2. The petitioner is before this Court seeking the
3. The petitioner suffers an award at the hands of the
Arbitrator. This is challenged by the petitioner before the
4. The petitioner then approaches this Court in
WP.No.8842/2025. The prayer sought in the said writ petition
is before the jurisdictional Court in Punjab. The Court hearing
Punjab.
5. The challenge afore-quoted is laid before this Court
3. The decree-holder filed Ex.No.198/2024 before
the X Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
Rural District, Bengaluru. In the said execution petition,
decree-holder filed IA No.1 under Order 21 Rules 54 and
64 r/w. Section 151 of CPC for attachment and sale of
the immovable properties of the judgment debtor. IA
No.2 is filed by the judgment debtor under Section 151
of CPC r/w. Section 29-A(1) and 29-A(4) of the 1996 Act
for dismissing the execution petition. The application
filed by the decree-holder was allowed and the
applications filed by the judgment debtor were
dismissed. Being aggrieved by the same, the judgment
debtor is before this Court.
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4. The learned counsel for the petitioner/judgment
debtor raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, as per Section 29-A(1) of the 1996 Act,
the arbitral tribunal has to pass an award within one year
from the date of completion of the pleadings. The
pleadings has been completed on 10.02.2022. The award
has been pronounced on 09.09.2023 and released on
11.09.2023, after completion of one year from the date
of completion of the pleadings. In view of Section 29-A
of the 1996 Act, since the award has been passed
beyond one year, the award has to be terminated.
(ii) Secondly, under Section 23(4) of the 1996 Act,
pleadings has to be completed within six months from
the date the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case
may be, received notice, in writing, of their appointment,
the six months is the outer limit. The twelve months
period for passing the award will start from the day of
filing of the defendant's side statement of defence and
counter-claim. The date of invoking of the arbitration
was 29.09.2021. The judgment debtor has completed his
pleadings on 10.02.2022, within twelve months from the
date the arbitrator was to pass an award. But the
arbitrator passed the award on 09.11.2023, which is
beyond one year.
(iii) Thirdly, under Section 23 of 1996 Act, there
is no provision for filing rejoinder. Even if the court
permits to file rejoinder to the parties, it cannot grant
time beyond six months from the date of invoking of the
arbitration clause.
(v) Fifthly, the Executing Court has considered the
limitation of one year from the date, which is granted by
the arbitrator, for filing the rejoinder, which is not
permissible. The Executing Court has considered that the
arbitrator has power to grant time to file rejoinder.
Since the decree-holder has not chosen to file rejoinder
on 10.08.2022, the said date is taken as the date when
pleading has been completed. This finding of the
Executing Court is contrary to the provisions of Sections
29-A and 23(4) of the 1996 Act. Hence, he sought for
allowing the writ petition.
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5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/decree-holder raised the following
contentions:
(i) Firstly, the writ petition filed by the petitioner
itself is not maintainable under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and he cannot seek for a writ of
certiorari quashing the order passed by the civil court on
an application.
(ii) Secondly, against the award passed by
the arbitral tribunal, the judgment debtor has filed
a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and he
has taken a specific ground that the arbitral award
has to be terminated under Section 29-A of the
1996 Act and he has also alleged regarding bias
against the sole arbitrator. The petition filed under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act has been dismissed by
order dated 09.12.2024. Being aggrieved by the
same, he filed an appeal in FAO-CARB No.9/2025
(O&M) before the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana. In the appeal memo, he has also taken a
specific contention regarding the termination of
award under Section 29-A of 1996 Act. When he
was already agitating the matter in an appeal
pending before the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, he cannot maintain an application in the
execution petition on the same grounds. He
cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of
the same matter at the same time. In support of
his contention, he relied on the judgment of the
Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.2206/1968 disposed
of on 19.11.1976 in the case of JAISINGH vs.
UNION OF INDIA.
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Thirdly, Section 23(4) of the 1996 Act is not a
mandatory provision, it is discretionary. The court has
the power to extend the period of six months.
