Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka By vs A Nataraj on 10 March, 2025
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
CRL.RP No. 1043 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 1043 OF 2018
BETWEEN:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
VIJAYANAGAR POLICE STATION,
BANGALORE, REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BANGALORE 01
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. RAJATH SUBRAMANYAM, HCGP)
AND:
A. NATARAJ
S/O. A VEERANNA,
R/AT NO. 5/1, 1ST FLOOR,
7TH CROSS, S.V.G NAGAR,
Digitally signed by MUDALAPALYA MAIN ROAD,
HARIKRISHNA V
Location: HIGH BENGALURU-560 072.
COURT OF ...RESPONDENT
KARNATAKA
(BY SRI. SHREYAS M.B, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRL.RP IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE AFORESAID ORDER DATED
04.06.2018 IN S.C.NO.1223/2017 ON THE FILE OF LIII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU
AND ALLOW THE ABOVE CRL.RP.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
CRL.RP No. 1043 of 2018
ORAL ORDER
The State has preferred this revision petition against the
order passed in S.C.No.1223/2017 dated 04.06.2018 by the
LIII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-54)
(hereinafter referred to as the 'learned Sessions Judge'),
whereby the learned Sessions Judge allowed the discharge
application filed by the respondent/accused under Section 227
of Cr.P.C. and thereby discharged the respondent/accused in
Crime No.201/2016 and S.C.No.1223/2017 for the offences
punishable under Sections 376, 313 and 420 of IPC.
2. The factual matrix of the prosecution case is that:
The accused/respondent was acquainted with the victim
in this case as both belonged to the same native. They were in
courtship and thereafter, the accused promised the victim to
marry her. Following such promise, the accused and the victim
were sexually active. On 27.02.2015, the accused invited the
victim to his house at Mudalapalya and forcibly consummated
with her. Further, the accused remained silent and reneged his
promise of marrying her. Thereafter, the victim conceived. The
accused insisted her to abort the pregnancy and threatened to
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
not marry her should she fail to undergo abortion. Relying on
his promise, the victim underwent abortion. Thereafter, the
accused failed to honor his promise and snapped contact with
the victim. As such, she lodged the complaint before the
respondent Police against the accused/respondent and an FIR
in Crime No.201/2016 was registered for the aforementioned
offences.
3. On committal of the case before the learned
Sessions Judge, the learned Sessions Judge secured the
presence of the respondent/accused and took cognizance of the
offence. Following this, the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused filed an application under Section 227 of
Cr.P.C to discharge the respondent/accused from the charges
leveled against him.
4. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the
counsel for the respondent and the learned PP, allowed the
application filed by the respondent/accused under Section 227
of Cr.P.C and discharged him for the offences he was charged.
The said order is challenged by the State in this revision
petition.
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
5. I have heard the learned HCGP Sri. Rajath
Subramanyam for the State and the learned counsel Sri.
Shreyas M. Basareddy, for the respondent/accused.
6. The primary contention of the learned HCGP is that
the Sessions Court has erred while discharging the
accused/respondent solely on the ground that the offence
under Section 375 of IPC does not attract in the case for the
reason that the accused and the victim were consensually
sexually active. However, this aspect has to be proved by detail
trial, instead, the learned Sessions Judge hastily discharged the
accused by allowing the application under Section 227 of
Cr.P.C. He submitted that, the complaint of the victim and the
statement of other witnesses prima facie make out a case
against the accused/respondent. Accordingly, he prays to allow
the revision petition by setting aside the order passed by the
Sessions Court.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused supported the order passed by the learned
Sessions Judge and submitted that the learned Sessions Judge
on meticulously examining the entire statement placed before
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
her, passed a well reasoned order which does not call for any
interference by this Court. He further submitted that, it is an
admitted case of the prosecution that the victim and the
accused were in love and the alleged sexual act was
consensual. In such circumstances, as per the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments, consensual
relationship between the accused and the victim does not
attract the offence under Section 375 of IPC which is
punishable under Sections 376 or Sections 417 and 409 of IPC.
The learned Sessions Judge has rightly passed a well reasoned
order which does not call for any interference at the hands of
this court and accordingly, he prays to dismiss the revision
petition.
8. It could be gathered from the records that, neither
in the complaint nor in the statements of witnesses, there is no
such prima facie materials forthcoming to establish that the
accused forcibly consummated with the victim on the pretext of
marrying her. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that
the victim was aged about 32 years and was very much
capable of understanding the consequences of her act. In such
circumstances the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiva
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
Prathap Singh Rana V/s State of Madhya Pradesh and
another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 313 held in paragraphs
No.26 to 34 as under.
"26. We have carefully gone through the
definition of "rape" provided under Section 375IPC.
We have also gone through the provisions of Section
376(2)(n)IPC, which deals with the offence of rape
committed repeatedly on the same woman. Section
375IPC defines "rape" by a man if he does any of
the acts in terms of clauses (a) to (d) under the
seven descriptions mentioned therein. As per the
second description, a man commits rape if he does
any of the acts as mentioned in clauses (a) to (d)
without the consent of the woman. Consent has
been defined in Explanation 2 to mean an
unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman
by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-
verbal communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific sexual act. However, the
proviso thereto clarifies that a woman who does not
physically resist to the act of penetration shall not
by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as
consenting to the sexual activity.
