the village offices under the
KVOA Act, the land became eligible for re-grant. One
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Hanumanthaiah, who was discharging Thoti duties, died
before the re-grant was effected, leaving behind two
daughters Smt. Narasimhakka, the mother of the
appellant and Smt. Lakshmamma, the mother of
Doddanarasaiah-respondent No.1.
2. After Hanumanthaiah's death, Smt.
Lakshmamma made an application before the Tahsildar,
Ramanagara, seeking re-grant of land. The Tahsildar
passed an order of re-grant on 06.08.1996 in her favour.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed M.A.No.5/2009
along with I.A.No.I under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 seeking condonation of delay of 13 years. The said
M.A. came to be rejected on the ground of delay. The
rejection of the miscellaneous appeal is challenged by the
appellant-petitioner before this Court in this writ petition.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and
learned counsel for the respondents and perused the
material on record.
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4. The appellant contended that both branches of
Hanumanthaiah's family were joint cultivators of Thoti
land, that Lakshmamma had suppressed the existence of
her sister Narasimhakka, and that the Tahsildar had failed
to conduct proper enquiry or verify the barabardar register
before granting the land exclusively to Lakshmamma. It is
argued that re-grant ought to have been made jointly to
all the heirs of the original barabardar. Regarding the
delay in preferring the miscellaneous appeal, learned
counsel submits that the petitioners became aware about
the re-grant order only recently, when revenue records
were verified, and that the delay was bonafide and
unintentional. It is contended that a liberal interpretation
ought to have been taken into consideration by the trial
Court, and would contend that the substantial justice
should prevail over technicality.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
respondents submits that the respondents opposed the
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appeal and the application for condonation of delay before
the trial Court, contending that the appellant had
knowledge of the re-grant since 1996, as the certified copy
of the Tahsildar's order was obtained by Kempaiah and
others on 18.11.1996, and the RTC entries of 1995-96
already reflected Lakshmamma's name. It is contended
that the appellant himself had alienated 20 guntas of the
same land on 24.01.1972 in favour of one Dasappa, and
therefore had no subsisting right or locus standi to
question the re-grant. It is contended that Tahsildar had
conducted proper enquiry, spot inspection, and recorded
statement before issuing the re-grant order.
6. The trial Court, on consideration of the records
and pleadings, rejected I.A.No.I, holding that the delay of
13 years was wholly unexplained. The Court observed
that:
i. The certified copy of the re-grant order
produced by the appellant showed the date as
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18.11.1996, proving that they had knowledge of
the order at that time.
ii. The RTC of 1995-96 indicated mutation of the
land in Lakshmamma's name, thereby indicating
the appellant was aware of the re-grant since
then.
iii. The appellant suppressed the material fact of
sale of 20 guntas in 1972, which disentitled him
to any equitable relief.
iv. There was no convincing reason or evidence to
explain why the appeal was not filed within the
prescribed time.
7. The trial Court observed that that sufficient
cause must be sufficiently proved with cogent and valid
reasons and observed that the appellant had approached
the Court after an inordinate delay and with unclean
hands, the delay condonation application accordingly was
rejected.
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8. Consequently, I.A.No.VI filed by the legal
representative seeking permission to withdraw the appeal
with liberty to file fresh proceedings was also rejected, the
Court observed that Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC was not
applicable and that no defect or jurisdictional bar existed
warranting such withdrawal. Having found the appeal
being barred by limitation, the Court dismissed
M.A.No.5/2009 and confirmed the Tahsildar's order dated
06.08.1996, observing that technical pleas cannot be used
to open settled matters when the party had knowledge
and had chosen to remain silent for more than a decade.
9. This Court has carefully considered the
submissions advanced and perused the material on record
including the impugned order passed by the trial Court.
10. It is not in dispute that land in Sy.No.1 Hejjala
Village, Bidadi Hobli, measuring 21 guntas was a Thoti
service inam land attached to the Village Office of Hejjala
that the original barbardar was Sri Hanumanthaiah, who
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had two daughters namely Narasimhakka and
Lakshmamma. After his death, Lakshmamma alone
applied for re-grant under the Act which came to be
allowed by the Tahsildar, Ramanagar on 06.08.1996, re-
granting the land in her favour.
11. The certified copy of the re-grant order and the
RTC extract demonstrated his knowledge of the re-grant.