(iv) Fourthly, under Section 29-A(1) of 1996 Act,
the award has to be passed within a period of twelve
months from the date of completion of the pleadings.
The pleadings includes rejoinder. In support of his
contention, he relied on the judgment of the High Court
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of New Delhi in the case of EMCO LIMITED vs. DELHI
TRANSCO LIMITED (O.M.P. (MISC.)(COMM.)
No.638/2024). Hence, he contended that, on
20.07.2022 the Tribunal permitted to file the rejoinder
and adjourned the matter to 02.08.2022. Again, it has
been adjourned to 10.08.2022 for filing the rejoinder and
framing the issue and evidence of the claimant. The
counsel for the claimant has stated that he is not
intending to file the rejoinder. Therefore, 12 months
period has to be calculated from 10.08.2022 and it
completes on 10.08.2022. Even though, no award has
been passed on or before 10.08.2023, no objection has
been raised by the judgment debtor, which means that
the parties have impliedly consented for extension of
time. Thereafter, the award has been passed on
09.09.2023. In support of his contention, he relied on
the judgment of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the
case of BALAK RAM AND OTHERS vs. NATIONAL
HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (Arbitration
Appeal Nos. 16-19 and 21 of 2003) and the
judgment of Madras High Court in the case of
AYYASAMY vs. A.SHANMUGAVEL (DIED) AND
OTHERS (C.M.P.(M.D.) Nos.1888 and 8135 of 2024.
Therefore, he contended that the award has been passed
within the time limit. Hence, he sought for dismissal of
the petition.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the writ papers.
7. Even though the petitioner has sought number
of prayers, after the decree-holder raised an objection,
the petitioner/judgment debtor filed a memo stating that
he will not press prayers (b), (c), (d) and (e). The memo
is taken on record.
8. The arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator
passed the award on Claim Petition No.1/2021, which
was pronounced on 09.09.2023 and detailed award given
on 11.09.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner/judgment
debtor filed an application under Section 34 of 1996 Act.
In paragraph 21 of the said application, he has taken a
specific contention regarding Section 12(3) and Section
29-A of the 1996 Act. He has also made an averment
regarding bias against the sole arbitrator. After
considering all these aspects, the District Court,
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Chandigarh, by order dated 09.12.2024 rejected the
application. Being aggrieved by the same, the
petitioner/judgment debtor filed an appeal before the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in FAO-CARB
No.9/2025 (O&M). In the appeal, he has taken a
contention regarding termination of the award under
Section 29-A of the 1996 Act and the same is pending
for consideration. In the meantime, decree-holder filed
execution petition in Ex.No.198/2024 before the X
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Commercial
Court, Bengaluru for executing the arbitrary award. In
the said execution petition, the judgment debtor filed an
application under Section 29-A(1) and 29-A(4) of the
1996 Act for termination of the award. He cannot pursue
two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter, at
the same time. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case
of JAISINGH (supra) has held as under:
"(4) The High Court dismissed the writ
petition on the ground that it involved
determination of disputed questions of fact. It was
also observed that the High Court should not in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction grant
relief to the appellant when he had an alternative
remedy. After hearing Mr. Sobhagmal Jain on
behalf of the appellant, we see no cogent ground
to take a view different from that taken by the
High Court. There cannot, in our opinion, be any
doubt on the point that the extent of purity of the
gypsum won by the appellant is a question of fact.
It has also been brought to our notice that after
the dismissal of the writ petition by the High
Court, the appellant has filed a suit, in which he
has agitated the same question which is the
subject-matter of the writ petition. In our opinion,
the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies
in respect of the same matter at the same time."
9. In view of the above, it is very clear that the
application - IA No.2 is not maintainable before the
executing court. The Executing Court also considered
the application filed by the judgment debtor on merits.
The main ground urged by the petitioner is that under
Section 23(4) of 1996 Act, there is no provision for filing
the rejoinder. Once the respondent filed a counter claim,
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on that day, the pleadings of the parties is completed.
