Karnataka High Court
Shri U Hanumantaiah vs Jsw Steel Limited on 5 November, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
WP No. 106657 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 106657 OF 2025 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
SHRI. U.HANUMANTAIAH S/O. U PALAKSHAPPA,
AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: TRAINEE IN L02T GRADE,
KUREKUPA POST, TQ. SANDUR,
DIST. BALLARI - 583 123.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V.S. KALASURMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
JSW STEEL LIMITED
REPRESENTED BY ITS ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT (HR)
VIJAYANAGAR WORKS, P.O.VIDYANAGAR,
TORANAGALLU, DIST. BALLARI - 53 275.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.PRASHANT F. GOUDAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
Digitally signed by
VISHAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO:
NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL
Location: High A) ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI BY
Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED TERMINATION ORDER
Dharwad BEARING NO.JSWSL/VJNR/1043498/2025-26 DATED
24.06.2025 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT VIDE
ANNEXURE-A.
B) ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING
THE RESPONDENT TO REINSTATE THE PETITIONER IN THE
RESPONDENT COMPANY.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
WP No. 106657 of 2025
HC-KAR
ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking the
following prayer:
A. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari by quashing
the impugned Termination order bearing no.JSWSL/
VJNR/ 1043498/2025-26 dated 24.06.2025 issued
by the respondent vide Annexure-A.
B. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing
the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in the
respondent company.
2. Heard the learned counsel Shri V.S. Kalasurmath
appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel
Shri Prashant F.Goudar appearing for the respondent.
3. The facts in brief germane are as follows:
The petitioner is said to have been appointed on
07.02.2011 as an Assistant in the respondent - JSW Steel Ltd.
The petitioner is then terminated from service. Termination of
service is what is called in question in the subject petition.
4. The respondent is not a State under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India nor a wing of the Government. It is a
Private Industry. Against a private entity, it is trite that the writ
could not lie. The issue has been dealt with in elaboration by this
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
Court in the case of United Brothers Healthcare Services
Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Government of India1. This Court following the judgments of
the Apex Court has held as follows:
"19. The Apex Court holds that in an appropriate case
a writ petition against a State or an instrumentality of a
State arising out of a contractual obligation is
maintainable. Merely because some disputed questions of
fact arise for consideration, writ cannot be refused. Even
a monetary claim is maintainable before this Court. The
Apex Court deduces the said principle after considering
the facts and entire spectrum of law. The Apex Court has
clearly held that in an appropriate case writ petition
against a State or instrumentality of State arising out of
contractual obligation is maintainable and not a contract
between the two private entities. The claim in ABL
International's case was against Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India Limited, an instrumentality of the
State. Therefore, the said judgment is inapplicable to the
facts of the case at hand. The judgment in the case
of Sanjana M. Wig (Ms.) v. Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited (supra) was again against Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited which is declared to be a
State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Contractual obligation arising out of a contract entered
into between the State or its instrumentalities was again
held to be maintainable under the writ jurisdiction. The
Apex Court follows ABL International and holds as follows:
"14. A Division Bench of this Court in ABL
International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of
India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553 : JT (2003) 10 SC 300]
observed that in certain cases even a disputed
question of fact can be gone into by the court
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution, holding : (SCC p. 572, para 28)
2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1600
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
"28. However, while entertaining an objection as
to the maintainability of a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court
should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue
prerogative writs under Article 226 of
the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not
limited by any other provisions of the Constitution.
The High Court having regard to the facts of the
case, has a discretion to entertain or not to
entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed
upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this
power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1.) And this plenary right of
the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not
normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion
of other available remedies unless such action of
the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and
unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional
mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and
legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it
necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction."
.........
18. It may be true that in a given case when an
action of the party is dehors the terms and conditions
contained in an agreement as also beyond the scope
and ambit of the domestic forum created therefor, the
writ petition may be held to be maintainable; but
indisputably therefor such a case has to be made out.
It may also be true, as has been held by this Court
in Amritsar Gas Service [(1991) 1 SCC 533] and E.
Venkatakrishna [(2000) 7 SCC 764] that the arbitrator
may not have the requisite jurisdiction to direct
restoration of distributorship having regard to the
provisions contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963; but while entertaining a writ petition even
in such a case, the court may not lose sight of the fact
that if a serious disputed question of fact is involved
arising out of a contract qua contract, ordinarily a writ
petition would not be entertained. A writ petition,
however, will be entertained when it involves a public
law character or involves a question arising out of
public law functions on the part of the respondent.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
19. But in a case of this nature, while exercising a
plenary jurisdiction, we must take the supervening
circumstances into consideration. The parties
admittedly invoked the arbitration agreement before
the arbitrator. They entered into a settlement.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said settlement,
the appellant herein was to pay a sum of Rs. 4,64,586
unto the respondent in five installments with interest.