Therefore, the plea of recent discovery was untenable. The
trial Court observed that the appellant has deliberately
suppressed the fact which disentitled him to equitable
relief. Having perused the reasons assigned by the trial
Court, this Court finds no infirmity or perversity in the
conclusion arrived at. It is manifest that the appellant
before the trial Court had assailed the order of re-grant
nearly 13 years, without placing any cogent material. On
the contrary, the documents relied upon by the
petitioner/appellant clearly indicates that the grant order
was obtained in November, 1996 and the RTC reflects the
mutation in the name of Lakshmamma for the year 1995-
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96, unequivocally demonstrates that the petitioner's family
had knowledge of the re-grant at the relevant point of
time.
12. The belated institution of the appeal in 2009,
without plausible explanation, therefore amounted to gross
delay and laches.
13. In the recent decision, the Apex Court in the
case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. and
Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)1 has given a
consideration to the provisions of law and has held at
paragraph No.26 as under:
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by
this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public
policy that there should be an end to
litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
2024 SCC Online SC 513
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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a
fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act
have to be construed differently, such as
Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice
may be kept in mind but the same cannot
be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that exercise
of power is discretionary in nature and may
not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as,
where there is inordinate delay, negligence
and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others
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are also entitled to the same benefit if the
court is not satisfied with the cause shown
for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to
be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to
be decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision."
14. The Apex Court in another judgment in the case
of Ajay Dabra Vs. Pyare Ram and Ors2 has observed
that an appeal has to be filed within a stipulated period
prescribed under the law belated appeals can only be
condoned, when "sufficient reasons" are shown before the
Court for the delay and the Courts should not be pedantic
in their approach while condoning the delay and the
explanation of each day's delay should not be taken
literally but the fact remains there must be a reasonable
2023 live law (SC) 69
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explanation for the delay and at paragraph No.5 has held
as under:
"5. What we have here is a pure civil matter.
An appeal has to be filed within the stipulated period,
prescribed under the law. Belated appeals can only
be condoned, when sufficient reason is shown before
the court for the delay. The appellant who seeks
condonation of delay therefore must explain the
delay of each day. It is true that the courts should
not be pedantic in their approach while condoning
the delay, and explanation of each day's delay should
not be taken literally, but the fact remains that there
must be a reasonable explanation for the delay. In
the present case, this delay has not been explained
to the satisfaction of the court. The only reason
assigned by the appellant for the delay of 254 days
in filing the First Appeal was that he was not having
sufficient funds to pay the court fee! This was not
found to be a sufficient reason for the condonation of
delay as the appellant was an affluent businessman
and a hotelier. In any case, even it is presumed for
the sake of argument that the appellant was short of
funds, at the relevant point of time and was not able
to pay court fee, nothing barred him from filing the
appeal as there is provision under the law for filing a
defective appeal, i.e., an appeal which is deficient as
far as court fee is concerned, provided the court fee
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is paid within the time given by the Court. We would
refer to Section 149 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908
which reads as under :-
"Section 149: Power to make up deficiency
of Court Fees.- Where the whole or any part of
any fee prescribed for any document by the law
for the time being in force relating to court fees
has not been paid, the Court may, in its
discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by
whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or
part, as the case may be, of such court-fee, and
upon such payment the document, in respect of
which such fee is payable, shall have the same
force and effect as if such fee had been paid in
the first instance."
It also needs to be emphasized that this Court
as well as various High Courts, have held that
Section 149 CPC acts as an exception, or even a
proviso to Section 4 of Court Fees Act 1870. In terms
of Section 4, an appeal cannot be filed before a High
Court without court fee, if the same is prescribed.
But this provision has to be read along with Section
149 of CPC which we have referred above. A short
background to the incorporation of Section 149 in
CPC would explain this aspect."
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15. It is well settled that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India, this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
findings resting on delay and laches, unless the petitioners
establish that the trial Court's order was patently
unreasonable or contrary to the settled position of law.
The principle that, "law aids to the vigilant and not those
who sleep over their rights", applies with full force in re-
grant proceedings under the KVOA Act, since the rights
crystallized by statutory re-grant cannot be unsettled after
a lapse of time at the instance of the person who stood by
silently.
16. The plea of incurrence advanced by the
petitioners is not supported by documents. A litigant who
seeks to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction must approach
the Court with clean hands and with due diligence. The
unexplained and inordinate delay of 13 years in preferring
the appeal before the trial Court is hopelessly barred by
delay and laches. Accordingly, this Court is of the
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considered view that trial Court was justified in declining
to condone the delay and in dismissing the appeal as
barred by limitation. No grounds are made out to interfere
with the findings on the aspect of delay and laches.
Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
ORDER
i. The writ petition is dismissed.
ii. The impugned order dated 03.09.2016 passed
by III Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Ramanagara in M.A.No.5/2009 (Annexure-A) is
hereby confirmed.
Sd/-
____________________
JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
AT