The Tribunal has no power to extend the period beyond
six months. It is also contended that under Section 29-A
of the 1996 Act, from the date when the defendant filed
statement of defence from that day, within twelve
months, the award has to be passed.
10. Section 23(4) and 29-A of the 1996 Act have
been considered by the High Court of Delhi in the case of
EMCO LIMITED (supra). The relevant paragraph are
extracted below:
"26. The relevant provisions which call for
consideration in this case would be Section 23(4)
and Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act.
27. Section 23(4) does not refer to the
termination of the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal. It merely states that the statement of
claim and defence under Section 23 would be
completed within six months from the date of the
arbitrator receiving notice of its appointment. The
interlink between the termination of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal and Section 23(4) is
contained in 29A(1).
28. It is necessary to appreciate the
difference in the wordings of Section 23(4) and
29A(1) read with Section 29A(4). Section 29A(1)
states that "the award in matters other than
international commercial arbitration, shall be
made by the arbitral tribunal within twelve months
from the date of completion of pleadings under
sub section 4 of Section 23". Section 29A(4) goes
on the state that "if the award is not made within
the period specified in Section 29A(1), the
mandate of the arbitral tribunal would terminate
unless the mandate is extended by the Court".
29. Section 29A(1) read with Section 29A(4)
thus, envisages termination of the mandate of
arbitral tribunal on the tribunal not making the
award within twelve months of completion of
pleadings under Section 23(4). It does not state
that the period of twelve months would be
reckoned from the date of filing of the SOD before
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the arbitral tribunal. Clearly, the period of twelve
months to be reckoned from the date of
completion of pleadings. The concluding words
"under sub Section (4) of Section 23" are, in my
considered opinion, employed only because
Section 23(4) refers to the filing of the SOD before
the learned arbitral tribunal. It would not, in my
view, be permissible to read Section 29A(1) as
requiring the arbitral award to be passed within
twelve months from the date of filing of the SOD
as that would amount to rewriting Section 29A(1).
30. The matter may be viewed from another
angle as well. Had the legislature intended to
require the arbitral award to be passed within
twelve months of filing of the SOD, it could very
well had said so, especially when Section 23(4)
particularly refers filing of the SOD. The
legislature, has consciously, not done so. Rather,
it has reckoned the period of twelve months from
the date of completion of pleadings.
31. The issue that arises for consideration,
is that, the interpretation to be placed on the word
"pleadings" in Section 29A(1). Specifically, what
the Court has to consider is whether, where the
rejoinder has been permitted to be filed, the
rejoinder should also be included in the ambit of
the expression "pleadings".
32. This issue is no longer res integra. It
stands decided, albeit in the context of the CPC,
rather than the 1996 Act, by the judgment of R.C
Lahoti J (as he then was) sitting singly in this
Court in Anant Construction (P) Ltd v Ram Niwas.
This Court, in that case, specifically addressed the
issue of whether a rejoinder/replication could be
included within the ambit of the expression
"pleadings", especially in the light of Order VI Rule
10 of the CPC which specifically states that the
expression "pleadings" means the plaint or the
written submissions. Lahoti J, in his judgment, has
specifically held in para 24 thus:
"Replication is a pleading by plaintiff in
answer to defendant's plea. 'Rejoinder' is a
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second pleading by defendant in answer to
plaintiff's reply i.e. replication."
33. The same view stands reflected in the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in Nicolas Piramal India Ltd vs.
Cultor Food Science Inc". In the said decision, the
High Court has held that "rejoinder, if received,
would also be pleading within the meaning of
Order VI".