27. Having regard to the above and in the
overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view
that the physical relationship between the
prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be
against her will and without her consent. On the
basis of the available materials, no case of rape or
of criminal intimidation is made out.
28. The learned counsel for the respondents
had placed considerable reliance on the provisions
of Section 90IPC, particularly on the expression
"under a misconception of fact". Section 90IPC
reads thus:
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
"90. Consent known to be given
under fear or misconception.--A
consent is not such a consent as it
intended by any section of this Code, if
the consent is given by a person under
fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the person
doing the act knows, or has reason to
believe, that the consent was given in
consequence of such fear or
misconception; or
Consent of insane person.--if the
consent is given by a person who, from
unsoundness of mind, or intoxication,
is unable to understand the nature and
consequence of that to which he gives
his consent; or
Consent of child.--unless the
contrary appears from the context, if
the consent is given by a person who is
under twelve years of age."
29. Section 90IPC says that a consent is not
such a consent as it is intended by any section of
IPC, if the consent is given by a person under the
fear of injury or under a misconception of fact.
30. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State
of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : (2020) 3 SCC
(Cri) 672] , this Court after examining Section
90IPC held as follows : (SCC p. 198, para 17)
"17. Thus, Section 90 though does
not define "consent", but describes
what is not "consent". Consent may be
express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through
deceit. If the consent is given by the
complainant under misconception of
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
fact, it is vitiated. Consent for the
purpose of Section 375 requires
voluntary participation not only after
the exercise of intelligence based on the
knowledge of the significance and moral
quality of the act, but also after having
fully exercised the choice between
resistance and assent. Whether there
was any consent or not is to be
ascertained only on a careful study of
all relevant circumstances."
31. This Court also examined the interplay
between Section 375IPC and Section 90IPC in the
context of consent in Pramod Suryabhan
Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan
Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 :
(2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , and held that consent
with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual
who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating
various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as
the various possible consequences flowing from
such action (or inaction), consents to such action.
After deliberating upon the various case laws, this
Court summed up the legal position as under : (SCC
p. 620, para 18)
"18. To summarise the legal
position that emerges from the above
cases, the "consent" of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an
active and reasoned deliberation
towards the proposed act. To establish
whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
"misconception of fact" arising out of a
promise to marry, two propositions
must be established. The promise of
marriage must have been a false
promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
time it was given. The false promise
itself must be of immediate relevance,
or bear a direct nexus to the woman's
decision to engage in the sexual act."
32. The learned counsel for the respondents had
relied heavily on the expression "misconception of
fact". However, according to us, there is no
misconception of fact here. Right from the inception,
it is the case of the prosecution that while the
appellant was insisting on having a relationship with
the prosecutrix, the later had turned down the same
on the ground that the appellant was the friend of
her younger brother and a distant relative of
her jijaji. That apart, according to the prosecutrix,
the appellant was younger to her. Nonetheless, the
prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant to a
temple, where she had voluntarily taken bath under
a waterfall. Her allegation that the appellant had
surreptitiously taken photographs of her while she
was bathing and later on changing clothes and was
blackmailing her with such photographs remain
unfounded in the absence of seizure of such
photographs or the mobile phone on which such
photographs were taken by the appellant. If, indeed,
she was under some kind of threat from the
appellant, it defies any logic, when the prosecutrix
accompanied the appellant to Gwalior from Dabra, a
journey which they had made together by train. On
reaching Gwalior, she accompanied the appellant on
a scooter to a rented premises at Anupam Nagar,
where she alleged that the appellant had forced
himself upon her. But she did not raise any alarm or
hue and cry at any point of time. Rather, she
returned back to Dabra along with the appellant.
The relationship did not terminate there. It
continued even thereafter. It is the case of the
prosecutrix herself that at one point of time the
family members of the two had met to discuss about
their marriage but nothing final could be reached
regarding their marriage. It was only thereafter that
the FIR was lodged.
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
33. As already pointed out above, neither the
affidavit nor stamp papers have been recovered or
seized by the police; so also the jewellery. The
alleged cheque of the prosecutrix's mother given to
the appellant or the bank statement to indicate
transfer of such money have not been gathered by
the police. In the absence of such materials, the
entire substratum of the prosecutrix's case
collapses. Thus, there is hardly any possibility of
conviction of the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is
not even a case which can stand trial. It appears to
be a case of a consensual relationship which had
gone sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the
circumstances, the Court is of the view that
compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial on
these materials would be nothing but an abuse of
the process of the court, result of the trial being a
foregone conclusion.
34. From the factual matrix of the case, the
following relevant features can be culled out:
(i) the relationship between the
appellant and the prosecutrix was of a
consensual nature;
(ii) the parties were in a
relationship for a period of almost two
years; and
(iii) though there were talks
between the parties and their family
members regarding marriage, the same
did not fructify leading to lodging of FIR.
9. Further, applying the principles laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the above case to the facts and
circumstances of this case, it is clear that the prosecution has
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:10099
failed to prove that the victim was coerced into consummating
with the accused. On perusal of the entire materials placed by
the prosecution, I am of the considered view that the learned
Sessions Judge has rightly discharged the respondent/accused
for the charges leveled against him. In that view of matter, no
interference is required in the impugned order passed by the
learned Sessions Judge and accordingly, I proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
The Revision Petition is dismissed being devoid of
merits.
SD/-
(RAJESH RAI K)
JUDGE
HKV