The appellant herein for violation of the terms of
contract presumably prayed for award of damages but
no reference thereto has been made in the award. In
any event such claim of damages could have been
made before the arbitrator on the ground of alleged
breach of contract."
20. Much reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of K.K.
SAKSENA v. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE (supra) wherein the Apex
Court was considering, a claim against International
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage. The Apex Court
in the said judgment holds as follows:
"32. If the authority/body can be treated as
"State" within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India, indubitably a writ
petition under Article 226 would be maintainable
against such an authority/body for enforcement
of fundamental and other rights. Article 12 appears
in Part III of the Constitution, which pertains to
"fundamental rights". Therefore, the definition
contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of application
of the provisions contained in Part III. Article 226 of
the Constitution, which deals with powers of the High
Courts to issue certain writs, inter alia, stipulates that
every High Court has the power to issue directions,
orders or writs to any person or authority, including, in
appropriate cases, any Government, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
and for any other purpose.
33. In this context, when we scan through the
provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution, as per the
definition contained therein, the "State" includes the
Government and Parliament of India and the
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
Government and legislature of each State as well as
"all local or other authorities within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India".
It is in this context the question as to which body
would qualify as "other authority" has come up for
consideration before this Court ever since, and the
test/principles which are to be applied for ascertaining
as to whether a particular body can be treated as
"other authority" or not have already been noted
above. If such an authority violates the fundamental
right or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as
the case may be), a writ petition can be filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and
seeking appropriate direction, order or writ. However,
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of the
High Court is not limited to the Government or
authority which qualifies to be "State" under Article
12. Power is extended to issue directions, orders or
writs "to any person or authority". Again, this power of
issuing directions, orders or writs is not limited to
enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part
III, but also "for any other purpose". Thus, power of
the High Court takes within its sweep more
"authorities" than stipulated in Article 12 and the
subject-matter which can be dealt with under this
article is also wider in scope.
34. In this context, the first question which
arises is as to what meaning is to be assigned to
the expression "any person or authority". By a
catena of judgments rendered by this Court, it
now stands well grounded that the term
"authority" used in Article 226 has to receive
wider meaning than the same very term used in
Article 12 of the Constitution. This was so held
in Andi Mukta Sadguru [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree
Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav
Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691]. In
that case, dispute arose between the Trust which
was managing and running science college and
teachers of the said college. It pertained to
payment of certain employment related benefits
like basic pay, etc. The matter was referred to
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
the Chancellor of Gujarat University for his
decision. The Chancellor passed an award, which
was accepted by the University as well as the
State Government and a direction was issued to
all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in
terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid
Trust running the science college did not
implement the award. Teachers filed the writ
petition seeking mandamus and direction to the
Trust to pay them their dues of salary,
allowances, provident fund and gratuity in
accordance therewith. It is in this context an
issue arose as to whether the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable
against the said Trust which was admittedly not
a statutory body or authority under Article 12 of
the Constitution as it was a private Trust running
an educational institution. The High Court held
that the writ petition was maintainable and the
said view was upheld by this Court in the
aforesaid judgment."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. The Apex Court in the case of K.K. SAKSENA was
dealing with a question, whether the International
Commission on Irrigation and Drainage was a State under
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and a writ could be
issued against the said Commission. It was held by the
Apex Court that the Commission was performing its duties
which were collection of data, research, holding of
seminars, organising studies, promotion of development
and systematic management of sustained irrigation and
drainage systems, observing all that, the Apex Court has
held as follows:
"49. There is yet another very significant aspect
which needs to be highlighted at this juncture. Even if
a body performing public duty is amenable to writ
jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial
review, as already pointed out above. Only those
decisions which have public element therein can be
judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. In Praga
Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585], as
already discussed above, this Court held that the
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
action challenged did not have public element and writ
of mandamus could not be issued as the action was
essentially of a private character. That was a case
where the employee concerned was seeking
reinstatement to an office.
50. We have also pointed out above that in Saka
Venkata Rao [Election Commission of India v. Saka
Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210] this Court had
observed that administrative law in India has been
shaped on the lines of English law. There are a catena
of judgments in English courts taking same view,
namely, contractual and commercial obligations are
enforceable only by ordinary action and not by judicial
review. In R. (Hopley) v. Liverpool Health
Authority [2002 EWHC 1723 (Admin) : 2002 Lloyd's
Med Rep 494] (unreported)(30-7-2002), Justice
Pitchford helpfully set out three things that had to be
identified when considering whether a public body with
statutory powers was exercising a public function
amenable to judicial review or a private function. They
are : (i) whether the defendant was a public body
exercising statutory powers; (ii) whether the function
being performed in the exercise of those powers was a
public or a private one; and (iii) whether the defendant
was performing a public duty owed to the claimant in
the particular circumstances under consideration."