34. Specifically in the context of pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal, a Division Bench of
the Karnataka High Court has, in Buoyant
Technology Constellations Pvt Ltd Infrastructure
Developer Pvt Ltd, held as under:
"(c) In terms of Section 23(4), pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal would include
statement of claim, objections, counterclaim
and objections to counterclaim. At this stage,
it would be useful to refer Order VI Rule 1 of
CPC which defines 'pleading'. In terms of
Order VI Rule 1 of CPC, 'pleading' shall mean
plaint or written statement. Rejoinder or
replication could be filed with the permission
of the Court. When the rejoinder or replication
is filed with the permission of the Court, then
it would form part of pleadings."
35. The above decision of the Karnataka High
Court was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court
in SLP (C) 9331/2024, which was disposed of by
the following order dated 29 April, 2024:
"We are in agreement with the findings
recorded in the impugned judgment that in
case a rejoinder or sur-rejoinder are filed and
taken on record, the pleadings for the purpose
of Section 29A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, shall concluded on the
date the last pleading is filed. We also agree
that the period during which there was a stay
of arbitration proceedings has to be excluded.
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Recording the aforesaid, the special leave
petition is dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of. "
36. Ms. Dhulia seeks to distinguish these
decisions on the ground that the rejoinder, in
these cases, was actually filed and also
emphasizes the word "if received", figuring in the
said decisions.
37. In my view, such a distinction would
be completely untenable in law. The question
that arises before the Court is whether a
rejoinder can be treated as part of
"pleadings" for the purpose of Section 291.
Inasmuch as the question arises in the
context of determining the terminus ad quem
from which the period of twelve months
under Section 29A(1) is required to be
reckoned, it has to be determined with
respect to the basic issue as to whether the
rejoinder, if permitted to be filed, would
constitute part of the pleadings. It cannot be
said that, if the rejoinder is permitted to be
filed, it would constitute part of the
pleadings only if it is actually filed. Where
the rejoinder is permitted to be filed by the
Court or by the Arbitral Tribunal, the period
of twelve months, for the purposes of Section
29A(1) would clearly reckon from the time
when the right to file rejoinder stands
exhausted. Needless to state, if the rejoinder
is on record, the period of twelve months
would be reckoned from the date when the
rejoinder is actually filed."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. From the above, it is very clear that the
Tribunal or the Court has the power to grant time for
filing the rejoinder. In the case on hand, the Tribunal
has granted time till 20.07.2022 to file rejoinder and
adjourned the matter to 02.08.2022. On 02.08.2022, it
has been adjourned to 10.08.2022 for filing the
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rejoinder. On 10.08.2022, counsel for the claimant has
stated that he does not intend to file the rejoinder.
Hence, on that day, issues were framed. In view of the
above judgment, twelve months time has to be
considered from 10.08.2022. One year period completed
on 10.08.2023. The award is not passed before
10.08.2023. No objection was filed by the petitioner.
Thereafter, the award passed on 09.09.2023. The High
Court of Madras in the case of AYYASAMY (supra) has
held that if the parties have not objected, there is
implied consent of the parties. The relevant portion is
extracted below.
"42. Section 4 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996:
"4. Waiver of right to object.- A party
who knows that-
(a) any provision of this Part from which
the parties may derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the
arbitration agreement, has not been complied
with and yet proceeds with the arbitration
without stating his objection to such non-
compliance without undue delay or, if a time
limit is provided for stating that objection,
within that period of time, shall be deemed to
have waived his right to so object."
43. The respondents are very well aware that
Section 29-A(1) of the Act provides for an outer
limit of 12 months for passing of an award from
the date on which the Arbitrator had entered upon
the reference. They are also aware of the fact that
in case, if the Arbitrator has not passed the award
within the said period, the mandate of the
Arbitrator shall get terminated unless it is
extended by consent of the parties or by an order
of the Court. Having knowledge about the said
legal mandate, the respondents have not raised
any objection with regard to non passing of the
award and waited till an award was passed by the
Sole Arbitrator on 28.03.2018. Therefore, it could
be concluded that the respondents have not only
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given their implied consent for passing of the
award, but also they waived their rights to object
to the passing of the award beyond a period of 12
months.
44. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment
reported in (2002) 3 SCC 175 (Inder Sain Mittal
Vs. Housing Board, Haryana) while considering the
objection to the award on the ground that the
Arbitrator did not have full qualification stipulated
in the arbitration agreement, had proceeded to lay
down the following proposition of law in paragraph
Nos. 12 and 13 had held as follows:
"12. In view of the foregoing discussions,
with reference to the provisions of the Act, we
conclude thus:
(i) Grounds of objection under Section 30
of the Act to the reference made, with or
without intervention of the Court, arbitration
proceedings and the award can be classified
into two categories, viz., one emanating from
agreement and the other law.
(ii) In case the ground of attack flows from
agreement between the parties which would
undoubtedly be a lawful agreement, and the
same is raised at the initial stage, Court may
set it right at the initial stage or even
subsequently in case the party objecting has
not participated in the proceedings or
participated under protest. But if a party
acquiesced to the invalidity by his conduct by
participating in the proceedings and taking a
chance therein cannot be allowed to turn
round after the award goes against him and is
estopped from challenging validity or
otherwise of reference, arbitration proceedings
and/or award inasmuch as right of such a
party to take objection is defeated.
(iii) Where ground is based upon breach of
mandatory provision of law, a party cannot be
estopped from raising the same in his
objection to the award even after he
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participated in the arbitration proceedings in
view of the well settled maxim that there is no
estoppel against statute.
(iv) If, however, basis for ground of attack
is violation of such a provision of law which is
not mandatory but directory and raised at the
initial stage, the illegality, in appropriate case,
may be set right, but in such an eventuality if
a party participated in the proceedings without
any protest, he would be precluded from
raising the point in the objection after making
of the award.
13. In the case on hand, it cannot be said
that continuance of the proceedings and
rendering of awards therein by the Arbitrator
after his transfer was in disregard of any
provision of law much less mandatory one but,
at the highest, in breach of agreement.
Therefore, by their conduct by participating in
the arbitration proceedings without any
protest the parties would be deemed to have
waived their right to challenge validity of the
proceedings and the awards, consequently,
the objections taken to this effect did not
merit any consideration and the High Court
was not justified in allowing the same and
setting aside the award."
45. When Section 29-A of the Act is only
construed to be a procedural one and discretion is
given to the parties to extend the arbitration
period for a further period of 6 months, this Court
can very well arrive at a conclusion that the
respondents herein by not raising any objection
before passing of the award, have not only given
their implied consent but also waived their rights
to raise any objection with regard to the non
passing of the award within a period of 12 months.
46. The objection relating to the invalidity of
the award has been raised by the respondents
only after they have suffered an adverse order. If
such an interpretation is given to Section 29-A(4)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the parties
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would resort to this argument after coming to
know that they have suffered an adverse order.
The legislative intent of inserting Section 29-A of
the Act is only for expeditious disposal of the
arbitration proceedings and not to confer a new
defence upon an unsuccessful party to challenge
the award and to reopen the entire proceedings."
11. In view of the above, it is clear that the
award passed in the case on hand is within the
time limit. Therefore, the contention of the
petitioner that the award has to be terminated is
unsustainable. In respect of IA No.1 is concerned,
the trial court, after considering all these aspects
justified in allowing IA No.1. Hence, the order
passed by the trial court on IA No.1 filed by the
decree-holder under Order 21 Rules 54 and 64 of
CPC is just and reasonable. Therefore, the writ
petition is devoid of merit.
Accordingly, it is dismissed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of disposal of the petition, all pending
applications stand disposed of."
The challenge therein as observed hereinabove was an
order dated 09.01.2025, which comes to be rejected. Rejection
of which has become final. Then comes the subject petition in
which the prayer sought is as follows:
"Set aside the order dated 09.01.2025 on IA NO 1
passed by the Hon'ble X Addl District and Session
Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore in Ex
No COM EX 198/2024 produced at Annexure A."