22. The Apex Court at the afore-quoted paragraphs
would hold that even if a body is a State, it is not
amenable to writ jurisdiction and all its decisions are not
subject to judicial review. The case does not remotely
assist the petitioner/Hospital to drive home the contention
that the fourth respondent was performing public duty.
Therefore, the said judgment also would not become
applicable to the facts of the case at hand, as it was
concerning appointment and termination of the petitioner
therein, K.K. SAKSENA.
23. The other judgment on which the learned senior
counsel for the petitioner/Hospital has placed reliance
upon to contend that merely because an arbitration clause
is available, it would not mean that writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable,
in the said judgment it was an agreement between Uttar
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Limited which is
a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, reliance placed on the said judgment is
misplaced and as such it is inapplicable to the facts of the
case on hand.
24. Much reliance is placed again on the judgment in
the case of BENEDICT DENIS KINNY to contend that
Covaxin is developed under public-private partnership
through formal memorandum of understanding between
ICMR and the Company and ICMR receives 5% royalty of
net sales. The judgment is inapplicable and the contention
is noted only to be rejected. The Government may enter
into any agreement with any private entity for discharge
of public functions. The agreement, in the case at hand, is
not entered into between the Government and any wing
of the Government or any other instrumentality of the
State which can be considered to be other Authority under
Article 12 of the Constitution of India, but it is entered
into between the petitioner/Hospital and the
4th respondent/Company. To iterate it is a 'private
contract'. Therefore, none of the armory from the arsenal
of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner - Hospital
would lend any assistance to hold the writ petition to be
entertainable qua the relief that is sought. A recovery suit
that had to be filed or an arbitration proceeding that had
to be initiated, is sought to be dressed with the colour of
public function, to make it entertainable, which is plainly
unacceptable.
25. Now, reference being made to the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of RAMAKRISHNA
MISSION v. KAGO KUNYA4 (supra) seems apposite. The
Apex Court holds as follows:
"15. Ramakrishna Mission runs a 263 bedded
hospital at Itanagar. The grant in aid which is provided
by the State Government covers the cost of running 60
beds out of 263 bedded hospital. Relevant factual data
in regard to the nature and extent of the grants has
been placed on record. About 32.26 per cent of the
total income of the hospital for 2014-2015, 23.33 per
cent for 2015-2016 and 22.53 per cent for 2016-2017
was from the grants provided by the State
Government. The revenue expenditure, the audited
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
balance sheets and accounts of the hospital indicate
that 35.23 per cent of the expenditure for 2014-2015,
23.83 per cent for 2015-2016 and 20.57 per cent for
2016-2017 was borne from the finances provided by
the State Government.
... .... ....
30. Thus, even if the body discharges a public
function in a wider sense, there is no public law
element involved in the enforcement of a private
contract of service.
... .... ....
32. Before an organisation can be held to
discharge a public function, the function must be
of a character that is closely related to functions
which are performed by the State in its sovereign
capacity. There is nothing on record to indicate
that the hospital performs functions which are
akin to those solely performed by State
authorities. Medical services are provided by
private as well as State entities. The character of
the organisation as a public authority is
dependent on the circumstances of the case. In
setting up the hospital, the Mission cannot be
construed as having assumed a public function.
The hospital has no monopoly status conferred
or mandated by law. That it was the first in the
State to provide service of a particular
dispensation does not make it an "authority"
within the meaning of Article 226. State
Governments provide concessional terms to a
variety of organisations in order to attract them
to set up establishments within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State. The State may
encourage them as an adjunct of its social policy
or the imperatives of economic development. The
mere fact that land had been provided on a
concessional basis to the hospital would not by
itself result in the conclusion that the hospital
performs a public function. In the present case,
the absence of State control in the management
of the hospital has a significant bearing on our
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
coming to the conclusion that the hospital does
not come within the ambit of a public authority.
... .... ....
34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature
would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely
by reason of the fact that they are structured by
statutory provisions. The only exception to this
principle arises in a situation where the contract
of service is governed or regulated by a statutory
provision. Hence, for instance, in K.K. Saksena [K.K.
Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation &
Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ)
654 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] this Court held that
when an employee is a workman governed by
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an
exception to the general principle that a contract of
personal service is not capable of being specifically
enforced or performed.
35. It is of relevance to note that the Act was
enacted to provide for the regulation and registration
of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe
minimum standards of facilities and services. The Act,
inter alia, stipulates conditions to be satisfied by
clinical establishments for registration. However, the
Act does not govern contracts of service entered into
by the hospital with respect to its employees. These
fall within the ambit of purely private contracts,
against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity
of this distinction must be preserved.
36. For the above reasons, we are of the view that
the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified
in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are
amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution as an authority within the meaning of
the Article.
37. For the reasons that we have adduced above,
we hold that neither the Ramakrishna Mission, nor the
hospital would constitute an authority within the
meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution.
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
38. Before concluding, it would be necessary to also
advert to the fact that while the learned Single Judge
had come to the conclusion that the appellants are
"State" within the meaning of Article 12, the Division
Bench has not accepted that finding. The Division
Bench ruled, as we have noticed earlier, that the
appellants do not fall within the description of "State"
under Article 12. This finding has not been challenged
before this Court by the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
39. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that
the tests which have been propounded in the line of
authority of this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258],
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical
Biology [Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of
Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S)
633] and Jatya Pal Singh v. Union of India [Jatya Pal
Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 452 : (2013) 2
SCC (L&S) 617] support the conclusion of the High
Court that the appellants are not "State" within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. The Apex Court clearly holds that even if the body
discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no
public law element involved in a private contract of
service. This judgment considers the sheet anchor of the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner i.e., K.K.
SAKSENA and then holds writ cannot be maintainable for
enforcement of a private contract. The case at hand
clearly demonstrates that it is filed for the enforcement of
a private contract. Long before the judgment in the case
of RAMAKRISHNA MISSION, the Apex Court in the case
of FEDERAL BANK LIMITED v. SAGAR THOMAS5 (supra)
has also held that Federal Bank would not be 'other
authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Following the Constitution Bench judgment in the case
of PRADEEP KUMAR BISWAS v. INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
CHEMICAL BIOLOGY - (2002) 5 SCC 111 the Apex Court
holds as follows:
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
"27. Such private companies would normally
not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain
circumstances a writ may issue to such private
bodies or persons as there may be statutes
which need to be complied with by all concerned
including the private companies. For example,
there are certain legislations like the Industrial
Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the
Factories Act or for maintaining proper
environment, say the Air (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Act, 1981 or the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. or
statutes of the like nature which fasten certain
duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such
private bodies which they are bound to comply
with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ
would certainly be issued for compliance with those
provisions. For instance, if a private employer
dispenses with the service of its employee in violation
of the provisions contained under the Industrial
Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court
interfered and has issued the writ to the private bodies
and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in
issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any
non-compliance with or violation of any statutory
provision by the private body. In that event a writ may
not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be
available, may have to be resorted to.
28. The six factors which have been enumerated in
the case of Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258]
and approved in the later decisions in the case
of Ramana [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] and the
seven-Judge Bench in the case of Pradeep Kumar
Biswas [(2002) 5 SCC 111 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 633]
may be applied to the facts of the present case and
see whether those tests apply to the appellant Bank or
not. As indicated earlier, share capital of the appellant
Bank is not held at all by the Government nor is any
financial assistance provided by the State, nothing to
say which may meet almost the entire expenditure of
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
the company. The third factor is also not answered
since the appellant Bank does not enjoy any monopoly
status nor can it be said to be an institution having
State protection. So far as control over the affairs of
the appellant Bank is concerned, they are managed by
the Board of Directors elected by its shareholders. No
governmental agency or officer is connected with the
affairs of the appellant Bank nor is any one of them a
member of the Board of Directors. In the normal
functioning of the private banking company there is no
participation or interference of the State or its
authorities. The statutes have been framed regulating
the financial and commercial activities so that fiscal
equilibrium may be kept maintained and not get
disturbed by the malfunctioning of such companies or
institutions involved in the business of banking. These
are regulatory measures for the purpose of
maintaining a healthy economic atmosphere in the
country. Such regulatory measures are provided for
other companies also as well as industries
manufacturing goods of importance. Otherwise these
are purely private commercial activities. It deserves to
be noted that it hardly makes any difference that such
supervisory vigilance is kept by Reserve Bank of India
under a statute or the Central Government. Even if it
was with the Central Government in place of Reserve
Bank of India it would not have made any difference,
therefore, the argument based on the decision of All
India Bank Employees' Assn. [AIR 1962 SC
171 : (1962) 3 SCR 269] does not advance the case of
the respondent. It is only in case of malfunctioning of
the company that occasion to exercise such powers
arises to protect the interest of the depositors,
shareholders or the company itself or to help the
company to be out of the woods. In times of normal
functioning such occasions do not arise except for
routine inspections etc. with a view to see that things
are moved smoothly in keeping with fiscal policies in
general."
(Emphasis supplied)
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:15065
HC-KAR
5. In the light of the issue standing completely
answered, reserving liberty to the petitioner to avail of any
remedy available in law, the petition stands disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
VNP / CT: ANB