(Emphasis supplied)
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The petitioner again challenges the order dated
09.01.2025 and the subsequent orders passed by the
concerned Court pursuant to the dismissal as observed
hereinabove in the said WP.No.8842/2025, that too without
divulging the dismissal of it. The only mention is found in
paragraph 11. It reads as follows:
"That the petitioner herein has filed a Writ
Petition in 8842/2025 to set aside the order dated
09/01/2025 on the grounds of limitation of the
jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and not on the same
cause of action as mentioned in this Petition. That
there are pending Civil and Criminal cases
between both the petitioner and Respondent,
however none of the cases are for the same cause
of action."
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the petitioner has repeated his attempt to
challenge the order dated 09.01.2025, which stood dismissed
by the order of the co-ordinate bench, and the said order has
become final, that too without divulging the finality of the
order, notwithstanding the subject petition being filed on
11.06.2025, and the order dismissing it on 16.04.2025.
6. Therefore, the petitioner has joined the breed of
petitions knocking at the doors of the constitutional Courts
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either under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India,
with unclean hands. It becomes apposite to refer to the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of DALIP SINGH Vs.
STATE OF U.P reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 of which
paragraphs 1 to 10 read as follows:
"1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two
basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (non-
violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi
guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life.
Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery
system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era
and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts
irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value
system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos
and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that
those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of
falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in
the court proceedings.
2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has
cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have
any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood
and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to
meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants,
the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and
it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to
pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure
fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any
relief, interim or final.
3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this
Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave
granted to the appellant by making the following
observations: (AIR p. 1558)
"It is of utmost importance that in making material
statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
special leave made under Article 136 of the
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Constitution, care must be taken not to make any
statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading.
In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court
naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact
contained in the petitions at their face value and it
would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by
making statements which are untrue and misleading.
Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court
is satisfied that the material statements made by the
appellant in his application for special leave are
inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is
entitled to contend that the appellant may have
obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the
strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations
of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the
Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such
a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to
be revoked."
4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 :
1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held
that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order
in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case.
5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of
Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the
Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the
fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition
Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the
High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the
Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2)
"2. ... Curiously enough, there is no reference in the
special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we
came to know about these orders only when the
respondents appeared in response to the notice and
filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim
orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and
the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to
suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the
special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well
settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the
Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who
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approaches this Court for such relief must come with
frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and
suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be
dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave
petitions."
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1
SCC 1 : JT (1993) 6 SC 331] the Court held that where a
preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an
important document from the court, the party concerned
deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it
was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of
law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes
the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the
Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of
material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the
High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to
entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of
Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax
Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and observed:
(Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p.
462, para 35)
In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind
the conduct of the party who is invoking such
jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts
or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty
of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the
action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The
rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter
unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court
by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction
rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If
the material facts are not candidly stated or are
suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the
writ courts would become impossible.
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8. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4
SCC 221 : AIR 2007 SC 1546] the Court held that Article
136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It
confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in
appropriate cases. In other words, the Constitution has not
made the Supreme Court a regular court of appeal or a
court of error. This Court only intervenes where justice,
equity and good conscience require such intervention.
9. In Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India [(2008) 2 SCC
326] the Court held that while exercising discretionary and
equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,
the facts and circumstances of the case should be seen in
their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of justice. If
the appellant has not come forward with clean hands, has
not candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of and
he intends to delay the proceedings, then the Court will
non-suit him on the ground of contumacious conduct.
10. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] the
Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary
and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ
court must come with clean hands and put forward all the
facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing
anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no
candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the
petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may
be dismissed at the threshold without considering the
merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G.
Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel [(2009) 3 SCC 141] ."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment
has dealt with every facts and circumstance of a litigant
approaching the Court with unclean hands and how the
approach of the Courts should be to curb such conduct of the
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litigants. Therefore, the petition on the said score deserves to
be rejected with exemplary costs.
4. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the petition
stands dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs.2,00,000/- to be
paid by the petitioner, to the respondent.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
JY
CT: BHK
